Chapter 11 – Case studies: Children in youth detention

Date  October 2023

Content warning

Please be aware that the content in this report includes descriptions of child sexual abuse, attempted suicide and self-harm, and may be distressing or raise issues of concern for some readers.

We encourage readers to exercise discretion in their engagement with this content and to seek support and care if required.

  1. Introduction to case studies

In this chapter, we present seven case studies that examine different aspects of Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

The focus of our Commission of Inquiry is the State’s response to known risks of child sexual abuse in institutions, including Ashley Youth Detention Centre. In this chapter, we also examine other forms of mistreatment of detainees (for example, physical abuse or degrading treatment) that we consider relevant to understanding the context in which child sexual abuse occurs. We also note that children’s vulnerability to child sexual abuse is heightened in contexts where other abuses and rights violations are prevalent.1

In Case study 1, we describe the nature and extent of abuse at the Centre, including the evidence we received from several current and former detainees, as well as allegations made through redress schemes and civil claims. This evidence is harrowing, describing abuses that are callous, cruel and degrading. Children and young people’s powerlessness in the face of such ingrained abuse and mistreatment is palpable and devastating. The consistency of themes across all these accounts, despite coming from multiple sources, is striking and includes:

  • sexual, physical and psychological abuse of detainees by staff
  • harmful sexual behaviours between detainees, sometimes with the knowledge of Centre staff
  • staff using strip searches as a tool of control, and as an opportunity to sexually abuse children and young people
  • staff humiliating, belittling and threatening detainees
  • inappropriate use of isolation and use of force, including to punish and control detainees.

While we did not test the truth of individual accounts, we gave particular weight to the consistency across the accounts of victim-survivors whom we heard from directly and those that we read in claims under the Abuse in State Care Program and the National Redress Scheme. In the accounts of different people detained at the Centre over different periods, and the information coming from direct accounts, critical incident reports and state and Commonwealth redress schemes, we saw a striking consistency (and enough variability) to the places and ways abuses occurred, the people who were allegedly responsible and the patterns and kinds of sexually abusive behaviours.

Taken together, alongside previous reviews and the evidence we received about a longstanding corrosive culture that doubts and disbelieves reports by detainees, we find that, for decades, some children and young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre experienced systematic harm and abuse.

In Case study 2, we examine the extent of harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre and responses to such behaviour. We include some accounts of former detainees who describe sexual harm by other detainees at the Centre and how this was often ignored by staff. We also heard allegations that staff sometimes actively used the harmful behaviours, including harmful sexual behaviours, of some detainees to control or frighten other detainees. We make findings in this case study about failures to respond appropriately to the risks of harmful sexual behaviours, which are listed in Section 9 and explained further in the case studies. In particular, we find that Ashley Youth Detention Centre has been aware of harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre and has not taken steps to protect children and young people from these harms.

Case studies 3 and 4 examine isolation and use of force at the Centre and make a range of findings that these practices have been misused, sometimes excessively and unlawfully, to punish and degrade detainees in breach of their human rights. In particular, we find that:

  • the use of isolation as a form of behaviour management, punishment or cruelty has been a regular and persistent practice at Ashley Youth Detention Centre since at least the early 2000s and, in July 2023, we received information to suggest that some harmful isolation practices are still occurring
  • the excessive use of force has been a longstanding method of abusing children and young people by some staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, and the Department and Tasmanian Government have not always responded appropriately.

When the isolation of young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre is unauthorised, unregulated and unreported, or there is excessive use of force, the risk of and opportunities for the physical and sexual abuse of young people increases. Such belittling and dehumanising practices also reduce the likelihood of children and young people making disclosures of child sexual abuse because their sense of what is right and wrong, trust in adults at the Centre and self-worth have been undermined.

Case studies 5 and 6 describe how complaints about the safety and treatment of detainees have been managed—including complaints by a staff member called Alysha (a pseudonym) and a detainee called Max (a pseudonym).2 We make findings about the State, the Department and the Centre’s response to these complaints, and identify systemic problems in these responses.

Case study 7 describes how the Department has responded to alleged sexual abuse of detainees by staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. This traces revelations from the Abuse in State Care Program (which began in 2003) and the perceived legal barriers that the Department told us limited its ability to act against staff, despite sometimes receiving multiple allegations of serious sexual assaults by staff still working at the Centre. Over time, corporate memory of the Abuse in State Care Program (and the information it revealed about current staff) was lost within the Department. Another wave of information alleging abuses by current and former staff came with the introduction of the National Redress Scheme in 2018, which was also met with confusion and inaction due to legal advice and practices that precluded use of that information, until a belated change of practice in the second half of 2020. We make a range of findings about failures to manage risks to detainees arising from this information.

  1. How to read our case studies and examples

Many of our case studies are closely related and benefit from being read together. While findings may sit within a particular case study, in some instances those findings also draw on evidence described in others. For example, our finding that, for decades, some children and young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre experienced systematic harm and abuse in Case study 1, also draws on the evidence we examined in Case studies 3, 4 and 7. Case studies 3 and 4 expand on some of the common themes we heard in Case study 1 about alleged abuse and mistreatment connected to isolation practices and the use of force, including previous reports and reviews. Case study 7 discusses a range of documentation outlining allegations of abuse that were in addition to the accounts we heard from people who had been detainees at the Centre or their families.

Case studies 5 and 6 describe responses to complaints (in one instance from a detainee and, in the other, a staff member). Taken together, our seven case studies have informed our recommendations in Chapter 12.

  1. Key witnesses and sources of information

Throughout the case studies in this chapter, we refer to several people who held senior departmental roles. In addition to our requests for information from the Tasmanian Government, we also requested statements and information from people who had a role in the response or may have had access to relevant information. Some of these people were no longer in the Department, which limited their access to information. Some joined the Department after the events into which we inquired and gave us information based on what was available to them, but in relation to matters with which they had no personal involvement.

Here, as a reference point, we summarise the key role-holders and witnesses who provided information in relation to our case studies:

  • Michael Pervan held the role of Secretary in the then Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Communities for the period from around October 2015 until July 2022 (other than between May 2018 and September 2019 during the split of the Department of Communities from the Department of Health and Human Services).3 The functions previously held by Secretary Pervan have since moved to sit within the Department for Education, Children and Young People, overseen by Secretary Timothy Bullard.4 Prior to his formal appointment, Secretary Pervan had been Acting Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services from March 2014 until his permanent appointment in October 2015.5
  • Ginna Webster has been Secretary of the Department of Justice since September 2019, and was previously the Secretary of the Department of Communities from May 2018 to September 2019.6 Prior to May 2018, Secretary Webster held the role of Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services in the then Department of Health and Human Services.7
  • Mandy Clarke held the role of Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families, which had portfolio responsibility for Ashley Youth Detention Centre, among other things.8 Ms Clarke reported to then Secretary Pervan.9 Ms Clarke was Deputy Secretary from 11 September 2019 to 11 February 2022, with her last working day being 21 January 2022.10
  • Kathy Baker held the role of Executive Director, Capability and Resources between July 2018 and September 2021. That role was subsequently reclassified Deputy Secretary, Corporate Services, and was held by Ms Baker between September 2021 and 30 June 2022, although she was seconded to the Department of Health between 10 March 2020 and 5 June 2020.11 She reported directly to then Secretary Webster between July 2018 and September 2019 and subsequently to then Secretary Pervan (except during her secondment).12 The role had responsibilities for corporate areas including People and Culture, Legislation and Legal Services, and Governance Risk and Performance (as they were then known)13 14
  • Jacqueline Allen commenced the role of Acting Assistant Director, Safety, Wellbeing & Industrial Relations, which was part of the People and Culture Division, in July 2020.15 She reported to the then Director of People and Culture.16 At the time she gave evidence at our public hearings in August 2022, Ms Allen was the Acting Executive Director, People and Culture (but had left that role by December 2022). We note that, despite her short tenure at the Department, Ms Allen provided us with a large amount of documentary evidence in response to our requests for information. This included in relation to events that occurred before her commencement at the Department and with which she was not involved, and often where we had not been provided with those documents in response to other requests. We were grateful for her efforts in this regard.
  • Greg Brown held the role of Director, Strategic Youth Services, within the Department between December 2017 and October 2019.17
  • Pamela Honan has held the role of Director, Strategic Youth Services (also titled Director, Youth and Family Violence Services) within the Department since 28 October 2019.18 The title of this role has changed over time but we understand that Ms Honan has had responsibility for Ashley Youth Detention Centre since she commenced employment with the Department.19 Ms Honan reported to Ms Clarke.20
  • Patrick Ryan was Manager, Custodial Youth Justice (‘Centre Manager’) at Ashley Youth Detention Centre from January 2017 until March 2020. Mr Ryan reported to Mr Brown and Ms Honan.21
  • In March 2020, Stuart Watson was appointed Acting Centre Manager (from his role as Assistant Manager, which he had held since January 2020).22 Mr Watson was appointed as the ongoing Centre Manager in March 2021.23 Mr Watson reported to Ms Honan.24

Case study 1: The nature and extent of abuse in Ashley Youth Detention Centre

  1. Introduction

In this case study, we find that children and young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre have experienced systematic harm and abuse for decades.

This finding is based on several sources—described in this case study—as well as the evidence outlined across the subsequent case studies.

This case study contains a series of concerning allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff. We acknowledge that there have been, and are, staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre who have tried to do their jobs lawfully and appropriately. References to problematic practices by ‘staff’ in this case study are not intended as a reference to all staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, unless explicitly stated in a specific context.

While we focus primarily on allegations of abuse by staff, we also heard of allegations of abuse by other children and young people, which were sometimes said to have occurred with the knowledge or endorsement of staff.25 We discuss this type of abuse (harmful sexual behaviours) in more detail in Case study 2. Understanding the extent and nature of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre was essential to informing our recommendations. It is also important that any agency responding to allegations of abuse at the Centre does so with knowledge of this history of abuse.

On the evidence that was available to us, it was apparent that sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre occurred alongside physical and verbal abuse. The sexual abuse perpetrated by some staff appears to have been motivated by a desire for sexual gratification. For other staff, the sexual abuse appears to have been one of many ways they asserted their dominance over, and otherwise degraded, detainees at the Centre, and may not have been sexually motivated.

In this case study, we outline sources of information about sexual and other abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Data from these sources tells us that numerous allegations of abuse, including of sexual abuse, at the Centre and its predecessor, Ashley Home for Boys, have been made through formal channels since 2003, when the Abuse in State Care Program was established.

We then summarise several of the many accounts of abuse that we received from victim-survivors of Ashley Youth Detention Centre, or their family members, during our Commission of Inquiry. In total, 11 victim-survivors and family members gave us permission to report their experiences, albeit anonymously.

It was not possible for our Commission of Inquiry to test the veracity of all the allegations outlined in victim-survivors’ accounts. However, we were struck by the common accounts of sexual, physical and other abuse by staff at the Centre, or older detainees, or both. Themes included the misuse of strip searches by Centre staff, how and where the abuse was perpetrated, and the absence or failure of effective reporting mechanisms when children and young people sought help to stop the abuse. While we do not make findings in relation to any individual allegation, we note the similarities across accounts.

The accounts of victim-survivors documented in this case study allege sexual and other abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre from the early 2000s to as recently as the early 2020s. At least some of the staff who were alleged to have perpetrated this abuse had worked at the Centre for many years at the time complaints were first made against them. They continued to work at the Centre for many more years due to the Department’s slow and uncoordinated response to redress claims and allegations of abuse (we discuss this in Case study 7).

Later in this case study and in Case study 7, we discuss the Department’s realisation in 2020 that many staff members against whom allegations of abuse had been made were still working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

We have included these accounts because we consider it is necessary that the Tasmanian Government understands the experiences of young people in detention, as well as the culture of sexual and other forms of abuse, denigration and human rights violations of children and young people that has persisted at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, to respond effectively to allegations of abuse in youth detention.

  1. Data about child sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

The Department has received allegations of child sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, from multiple sources, over a long period. In this section, we outline the avenues through which the Department has received these allegations. We note various inconsistencies about the extent of abuse between the data collected by different bodies and for different purposes. In Chapter 12, we emphasise the importance of collecting and comparing data about the sexual and other forms of abuse of children and young people under the care of the State and recommend an audit of allegations of abuse (refer to Recommendation 12.5).

  1. Response to our notice to produce

To understand the nature and extent of child sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, we issued a notice to produce information, which asked the Department to:

Produce any document which summarises—or if no such document exists, prepare a document which describes—the following information for … Ashley Youth Detention Centre in relation to any allegations or incidents of child sexual abuse (including allegations or incidents of misconduct against children which may constitute child sexual abuse) in Institutional Contexts for each year of the Relevant Period [this is defined as 1 January 2000 to the date of the notice]:
  1. the number of allegations or incidents
  2. the dates of those allegations or incidents
  3. the nature of those allegations or incidents
  4. any investigation of those allegations or incidents
  5. any reporting or referral of those allegations or incidents to a law enforcement or regulatory agency, or Child Safety Services, or
  6. any action or outcome as a result of those investigations, allegations or incidents.26

The Department told us it collected child sexual abuse allegations made by former detainees from a range of sources including claims made through the Abuse in State Care Program, civil litigation claims and the National Redress Scheme to provide us with a number of documents.27 We continued to receive information (often in the form of spreadsheets) over the course of our Inquiry.

There were significant discrepancies across the data we received about sexual abuse incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Barriers to us understanding the scope and scale of abuses included the following:

  • Incompatible documentation. We received multiple and differing documents and spreadsheets recording varying numbers of incidents, which were difficult to reconcile across different sources and agencies, particularly where dates were vague or within a broad range. Also, different aspects of an incident were described or reported to different audiences and in some instances, alleged abusers and victim-survivors were unnamed.
  • Very limited details relating to some incidents. We accept that sometimes this was unavoidable due to the limited nature of information the Department received (for example, through a National Redress Scheme claim) but, at times, suggested incomplete departmental record keeping.
  • Differences in how data is segmented and reported. For example, the various public reports relating to the Abuse in State Care Program segmented data differently, sometimes breaking down the number of claims by institution, allowing us to understand specifically how many related to Ashley Youth Detention Centre or Ashley Home for Boys, and other times generalising to institution type (‘government institution’), which made this impossible.

We consider some discrepancies may have arisen in the number and nature of incidents that the Department reported to us because of the following:

  • Confusion around what fell within the ‘Relevant Period’. There was uncertainty about whether our request related to incidents that had occurred within that period or were reported or otherwise made known to the Department within that period (but may have occurred before 2000). In most documents, the Department has appeared to have adopted the former approach in only reporting incidents that fall within the relevant period (noting sometimes abuse may have predated but overlapped with this period—for example, 1998–2002).
  • The Department not adopting a consistent definition of what constitutes child sexual abuse. For example, the Department sometimes did not include incidents relating to harmful sexual behaviours between detainees or complaints about a staff member applying cream to a detainee’s genitals. At other times, the Department did include such incidents.

We consider that the discrepancies were more likely to lead to an underreporting of incidents to us.

We invested significant effort to accurately reflect the information we received, but it has been difficult—indeed impossible—for us to entirely assure ourselves of the completeness and accuracy of some of the figures and information we received. Often, witnesses could not help us clarify discrepancies or broaden our understanding of some of these incidents.

These challenges mean there are internal inconsistencies in some of the information we present. In the interests of the reader, we have at times prioritised clarity ahead of providing detailed explanations or clarifications of inconsistencies and limitations in the documentation we received, particularly where we could find no such explanation.

With these limitations in mind, the next section outlines the key sources of information relating to reports of child sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

  1. The Abuse in State Care Program

In July 2003, the Tasmanian Government announced a review of claims of abuse, including sexual abuse, by people who had been in state care as children, including in youth detention and in out of home care. The Government ran the Claims of Abuse in State Care Program (‘Abuse in State Care Program’) over four rounds between 2003 and 2013, resulting in 2,414 claims and 1,848 ex gratia payments (voluntary payments made as a gesture of goodwill without any legal obligation). These payments totalled to $54.8 million.28 To be eligible to make a claim, a person had to be aged 18 or older on 11 July 2003 and not have been a claimant in a previous round of the Abuse in State Care Program.29 The eligibility criteria were set at the beginning of the first round and remained the same (including in relation to the age requirement) through all rounds of the program.30

The Department of Communities’ predecessor, the Department of Health and Human Services, was involved in each round of the program, with the first two rounds delivered as a joint undertaking with the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Health and Human Services. The third round was administered by the Department of Premier and Cabinet in partnership with the Department of Health and Human Services. The Department of Health and Human Services was solely responsible for administering the final round of the program.31

Many allegations of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (and Ashley Home for Boys) were raised in each round of the program. New rounds of the Abuse in State Care Program were initiated in response to new claimants coming forward.32

According to reports published on the various rounds of the Abuse in State Care Program (which varied in the level and type of information they provided about claims):

  • During the first round, which ran from 2003 to 2004, 32 people made claims relating to abuse that occurred at Ashley Home for Boys.33 The report described, in general terms, that most of these claims related to ‘sustained physical and emotional abuse’, with allegations of sexual abuse described as ‘less common’ in boys’ homes (including Ashley Home for Boys).34
  • In the second round, which ran from 2005 to 2006, 117 people came forward claiming abuse that occurred at Ashley Home for Boys.35 We are unclear what type of abuse these claims relate to but note that across all eligible claims (423) made in this period, 189 (or 45 per cent) included sexual abuse.36
  • There were 995 claims (in total) made in the third round, which ran from 2007 to 2010. We have not been able to identify the number of claims that were made relating to Ashley Home for Boys or Ashley Youth Detention Centre because a detailed report on this third round of claims was not available (we drew the overall 995 figure from the report of the fourth round of claims).37
  • The fourth round of the program, which ran from 2011 to 2013, resulted in 172 claims against Ashley Home for Boys and Ashley Youth Detention Centre.38 We are unsure what proportion of these claims relate to sexual abuse but note that, of the 199 claims of sexual abuse made during that round, nearly 50 per cent were made by claimants who were placed in an institution (including Ashley Youth Detention Centre).39
  • The number of claims listed in the reports on rounds 1, 2 and 4 of the Abuse in State Care Program indicate that, in these three rounds alone, 321 claims of abuse were made in relation to Ashley Youth Detention Centre or Ashley Home for Boys.

The Department provided us with a spreadsheet listing allegations or incidents of child sexual abuse since 2000. The spreadsheet showed that 18 claims of child sexual abuse were made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff through the Abuse in State Care Program (some of which included multiple allegations).40 It also indicated that the Department of Health and Human Services began to receive these claims in 2008 and that the period of abuse to which these claims related spanned 1995 to 2013.41 Not all claims received by the Department of Health and Human Services were eligible for redress, due to not meeting the age requirement or for other reasons.42

The discrepancy between the Department’s spreadsheet and the data in the Abuse in State Care Program reports is likely to be partially attributed to the scope of our request to the Department, which did not include a request for allegations relating to Ashley Home for Boys, which closed in 2000. The discrepancy may also be partly due to the Abuse in State Care Program reports referring to physical and sexual abuse, as well as abuse alleged to have been perpetrated by other children and young people (which were not captured in the Department’s spreadsheet). Discrepancies may also be due to different interpretations of sexual abuse.

  1. Other government data

The Department provided us with several other documents indicating that many claims of child sexual abuse were made against staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and Ashley Home for Boys through the Abuse in State Care Program:

  • A spreadsheet provided by the Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit in the Department of Justice to the Department of Communities on 19 September 2020 indicated there were 127 claims of child sexual abuse made against named staff members through the Abuse in State Care Program (some of whom were named on multiple occasions).43
  • The Department of Justice also provided our Commission of Inquiry with a different table of data relating to the Abuse in State Care Program that was ‘extracted from a manual review of hard copy files during the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse’.44 This information indicated that:
    • Claims of sexual abuse were made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre or Ashley Home for Boys staff through the Abuse in State Care Program as early as 2003, although it is unclear when the Department received these earlier claims given there were different administrators of the scheme (we consider it would have been during the period of the first phase of the scheme—2003 to 2004).45
    • Based on our review of the listed claims in the Abuse in State Care Program, at least 95 of the accepted claims involved named staff, and at least 44 involved unnamed staff, at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or Ashley Home for Boys.46 Several staff had multiple claims made against them. We note that the number of claims of child sexual abuse against staff members is likely higher because there were claims that did not specifically refer to, or name, staff members and, therefore, have not been included in our analysis because they may have related to harmful sexual behaviours.
    • The period of abuse spanned much longer, dating back to the 1940s.

As we discuss later in this case study, staffing at the Centre had been relatively stable, with many staff moving from Ashley Home for Boys to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in 2000 and continuing to work there through the 2000s.

We note that the Department of Communities’ and the Department of Justice’s spreadsheets described above provide summaries of the claims made under the Abuse in State Care Program.47 It is clear from these documents that there is a commonality in the types of sexual abuse claims against staff at Ashley Home for Boys and Ashley Youth Detention Centre. The claims include allegations of rape, abuse during strip searches, abuse through applying scabies cream on detainees’ genitals, detainees being watched in the shower, the use of bribes and threats to force detainees to engage in sexual acts, forcing detainees to engage in sexual acts with each other, and sexual abuse occurring in the Centre’s ‘secure unit’ and when detainees were taken off site.48 As we describe, these types of abuse were also raised through other avenues over different periods and correlate with the accounts provided to us by victim-survivors.

  1. The Abuse in State Care Support Service

When the Abuse in State Care Program wound up in 2013, it was replaced by the Abuse in State Care Support Service. The Abuse in State Care Support Service was set up to provide financial support to people who experienced abuse, including sexual abuse, in state care when they were children.

As with the Abuse in State Care Program, the Abuse in State Care Support Service is available to people who had previously been detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, as well as those who were in other forms of state care.49 The process for accessing financial support under the service involves the applicant being interviewed by the Department and having a ‘discussion with the Applicant about counselling and other supports’.50 Up to $2,500 is available for successful claimants to pay for goods and services related (but not limited) to education, employment, counselling, personal development, family connection and medical and dental services.51

Michael Pervan, former Secretary, Department of Communities, told us in a statement dated 14 June 2022 that 185 people had made applications or requested information since the service began in 2013, of which 89 applications alleged sexual abuse.52 We understand that this relates to claims in relation to all forms of state care. Secretary Pervan could not provide us with the number of applications that had been approved, but said that of those who received financial support through the service, fewer than 20 applicants received less than $2,000.53

Information provided to us by the Department of Communities in response to our notice to produce indicated that, as of 20 July 2021, 26 claims had been made through the Abuse in State Care Support Service involving allegations of sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (or its predecessor, the Ashley Home for Boys).54 Most of the allegations related to conduct by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff.55 The period of abuse spans from 1995 to 2012.56

The claims raised through the Abuse in State Care Support Service include similar allegations against staff to those raised through other avenues and in victim-survivors’ accounts. The allegations again included abuse during regular and random strip searches; abuse by applying cream, powder and lotion to detainees’ genitals; detainees being watched in the shower; using bribes and threats to force detainees to engage in sexual acts; forcing detainees to engage in sexual acts with each other and in the presence of others including Centre staff; and sexual abuse occurring in the Centre’s ‘secure unit’ and when detainees were taken off site.57

  1. The National Redress Scheme

As discussed in Chapter 17, the National Redress Scheme was created in response to National Royal Commission recommendations. The purpose of the Scheme is to hold institutions accountable for child sexual abuse and to help people who have experienced institutional child sexual abuse to access counselling, a direct personal response and a redress payment. The National Redress Scheme started on 1 July 2018. It will run for 10 years and is only available to people who were born before 30 June 2010 and whose abuse occurred before 1 July 2018.58

The National Redress Scheme is administered by the Australian Government. Tasmania’s Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit (which sits within the Department of Justice) responds to requests for information about the Scheme, with the assistance of other agencies.59 On receiving a request for information relevant to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, the role of the Department for Education, Children and Young People is to undertake a desktop investigation and provide a summary of material relevant to the National Redress Scheme claim to the Department of Justice.60 We outline this process in more detail in Case study 7.

As of 20 July 2021, the Department had received 49 National Redress Scheme claims for allegations of child sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (some of which contained multiple allegations).61 In total, these claims included 53 allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff members (including youth workers, security guards and contractors), with the alleged period of abuse spanning from 1995 to 2012.62 Allegations were also raised against other detainees.63

Of the 49 National Redress Scheme claims the Department received, 10 claims were made in 2019, 14 claims were made in 2020, 24 claims were made in 2021 and it is unclear when the remaining claim was made.64

Secretary Pervan told us that, from 20 July 2021 until 27 May 2022, there were another 49 claims made under the National Redress Scheme (and five civil claims) for incidents dating between 1997 and 2016.65 Other information in relation to these additional claims suggests that there were 48 National Redress Scheme claims and six civil claims relating to conduct alleged to have occurred over the period 1997 to 2019.66

Again, the allegations the Department received indicate a commonality in the methods of abuse allegedly perpetrated by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff, including abuse during strip searches; abuse through applying products to detainees’ bodies and genitals; detainees being watched in the shower; rape; using bribes and threats to force detainees to engage in sexual acts; forcing detainees to engage in sexual acts with each other and in the presence of others including Centre staff; and sexual abuse occurring in the Centre’s ‘secure unit’ and when detainees were taken off site.67

  1. Civil claims

As discussed in Chapter 17, the Tasmanian Government has made several legislative amendments in response to recommendations of the National Royal Commission, which pave the way for more civil claims to be issued against institutions that may be vicariously liable for the conduct of their staff, or liable for failing to protect a child from abuse.

In response to a notice to produce, the Department provided information to our Inquiry about civil claims that relate to allegations of child sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre for the period 2000 to 20 July 2021.68 Secretary Pervan provided further information for the period 20 July 2021 to 27 May 2022.69 The data indicates that:

  • In 2019, one civil claim was issued in relation to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.70
  • In 2020, four civil claims were issued in relation to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.71
  • In 2021, one civil claim was issued in relation to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.72
  • From 20 July 2021 to 27 May 2022, six civil claims were issued in relation to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.73

The dates of the incidents raised in these claims up to July 2021 span 1998 to 2010.74 The additional civil claims the Department received between 20 July 2021 and 27 May 2022 relate to conduct alleged to have occurred between 2002 and 2008.75 Most of these claims include allegations against staff members, and the allegations involve similar methods of abuse identified in our discussion of the redress schemes above.76 The allegations in these civil claims include rape, digital penetration, being forced to engage in sexual acts with other detainees and Centre staff (sometimes in the presence of other Centre staff), being photographed while performing sexual acts, using physical abuse and threats, being placed in settings where sexual abuse by other detainees took place, sexual abuse by staff while off site, and the application of products to bodies, including genitals.77

We also received evidence that suggests many more civil claims have been issued in relation to physical abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. A briefing for the Minister for Children and Youth that Secretary Pervan cleared on 4 November 2021 states:

As of 18 October 2021, 42 civil claims [have been made] in relation to physical and/or sexual abuse that involve the Department (or its predecessor). Court proceedings have commenced for 12 of these matters.78

Also, on 11 August 2022, a class action was commenced in the Supreme Court of Tasmania on behalf of more than 100 former Ashley Youth Detention Centre detainees, with more claimants being added at the time of writing.79 The claim of the lead plaintiffs is that the former detainees named as part of the class action suffered serious injuries due to systemic negligence in the management of Ashley Youth Detention Centre over the period from 1961 to 2019. Allegations include that staff:

  • performed degrading strip searches
  • forcibly applied scabies treatments that caused burns to detainees’ bodies, including their genitals
  • failed to provide appropriate medical treatment
  • used isolation and beatings as punishment.80

Lawyers acting for the plaintiffs in the class action, Angela Sdrinis Legal, told us that they act for more than 150 clients who allege abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and Ashley Home for Boys, some of whom are not part of the class action.81 In a submission to our Commission of Inquiry, Angela Sdrinis Legal told us that these clients’ complaints relate to:

  • sexual abuse spanning more than 40 years, with many of the same abusers (detainees or employees) committing repeated abuse against numerous children throughout their time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre82
  • an extensive range of abuse, including rape (54 clients), grooming (11 clients), oral rape (nine clients), object rape (10 clients), forced sexual acts between children (two clients) and contact abuse83
  • many instances of physical and mental abuse that accompanied the sexual abuse, such as extended periods of isolation and regular beatings84
  • staff manipulating children into performing sexual acts on each other or on guards, sometimes through threats of physical violence or denial of certain privileges such as personal visits, or to avoid isolation85
  • staff encouraging children to take part in abuse through perceived rewards or treats, such as cigarettes.86
  1. Direct reports to the Department

As well as civil claims, and claims raised through the redress schemes, the Department also receives complaints and allegations directly from young people who are (or were) detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, staff and others with knowledge of alleged misconduct at the Centre. For example, the Department told us that it had received complaints from the then Tasmanian Greens Leader Cassy O’Connor MP in December 2020 and a member of the public in August 2020, as well as referrals from Crime Stoppers reports.87 The Department may also be alerted to complaints through reports by the Ombudsman, Custodial Inspector and Commissioner for Children and Young People.

In response to our notice to produce, the Department told us the following about complaints (in addition to allegations raised through civil claims and redress schemes) of child sexual abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff during the period 1 January 2000 to 20 July 2021:

  • Several complaints about incidents alleged to have occurred between 2007 and 2016 were physically stored in a filing cabinet at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Of the approximately 200 complaints the Department reviewed:
    • 10 related to allegations or incidents of child sexual abuse88
    • of these 10 complaints, at least six of the allegations were against staff members89
    • the allegations include staff members inappropriately touching detainees (including during strip searches), making sexual comments and walking in on a detainee while they were in the shower.90
  • Another complaint was made to the Department’s Client Liaison Officer in January 2021. The detainee alleged that during the period from 2015 to 2016 they were forcibly strip searched and, on a separate occasion, assaulted.91

It is not clear to us if any of these complaints relate to staff still working at the Centre.

We also discuss in Case studies 5 and 7 a report in 2020 made by staff member Alysha (a pseudonym) about multiple concerns about the Centre, including allegations of child sexual abuse and staff management of harmful sexual behaviours.92

  1. Observations across data

It is difficult to put a specific number to the allegations of child sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre received by the Department. Nevertheless, there have been hundreds of allegations over the years.

Based on the material discussed above, we consider it is likely the Department of Health and Human Services knew of serious allegations of abuse against current staff working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre from at least 2006 when the second phase of the Abuse in State Care Program ended, if not from 2003. By 2006, there were 149 claims involving Ashley Youth Detention Centre or Ashley Home for Boys. As discussed below, staff at the Centre had been relatively stable and many staff moved from Ashley Home for Boys to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in 2000. We discuss the Department’s knowledge of allegations of abuse through this program in Case study 7.

  1. First-hand accounts of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

In this section, we summarise the accounts of nine victim-survivors of Ashley Youth Detention Centre and two family members of victim-survivors.

As noted earlier, it was not possible for our Commission of Inquiry to test the veracity of all allegations of abuse, but we identified many common themes in the accounts we heard. We have included these accounts so the Tasmanian Government and the Tasmanian community can get a better sense of the extent and nature of the abuse that has occurred at Ashley Youth Detention Centre as safeguarding reforms are considered and implemented.

The accounts below speak to the circumstances of victim-survivors’ residency at the Centre, the alleged abuse that victim-survivors suffered, their attempts and attempts by their family members to report the abuse, the impact the alleged abuse continues to have on them, and the changes they would like to see so other children and young people in detention do not have to experience similar trauma.

Most names used in the following case examples are pseudonyms. The case examples present the accounts of victim-survivors or those of their family members.

  1. Case example: Ben
  1. Before Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Ben’s (a pseudonym) early life was unsettled.93 His parents separated when he was very young and his father died before Ben was 10 years old.94 Ben moved in with his mother’s new family and he began misbehaving, skipping school, stealing and using drugs.95 He then ran away from home and was exposed to more serious drugs and crime.96

  1. Admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Ben was 11 years old when he was first detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the early 2000s.97 He was charged with property offences and he refused to be bailed to his mother’s address.98 With no other address for bail, Ben was sent to Ashley Youth Detention Centre on remand.99

Ben described to us his experience of being admitted to the Centre. He recalled that after a three-day period of isolation and observation:

I was made to strip naked and face a wall with my hands above my head, legs apart. One of these men [a staff member] started to roughly smother some lice cream of some kind up my bum crack all over my bum between my legs and all over my genitals and surrounding area, as another one of them done the same to my underarms and my head. I was made to stand there for 5–10 minutes it was really painful and burning me. I complained but was told I’d have it left on there longer if I didn’t shut up. Upon the completion of my intake assessment I was taken to my cell/room where I would stay for several long very traumatic weeks.100

Ben spent the rest of his childhood, until the late 2000s, in and out of the Centre.101 From his first admission to when he was aged 18, the longest period Ben spent outside detention was about five months.102 Ben recalled that he spent most of his time at the Centre on remand.103 He explained that, most of the time, he was remanded for crimes for which he was eventually acquitted.104

  1. Alleged harmful sexual behaviours at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Ben said that during his first admission he ‘witnessed the most violence [he had] ever seen in [his] life’.105 Ben told us that his first experience of sexual abuse at the Centre happened immediately after his first admission.106 Ben recalled he was placed in a unit with six much older boys, four of whom physically and sexually abused him.107 Ben said that after a few weeks, he was moved to a unit with other ‘young and vulnerable detainees’.108

Ben said that he was physically and sexually abused by older boys at the Centre several times during his admissions.109 He recalled that this abuse occurred ‘every day’ during his first admission.110 Ben said that younger detainees were vulnerable to older male detainees, some of whom were 21 years of age.111

Ben told us that he was hospitalised on several occasions during his time at the Centre, including for an injury suffered during an episode of violent sexual abuse by an older boy.112 He said that some members of staff at the Centre would, on occasion, incite and reward young people for abusing or humiliating other (usually younger or smaller) detainees.113 Ben told us that young people were encouraged by staff to ‘smack their mates’ and were offered cigarettes as rewards.114

Ben said that he soon learned that the abuse at the hands of older boys ‘would be nothing compared to what several of the officers would come to do to me’.115

  1. Allegations of abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

Ben told us that he and other young people were physically and sexually abused by staff on numerous occasions. He said these incidents often occurred during activities that took place away from Ashley Youth Detention Centre.116 He told us that these activities were made available to young people as a reward for good behaviour.117 Ben believed that design changes to the Centre in the early 2000s meant that sexual abuse was more likely to take place away from the Centre’s premises.118 He soon realised that participating in excursions made him more vulnerable to abuse.119

Ben recalled one occasion when a staff member violently sexually abused him and two other young people from the Centre during an off-premises activity.120 The three boys were not yet teenagers.121 Ben remembered crying in the backseat of the car on the way back to the Centre. He said that the staff member threatened to hurt the boys again if they did not stop crying or if they told anyone what had happened.122

After this incident, Ben said he was too scared to be taken off the Centre’s premises and would try to avoid these activities. Ben said it was ‘hit and miss [whether] we would be abused or not’.123 Ben explained that missing an outing often meant being left locked inside all day because there were not enough staff left to supervise the young people who stayed on site.124

Ben also recalled a multiday camping excursion during which he was sexually, physically and emotionally abused at least once a day.125 Ben said he was raped three times on this excursion by an Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member, Stan (a pseudonym). Ben told us that he knew of at least one other young person who was abused on that trip as well.126 We discuss the Department’s response to allegations raised against Stan in Case study 7.

Ben described the effect of the alleged abuse on him:

By the end of the trip … me and [my friend] were broken. The trip had destroyed us mentally! All we had been enduring had finally caught up to us on this trip that was supposed to be fun and exciting. Once we got back to Ashley everything was harder. I began to do poorly at school and art and all of the other programs run at Ashley. Slowly I started to notice drastic changes in my beliefs, my thoughts, my actions and my behaviour overall—at [this young age] I felt nasty, I felt like violence was the answer to everything and that rage and anger were normal, that flying off the handle over everything was OK.127

Ben said that as his behaviour escalated, he was regularly in trouble at the Centre.128 He told us he was often restrained by staff and that they targeted him for further abuse.129 Ben believed that some Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff were not ‘adequately assessed or screened’ for the work, which sometimes involved dealing with the young people’s aggressive and violent behaviours.130 He said that maintenance staff were sometimes called in to resolve incidents and restrain young people.131 Ben also recalled regular violent abuse by three staff members in particular, which twice resulted in broken bones and other serious injuries to Ben and other young people.132

Ben said that the ‘sheer scale and volume of sexual and physical acts committed upon [him at Ashley Youth Detention Centre] is astonishing and devastating’, so much so it is a ‘blur’.133 He said that the abuse pushed him into a ‘dark place’.134 He recounted an incident where he and two other young people attempted to die by suicide by breaking into a medication cabinet at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and taking the medication they found.135 Ben said that the incident resulted in a two-hour stand-off with staff, after which the boys were stripped naked, beaten and put into isolation:136

We [were] locked down on 23-hour-a-day lockdowns for weeks on end. Every couple of days we would be belted for the standoff in [the] office and [to] scare us into mercy and [to] never do it again. … I would be on and off the [behaviour management program] all the time … when they would lock us down for 23 hours a day in our cells with one book, one pen and pad, a mattress and bedding.137

Ben also recalled a violent beating after an escape attempt, during which he was stripped naked, handcuffed behind his back and had his feet cuffed together.138 He told us that he was left handcuffed and unable to move off the floor for about five hours, before being placed in lockdown for another three weeks.139

Ben was transferred to an adult remand centre in his late teens, where he said he was placed with violent offenders and sex offenders.140 Ben told us that he continued to suffer physical and sexual abuse there.141

  1. Reporting allegations of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

During his first admission to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Ben reported the physical and sexual abuse he said he experienced from other young people in detention to staff.142 Ben said that, in response, he was restrained, taken to an observation cell and stripped naked by senior staff.143 He recalled that staff members told him that ‘if [he] had to suck dick to survive then [he] shouldn’t steal tax payers’ cars’.144 Ben said he learned very quickly to keep his mouth shut.145

Ben recalled that after he was hospitalised following an episode of violent sexual abuse, it appeared some steps were taken at Ashley Youth Detention Centre to separate the younger, more vulnerable boys from the older boys.146 He said this involved placing the younger detainees in makeshift container accommodation, where they had to use buckets as toilets.147 Ben told us that, eventually, young people charged with sexual offences were placed with these younger detainees and the abuse resumed.148

Ben described how he and another young person at Ashley Youth Detention Centre made complaints against two staff members.149 Police investigations began, but Ben and his friend withdrew their complaints because they feared reprisals.150 Consequently, these staff members returned to work at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.151 Ben said that soon after this incident, he suffered a medical event, and doctors ordered that he not be moved due to the significant pain he was in.152 He said that an hour after that medical advice was given, staff at the Centre and police forced Ben into a car so he could attend a meeting at the local police station.153

Ben also recalled instances where privileges were taken away from him when he complained about staff members and that favours were granted when he withdrew his complaints.154 He told us that people external to the Centre visited every four to six weeks to check on the young people.155 Ben said he was never asked by these visitors if he was being mistreated and that, even if he had been asked, he knew better than to say anything when he was being observed by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff.156

In addition to his fear of repercussions, Ben also believed that the culture at Ashley Youth Detention Centre among young people discouraged reporting abuse.157 He said:

I … wanted to be a criminal, and making complaints is not what criminals do. In a way we wanted to be like the people that were abusing us. We wanted to be big and tough. We believed that we only had one way out and that way was violence. There was also no CCTV cameras, so nothing that happened was recorded.158

Ben said that staff saw the young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre as ‘the scum of society’ and that they normalised violence and abuse against young people.159 He described watching as new staff were absorbed into this system:

… there was the perception that any staff who didn’t follow these rules would not have a job. On countless occasions I witnessed staff new to Ashley be ridiculed by long term staff because they did not join in on restraints. These new staff would quit or get kicked out for not toeing the line. In my opinion they were the sort of people that should have been employed at Ashley. They could have made a difference if they weren’t continually pushed out.160

In Ben’s view, operational leaders of the units wielded the most power over the young people at the Centre.161 He felt that young people had little access or recourse to Ashley Youth Detention Centre management.162

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

As an adult, Ben said he was approached by representatives of the Abuse in State Care Program.163 He was told that making a claim would be trauma-informed and that his best interests would be prioritised throughout the process.164 Ben recounted some of the abuse he suffered while at the Centre to these representatives.165 A few days later, Ben told us that he was informed that there had been a mistake and that he was ineligible for the program.166 He was ‘shattered’. He added:167

While I don’t think they did it on purpose, they should have followed up after this monumental mistake. I felt so worthless, confused, and suicidal after this meeting. To me it was like … there was nothing anyone could do about the horrific sexual and physical abuse I had suffered. This was devastating and has consumed my mind, my thoughts, and my feelings until now. I’d come so far and this [brought] me back so much. It wrecked me.168

Ben further recounted that, a few years later, he was visited by lawyers in relation to the National Redress Scheme.169 He said he was wary about talking to these lawyers because of his experience with the Abuse in State Care Program and that he asked them how they knew he and others had been at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.170

Ben is now bringing a civil claim against the State for the abuse he suffered at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.171 He is frustrated by how long the process is taking:

The length of time that the process has taken makes me feel betrayed and worthless, and I am starting to question the legitimacy of the process and whether it is worth it for me. … [The Government] are dragging their feet as much as they can. I personally feel like they are weighing up my longevity. They hope that I die of an overdose, die of murder, die in prison – because I chose to go the civil route. I know they won’t want to give me a cent. They see it that I’ve already cost the state money. It doesn’t matter what happened to me as a child, it only matters what I have done since then … The process of trying to seek compensation has eaten me up from the inside.172

  1. Improving youth detention

Ben wants the Government to acknowledge that it allowed the wrong people to work at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.173 He wants the Government to ensure people like those who abused him are never employed in institutions like the Centre again.174 Ben considers that greater scrutiny of youth detention staff is required.175 In his view, a National Police Check or registration to work with vulnerable people is not enough.176 He also believes that greater care should be taken when placing young people together in detention to ensure they do not pose a risk of harm to each other.177

Ben thinks that more community supports would have prevented him from falling into a life of crime, and that these supports are critical for other youth in crisis and to prevent youth detention.178 Ben also thinks there is a need for more residential facilities for struggling young people.179 In his experience, existing residential facilities are wary of taking on young people with a history of violence, mental illness or drug use, which has led to the most vulnerable children ending up back in the community without support, destined to return to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.180

  1. Case example: Eve
  1. Before Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Eve’s son Norman (both pseudonyms) had struggled with significant mental health issues from the age of 13, for which he was prescribed medication.181 Before Norman experienced mental health issues, Eve recalled that Norman was a ‘nice, happy, great kid, everyone loved him, got along well with everybody in the community’.182 After his mental health issues presented, Norman began ‘hanging out with a really bad group of people and he made a bad decision’ that resulted in criminal charges and a sentence to be served at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.183

Norman was admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the early 2010s when he was 17 years old.184

  1. Admission to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

When Norman was first remanded at the Launceston Remand Centre (now Launceston Reception Prison), staff refused to accept Norman’s medication from Eve.185 Eve was told that any medications that Norman required would be provided at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.186 Norman was transferred to Ashley Youth Detention Centre the next day. When Eve called to ask if Norman had received his medication, staff told her they did not have any medication at the Centre and that Norman would have to wait until after the weekend to see the doctor.187 On Monday, Eve drove from Hobart to Ashley Youth Detention Centre to supply Norman’s medication herself.188

Although staff eventually gave Norman his medication, Eve said they questioned Norman’s mental health diagnosis and the dosage of his medication. She said they gave him a lower dose than his doctor had prescribed.189 Staff told Eve that an Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychiatrist would have to review the dosage.190 Eve also recalled being told that the psychiatrist visited the Centre from the mainland every six weeks.191 She said that it was impossible for Norman to get an appointment with a psychologist at the Centre, and the Centre refused her attempts to get him access to a local psychologist on the basis that he was under state care.192 She could not recall how long Norman went without receiving his prescribed dosage of medication.193

Eve told us that she advocated for her son through every channel at her disposal. She had her doctor write to the Centre regarding her concerns about Norman’s mental illness and wellbeing.194 She also had the Shadow Minister for Children write to the Minister for Children about Norman’s history and her concerns.195 Further, she contacted the Minister directly but did not receive a response.196 Eve said she also engaged with Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff but did not find them helpful. She said they would block her attempts to get information about Norman’s situation or to help Norman.197 Where she raised concerns about Norman’s welfare, the response was to put Norman on suicide watch in a small cell with observations every three minutes.198

Eve said she worried that her advocacy for Norman only made things worse for him:

If [Norman] rang and told me things, I continued to call Ashley and let them know I had fears for his safety. The outcome of this would be that they would put [Norman] back on three-minute observations. It became a deterrent for him to tell me things. Every time I rang there would be repercussions for him.

Over time the phone calls between [Norman] and I became less frequent and [Norman] stopped telling me things. In the end he said, ‘please mum, stop’. My advocating for [Norman] meant there were repercussions for him. He wouldn’t even tell me how he was feeling anymore.199

Eve initially visited Norman at the Centre every two weeks.200 However, Norman asked her to stop visiting because, as she learned later, he would have to endure ‘cruel’ strip searches after each visit:201

So, when I would go and visit, it’s a little bit upsetting for a parent to know that, just for a child to come visit its mother in a room, that the guards are going to fossick through their anus and their genitals on their way back out. It wouldn’t be something that most people would want to have to happen, and it was—it did feel awful knowing that that did happen every time I visited him, but it wasn’t until later on that I found out that there was a lot of bastardisation going on during these searches, I won’t go into details, but it was enough to make him not want me to visit anymore.202

During Norman’s time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, a detainee died in custody. Eve said Norman heard the detainee being sick in a nearby cell and begging for help, but staff did not assist.203 Norman told Eve that the other kids heard the detainee whimpering in bed during the night and then the noise stopped.204 After not showing up for breakfast, the detainee was found dead. Eve said Norman felt really unsafe and was afraid that this sort of thing could happen to him as well.205 Eve reflected that:

It really affected him. I remember him distressed on the phone. When you’re 17, and you hear a friend die, it’s going to affect you for the rest of your life. Despite this, none of the kids got proper counselling.206

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Eve described her son before he went to Ashley Youth Detention Centre as ‘saveable’.207 She said: ‘He was a child that still could have been turned around and had a future, but they changed that and his future’s been pretty awful’.208

Eve believes that nothing was done at Ashley Youth Detention Centre to help Norman to address his behaviour and that he ‘came out ten times worse than he went in’.209 She said that:

When he came out, he was a different kid. He wasn’t coping. He wasn’t acting like himself. He was very angry. He wouldn’t speak. There was no happiness in him. He wouldn’t tell me what was wrong, but it was clear he was really traumatised.210

Eve said that Norman had a lot of bad experiences at Ashley Youth Detention Centre that he does not want to tell her about because he knows how much it will affect her and he doesn’t want her to worry about it forever.211

Recently, Eve went through the right to information process to try and learn more about Norman’s time at the Centre. She believes the records she received show the unwillingness of staff at the time to give her information or constructively address Norman’s behaviours. She said the records focus on punishing Norman and satisfying the public perception that young people in youth detention should be treated as ‘criminals’.212

Eve told us that Norman has recently started engaging with the Sexual Assault Support Service and was talking to them about what happened to him at Ashley Youth Detention Centre more than a decade ago.213

  1. Improving youth detention

Eve believes that the detention of young people should be therapeutic rather than focusing on punishment.214 She stated that Norman’s behaviour worsened due to a lack of alternative support for young people with mental health issues and the fact that non-violent young people were detained together with violent young people.215 She said: ‘There needs to be a better way of dealing with children than just destroying them in detention’.216

Eve also feels the location of Ashley Youth Detention Centre, a three-hour drive from Hobart, is an issue and that there should be facilities in the north and south of Tasmania so children in detention can stay connected to their families.217 She told us:

As a mother that wanted to stay involved and advocate for [Norman], they cut me off. It’s detrimental to children to separate them from their families when they are trying to rehabilitate. Family support when they are released from detention is critical.218

  1. Case example: Max
  1. Alleged harmful sexual behaviours at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Max (a pseudonym) was detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre from the late 2010s to 2021. He was 12 years old when first detained and, at the time, he was the youngest person in his unit.219 Max told us that, barely an hour after arriving at his unit, he became the target of bullying by other young people in detention.220 Max said he asked staff if he could be moved elsewhere because he felt unsafe, but they responded: ‘If you don’t like coming here, then don’t do the crime’.221 To keep himself safe, Max ‘locked [himself] down’ in his cell until he was released on bail a few days later.222

Max returned to the Centre for breaching his bail conditions.223 Soon after arriving, Max was placed in a unit with three boys who were much older than him, including Floyd (a pseudonym), who Max knew from the community.224 As soon as Max found out that Floyd was in the unit, he told staff that he was not safe there and would likely be ‘bashed’.225 Max told us that staff refused to move him, saying he ‘had no choice’.226

Max said that on the same day, Floyd verbally threatened Max.227 Max recalled that a staff member, Alan (a pseudonym), was present when Max was threatened, but Alan left the room and sat in the office, watching the boys through a window.228 Max recalled feeling as though Alan ‘had purposely walked away from us’.229 As soon as Alan left the room, Max was assaulted by Floyd and another boy, Ned (a pseudonym), when Max refused to perform oral sex on Floyd.230 Alan yelled at the boys to stop fighting but did not physically intervene until other staff arrived to assist.231

Max was angry and upset that staff had not listened to his concerns about being placed in a unit with Floyd. He said:

I was bleeding from the nose. I started saying to the youth workers, ‘I told you this would happen’. They just ignored me and didn’t say anything. The thing that really pissed me off was that I told all of the youth workers that it was going to happen but they didn’t listen to me. [Alan] heard [Floyd] threaten me. They should have been more aware.232

Max refused to press charges against Floyd or Ned for the assault because he thought it was a ‘dog thing to do’.233 He also felt it would just make life harder for him at the Centre and put his family at risk because the boys knew where his mother lived.234 Max said he was aware that the Centre’s management took steps to charge other young people for assaults committed at the Centre, and he does not know why this didn’t happen in his case.235 Instead, Max recalled that as punishment, Ned was dropped a ‘colour rating’ in the Centre’s behaviour management program.236

Max was moved to another unit, again with boys who were bigger and stronger than him.237 He said he was picked on because he had got the boys from the previous unit in trouble.238 Max told us that on one occasion, a boy, Arlo (a pseudonym), tried to insert a table tennis bat into Max’s anus.239 Max said that the staff at the Centre were aware of the incident and dropped Arlo’s colour rating in the behaviour management program, but they did not take any other steps to keep Max safe.240 Eventually, Max was moved to another unit when he refused to go to bed at the same time as the other boys in the unit.241

On a later admission to the Centre, when Max was still aged under 15, he was again placed in a unit with Floyd.242 Fearful, Max asked the staff why he was being placed with Floyd after what had happened; he was told he was ‘exaggerating’ and that there were no other units available.243 Max told us that staff threatened to put him into isolation if he did not calm down.244 Max said that Floyd apologised for what had happened previously, but Max was still afraid.245 He recalled:

… I was still scared and thought it was only a matter of time before something else serious happened to me. I don’t understand how they could put me back in a unit with someone who nearly raped me. The youth workers knew about it but they weren’t even concerned about it.246

Desperate to be moved, Max said he intentionally damaged the roof of his cell and was transferred to another unit the next day.247

  1. Alleged abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

Max recalled that, as he got older, the abuse and assaults by other young people at the Centre stopped, but the frequency of physical and sexual abuse by staff increased.248

Max said that the lack of surveillance cameras was a big problem at the Centre and that staff knew how to exploit the ‘black spots’.249 He said that: ‘Nine times out of 10 [those black spots are] where everything happens’.250 He said staff would regularly take young people to these places to ‘belt’ them, or threatened to do so if the young people did not behave.251 On one occasion, in the early 2020s, Max recalled being assaulted by staff on a construction site on the Centre’s property—Max believes that this was a deliberate attempt to avoid the assault being caught on surveillance cameras.252

Max had been told to ‘talk before you use actions’ to help regulate his behaviour, but, in his experience, Centre staff often did not listen.253 He recalled one occasion where he had been sent to his room after assaulting a teacher.254 A staff member asked him what the problem was, to which Max replied that he did not want to talk about it and said that if the staff member did not leave the room Max would hit him.255 Max told us that the staff member did not leave and Max started towards him, at which point Max was tackled by two other staff who had been outside the room.256 Max explained that he knew assaulting a staff member was wrong, but he thought the incident could have been avoided if they had listened to him:257

… the way they always say, like, if you’ve got something, they say talk about it with case management; they say, ‘talk about stuff before you do something, like, just try and talk about it, talk before you use actions’, so I tried it and it just didn’t work, like. So, there was nothing else for me to do.258

Eventually, Max felt that the only way he could keep himself safe was to be moved out of the Centre.259 He continued to act out, including assaulting staff, until he was sent elsewhere in his late teens.260

Max said that he was forcibly strip searched by at least three or four staff members in his cell, where there were no cameras.261 He recalled that on at least two occasions a staff member inserted a finger into Max’s anus.262 On one occasion, he told us that staff handled his genitals and searched between his buttocks.263

Max remembered another incident when he was dragged to his room following a stand-off with staff. Max told us that when he refused to be strip searched, staff responded that they could ‘do whatever the fuck [they] want’.264 Max said that none of the other detainees involved in the stand-off were strip searched.265 He further recalled that, after another incident, staff members ripped his clothes off and started searching him, after which they threw him to the ground and then left him in his cell.266 Max said he ‘felt disgusting after what [the staff] did’ and that it made him ‘feel like shit knowing that [he] had no power over anything’.267

On another occasion, Max recalled that he and another young person were strip searched by Alan and other staff in the breezeway, after they had been caught with cigarettes and drugs.268 Max told us that he lashed out during the search, at which point Alan punched Max, reminding him that ‘there are no cameras up here’ in the breezeway, and that ‘no one knows what happens up there’.269

Max observed that new staff members would quickly adapt to the culture at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.270 He explained that new staff often started off well, acting nicely towards the young people and not assaulting them, but after a year or so they would ‘normally turn into the same as the other ones’.271

  1. Reporting allegations of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

A couple of years after his first admission to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Max began to engage with the Commissioner for Children and Young People.272 At first, Max did not want to speak to the Commissioner because he thought it was a ‘dog thing to do’, but he was encouraged when he saw other young people doing it.273 Max said that Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff did not like the people in detention speaking to the Commissioner and that, once he started doing this, the staff began treating him even more poorly and made it ‘obvious’ that they were punishing him.274 He said that staff thought that by speaking to the Commissioner for Children and Young People, the young people were ‘trying to get [them] in trouble’.275

Max explained that he did not report the abuse by other young people in detention and staff members at the Centre because he thought that no one would believe him. He recalled that a staff member had told him that making a report to the Commissioner was no use because ‘no one will believe you’.276 Max said that without surveillance footage, he had little hope:

Because there were no cameras, it was just my word against all of the youth workers. When there are three or four youth workers against one resident, people are always going to believe the youth workers. I’m a criminal and they’re government. Everyone is going to believe them. They will just see it as a kid crying wolf.277

Max told us he was also scared of the staff at the Centre and how they would react if he were to complain. He felt that the close relationships between staff members meant that they would share information or support one another.278 He felt that even telling people outside the Centre, including his Youth Justice worker or his lawyer, might result in information getting back to youth detention centre staff.279 He explained:

The staff at Ashley are all like family to each other. They all know each other from the outside. They aren’t just like work colleagues. They are family and friends or in relationships. That’s why you can’t tell anyone about another staff member. It always gets back to them and it just ends up worse in the end.280

Today, Max thinks that failing to complain about what other young people in detention and staff members did to him made him a target:

It was like they saw that I wasn’t going to be a dog, so they could do these things to me. I look back now and think that I should have done more about it so all of these things would have stopped. I should have told someone. At the time I felt like if I did tell someone I would have been treated even worse.281

More recently, Max has told the Commissioner for Children and Young People about his treatment at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and his view of the way staff at the Centre responded to his contact with our Commission of Inquiry. We discuss Max’s complaint in Case study 6.

  1. Improving youth detention

Max felt that he ‘should have [had] the right to complain’ when he was at the Centre, rather than be made to feel as though no one would take him seriously or that he would be harmed if he did so.282 He thinks that the complaints of young people in detention ‘need to be taken seriously’ and that more needs to be done to ensure problems are addressed before something serious happens or before it is too late.283

Max thinks that if Ashley Youth Detention Centre is replaced, there must be an entirely new workforce employed.284 He commented: ‘You can open a thousand centres but if you keep the same staff there the same stuff is going to happen’.285

Max hopes that there will be cameras everywhere in any youth detention centre that replaces Ashley Youth Detention Centre.286

  1. Case example: Warren
  1. Before Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Warren (a pseudonym) told us that, from a young age, he was regularly physically abused by his mother, who struggled to care for him after he was diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).287 Warren was taken from his mother’s care and made a ward of the State before he was 10 years old.288 He was placed with numerous foster families and would steal or run away from them in the hope that he would be sent home.289

  1. Admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Warren was first admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the mid-2000s when he was 13 years old.290 He was charged with theft and assault while on bail for other offences and was remanded to the Centre for four months.291 Warren said he was detained at the Centre about 21 times in the 2000s, usually for a couple of months at a time.292 The longest period he was at the Centre was for about a year, from just before he turned 18 until he was almost 19.293 Warren’s detentions at the Centre were about evenly split between him being on remand and under sentence.294

  1. Alleged abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

Warren said that initially he did not think the conditions at the Centre were too bad.295 He said he got along with some of the staff really well and that they would treat him like a human being, rather than just a criminal, and try to help him out and keep him out of trouble.296 Warren said he also learned how to read and write at the school at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and had the opportunity to learn life skills such as woodworking and being a barista.297

Warren also said that some staff would ‘bring their bad mood to work’ and would be ‘physical’ with the detainees who they did not like.298 There was also some violence among the young people detained.299 Warren said he tried to ‘keep out of stuff’ by staying in his room a lot and avoiding interactions with other people.300

Warren said he was sexually abused at the Centre for the first time when he was 14 years old.301 He recalled that it happened during his second admission while he was being searched.302 He told us that strip searches, usually conducted by two staff, were ‘degrading and abusive’.303 Warren said he was forced to strip naked in front of staff and to bend over so they could check for contraband, despite this being contrary to the procedure at the time, which stated that a person in detention only had to expose the top or the bottom half of their body at a time.304

Warren said that, starting from his third admission when he was 15 years old, he was abused in his room.305 He said that three staff members, while giving him medication, forced him to masturbate in front of them.306 Warren said that the staff would also force him to touch their penises with his hands and perform oral sex on them.307 Warren also said he was anally raped more than 20 times by one of the staff while other staff members restrained him.308 He said that the staff would withhold his medication unless he performed sexual acts on them.309 Warren was supposed to take his medication in the morning and at night. He told us that the sexual abuse would often occur in the morning, and Warren would be required to perform sexual acts on the staff or on himself while they watched, before they would give him his medication.310 He recalled that such abuse happened to him more than 50 times during his time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.311 He also told us that if he did not submit to sexual acts, ‘the guards would arrange for my family to be hurt’ or that they would ‘arrange for older and bigger inmates to bash me’.312

Warren said that staff would also physically abuse him by pinning his arms behind his back, hurting his shoulders and ramming his head against the walls.313

He said that the staff who abused him were consistently on the same shifts, working together.314 Warren recalled that the abuse continued throughout his admissions to the Centre until after he turned 18.315

Warren said he did not tell anyone what was happening to him at the time.316 He said that the staff threatened to tell other young people in detention that Warren was informing on them if he disclosed the abuse. He said they also made threats against his family to prevent him from disclosing the abuse.317

Warren recalled: ‘They would tell me that no one would believe me anyway because I was just a little criminal. I didn’t want to say anything because I was afraid of what they could do’.318

Warren stated that nobody ever really complained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre because the staff would receive the complaints and tell each other about them.319 At the time, he did not know of anyone outside the Centre to whom he could complain.320

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Warren said that since leaving the Centre he has had ‘very few achievements’ in his life and has struggled with drug use and mental health issues.321 Warren has also been in and out of prison and has attempted suicide.322 He said that many of his problems were exacerbated by the abuse he experienced at the Centre.323

He said he was almost 30 years old before he began to discuss his experiences at Ashley Youth Detention Centre with his family. He said he has recently engaged with the redress process and counselling, which he has found helpful.324

In relation to the impact of his abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Warren said: ‘I have a hard time trusting people. This makes it really hard for me to keep relationships and friendships. I tend to keep to myself and distance myself from people’.325

  1. Improving youth detention

Warren told us that many incidents of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre happened in areas that were not covered by closed-circuit television cameras.326 He thinks that the Centre, or any facility that replaces it, needs more cameras.327

Warren also said that the staff need to treat young people in detention better, be better trained and not take their problems out on the people in detention.328 He said that he never had the same problems with staff in adult prisons that he had with staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.329

Warren said there needs to be a safe way for young people in the Centre to make complaints, including having someone to speak with who visits from outside the Centre.330

  1. Case example: Charlotte
  1. Before Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Charlotte (a pseudonym) was 12 years old when she first arrived at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the early 2000s.331 At the time, Charlotte’s family was ‘very broken’.332 Her parents were in jail and Charlotte was living with their friends.333 Feeling abandoned and alone, Charlotte began running away and fell in with the wrong crowd.334 She started shoplifting and stealing cars.335

  1. Alleged abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

Charlotte described her first admission to Ashley Youth Detention Centre as ‘the worst time of my life’.336

During her first admission, Charlotte said she encountered a staff member, Edwin (a pseudonym), whom she knew from the community.337 Charlotte described Edwin as ‘very sleazy’.338 She told us that he would often touch her legs under the table and watch her while she showered.339 Edwin told Charlotte how pretty she was and that he would ‘love it if [she] were a bit older’.340 Charlotte said that Edwin’s behaviour made her ‘feel yuck’ but that she was too scared to report him because she thought her father might hurt Edwin and be sent to jail again.341 She was also concerned about what Edwin might do if she told anyone about his behaviour.342

Charlotte told us that another male staff member at Ashley Youth Detention Centre would also speak and act inappropriately towards her and a friend of hers, who was also in detention. Charlotte said that this staff member would be ‘really sleazy, touching our breasts and stuff like that’.343 She said that on one occasion, he wrote the words ‘bite me’ across her friend’s chest.344 A female staff member witnessed the incident and reported it.345 Charlotte wanted to speak to the team leader at Ashley Youth Detention Centre about what had happened, but it was several days before she and her friend could. The team leader shrugged the matter off and responded that the male staff member was no longer at the Centre.346 Charlotte told us she later found out that the staff member had not been fired. The staff member who had witnessed the assault confirmed to Charlotte that nothing had been done.347 Charlotte said neither she nor her friend heard anything more about the matter from the Centre’s management or the police.348 Charlotte said she was hurt by the lack of response. She recalled: ‘We went to tell someone what happened and nobody cared. We were only little kids’.349

Charlotte said that her first admission at Ashley Youth Detention Centre had a significant effect on her.350 When she was released, Charlotte went to live with friends who had also been detained at the Centre.351 She began using speed regularly and drinking heavily.352 She was worried that Edwin would hurt her if she said anything about what had happened at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.353

When Charlotte returned to Ashley Youth Detention Centre a second time, Edwin’s behaviour was much worse.354 Charlotte recalled that, on several occasions, Edwin told her that he ‘couldn’t wait’ to go offsite with Charlotte so he could ‘do some good things to [her]’.355

Charlotte described Edwin as being ‘very close’ with the male detainees and said that he was known for turning a blind eye to their behaviour.356 Charlotte recalled that Edwin would regularly bring in cannabis and cigarettes for young people in detention.357

On one occasion, Charlotte recalled that Edwin and other staff at the Centre left Charlotte unsupervised with several young people, including older boys.358 This was not an isolated occurrence. Charlotte recalled that she was regularly left unsupervised with older boys for more than an hour at a time.359 She told us that, on this occasion, she was sexually abused by an older boy.360

Charlotte felt unable to report the abuse because she was sure that friends of the older boy who assaulted her would harm her if she did.361 Charlotte also felt that even if she did report it, nothing would be done because the young person was a long-term detainee and favoured by staff.362 Charlotte also said that the staff member responsible for supervision at the time she was detained ‘was known to turn a blind eye to pretty much anything’.363 To keep herself safe, Charlotte isolated herself in her room and her unit.364 She was depressed and regularly self-harmed.365

Charlotte told us she was sexually abused a second time by an older boy from the Centre during an excursion away from the premises.366 These excursions were common near the end of a young person’s sentence and often took place in very remote outdoor places.367 On this occasion, Charlotte was the only girl in a group of six male young people and supervised only by Edwin.368 Charlotte said she tried to scream when she was being abused, but no one came to help her.369 Charlotte did not report the abuse. She explained:

I just had to leave it like that because, if I said anything, [the older boy] would have got other girls in there to bash me that were in there, and if I said anything to Centre staff, obviously nothing was working anyway, so I just had to keep it to myself.370

Charlotte was in her mid to late teens when she was admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre a third time.371 On one occasion during her third admission, staff locked Charlotte and other girls in their cells because they were misbehaving.372 Staff demanded that Charlotte hand over a lighter that she had, threatening to strip search her if she did not hand it over.373 Charlotte said she had been strip searched before and was scared about it happening again, so she set fire to her cell and cut her wrists.374 The fire was ultimately extinguished by the building’s sprinkler system.375 Charlotte said that even though the staff could see her covered in blood in the shower (through a viewing panel in the door), they left her alone in her room for four days in her wet clothes, with no bedding and little food.376

Eventually, Charlotte was given new clothes and locked down for another week.377 Upset and confused, Charlotte attempted suicide again.378 Charlotte told us that a staff member came into her room after her suicide attempt and slammed her head against the bed base, cutting her scalp.379 Charlotte told us the staff member said that Charlotte ‘deserved it’, that she was ‘a little bitch that needed a flogging’ and that she was ‘making more paperwork’ for the staff.380

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Charlotte said that, upon exiting the Centre after her third admission, she reported some of her experiences to her probation officer.381 Charlotte left Tasmania soon after and, as far as she is aware, her reports were never addressed.382

Charlotte has struggled with anxiety, depression and drug use throughout her teenage years and adult life.383 She is uncomfortable around men and often reacts with fear when somebody touches her.384 Charlotte attributes these difficulties to the abuse she suffered at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. She explained:

If it wasn’t for how they treated me, I wouldn’t be where I am today; using drugs to cover up how I feel and try to forget what happened.

So many times, I’ve tried to kill myself because of what happened at Ashley. I have lost count.385

  1. Improving youth detention

Charlotte thinks that more support should be available to children in detention, including giving young people access to somebody to speak to.386 She feels that she received more support of this kind in adult prisons than she ever received as a 12-year-old at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.387

Charlotte thinks that more cultural support for Aboriginal children, like her, would have made a difference.388

Charlotte also noted the lack of educational support she received at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, stating that she still struggles to read and write.389

  1. Case example: Fred
  1. Before Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Fred (a pseudonym) told us he had a tumultuous childhood. He recalled that his father was abusive and physically assaulted Fred and his siblings.390 Fred’s parents separated before he was 10 years old, and he then spent several years moving around the country living with various family members.391

Fred had substance abuse issues from his early teens.392 He told us that, when he was in his mid-teens, his stepfather took out a family violence order against him, and Fred had to move out of the house. Fred became homeless.393

  1. Admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Fred was in his late teens when he was first admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the mid-2000s.

He was charged with stealing a car and remanded in custody because he was homeless and, therefore, could not give the court a fixed bail address.394 Fred spent three months on remand in the Centre. He was then given bail and released for six months to an independent living placement organised by Ashley Youth Detention Centre.395 Fred was eventually sentenced to serve another three months’ detention on the same charges. Despite having turned 18 by this time, Fred was sent back to the Centre because he had been charged when he was a child.396

Fred was placed in the Franklin Unit at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, which he said housed the young people whom the staff had the most trouble controlling.397 While Fred was not violent, he believes that he was housed in the Franklin Unit because he would ‘push the guard’s buttons’.398

  1. Alleged abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Fred told us he was subjected to numerous strip searches on each of his admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre. For every strip search, Fred recalled that he had to strip completely naked. Fred told us that he was often restrained by staff during these searches and subjected to intrusive physical search techniques.399 Fred recalled three or four staff holding him down, putting their knees on him, running their fingers along his buttocks and genitals, taking off his clothing and asking him to ‘squat and cough’ as part of searches.400

Fred described being strip searched when staff suspected that he had received drugs during a visit, although nothing was found.401 Fred recalled that the staff began threatening him in an attempt to make him hand over the contraband and comply with the search, with one staff member saying, ‘I know where your parents live’ and ‘we’ll make your time harder’.402 Fred said that the strip searches made him feel belittled and disgusting; he described them as ‘harrowing’.403

Fred told us that violence between the young people at the Centre occurred daily in the Franklin Unit and that it was often encouraged by staff at the Centre, who did little to stop the fights that broke out.404 Fred said that the young people in the Franklin Unit called the unit the ‘gladiator pit’ because it felt like the staff treated fights between them as a sport.405 In Fred’s experience, the Franklin Unit staff waited until a fight was almost over, or until there were more staff present, before taking any action to stop the fighting.406

Fred said that on at least two separate occasions he was violently abused by other young people while staff stood by and watched. He said staff then punished him, although he was the victim of the abuse, because he was ‘an annoyance to the unit’.407

Fred told us he was also subjected to physical abuse by the staff. He said the staff, who were physically bigger than Fred and most other young people in the Centre, would hit Fred on the back of his head, push him and jump on him.408 Fred recalled that once, when some young people from Fred’s activity group escaped from the Centre, staff handcuffed him and screamed at him to ‘interrogate’ him for information about the other boys’ whereabouts. He said this reminded him of interrogations shown in films.409

Fred told us he witnessed physical and sexual abuse perpetrated against other young people at the Centre. He said he saw a young person at the Centre being raped by another young person, a young person being bashed by other young people, and a staff member dragging a female young person naked from the shower by her hair before placing her on the ground and cuffing her.410 Fred said that staff generally treated the young people in the Centre roughly, including the younger children who were detained.411

  1. Reporting abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

While he was at the Centre, Fred made two written complaints about the misconduct of staff. He said the process for making a written complaint was to ask for a complaint form, fill it out and then slide the complaint under his cell door for a passing staff member to collect.412 Fred told us that neither of his complaints were acknowledged by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff or gave rise to any follow-up action. Fred said that, after he slid the complaints under his door, he never saw nor heard about the complaints again.413

Fred said that he learned he should not speak out or complain because, if he did say something, staff and other young people at the Centre would ‘come after him’.414 Shortly after he made his second complaint, Fred was moved from Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Risdon Prison. Fred said that staff at the Centre told him that being sent to Risdon was his 18th birthday present.415

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

The effect of the abuse Fred endured at Ashley Youth Detention Centre has been significant and ongoing. Fred said he suffers from poor mental health in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as panic attacks. He feels that his experiences caused him to lose trust in authority figures such as police, prison guards and alcohol and drug counsellors.416 Fred believes that the physical and sexual abuse he and others suffered at Ashley Youth Detention Centre should not happen to any child:

The things that happened to me at Ashley and the things I saw have affected my mental health. I have flashbacks. These things shouldn’t happen to kids, regardless of how naughty we were or how tough we acted. Especially kids that were younger than me.417

Fred believes that his time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and in the youth justice system failed to address his behaviours. Instead, he said his experiences contributed to him falling into a life of crime: ‘They never addressed my behaviours. All I did at Ashley was learn how to be a criminal and meet people who led me further down the wrong track’.418

  1. Improving youth detention

Fred thinks that the Tasmanian Government should move towards a model of managing offending behaviour in children through rehabilitation rather than punitive incarceration.419 He notes that Tasmania has the highest rate of recidivism among young people in youth detention in Australia and he has no doubt this is due, at least in part, to how Ashley Youth Detention Centre treats its young offenders.420

Fred firmly believes that Ashley Youth Detention Centre must be closed:

[The Government should] just close this place down and start again, because it’s not—it’s systemic, it’s grown in that environment. You won’t ever get rid of it by putting in new staff members or changing things: tear the place down and start again, the memories are too— just appalling.421

  1. Case example: Oscar
  1. Admission to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Oscar (a pseudonym) first went to Ashley Youth Detention Centre on remand for a few months in the mid-2000s when he was 14 or 15 years old.422 He spent another three months on remand at the Centre about a year after his first admission.423

  1. Alleged harmful sexual behaviours at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

During his first admission to the Centre, Oscar was initially placed with boys he knew from the community.424 He was then moved to a unit with boys he did not know.425 Oscar recalled that on his second day in the new unit, he went to do some laundry and was physically and sexually abused by five boys.426 Oscar said that a staff member at the Centre was present and watched the abuse.427 When Oscar asked for the staff member’s help, Oscar recalled that the staff member ‘just laughed’.428 Eventually, the boys stopped abusing Oscar. Oscar said the staff member did not say anything about the abuse that had just occurred; he just told Oscar to go back to his room.429

Oscar remained in the unit with the same boys.430 They continued to bully him, hit him when no one was looking and take his canteen food. Oscar explained that he felt like he was walking on eggshells all the time. The guards were aware of what was happening but would just turn a blind eye’.431

Oscar recalled that when the other boys in the unit found out he was receiving a visitor, they pressured him to have drugs and money brought into the Centre for them.432 Oscar said that they threatened that if he didn’t do this, ‘they would bash the shit out of [him]’.433

Oscar said that he never spoke to anyone about the abuse he suffered from other young people detained at the Centre, and he never made a complaint: ‘I didn’t know how to make a complaint and was worried about what would happen if I did. I also didn’t want to be a snitch’.434

  1. Alleged abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

At a visit during his first admission at the Centre, Oscar was given $20, which staff found after Oscar had initially denied being given anything after he left the visitation room.435 After they found the $20, Oscar told staff that he had not been given anything else during the visit; however, he said they replied: ‘We know you’re lying to us and you’ve got other stuff’.436 Oscar said that staff indicated that they thought Oscar had something hidden in his anus.437 He recalled that he was then locked in a room near the visitation area that only had a bucket and a desk in it, and he was left there all day:

At end of the day, they came in and asked me if I’d taken a shit in the bucket. I said I wouldn’t go in the bucket. After I refused, they scruffed me and held me down. Then one of the workers who had a glove on stuck his finger up my arse. He said ‘I know you’ve got something in here’. Afterwards, they took me back to my room and locked me in there for the rest of the night and the next day.438

Oscar said that he was ‘upset and pissed off’ after the incident and that he knew the way he had been treated was wrong.439 Oscar did not want to make a complaint because he ‘didn’t know who [he] could trust’ and was worried what would happen to him if he told the ‘wrong’ person, because the same staff would always be on the same shifts together.440 At the time of giving his evidence to our Commission of Inquiry, Oscar still did not want to name the staff involved in that, or any other, incident.441

Oscar recalled being regularly strip searched during his time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, including at admission and after court and visits.442 The searches would be done in the admissions area, with two staff members watching Oscar: one in front of him and one behind.443 Oscar also recalled that staff would search his room if they thought he was hiding something.444 If they did not find anything, they would strip search Oscar in his room’s shower bay.445 Oscar said that during these searches, staff members would sometimes ask him to move his genitals; at other times they would do it themselves.446 Oscar said that he ‘thought it was wrong for them to touch [him]’.447 Oscar thought he was strip searched in his room like this four or five times while he was at the Centre.448

Oscar also recalled being locked in his room on two occasions as punishment for fighting.449 He said staff would lock him in his room all day and night, only allowing him out once to make a phone call and then making him go to bed at 5.30 pm.450

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Looking back on his experience at the Centre, Oscar said that he does not trust or get along with many people because of the way he was treated there.451 Oscar said he tries not to think about what happened to him because it upsets him, and he does not like to talk about it; he is trying to get on with his life.452

  1. Improving youth detention

Oscar said there needs to be better background checks on people who are hired to work at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.453 He said he believes that some of the staff at the Centre should not have been looking after kids.454 Oscar said he was always worried about what staff members would do if he complained or spoke up about what happened there.455

Oscar said he thinks that places such as Ashley Youth Detention Centre should focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment:

Kids that are in trouble need help to change their behaviours and get a start in life. They should be put into programs and helped to get a job. They shouldn’t just be locked up in an institution. Being at Ashley didn’t help me in any way. It didn’t teach me anything or help me change my behaviours one bit. If anything it made me worse due to the things that happened there and the people I was in with.456

  1. Case example: Simon
  1. Admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Simon (a pseudonym) was admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre seven or eight times from the early to mid-2000s.457 Simon was only 10 years old when he was first admitted, on remand for stealing.458

On the first and each later admission, Simon was detained at the Centre because he was denied bail, remanded in custody and sentenced while he was at the Centre.459

  1. Alleged abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

Simon told us that strip searches were regularly conducted at the Centre—every time he was admitted, every time he went to and from court, and during random searches of his room.460 He said that during these searches he had to be naked in front of the staff searching him.461

Simon said that, during one search, after he had removed his clothes as requested, the staff asked him to pull his buttocks apart and told him that they would need to hold him down to search him.462 Simon said he refused and asked the staff to perform a ‘normal’ search instead.463 He said that three staff members then came into the room, wrestled him to the ground and spread his buttocks, before putting him in an observation room known as ‘the fish tank’.464 Simon told us that, decades later, he still thinks about that search, how it made him feel abused and how it should never have happened to a child.465

Simon said that he was regularly physically abused by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff, often for minor transgressions such as refusing to go back to his room.466 Simon told us that staff often responded disproportionately to the actions of the young people in detention; for example, not going to bed on time or ‘slipping up [and] doing something simple like a kid does’ would lead them to be ‘smashed up’.467 He recalled that staff regularly left him with bruises and grazes.468 He said that, as well as physically abusing him, staff often called him names such as ‘little cunt’, which distressed him.469 Simon told us that he was subjected to verbal abuse ‘all the time’ while at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.470

Simon further recalled staff acting inappropriately towards other young people detained at the Centre. For example, he said that an older staff member would regularly sit and watch young people shower through a viewing panel intended for suicide prevention.471 Simon said that the staff member became so notorious for this behaviour that he earned the nickname ‘dirty old dog’ from some young people.472

Simon said he was placed in isolation at the Centre two or three times.473 He recalled being put into isolation as punishment, sometimes for minor transgressions.474 Simon said he remembers the experience as ‘the coldest thing in [his] life that [he has] ever been through’, and that it was so cold that it ‘felt like it was snowing’.475 He was only given a horse blanket for warmth.476 He recalled that, on one occasion, he spent two and a half weeks in isolation.477

Simon said he generally did not complain about poor conditions and poor treatment while he was in the Centre because he was afraid that the staff might physically abuse him if he did.478 He said that, on the occasions he did complain about things the staff did to him, he felt he was not believed because he was a ‘criminal’ going up against the State.479

When Simon was aged 17, he was remanded for robbing a house.480 When he was told that he was going back to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, he asked to be sent to Risdon Prison instead because he believed he would receive better treatment there.481 Simon is now in his 30s and has spent more than 15 years of his life in the youth justice and prison system.482

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Simon said that his experiences at Ashley Youth Detention Centre have affected him into adulthood and he feels they have contributed to his long history of incarceration. He told us that the young people detained at the Centre could not defend or protect themselves and were not appropriately supported to improve themselves. He explained:

We were only kids and we couldn’t stick up for ourselves. The guards and workers at Ashley were disgusting. I’ve been in [and] out of jail all my life. I was never taught right or wrong to help me change. I was just abused. I don’t want what happened to me happening to another kid.483

  1. Improving youth detention

Simon said he believes that children and young people who get into trouble should be helped and educated, not punished.484 He said:

There needs to be a better place for kids who get in trouble to be sent. A place where the kids actually get help to change their behaviour. Somewhere that makes them realise there are better things out there in life. Kids can’t stick up for themselves and should be helped …485

Simon said that Ashley Youth Detention Centre could introduce courses and programs to help young people rehabilitate and he believes that he might not be stuck in the prison system now if he had been given that opportunity—he would have had a chance to lead a ‘normal’ life.486

He said Ashley Youth Detention Centre should not be converted into an adult prison after its planned closure, because there is a significant number of adults in prison who spent time at the Centre when they were younger and were assaulted or sexually abused there.487 Simon said he is concerned that if those adults were sent to a prison on the same site, it could trigger past trauma. He worries that: ‘They will put their head down on their pillow at night and think about what happened to them as kids. They will have flashbacks. The whole place should just go’.488

Simon said he thinks the Centre should close as soon as possible to avoid causing trauma to more children. He explained: ‘I want them to realise they can’t treat kids like they did. I don’t want other kids to be put [through] what I went [through]. I think the place should be shut down now’.489

  1. Case example: Erin
  1. Admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

When Erin (a pseudonym) was 14 years old, she was living in a women’s shelter after acting up at school and becoming estranged from her mother.490 Erin’s behaviour escalated quickly; she was arrested for stealing and remanded at Hobart Remand Centre (now Hobart Reception Prison) in the mid-2010s.491 She recalled that the court ‘didn’t know what to do’ with her; a placement in foster care, in a shelter or living with her parents were not seen as suitable options for Erin.492 After two days at the Hobart Remand Centre, Erin was sent to Ashley Youth Detention Centre on remand for three months.493

Erin told us that she was initially comforted by the idea of leaving the Hobart Remand Centre and going to the Centre. She said: ‘I was relieved. I thought going there would provide me with some security. I thought Ashley would be better, but it turned out to be worse’.494

After her first admission, Erin was admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre another three times.

  1. Alleged abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

Erin said she was strip searched by male staff on her arrival and placed in the female unit.495 The male detainees yelled at her and banged on her windows.496 She said she later learned that the males in detention could watch her through the staff office that separated the girls’ unit from the boys’ unit.497

Erin told us that ‘if the guards didn’t like you, they would do things like leave you in your cell on the weekend’.498 She said she was once ‘unit bound’ for a week and only allowed out for an hour or two a day.499 She stated that this experience has left her traumatised.500

Erin recalled frequent strip searches by male staff, during which she would be naked.501 Erin said she was strip searched each time she was admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre and before and after going to court.502 She said she was also subjected to random strip searches.503 Erin said she was often strip searched by multiple male staff, who told her they all had to be there for her safety, but Erin felt they treated the strip searches ‘like a show’.504 She described the experience as ‘totally violating’.505 Erin said that she was never given the option of being strip searched by female staff.506 Erin said that at the time she thought the strip search procedure was normal because she had had the same experience at the Hobart Remand Centre.507

Erin described the environment at the Centre as ‘hostile’.508 She said she regularly saw staff physically abuse male detainees.509 Erin described staff members’ attitudes and behaviours towards her as more ‘manipulative’.510 She recalled that staff members would intentionally cause her to miss meals, leave her in her cell on the weekends and regularly make offensive or inappropriate comments about her body.511 Erin described being ‘treated like an object’ by staff.512 She said that during her detention she was never provided with a bra, was not allowed tampons and was only provided with a certain number of sanitary pads at a time.513 Erin reflected that ‘[t]here were no rights or dignity. It was disgusting’.514

Erin told us that, about a month after arriving at the Centre, she was feeling unwell and was worried she had appendicitis.515 She said she told a male staff member and asked to see the nurse.516 Instead of arranging access to a nurse, she said the male staff member told her to lift her top up, felt around her lower abdomen and drew a shape near her hip, telling Erin it was a ‘happy appendix’.517 Feeling violated and that his actions were ‘creepy’, Erin reported the incident to a female staff member, who advised Erin to report it to the Ombudsman.518

Erin told us that the same male staff member entered her room to collect sheets while she was showering, despite Erin’s request that he send a female staff member to collect the sheets, or that he waited until she finished showering.519

Erin reported these incidents to the Ombudsman, who responded by letter two weeks later, stating that the matter would be resolved by Ashley Youth Detention Centre management.520 An internal investigation by management found that the male staff member had not displayed ‘inappropriate intent’ in either case, but that he should have known his actions might make Erin ‘feel uncomfortable and even potentially unsafe’.521

Erin said nobody at the Centre spoke to her about her complaint, she did not receive any counselling or other supports, and she was not notified of any outcomes.522 Erin said that she heard from another staff member that the male staff member was placed on two weeks’ paid leave as a result of her complaint, but that this was never confirmed for her by the Ombudsman or by the Centre’s management. We discuss the management of Erin’s complaint to the Ombudsman further in Case study 7.523

Erin told us that when the male staff member returned from leave, she had to continue engaging with him and that he was ‘never nice to [her] again’.524 She said that other staff were angry at her for reporting the incidents, calling her a ‘dog’ and a ‘drama queen’.525 This made Erin feel as though complaining only created problems:

After this I felt like it was pointless making complaints or speaking up. I learned that you don’t say anything in Ashley, it was more trouble than what it was worth. I would describe the staff at Ashley as being like a pack of animals. Some of them had been working there for 30 years. They all went to school together. They were all from Deloraine, which was a small country town. They all looked after each other.526

  1. Alleged harmful sexual behaviours at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

There were few girls at Ashley Youth Detention Centre when Erin was detained. She said that this meant she was often in the company of males in detention when taking part in educational or therapeutic programs.527 Erin said that, on one occasion, she was left unsupervised in a room with 10 males in detention and was sexually abused.528 She said that it ‘was probably only 2 or 3 minutes but it was enough time for them to do significant damage’.529

Erin said she shared what happened to her with another young woman in detention, who then told a female staff member.530 Erin said that although she asked the staff member not to tell anyone, the staff member reported the incident to management.531 Erin said she was not offered counselling support or medical treatment, and no one else from the Centre spoke to her about the incident.532 Instead, she was released a few days later.533

Erin returned to Ashley Youth Detention Centre some weeks later on a charge of stealing.534 She said she was told that the boy who had been predominantly responsible for the sexual abuse during her previous admission had gotten into trouble.535 Once Erin arrived, the boy’s friends began threatening her and she was confined to her room for her safety.536 She said she also felt targeted by the staff members who had been reprimanded for allowing the incident to occur.537 She said this treatment reinforced her view that it was better to stay silent. Erin reflected:

I wasn’t offered any support or protection to help me deal with all of this. There was no-one there to support me. This again confirmed to me that you don’t say anything at Ashley. If things happen you don’t talk, you just go along with it.538

Erin was admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre two more times, each time for breaching her bail conditions.539 She said that sexual abuse by male detainees continued during these admissions.540 Erin told us that staff were aware of what was occurring but that ‘they just accepted it’, enabling the boys to get away with what they wanted.541 Erin recalled that she was regularly forced to perform sexual acts on males in detention during scheduled programs while staff members watched.542 Erin said that eventually she was placed on the contraceptive pill and recalled that she visited the nurse’s office each day to receive it.543

Erin said she never tried to report sexual abuse again:

I went along with doing these things because I just thought it was easier. I believed that if I didn’t, I would get my head kicked in. It was easier to comply. I didn’t make complaints to the staff because I knew if I did things would get worse. Again, I was fearful of being physically assaulted.544

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Erin said that, after leaving the Centre, she tried to forget her experiences by using alcohol and drugs.545 Erin has post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression and low self-esteem. She struggles to trust men, which affects her personal relationships and her children.546

Erin said she attributes her poor mental health and wellbeing to the way she was sexualised and sexually abused at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.547 Reflecting on the impact of her abuse, Erin stated:

Ashley made me feel like it was normal and it was okay for men to treat me like that. It made me believe that it was what I was used for. I have had horrendous things happen to me that I have just thought I deserved. I believed that it was normal for these things to happen because that’s how I was treated at such a young age. Before I went to Ashley, I was never exposed to sexual abuse.548

  1. Improving youth detention

Erin expressed her view that Ashley Youth Detention Centre would be much safer for young women in detention if they were kept separate from males in detention, if there were more female staff, and if staff were better trained.549

Erin said that children should not be detained for minor offences and that alternative options to institutional detention, such as home detention, are needed.550

She also said that a commitment to therapeutic-based systems must be more than mere words; it needs to be evident in the systems and processes in place at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or any new youth justice facility.551 She recalled that Ashley Youth Detention Centre was said to be operating a ‘therapeutic model’ when she suffered abuse there.552 She said: ‘Building a new centre and putting a ribbon on it isn’t going to change anything. They need to break it right down and make sure it changes’.553

  1. Case example: Jane
  1. Before Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Jane’s youngest daughter Ada (both pseudonyms) was bubbly, outgoing and well liked for most of her primary school education.554 Jane told us that Ada became uncontrollable soon after she started her schooling in Tasmania in the late 1990s, aged 11.555 Ada spent much of her time trying to fit in with older kids, smoking, drinking and not attending school.556

Jane reached out to the Department of Education for assistance, hoping they could encourage Ada to go to school.557 However, Jane said that the departmental employees sent to speak with her and Ada told Ada to ‘not worry about schooling’ and to ‘focus on [her other] problems instead’.558

Jane became concerned that she could no longer keep Ada safe and in school.559 She described feeling ‘betrayed’ after she sought help from the Department of Education and two social workers who visited told Ada not to worry about school and to focus on addressing other problems.560 She was later told by the Department of Education that the social workers were students and that the Department considered Ada’s non-attendance a serious concern.561 Jane recalled that, after finding Ada’s behaviour uncontrollable and fearing for her safety, she decided to ‘get welfare involved’.562 She described being assisted to put together an application and ultimately applied to make Ada a ward of the State when Ada was aged 12.563 At around this time, a psychological assessment found that Ada’s behaviour was consistent with that of a primary alcoholic.564

  1. Admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

The same year, while she was a ward of the State, Ada was admitted to hospital with severe alcohol poisoning.565 Jane said that, after five days in hospital, Ada’s behaviour was deemed too problematic for the hospital to manage, and Child and Family Services approved Ada’s transfer to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.566 While Jane told us that Ada was admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, we understood her to mean that Ada was admitted to the former Ashley Home for Boys (which was the relevant institution at this time). Jane recalled that Ada’s Child and Family Services’ case workers agreed that this transfer ‘wasn’t right’ but explained to Jane that Ada had been moved to the Centre because there was nowhere else for her to stay while they considered what to do with her.567

The Department told us Ada was admitted to the Centre under section 39(7) of the Child Welfare Act 1960.568 We were told the decision to admit Ada was made to address her complex behavioural and medical needs, was based on expert recommendations and was not a decision that was taken lightly.569

Jane told us that Ada resisted being transported to Ashley Youth Detention Centre and was therefore restrained during the trip.570 Jane said that, once at the Centre, Ada was placed in a single cell with other young people. Jane’s recollection was that Ada was subjected to the same rules, such as rules relating to isolation and searches, despite not having been charged with any crime.571 We were told that Ada was the only female young person detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre at the time.572

Ada was detained at the Centre on and off in the late 1990s and 2000s. Her first admission lasted around two and a half months.573 Jane told us that, eventually, Ada was transported every day from Ashley Youth Detention Centre to a house, where she was cared for by a case worker or a foster carer. She was then transported back to the Centre every night.574 Jane recalled she was not allowed to visit Ada during her first admission but visited her at the day home.575

Ada was placed with a foster family full-time.576 A couple of weeks into that placement, Ada ran away for several days until Jane tracked her down and convinced her to go back to the foster home.577 In response to her running away, Child and Family Services decided that Ada would be detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre again each night for two weeks and returned to her foster family during the day.578

After Ada left Ashley Youth Detention Centre, she returned to Jane’s care. Ada was later charged with burglary offences and put on a probation order, with conditions that included not drinking alcohol.579 The only support the State offered Ada for her alcoholism was counselling. However, Jane stated that Ada, then 13 years old, was left to decide whether she would access counselling.580 Ada soon breached her probation and was sentenced to a few months’ detention.581

Jane believes the State set Ada up for failure by neglecting to give her the tools she needed to comply with her probation order. Jane said: ‘[Ada] had a major drinking problem and they didn’t put anything else in place to help her stop. All of these rules had been set up that she would never be able to comply with’.582

Jane believes what happened to Ada at Ashley Youth Detention Centre is Ada’s story to share, not Jane’s.583 While Jane does not know all the details, Ada has told Jane she had some ‘bad times’ at the Centre, that she had to be ‘tough’ when she was there, and that she had to ‘fend off some older boys’, including males over the age of 18.584 Ada also told Jane that the increasing number of older people being detained, especially people over the age of 18, created a ‘hierarchy’ based on age groups and resulted in the older kids causing trouble.585 While Jane thinks there was more supervision for Ada because she was the only girl at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, she believes the Centre was an entirely unsuitable place for a vulnerable child.586

  1. Out of home care

Jane told us the State’s decisions for Ada were often inconsistent and poorly communicated to Ada.587 Jane described one instance where Child and Family Services told Ada she would be placed in independent living on release from Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Jane told us Child and Family Services then changed its mind a week before Ada was released and instead transferred Ada to a women’s shelter.588 Jane said these changes were confusing for Ada, would cause Ada to get angry or upset, and in Jane’s opinion, set Ada back.589

Jane thinks Ada was not supported well enough as a ward of the State. She described how, on one occasion, when Ada was released from youth detention at the age of 14, Ada had to make her own arrangements to be picked up from the Centre because Child and Family Services had not put any transit arrangements in place for her.590

Jane also feels there was poor communication and coordination between the different services with which Ada interacted, including Child and Family Services, the Department of Education, the Department of Justice and police.591 Jane was particularly frustrated by the State’s failure to support Ada in her education:

They just didn’t have the facilities to deal with kids like [Ada] and as a result the system was failing them. There was never a push to get [Ada] back into school. The education department had told her to sort her issues out and not worry about school. There was no education under the care of [Child and Family Services] and as a result [Ada] didn’t complete primary school.592

Jane recalled that Child and Family Services allowed Ada to do things that Jane and Ada’s foster carers would not, given her young age.593 For example, Jane was aware that Child and Family Services would buy cigarettes for Ada when she was in her early teens.594 On one occasion, Jane told us that Child and Family Services gave Ada permission and spending money to go on a two-day trip with a female and three males who were much older than her.595 When Jane confronted Child and Family Services about this, she was told that the trip had been approved because one of the males, a 19-year-old, had a driver’s licence.596 Jane felt that Child and Family Services failed to listen to or consult her about Ada’s care, and let Ada do things that she didn’t have the maturity to do.597

  1. Improving youth detention and out of home care

Jane thought that by making Ada a ward of the State, Ada would be safe and educated.598 Looking back, Jane feels betrayed by Child and Family Services’ decisions to treat Ada like a detainee even though, for much of her time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, she had not been charged with any crime.599 Ada now battles an addiction to methamphetamine, which Jane attributes to Ada being caught up in ‘the system’ and spending time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.600

Jane wants the Tasmanian Government to reduce its reliance on the criminal justice system to work with young people who have complex needs, in favour of alternative interventions and prioritising education.601 Jane would also like the Government to focus on addressing the cause of youth offending, such as treating Ada’s alcoholism.602

Jane also believes the various Tasmanian Government departments responsible for children and the out of home care, education and youth justice systems must work together in a child-centred way. She said:

… these are youth that need help, you know, but [through] a combination of all the services working together and [communicating] … [Ada] didn’t finish primary school and she hasn’t got an education, and she was extremely bright but she just didn’t get that education that I would have liked for her and I think there could have been a lot more done about that.603

  1. Case example: Otis
  1. Admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Otis (a pseudonym) was detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre twice in the early 2010s.604 He was 16 or 17 years old when he was first detained and 17 years old when he was detained a second time. In total, he was detained for several months.605

  1. Alleged abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

Otis recalled being regularly strip searched at the Centre—on each admission and before and after leaving the Centre’s premises.606 During searches, Otis said staff required him to be naked and instructed him to squat or ‘stand like [he was] riding a motorbike’.607 Otis recalled that staff would then perform an intrusive cavity search, including putting their fingers in his anus.608 Otis said that if he did not comply with instructions, the staff would hold him down to perform the search and that they sometimes deliberately made it more painful and more sexual.609 It appeared to Otis that some staff enjoyed strip searching him.610 Otis recalled that because the strip searches occurred so regularly at the Centre,[at] the time I just thought the searches were part of what goes on. I thought it was normal. I didn’t realise it was illegal like I do now’.611

Otis said that, on his second admission to the Centre, he was placed in a unit with young people who were afforded more privileges than most because they were well behaved.612 These young people were offered extra comforts such as DVD players in their rooms and more exercise time.613 The unit was not as heavily supervised as other units, and it received more funding.614 At the start of Otis’s admission, the unit did not have any closed-circuit television cameras.615

Otis told us that his first experience of sexual abuse was from staff working in that unit, after he opted to stay in his room instead of going to a class, to avoid problems he was having with other young people.616 Otis said that a staff member entered Otis’ room and told him that he would need to do the staff member ‘a favour’ for letting him stay out of class.617 Otis said that the staff member then made Otis perform oral sex on him and told Otis that ‘it was a secret and he’d look after [Otis] if [Otis] kept it a secret’.618 Otis recalled that the staff member also told him that if he did not keep it a secret, the staff member would tell the other young people in detention that Otis had ‘dobbed’ on the other boys.619

Otis told us that, after this first incident, he experienced further sexual abuse at the hands of other staff at the Centre.620 He recalled being made to perform sexual acts on staff and engage in sexual intercourse with staff in his room, in a storeroom, during relaxation therapy group sessions and outside his unit on the Centre’s grounds.621 Otis said that usually, when he was sexually abused, it was just him and the abusing staff member.622 Otis also recalled a ‘gang of perpetrators’ that he described as having a ‘gang mentality’.623

Otis also recalled being sexually abused by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff during weekly excursions away from the Centre, and witnessing staff sexually abusing other young people in detention during these excursions.624 Otis said that the abuse started happening outside their rooms, in storerooms or on excursions once cameras were installed in the unit where he was detained.625

On some occasions, Otis and other young people were taken off the Centre’s grounds to perform community service.626 Otis said that the staff member accompanying them took advantage of this time to sexually abuse them.627 He told us that, when he was taken off site during the early 2010s, he would be separated from the group, held in a car and sexually abused.628 He said because there was no oversight, staff ‘would get away with an extreme amount of shit’.629 Otis described yelling out to another staff member for help following an incident of sexual abuse when he was left alone with one particular staff member when off site.630 Otis told us that, in response, this staff member physically assaulted Otis and urinated on him.631 Otis said that staff would also threaten to leave a young person off the grounds or to tell the Centre’s management that the young person had ‘run away’ if they did not submit to the abuse.632

Otis said that he and other young people in detention were bribed with cigarettes and alcohol to stay quiet, and they were physically abused if they complained about the sexual abuse.633 Otis said that it was well known among the young people in detention that going ‘off-property’ would mean being sexually abused, but that they would come back with cigarettes for everyone.634

Otis recalled being sexually abused almost every time he was taken off-property.635

  1. Reporting abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Otis said he felt he could not share the details of his abuse with anyone at the Centre because it would affect his living conditions; the staff who sexually abused him were in control of his television time, his bedtime and his life.636 He told us that he wanted to stay in his more relaxed unit at the Centre and he was aware that, because he was aged 17 at the time, he had to be well behaved to avoid being transferred to the adult Risdon Prison.637 Otis said that, when the staff were not content with the sexual acts he was performing, they became physically violent and threatened to take away his bedding or his canteen privileges.638 Otis believed that his fear of retribution and, in turn, his lack of retaliation, caused staff to continue to sexually abuse him.639

Otis said he had heard that young people in detention at Ashley Youth Detention Centre were suffering sexual abuse long before he was admitted to the Centre.640 He said that sexual abuse was embedded in the everyday behaviour of the place.641 He said that the young people in detention knew not to ‘dob’ on anyone:

We … had a code in Ashley that you don’t dob anyone in. The [staff] knew that we had this code, so they knew that we wouldn’t speak up. I think they treated us the way they did to show us that they had all the power, and that we had none.642

Otis said he eventually reported the abuse to a psychologist at the Centre, although he did not share all the details of his sexual abuse.643 Otis recalled that the psychologist did not believe him and accused him of being a compulsive liar.644 He said the psychologist told him not to tell his family about his abuse.645

At the time, Otis did not tell his family about the abuse. Otis said: ‘I couldn’t tell mum about what was happening, and I still haven’t been able to tell her some stuff to this day. I got myself into Ashley because I wanted to be a cool kid and do crime. I just didn’t expect this stuff to happen’.646

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Otis said that after being sexually abused at the Centre, he has been confused about his sexuality because he felt that he ‘accepted’ the abuse from male staff.647 For example, Otis would sometimes offer himself up to go off-property or to the storeroom, where he knew he would be sexually abused, in the place of a younger person who had not been at Ashley Youth Detention Centre before.648 Otis said he was prepared to endure the abuse rather than watch others go through it.649

Otis said he also continues to feel distressed by the death of a fellow young person in detention at the Centre.650 Otis said the Centre did not offer any counselling or support to other young people in detention following the death.651 Otis told us that the circumstances before and after the young person’s death were ‘handled atrociously’ by staff at the Centre.652 He said the incident ‘still haunts’ him.653

Reflecting on his mental health issues following his time at the Centre, Otis said:

I was in detention because I did the wrong thing. That should have been my punishment, not the abuse that I had to endure. It’s changed who I am as a person. My self-esteem and personality have been affected. It’s impacted my mental health. I’ve lost faith in people. I was failed hard. I’m still suffering to this day for the things that happened to me.654

  1. Improving youth detention

Otis said that the sexual abuse of young people in detention was allowed to happen in Ashley Youth Detention Centre because of a lack of oversight.655 He told us that, in contrast with adult prison, where a strict system of approvals and bookings applies, Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff were allowed to put detained young people in a car and drive them wherever they wanted, with no checks and balances.656 Otis said he believes the Centre should be run in a more organised manner, where everything requires approval, such as occurs in an adult prison.657 Otis told us that he wants young people to be accompanied by at least two staff members at all times when going off-property and for proper approval processes accompanying such trips to be introduced at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.658

Otis said that, in the past, he has not been comfortable speaking about his experiences of sexual abuse at the Centre.659 However, he said that, with the assistance of a counsellor, he has reached a point in his life where he wants to talk about what happened, so others are not subjected to similar abuse.660 Otis said: ‘I want to know who allowed these things to happen. I don’t care about money. Money doesn’t solve problems ... I worry about what will happen if my kids end up in detention like I did’.661

  1. Case example: Brett
  1. Before Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Brett was taken into the care of the Department when he was in his first year of high school because of his father’s mental health issues.662 However, he regularly ran away from his placements because of his experiences, trying to find a way back to live with his father.663 In Chapter 8, we discuss Brett’s experiences of abuse in out of home care. He said he ended up sleeping rough and stole to survive because he had no income.664

  1. Admission to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Brett had just turned 14 when he arrived at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the late 2000s.665 He was remanded to the Centre after being charged for an armed robbery he said he committed to finance a plane ticket to the mainland.666

  1. Alleged abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

Brett said he was strip searched by a staff member on admission, and when Brett resisted taking off his boxer shorts, the worker physically abused him. Forcibly removing Brett’s shorts, Brett recalled that the staff member then inserted his finger in Brett’s anus, saying, ‘Welcome to Ashley, boy, you do as you’re told’.667

Brett said he went to Ashley Youth Detention Centre six times between the ages of 14 and 17.668 Brett described his treatment by staff during his time at the Centre as ‘horrible’.669 He recalled constant belittling comments such as being called a ‘drug baby’ and being told that he wasn’t wanted, as well as physical abuse such as being hogtied for minor infractions such as not moving fast enough back to his room.670 Brett described being kept in isolation in his room, under what was termed an ‘Individual Support Program’, for up to six weeks at a time.671

  1. Reporting allegations of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Brett described trying to complain to staff about his treatment in youth detention but stopped because ‘it made it 100 times worse’ when staff responded by making life even harder. He said was not aware that he could complain to the Ombudsman at that time.672

  1. After Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Brett said that his experiences at Ashley Youth Detention Centre led him to distrust the justice system and police—‘the ones that are supposed to help are the ones you’re trying to escape from’.673

Brett said he has been incarcerated multiple times as an adult.674 He said that he has used drugs to try to ‘escape from it all’ and attempted suicide.675

  1. Improving Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Brett expressed the desire for improved safety at Ashley Youth Detention Centre because of the impact that the experience has had on his life, stating, ‘it’s wrong … it’s destroyed my life and it’s destroyed many other lives that I know’.676 He recommended more cameras in Ashley Youth Detention Centre and that the Centre employ staff ‘who understand how to work with children’.677 He wants children to get help before they get to youth detention.678

  1. Common themes

The accounts of abuse we have outlined here predominantly occurred between the early 2000s and the early 2020s (except in relation to Ada, who was detained at Ashley Home for Boys in the late 1990s and then at the renamed Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the early 2000s). Yet, we observed commonalities in the allegations of abuse made by these victim-survivors and their families, as well as in the allegations made through the Abuse in State Care Program, Abuse in State Care Support Service, National Redress Scheme, civil claims and other complaints. We describe some of the common themes from these accounts below. We urge the Tasmanian Government to reflect on these themes when responding to current and future allegations of abuse, and when planning and implementing reforms relevant to youth detention.

More than two-thirds of victim-survivors in the accounts we have documented were under the age of 14 when they were first detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. One of the victim-survivors, Simon, was only 10 years old on his first admission.679 Most of these children were initially detained at the Centre on remand for relatively minor charges, and some of them were never detained under sentence. In the case of Ada, who was only 12 years old when she was first admitted to the then Ashley Home for Boys, her mother Jane recalled that she was not subject to any criminal charges, although the Department told us she was there on specialist advice. Many of the victim-survivors were on remand, and some told us that the lack of an adequate bail address was the reason they were remanded to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

All victim-survivors described being subjected to sexual, physical and other abuse by staff at the Centre or older detainees, or both. We summarise themes in the accounts of alleged abuse by staff below, including in relation to sexual abuse (including through personal searches) and the humiliation and belittling of children and young people. In Case study 3, we closely examine isolation practices at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, including individual accounts of this practice. In Case study 4, we summarise individual accounts of the use of force by staff towards children and young people in the Centre.

Some victim-survivors told us they were forced to share a unit with, or were left unsupervised in the company of, older boys detained at the Centre, despite some pleading with staff that they were not safe. They were subsequently sexually abused, sometimes by groups of older boys. We summarise the accounts of harmful sexual behaviours in Case study 2.

It is incomprehensible to us that children were exposed to such abuse while in the care of the State.

Most of the victim-survivors whose accounts we have reported told us they had experienced trauma before being detained, which contributed to their contact with the justice system and may have made them more vulnerable to sexual abuse once in detention. We heard that victim-survivors came from unsettled, tumultuous and broken family situations. One young person was living in a shelter before her detention at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; another was homeless and two were in out of home care.680 Victim-survivors spoke of physical abuse in their familial settings and of mental health issues that were triggered or exacerbated by their traumatic circumstances. It makes no sense to us that children and young people living under these pressures were not assessed for, and provided with, support services, rather than being detained, especially in circumstances where they had not been said to have committed an offence. In Chapter 9 of our volume on out of home care and in Chapter 12 of this volume, we discuss the need to support, and advocate for, at-risk children, and to ensure detention is imposed as a last resort.

Many victim-survivors told us that their abuse by staff, or their subjection to the harmful sexual behaviours of other detainees, began as soon as they were admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre. As described by Ben, Simon and Erin, when young people first arrived at the Centre, they would undergo an admission process that could involve a period of isolation ranging from a few hours to a week.681 We were told by Ben and another former detainee whose account is not recorded here that, in addition to the inherently humiliating experience of being strip searched and isolated, there was also a practice of applying scabies cream to young people’s naked bodies, causing a burning sensation.682 We understand that this practice occurred from the mid to late 1980s until the early 2000s.683 A staff member described the practice in a statement he made in 2020 to the Department:

The kids would come in, they would be showered and they would be de-liced … and you would have to paint their bodies with scabies cream … The process involved painting just about every inch of their body, including genitals … The cream would get applied with a paintbrush. Most of the time staff would apply most of it, including to the genital area …684

We received evidence from another former detainee of Ashley Youth Detention Centre that, when he was first admitted to the Centre at the age of 13 in the late 1990s, it was midnight, and he was strip searched and ‘painted head to toe in anti-scabies lotion’ in what he referred to as ‘punishment on top of punishment’.685 He also described a further incident involving the application of scabies cream as follows:

Once, they said there was an outbreak of scabies, so they line[d] us all up and they painted us all again. The stuff gets left on you, till 3.00 pm the next day when you can shower. It stung, and it’s genital torture. It wasn’t diagnosed by a doctor, it wasn’t completed by a nurse, just a staff member.686

Centre staff using strip searches as a tool of control, and as an opportunity to sexually abuse children and young people, was a common theme across the accounts of victim-survivors. We heard that victim-survivors were subjected to aggressive and ‘harrowing’ strip searches on numerous occasions during their time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.687 The mother of one victim-survivor told us that her son asked her to stop visiting him in detention because of the strip searches he had to endure before and after her visits.688 As a result, her son was further isolated from the support he needed.

Others described being restrained while strip searched, and several victim-survivors detailed being sexually assaulted during ‘cavity’ searches, including through digital penetration. We also received evidence of male guards performing cavity searches on female detainees by inserting their fingers into detainees’ vaginas.689 Erin described how she was regularly strip searched by male staff members and never provided the option to be searched by female staff.690

Some victim-survivors described being stripped naked by staff, verbally abused and left in locked rooms for extended periods as punishment for any number of actual or perceived infractions.

Many, if not all, of these accounts of strip searches are allegations of child sexual abuse by staff.

Female victim-survivors described staff targeting them for humiliation. For example, Charlotte described staff trying to see down her top, making comments about her body and touching her inappropriately.691 Erin recounted that staff controlled her access to basic amenities such as a bra and sanitary products.692

We are particularly concerned by reports that female detainees, who were often alone or in the minority among male detainees at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (and thus especially vulnerable while in detention), said they were targeted for sexual harassment and abuse arising from their gender. We also heard that older boys would harm younger boys.

Several victim-survivors told us that sexual abuse by Centre staff was often perpetrated off site or in areas of the Centre that did not have closed-circuit television, so the abuse was less likely to be detected. Victim-survivors further recalled that if they attempted to avoid off site ‘excursions’, they were met with reprisals, including having food withheld.693

We were told that staff provided children with cigarettes and other privileges, such as more television time, if they submitted to abuse, both on- and off-premises.694 We heard that this level of manipulation has had lifelong adverse effects on victim-survivors’ understanding of their sexuality, their intimate relationships and their capacity to trust, because they believed that accepting such incentives meant they accepted the abuse.695

Victim-survivors who spoke to our Commission of Inquiry described being subjected to many forms of humiliating, belittling and threatening conduct at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. We heard evidence that being the target of staff members’ derogatory language and verbal threats often happened in conjunction with admission processes, strip searches, isolation and during the perpetration of physical and sexual abuse on Centre premises and off site. Many of the incidents described to us are likely to constitute human rights abuses under instruments such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

One common way that young people described being humiliated and sexually violated at the Centre was being watched by staff while they were showering. Showers at the Centre were visible through observation panels, which were designed so staff could open the panel and check the location and wellbeing of young people, especially if they were at risk of suicide or self-harm.696 Young people told us that this design was abused.697

We also received accounts of young people having insufficient access to toilet facilities while in isolation, including being given only a bucket to use or otherwise being forced to urinate and defecate on their cell floor.698 The Department told us that none of the rooms at Ashley Youth Detention Centre had toilets until refurbishments in the early 2000s.699 The Department advised that when a toilet was otherwise unavailable, access to toilet facilities occurred at the request of a detainee while they were in isolation.700

Alysha (a pseudonym), former Clinical Practice Consultant, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, told us that, during her employment at Ashley Youth Detention Centre between late 2019 and mid-2020, staff made direct threats of physical violence against detainees.701 She described a staff member threatening to turn a young person ‘into an owl’ if they did not change their behaviour. She recalled being told that this meant the staff member would ‘cave the child’s face in’.702 We also received evidence from Alysha of young people being teased about their weight and called names such as ‘fat fuck’ by staff while being strip searched.703

If this conduct did occur, it involves using degrading language to demean the young person and to frighten them as a means of securing their compliance and exercising power and control. The Youth Justice Act 1997 prohibits any form of psychological pressure intended to intimidate or humiliate children and young people in detention, as well as any form of physical or emotional abuse, or any kind of discriminatory treatment.704 Young people in detention are entitled to, and deserve, humane treatment and the maintenance of their dignity. Every child has the right not to be humiliated, belittled or threatened.705

The sense of utter helplessness that anything could be done about the ways in which young people were treated in detention was palpable across the accounts by victim-survivors, who commonly stated that, after initial attempts to report abuse, things often got worse rather than better for them. Therefore, they learned never to complain again. Victim-survivors told us that reprisals for reporting the abuse included severe violence from staff and other detainees. Consequently, some young people stopped disclosing sexual and physical abuse to other staff members, their parents, community visitors and statutory authorities, such as the Commissioner for Children and Young People.

We are deeply saddened to report that one of the most common themes to emerge from the accounts we have documented was the devastating ongoing trauma that the abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre has had on victim-survivors’ mental and physical health. We heard that many victim-survivors have attempted suicide, struggle with significant mental health conditions and addictions to drugs and alcohol, and have been incarcerated during their adult lives.

Ben provided a particularly evocative reflection on how the violent sexual abuse that he told us he experienced at Ashley Youth Detention Centre eventually broke him, and his realisation that using violence himself was the only way to survive.706 His account provides just one illustration of the failure of Ashley Youth Detention Centre to fulfil a core purpose of youth justice—rehabilitation. Instead, through a culture of humiliation, denigration, control, violence and abuse, Ashley Youth Detention Centre seems to have contributed to the antithesis of rehabilitation—further criminalising young people.

Many of the victim-survivors and their family members told us what they wanted to see happen at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and in relation to the youth justice system more broadly. Most commonly, they said they want proper mental health and other supports—not remand—for children when they start offending, and for the Government to reduce its reliance on detaining children and young people overall. They also told us that they want:

  • an acknowledgment from the Government about what has happened to them
  • a prohibition on staff who have abused children in detention from ever working with children again
  • comprehensive background checks on anyone seeking employment at a youth justice facility
  • a rehabilitative facility for young people that is more centrally located and ensures detainees have access to a full education
  • closed-circuit television throughout a new facility
  • female and male young people to be housed separately in detention facilities, with girls to be supervised only by female staff
  • a safe and effective process for children to make complaints about their treatment when detained
  • more cultural support for Aboriginal young people in detention.
  1. Management recognition of the scale of the abuse

Despite a large number of claims and allegations filtering through various redress programs and civil claims, we heard it was only relatively recently that the full scale of allegations—and that many allegations were against current staff—became apparent to senior managers in the Department.

It started to become generally understood in the Department in late 2020 that many of the allegations through redress programs and schemes, civil claims and other sources related to current staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. We discuss this development in more detail in Case study 7.

Although he knew about the existence of the Abuse in State Care Program from 2014, Secretary Pervan told us it was in late 2020 that he became aware a significant number of current Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff were named in those records and other redress claims:707

There was a lot of activity in a very short period of time. It would have been towards the end of 2020 where we became aware of the extent of the number of current employees who were implicated from the various redress programs … and the severity of the allegations.708

A former Acting Executive Director, People and Culture in the then Department of Communities, explained to us that the ‘true picture … as to what may have occurred at Ashley’ only came to be understood at the time that various pieces of information (from civil claims, National Redress Scheme applications and Abuse in State Care Program applications) were put together and viewed as a whole.709

We were told that when reviewing this information together, it became clear there was a pattern of alleged abuse occurring at Ashley Youth Detention Centre over a lengthy period, and that many allegations related to current employees.710 At hearings, the former Acting Executive Director, People and Culture described her realisation of the extent of the allegations of abuse around August or September 2020 (soon after she joined the Department) once the various sources of information were viewed in totality:

Probably up until that point [the point at which she viewed the totality of claims together] I’d only read a few applications, maybe one or two letters of demand, but when you have, I believe, in excess of 300 applications that have come through detailing acts of abuse, and you can see the same names and the same types of abuse, and you can pick up themes and— it’s quite confronting.

… there is probably too much commonality in some of the methods of abuse, if I may call it that, or the allegations; that, for people that have spanned so many different years, to not believe that they’re— it’s not a matter of belief, but some of the themes have just repeated so much that it does definitely cause a lot of concern, and I think I’ve been quite specific in my statement as to a couple of those areas where I think that we see themes coming through now in terms of almost opportunities for abuse when they occurred, such as strip searches; that’s probably the main one coming through.

But you do have, again, these themes that just continue and again going back to the strip searching one, and it’s just how it’s described in these applications … a lot of the people didn’t even see what happened to them in terms of a cavity search as being a sexual abuse; it was almost like it was an intimidation tactic, and that’s how they describe it in their applications, and some of them are so detailed that they are very concerning.711

Mandy Clarke, former Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families in the then Department of Communities (between September 2019 to February 2022), told us she was alerted to the possibility of a history of claims made relating to serving staff after a meeting she had with an external lawyer on 31 August 2020 that prompted her (and others) to begin to cross-check records against serving staff.712 In her statement to us, Ms Clarke said she was shocked and confronted by the allegations and never anticipated that the Department would need to respond to so many historical allegations of abuse involving current employees.713

Under questioning at hearings, Pamela Honan, Director, Strategic Youth Services in the then Department of Communities, conceded that there were abusive patterns of behaviour exhibited by Centre staff towards detainees.

Q [Counsel Assisting]: … [W]ould you accept from the materials that you’ve reviewed that it’s been a place where children have been physically abused? Not all children, but quite a lot?

A [Ms Honan]: There’s— absolutely, yep.

Q: That there’s been an ongoing pattern of what I would call emotional abuse or disregard in the way in which children have been treated by at least some workers?

A: Yes.

Q: And would you also accept that there’s clearly been an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of some residents by some workers?

A: I would agree.714

Ms Honan also conceded ongoing problems with harmful sexual behaviours being displayed by detainees against other detainees.715

Secretary Pervan also accepted Counsel Assisting’s proposition that it is open to our Inquiry to find that there has been an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse of some detainees by some staff members over the past 20 years.716 At hearings, Secretary Pervan conceded this in response to questioning by Counsel Assisting:

Q [Counsel Assisting]: … [W]ould you agree that, having regard to all of the evidence that’s available, it’s open to the Commission to find that there has been ongoing sexual abuse of some detainees by some officials at Ashley over the last 20 years?

A [Secretary Pervan]: Yes, I would.

Q: And that, whether we describe it as a ‘pattern’ or ‘repeated conduct’ or whatever, nevertheless it’s clear that it’s not isolated incidents; would you accept that?

A: Yes.717

Stuart Watson, Manager, Custodial Youth Justice (‘Centre Manager’), acknowledged that Ashley Youth Detention Centre had a ‘dark past’.718 He noted it was not for him to draw conclusions about the truthfulness of some allegations made against staff but acknowledged that his reference to a ‘dark past’ necessarily involved wrongdoing by staff towards detainees.719

We note that, in recent times, as discussed in Case Study 7, the Department has conducted some misconduct investigations in response to allegations of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. However, the Department did not take disciplinary action in respect of the Abuse in State Care Program allegations until late 2020 at the earliest and, in some cases, much later (and only after other allegations had been raised against staff members). As a result of the time span over which allegations were made against some staff, we can only conclude that some alleged abusers continued to work at the Centre for many years after allegations were first made against them and, as a consequence, had access and opportunity to continue to abuse children and young people in detention during this time.

  1. The broader context

The allegations of abuse need to be understood in context, including a longstanding corrosive staff culture, the beliefs of some staff that children and young people in Ashley Youth Detention Centre sometimes or often deserved punishment and make false allegations, and the fact that the Centre is isolated, physically and operationally from the department that oversees its.

  1. A longstanding corrosive staff culture

It is clear to us that a significant proportion of staff members have worked at Ashley Youth Detention Centre for many years. Victim-survivor Erin, who was at the Centre in the mid to late 2010s and whose experiences we have outlined above, told us that she encountered staff who had worked at the Centre for 30 years.720 Staff members Ira, Lester and Stan (all pseudonyms), against whom a number of serious complaints of abuse were made (discussed in Case study 7), all began work when the Centre was the Ashley Home for Boys.721

In a May 2016 Minute to the Secretary, it was noted that many staff had been working at the Centre for more than 15 years.722

Ms Clarke confirmed that a large cohort of the Centre’s total staff have worked at the Centre for a very long time and that such staff continually describing ‘the old days’ could make it challenging for Centre management to redefine the culture in line with a more therapeutic approach.723 She reflected on this further in hearings, adding:

… some staff that perhaps dominated decision making that had been there for some time, and that perhaps new staff who brought fresh ideas and new ideas and new way of thinking, their thoughts were not always reflective in that decision; in fact, sometimes they just weren’t even being heard …724

Information provided in the accounts of victim-survivors, as well as evidence from others, further suggests that the personal connections of staff members at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, beyond their common employment, meant that staff ‘looked after each other’ and that it was challenging for individual staff members to raise concerns about the misconduct of their colleagues.725

A participant in one of our sessions with a Commissioner, who asked to remain anonymous, told us that:

Most of the staff [at Ashley Youth Detention Centre] were farmhands from around the Deloraine area. Nobody had qualifications. There was a bit of a joke: if you’re a member of [a particular club], you’ve got a job at Ashley. They were all connected through the … club.726

Ben, who was first detained at the Centre in the early 2000s, similarly stated that when he was at Ashley Youth Detention Centre it was ‘run’ by a group of families who would employ other family members and their friends to work there.727 When he was released from detention, Ben recalled seeing a photo at a club in the local area and could identify more than 50 per cent of the club members in the photo as people connected to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.728

As documented throughout this case study, we heard evidence from multiple sources about staff members working together to manipulate, control and abuse children. Warren, who was at the Centre for various periods between 2004 and 2009, described being raped on numerous occasions by different staff members while other staff restrained him and subjected him to verbal abuse.729 Erin recounted to us that male staff members watched as she was sexually abused by a group of older male detainees.730 Otis, who was admitted to the Centre in the early 2010s, referred to staff as having a ‘gang mentality’.731 Fred, who was first detained at the Centre in the early 2000s, told us that staff treated violence between young people in detention ‘like a sport’, either provoking violence or encouraging it when it broke out, rather than stepping in to de-escalate a situation.732 Max described multiple occasions where a number of staff physically or sexually abused him.733

Otis, who told us that he began to ‘offer’ himself to staff members when he realised that they were targeting younger children to abuse, suggested that sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre was not uncommon, at least during the early 2010s when Otis was detained there.734 We were also told of staff withholding essential medication unless young people submitted to sexual acts, despite repeated requests by young people to staff that they needed this medication.735 Several accounts allege that physical and sexual abuse was perpetrated by two or more staff acting together. Some victim-survivors stated that other staff saw or heard physical and sexual abuse take place. There were multiple accounts of children’s attempts to make reports to staff.

There were also striking similarities in some of the ways that victim-survivors told us they were abused at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, with accounts naming multiple staff over decades using the same tactics, such as abuses perpetrated under the guise of strip searching.

In a submission to our Commission of Inquiry, Ms Sdrinis, who represents more than 300 victims of abuse seeking compensation from the Tasmanian Government (150 of whom relate to Ashley Youth Detention Centre), raised concerns about ‘collusion’ among staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre:736

Numerous clients have described a sense of collusion between staff at [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] that inhibited reporting of abuse. Clients report there were numerous husband/wife teams working as guards … gang members working as security, and security personnel referring friends for shifts at [the Centre].

This created a perceived sense of solidarity between the guards, and an ‘us vs them’ attitude for staff and residents. This combination of circumstances allowed perpetrators to continue offending for many years, effectively unchecked.737

Alysha, who reported allegations against a staff member, Lester, in January 2020 (discussed in Case study 7), told us that:

Due to the, at times, nepotistic recruitment practices and Tasmania being a small place, speaking up often carries additional considerations such as being friends, community members or parents of children at the same school as someone acting inappropriately. With the Centre being in such a remote location, this issue is additionally compounded as the majority of the staff group live in a small town together. Not only is there fear of professional consequences such as failing to be considered for promotions or being bullied at work, but there are also social considerations that would leave staff ostracized or possibly in danger of reprisal in their own community.738

It is further apparent from the accounts of victim-survivors and their families that some new staff were drawn into a culture of degrading children and young people detained at the Centre or ignored the abuse happening around them. While we heard that some staff members who witnessed abuse made attempts to report it, we also heard that some new staff who may have ‘started off well’ would ‘turn into the same as the other ones’.739

Ben told us that:

The hardest thing for me to accept about this abuse is that all of the other staff that weren’t doing it to us had to have known. There were times when we did get to leave Ashley to go places and do fun things, but there was always a process. We would have to fill out paperwork. The times we were abused there was no process. We were just told that we were going fishing or caving or something like that, and then just taken off site.740

He also told us that staff who did not want to take part in the abuse were sidelined for ‘not toeing the line’. He said that these staff, who could have made a difference, were ‘continually pushed out’.741

In a panel at hearings, Professor Donald Palmer and Dr Michael Guerzoni—both experts in organisational misconduct—described how an organisation’s dynamics can foster such indoctrination. Dr Guerzoni, who teaches in the field of criminology (including youth justice), has examined many of the reports into Ashley Youth Detention Centre.742

Dr Guerzoni spoke of formal and informal aspects to the socialisation of staff, describing informal components including:

… the so-called water cooler conversations, lunchtime conversations, barbecue chats and that kind of thing where informal tips on how to do the job or ways of seeing problems and situations which arise within an organisational setting and how to respond to those.743

Dr Guerzoni further reflected:

… it is my understanding that the evidence suggests that new workers at Ashley Youth Detention Centre have been socialised into a punitive culture that is informed by a view that the children in their care are bad people who do not deserve to be treated well.744

Dr Guerzoni went on to note that even though Ashley Youth Detention Centre has introduced a range of policies and procedures designed to improve safety, the desired change does not seem to have achieved the intended effect.745

Speaking more broadly about cultures within youth detention settings, Professor Palmer said:

People who become guards in a detention facility very quickly learn from their peers what the culture of that organisation is and it may be; for example, never trust a child and what they say. That might not have been a view that they held before they took the job as a guard in a juvenile detention facility.746

Samantha Crompvoets, a sociologist who has examined misconduct in the armed forces, described risks of negative socialisation and misconduct in ‘closed’ organisations or those that are ‘in isolated parts of a network’ where distinct norms and behaviours can emerge among a group:

… when you enter an organisation, you take cues from everyone around you regarding … what is normal and what is not. Part of this is the natural human desire to conform and assimilate. So for organisations or parts of organisations that are closed, it is important that there are checks and balances in place to prevent new employees conforming to the behaviours of the rest of the group.747

It seems unlikely that persistent incidents of abuse like this could have happened without some level of staff awareness or collaboration. It also seems unlikely that abuse of this nature and to this extent could have occurred without some other staff knowing about it, or at least harbouring concerns or suspicions.

  1. A culture of disbelieving detainee complaints

In addition to the broader culture that we heard worked to dehumanise children and young people, we observed a view held by many staff, management and even some external agencies that detainees were sometimes or often unreliable witnesses and concocted false allegations of abuse for monetary gain or retribution against staff.

A youth worker at the Centre, Sarah Spencer, said that she had observed some detainees make statements about their intentions to falsify complaints for redress purposes:

The government gave these young people, ex-residents whether they went to Risdon, payouts when they said, ‘Oh, so and so interfered with me or did this’. No investigation, just gave them 10 grand there, 20 grand there, 30 grand there. We knew about it because they told us all the time. They would leave the Centre saying, ‘I’m going to say this when I leave, so and so got this much money for saying this’. Constantly we’ve lost valuable workers through a lot of unproven allegations with no investigations whatsoever.

It just doesn’t make— it’s horrific, because they just kept handing them money with no investigation, and now we’ve got this flood of allegations, and there would be a percentage, I’m not diminishing that, but all of these false allegations take away from the legitimate ones.748

Ms Spencer also told us that she believed all young people who reported abuse to her and appropriately escalated all reports of abuse she received.749

Fiona Atkins, Assistant Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, told us that staffing levels at the Centre were affected in part by ‘the perception of threats from young people about the making of false claims against staff’.750 In our public hearings, she said:

Q [Counsel Assisting]: Do you mean that people are worried that they’ll be falsely accused of physical or sexual abuse?

A [Ms Atkins]: Some young people have actually voiced that they will say, you know, ‘You touched me’ or whatever, so that they can get a payout. I have heard that.

Q: And it’s your assumption that, if a young person said that, it wouldn’t be truthful?

A: Not when they’re smiling and laughing in front of me, no.751

Mr Watson agreed with Counsel Assisting’s proposition that ‘a lot of staff’ would hold the view that many allegations made by detainees are false.752 Mr Watson pointed to one factor leading him to this conclusion about such a view among staff:

Often these people have worked with each other for a long period of time, and I guess, you know, it is the example of, do you really know your neighbour and do you really know what they do?753

In reflecting on his opinion of the views of staff later in oral evidence, Mr Watson felt there would likely be mixed views among staff about detainee accusations of abuse, with some thinking that suspensions of staff because of some of these complaints were ‘timely’.754

Former detainees Max and Warren shared with us that staff told them that reporting abuses was futile because no one would believe them.755 Otis disclosed some of his abuse to a psychologist at the Centre and told us that he was not believed.756

Both the Commissioner for Children and Young People, Leanne McLean, and the Ombudsman, Richard Connock, agreed with Counsel Assisting’s proposition that many young people may not have reported their abuse to oversight bodies partly due to fear of not being believed.757 Mark Morrissey, a former Commissioner for Children and Young People, told us he believed children at the Centre did not have confidence that their reports or concerns would be adequately responded to.758

The abuse of children at the Centre became normalised—so much so that some young people at the Centre understood the violence and abuse by staff against them as ‘normal’ treatment.759

We received evidence to suggest that this scepticism of detainee complaints was not confined to the Centre and Department, but also extended to some external agencies. In Case study 7, we discuss attitudes inside Tasmania Police that were dismissive of allegations of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.760

As we have made clear, it was not possible for our Commission of Inquiry to test the veracity of accounts given to us by detainees or to determine the prevalence of any false complaints. We do consider, given the patterns and consistency in allegations over decades, that at least a proportion of these allegations are likely to have occurred. We consider the prevailing views and attitudes of Centre staff, and bodies tasked with protecting children at the Centre, to be relevant to understanding how longstanding and systematic abuses at the Centre were not identified and addressed.

  1. Isolation of Ashley Youth Detention Centre

It is clear to us that the risk of abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (and the likelihood that it would go unchecked and unreported) was heightened, in part, due to the physical isolation of the Centre, and because of breakdowns in communication and leadership between those working at the site and those in the Department. Ms Honan described her immediate impression of the Centre when she began her role in October 2019:

[The Centre] operated independently to the broader Division of Children, Youth and Family Services (CFS) and Department of Communities. It was highly autonomous, inward facing and lacked strategic leadership. My impression was that there was also a high degree of mistrust and selectivity in what and how information was reported by the Manager up to the executive to ensure the operating of the centre was positively regarded. The relationship with independent statutory bodies appeared to be wary and uncooperative.761

At hearings, Ms Honan elaborated on the relationship between the Centre’s management and the broader Department, telling us that the Centre operated as a ‘satellite’ and that it was ‘very closed, very wary, and very defensive’.762 She told us: ‘I think what I was being told, but then what I was hearing and seeing on site suggested something quite different’.763 She also observed that the relationship had ‘changed significantly’ since 2020 due to many factors, including her weekly physical presence at the Centre and the ‘functional alignment’ of certain positions that are physically based at the Centre but are also ‘professionally supported and interface outside the centre’.764

Ms Clarke agreed with Ms Honan’s observations that the Centre was operating in a closed environment without a clear passageway to the executive when she began working at the Department in 2019.765

In response to questioning at hearings, Secretary Pervan also agreed that the Centre was disconnected from the broader Department and characterised by an insular and inward-looking culture.766 When we asked him about the cause of the Centre’s self-isolation from the rest of the Department, Secretary Pervan said:

I think it’s a broader reflection of cultural norms and history in that there’s been a facility on that farm—and Ashley does sit on the edge of a farm that’s owned by the Crown—for around 100 years. It was like a lot of our not-good past, a shameful past you might say, that no regard was given to young people …767

Secretary Pervan reflected on his role as Secretary and the role of the executive in allowing the self-isolation of the Centre to occur:

Q [Counsel Assisting]: Doesn’t that reflect on the management above Ashley in the hierarchy up to and including you if, if up to 2019 the Ashley management had been permitted to isolate themselves and not participate properly as part of the Department?

A [Secretary Pervan]: There is a reflection there, I’ll own that; I was also running the Tasmanian Health System, so it wasn’t as if I wasn’t aware of the issues at Ashley, and I very much depended on a succession of Deputy Secretaries to be informing me, as I was those conversations with the Commissioner for Children and Young People as to what was happening at Ashley and what I needed to do to remedy it …

It was very difficult to find out exactly what the situation was at Ashley other than noting that it was a facility that was isolated and had isolated itself over a considerable period of time. As with the Deputy Secretary and Director level, there was a succession of Centre managers, and getting to grips with not only what was the problem but what we could actually do about it was incredibly challenging.

Q: And so the practical effect of that … was that it appears that over a series of years the self-isolation of Ashley from the scrutiny that might be best practice in terms of an open line of communication up through the Director of Custodial Justice and up through the Deputy Secretary to you, that was able to continue so that it was still in place in October 2019?

A: Yes.768

It is clear from the Department’s evidence that senior members of the Department were aware of the inadequate scrutiny and supervision that occurred due to the Centre’s physical location and a culture in which it could self-isolate from the broader Department. We consider this evidence is relevant in understanding how abuses at the Centre continued over a long period without adequate responses from the Department.

  1. Observations

Children and young people were supposedly sent to Ashley Youth Detention Centre for rehabilitation from the complex factors that contributed to their offending. In doing so, they entered a highly controlled environment that was largely closed off from the community. They become wholly dependent on staff to care for them, meet their basic needs and protect them from harm. The experiences victim-survivors shared with us paint a harrowing and heartbreaking picture of systematic mistreatment over years—mistreatment that included physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal abuse, denigration, humiliation, bullying, threats, intimidation, use of isolation and other likely human rights abuses.

While we acknowledge the evidence we received from some staff about the propensity of detainees to falsify claims (or at least state an intention to do so), we can only say that the accounts that we heard from current and former detainees were consistent in terms of the individuals and patterns they described over different periods and varied in ways that suggest a lack of collusion between detainees. Their accounts often were measured and nuanced—particularly in recognising the existence of staff who were not complicit in the behaviour and who recognised their plight for what it was. Many of their accounts, particularly around the culture and dynamics at the Centre, echo the recollections of staff, former staff, some senior managers and oversight agencies. Taken together, all the descriptions of Ashley Youth Detention Centre reveal a toxic and callous environment—a very far stretch from a therapeutic place of rehabilitation and recovery.

Finding—For decades, some children and young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre experienced systematic harm and abuse

Considering all the evidence from victim-survivors and their families, current and former Centre staff, senior management in the Department, the many prior reports and investigations into the Centre, the allegations made through civil and redress scheme claims, the matters considered in Case study 7, and the insight of relevant experts into organisational misconduct, we consider that many children and young people were systematically dehumanised, brutalised and degraded while at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. We do not accept that the mistreatment of detainees occurred only as rare or isolated incidents, or that it always occurred in a highly concealed fashion. We consider it reflected a widespread and, at times, methodical practice, albeit to varying degrees. In this sense, the abuse, including sexual abuse, was systematic.

The broader dynamics at Ashley Youth Detention Centre contributed to a perfect storm that enabled abuses, including sexual abuse, to be perpetrated over a long period. We consider there are complex and varied motivations among staff who harmed children, or who contributed to or ignored harms. We consider at least some staff members were motivated abusers with an abiding sexual interest in children and young people, while other staff members were opportunistic in their abuses, and others again perpetrated abuse as a means of exerting power and dominance over detainees. We also consider it likely some staff felt peer pressure to conform to the poor practices of others (for example, when performing strip searches) and participated reluctantly on this basis, but also to avoid becoming targets for abusive or bullying behaviour from colleagues. We consider some of this behaviour reflects a highly traumatised and dysfunctional workforce.

We accept that not all staff engaged in problematic practices, but we consider many would have been aware of the poor treatment of detainees. As discussed in Chapter 3, cognitive biases (such as wilful blindness) may have contributed to such staff minimising the nature and scale of the behaviour occurring around them, alongside the gradual normalisation of such callous brutality, which operated to erode normal human reactions. Also, a sense that reporting the conduct would be futile—or worse, place them at risk in some way—may have contributed to inaction or people simply leaving their roles.

We acknowledge that some staff did seek to investigate and report abuses, and to escalate such alleged abuses to their superiors, despite feeling discouraged from doing so.

We consider a range of factors are relevant to the culture that enabled systematic abuse of detainees, which includes the following:

  • As discussed in Chapter 10, the highly pressured, stressful and occasionally frightening conditions in which staff sometimes had to work, coupled with inadequate professional training and development for some staff, made it more likely for staff to deviate from best practice when seeking to manage the behaviour of detainees. We also consider it likely that difficult—and at times violent—behaviours exhibited by detainees contributed to staff holding negative attitudes towards them.
  • Familial and personal connections between some staff created strong social disincentives to challenge, question or report poor behaviour of staff towards detainees.
  • The often-longstanding tenure of staff contributed to entrenching problematic attitudes and normalising the poor treatment of detainees. New starters were socialised into this environment, and efforts to promote change towards therapeutic approaches were resisted.
  • Staff (and broader community) attitudes that diminished the humanity and credibility of detainees worked to reduce empathy and compassion for them; it heightened scepticism of any complaints or concerns they may have raised in the Centre and beyond.
  • While they felt violated, detainees were not always aware that abusive practices likely contravened law, policy or human rights conventions.
  • Detainees were disinclined to speak out about abuses for reasons including the stigma and a lack of confidence in reporting processes, the normalisation of their mistreatment and genuine fears for their safety and the safety of their families.

We also consider that the broader context of Ashley Youth Detention Centre contributed to this abuse going unidentified and unaddressed. The physical isolation of the Centre and the culture in which it operated as a ‘satellite’ from the broader Department enabled conditions in which abuse could be perpetrated and not reported, resulting in delays in action from the Department and an unacceptable level of risk to children. The closed nature of Ashley Youth Detention Centre—and the vulnerability of detainees at the Centre—made it especially necessary for the Department to maintain close supervision over the Centre. Instead, the inadequate scrutiny and apparent inability to address the cultural and physical conditions in which a closed environment was able to flourish meant that inherent risks went unchecked by the executive and abuse could continue.

Case study 2: Harmful sexual behaviours

  1. Overview

Over the course of our Commission of Inquiry, we heard from many victim-survivors about their exposure to and experiences of harmful sexual behaviours, often by older male detainees, at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. In this case study, we summarise allegations of harmful sexual behaviours over many years at the Centre. We also consider the Centre’s and the Department’s responses to these allegations. We recount allegations that staff sometimes actively used the fear of harmful behaviours of children and young people to control other children.

We outline detainees’ personal accounts of experiencing harmful sexual behaviours, drawing from the accounts we present in Case study 1. We then focus on a series of incidents involving three young people, Max, Henry and Ray (all pseudonyms), between 2018 and 2022.769 First, we outline the law and policies during this period. Then, we provide a timeline of incidents involving these three young people. The timeline begins when Max was first admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre. It follows the responses of the Centre and the Department to some of the harmful behaviours, including harmful sexual behaviours, of young people in Tasmania’s youth justice system.

Throughout this discussion, we highlight specific and systemic failings in the management of Max, Henry and Ray—as well as the children and young people who were displaying harmful sexual behaviours. At the end of the timeline, we highlight some of the systemic problems that were common to the incidents, including:

  • staff tensions
  • an absence of risk assessments
  • a lack of capacity to respond to complex behaviours of children and young people
  • the importance of critical incident investigatory skills.

We are particularly concerned about the disrespect and disregard apparently shown to staff who endeavoured to raise or address the risks to young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. We received information about unprofessional conduct, silencing in meetings and written complaints being ignored or deflected. We are concerned about apparent efforts to undermine the status and expertise of those professionals raising concerns.

This chapter covers a series of concerning allegations regarding the responses of Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff to harmful sexual behaviours displayed by some young people at the Centre. We acknowledge there have been and are staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre who have sought to do their jobs lawfully and appropriately. References to ‘staff’ in this case study are not intended as a reference to all staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, unless explicitly stated in a specific context.

In the final section of this case study, we provide our general observations about systemic and operational deficiencies at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, which we consider have contributed to young people being exposed to or experiencing sexual harm by other detainees.

We identify that, over many years, some staff had knowledge of the harmful behaviour, including harmful sexual behaviour, of children and young people against other children. There was often an inadequate response to the risk that such behaviour could occur, as well as inadequate responses when it did occur. Children and young people in detention have too often been exposed to serious harm, including sexual harm, by other children and young people in detention. Some staff have not taken enough steps to protect them.

  1. What we heard from victim-survivors about harmful sexual behaviours

In Case study 1, we outline personal accounts of young people’s allegations of harmful sexual behaviours at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, including the following:

  • In the early 2000s, 11-year-old Ben (a pseudonym) told us he was placed with much older boys who physically and sexually abused him on numerous occasions during his first admission.770 He had multiple admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre and said he was frequently sexually abused by older boys.771 He said his abuse occurred in the Centre and on outings, where there was less supervision.772 He told us that, when he told staff early on about the abuse, they essentially blamed him for putting himself in such a position.773 At other times, he said he was punished for speaking up.774
  • Charlotte (a pseudonym) told us she was sexually abused by boys at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on several occasions in the mid-2000s when she was in her mid-teens.775 She told us staff were aware she had a history of experiencing sexual abuse, but she was left alone with groups of boys and was sexually abused more than once.776 She said she reported the abuse after leaving Ashley Youth Detention Centre but heard nothing more.777
  • Fred (a pseudonym) told us he was in his late teens in the mid-2000s when he witnessed a detainee raping another boy and was himself physically abused by other boys at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.778 He said he learned not to speak up because he experienced retribution from staff and residents.779
  • Oscar (a pseudonym) told us he was in his mid-teens when he was first admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the middle of the 2000s.780 He said older boys sexually abused him within days of his admission while a staff member watched on and laughed.781 He said other boys regularly physically abused him but did not disclose for fear of being labelled ‘a snitch’.782
  • Erin (a pseudonym) first came to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the mid-2010s.783 She told us she was left unsupervised with a group of 10 boys, where she was sexually abused.784 After disclosing the abuse, she said she did not receive any support.785 Instead, she said she felt shunned by staff who had been reprimanded for allowing it to occur, and was subsequently and targeted and sexually abused by other boys.786 She said staff witnessed the harmful sexual behaviours and did nothing but put her on the contraceptive pill.787
  • In the late 2010s, Max was repeatedly placed in units with older boys who posed a risk of harmful sexual behaviours.788 Consequently, he told us he was physically abused on numerous occasions, threatened with sexual abuse and then sexually abused with a table tennis bat.789 He said his behaviour became more challenging as he sought to protect himself from other residents and he displayed harmful sexual behaviours himself.790 Professional services staff came into conflict with operational staff about responding to incidents and protecting Max from harm.791 We discuss Max’s account in more detail in the next section.

As we have made clear, it was not possible for our Commission of Inquiry to test the veracity of all the individual allegations outlined in victim-survivors’ accounts. However, we were struck by the many common themes across these accounts. While we do not make findings in relation to any individual allegation, we note the similarities across accounts.

In many of these accounts, younger children were placed with older children who had previously displayed harmful sexual behaviours and received no therapeutic intervention.792 Although girls were generally placed in separate units from boys, the harmful sexual behaviours they told us about occurred when they were left unsupervised and outnumbered by boys in the Centre.793

Victim-survivors told us that some Centre staff were aware of incidents of harmful sexual behaviours but responded in ways that apparently condoned the behaviour—such as dismissing the damage caused by harmful sexual behaviours or responding passively or punishing children and young people for complaining about the harmful sexual behaviour of another child.794 Victim-survivors told us these responses discouraged them from subsequently reporting harmful sexual behaviours they experienced or witnessed.795

  1. The exposure to harm of vulnerable children and young people in detention, 2018–22

In this section, we focus on the specific experiences of Max, Henry and Ray from 2018 to 2022. We outline Ashley Youth Detention Centre’s response to these young people’s vulnerabilities to harmful sexual behaviours (and other harmful behaviours by young people) at the Centre.

Max, Henry and Ray have much in common. Each was detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the past five years and some of their time there overlapped. Each of these three young people were particularly vulnerable to harmful behaviours from other detainees because of their age, experiences of trauma, mental health problems or more than one of these vulnerabilities. At some point during their detention, Max, Henry and Ray were housed in the Centre’s Franklin Unit despite protests from several staff and the young people themselves that this unit was not safe for them. All three young people were put at risk of or experienced harmful sexual behaviours by one or both of two detainees in the Franklin Unit, Albert and Finn (both pseudonyms).796 It is our view that Ashley Youth Detention Centre failed to protect Max, Henry and Ray from harmful behaviours, including harmful sexual behaviours, of other young people. We discuss non-sexual harmful behaviours in this case study because harmful sexual behaviours can be one part of a spectrum of harmful behaviours.

We discuss other experiences that Max says he had in Ashley Youth Detention Centre elsewhere in this report (refer to Case study 1 and Case study 6). In this case study, we consider only those aspects of Max’s evidence, and the relevant evidence of others, that relate to his accounts of harmful sexual behaviours and the responses to those behaviours by Centre management and the Department.

First, we discuss the laws, policies and practices relevant to the 2018–22 period. We then outline several incidents of harmful sexual behaviours relevant to Max, Henry and Ray, as well as the varied responses of Centre staff to these incidents at the time.

  1. The law, policies and practices

In this section, we provide some relevant context about:

  • the laws and standards that prohibit bullying and physical and verbal abuse of children and young people in detention
  • how decisions were made about where to place young people within Ashley Youth Detention Centre, including what we heard from former staff members about placing young people in the Franklin Unit
  • the use of ‘Very Close Supervision’ orders at Ashley Youth Detention Centre to manage young people whose behaviour is considered a risk to others or to the security of the Centre
  • how incidents involving harmful sexual behaviours are reported and investigated at the Centre.
  1. Laws and standards

The Youth Justice Act 1997 (‘Youth Justice Act’) prohibits using:

  • any form of psychological pressure intended to ‘intimidate or humiliate’ a child or young person in detention
  • any form of physical or emotional abuse
  • discriminatory treatment.797

It also provides that a child or young person in detention is entitled to have their developmental needs met.798 In addition, the Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania includes several standards designed to protect vulnerable young people from verbal or physical abuse and bullying.799

  1. Managing children and young people in detention through placement and supervision

Placement decisions

In Chapter 10, we detail how, prior to 31 May 2022, Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff decided the unit within which to place children and young people at the Centre.800 To summarise:

  • The Centre Support Team generally made week-to-week placement decisions, although these could be changed daily, based on operational factors.801
  • Placement decisions considered some or all the following factors:
    • age
    • gender
    • safety and security
    • legal status and length of sentence
    • individual needs
    • behavioural issues
    • relationship dynamics between young people and staff
    • the views of staff.802
  • Due to operational challenges, including staffing numbers, placement decisions sometimes amounted to ‘choosing the best out of a poor range of options’.803
  • Young people could make a formal request for a unit transfer, which the Centre Support Team would consider.804

Franklin Unit

Until recently, the Franklin Unit was the most secure unit at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, housing ‘the most high risk or dangerous young offenders’.805 Mr Watson told us that before the Centre’s redevelopment in 2022, the Franklin Unit was the only unit with a secure courtyard. It also had concrete (instead of plaster) ceilings.806 He explained that certain children and young people in detention, such as those who presented an escape risk, were placed there.807 Mr Watson told us that now all units at Ashley Youth Detention Centre have secure courtyards.808 We understood his comments to mean Centre staff now have more flexibility in housing children and young people in detention who pose an escape risk.

Madeleine Gardiner, former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, recalled that, ‘on occasion’, youth workers or Centre Support Team members would comment that ‘placing certain detainees with other detainees was helpful to manage the behaviour of detainees’.809 She told us the chair of the Centre Support Team said this was inappropriate and the ‘general consensus of the [Centre Support Team] would not support this’.810 Alysha (a pseudonym), a former Clinical Practice Consultant at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, believes young people were regularly placed in the Franklin Unit to ‘manage and punish behaviour that was considered disruptive by Operations staff’.811 Her opinion is that staff relied on the reputation of the Franklin Unit and the fear of what happened to young people there ‘to essentially “scare them into line”’.812

Alysha believes the Franklin Unit was operated very differently from other units, specifically in terms of how it was staffed.813 She said:

There were ‘Franklin staff’, whereas [staff in the other units] all seemed to rotate a little unless there was a particular issue for a staff member. None of the staff rotated as they ought to, but the Franklin staff appeared to dictate the rules under which they worked. They would ‘refuse’ to work in any other units.814

Alysha’s concern echoes matters departmental staff identified in a 2016 Minute to the Secretary with the subject line ‘AYDC–Commissioner for Children letter and emerging concerns’ (refer to Case study 3 for more detail).815 This Minute noted serious concerns about human rights abuses and, among other things, that the Tasmanian Government had previously agreed ‘staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre were to work across teams when requested to do so rather than working solely in the allocated smaller team groups’.816 We note one of the recent reforms we discuss further in this case study (in response to the 7 August 2019 incident) was to regularly rotate staff through all units.817

We asked several past and present Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff about placing young people in the Franklin Unit. The general response was there was no policy or practice (informal or otherwise) of using some detainees as a threat to influence or punish the conduct of other children and young people in detention.818 We were instead told placement decisions were made according to a range of factors such as age, individual needs and security.

Very Close Supervision

We are aware it is sometimes necessary to place young people in units where staff anticipate incidents might occur.819 In such situations, a Very Close Supervision order may be applied to the young person.820

In August 2019, Standard Operating Procedure No. 8: Supervision and Movement of Young People outlined the requirements for Very Close Supervision at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.821 It stated:

Very Close Supervision (VCS) is used if a higher level of risk is presented by an individual young person.

Approval for a young person to be placed on and taken off VCS status can only be given by the Centre Support Team (CST), Operations Manager or On Call Manager based on information provided by operational and/or professional staff.

A young person may be classified as requiring VCS if it is assessed they are a serious safety and/or security risk due to:

  • Aggressive, subversive and/or inappropriate behaviour.
  • The risk of assault or harm from other young people.
  • Escape or threat of escape.
  • Any other reasons identified by staff that require a higher level of supervision.

The supervising Youth Worker will ensure the young person on VCS remains within five metres at all times whenever the young person is outside of a locked building.822

It is unclear from the wording of this Standard Operating Procedure whether a youth worker is required to be within a certain distance of the young person on Very Close Supervision while the young person is inside a building, or if the terms of the supervision only apply outside a locked building. We are aware that some young people have been placed under Very Close Supervision inside and outside a unit.823

The Department’s Serious Events Review Team (described further in this case study and in Chapter 9) received evidence from a staff member that in practice, Very Close Supervision may not ‘guarantee’ that a young person would receive one-on-one supervision.824 Rather, it was suggested that Very Close Supervision was considered more of an ‘alert’ to staff to be watchful for potential problems, as opposed to a direction to increase supervision itself.825 The review concluded that Very Close Supervision ‘is problematic and difficult to achieve’ even when in use, given the insufficient staffing numbers and the lack of understanding among Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff on how Very Close Supervision operates.826

As discussed in the timeline below, Ray was subject to a Very Close Supervision order during a period of his detention at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. However, it does not appear that Albert and Finn were placed on Very Close Supervision orders in response to the incidents outlined below, despite staff being aware of their ongoing sexualised behaviours towards younger detainees.

  1. Incident reporting, referrals and review

Incident reporting, detention offences and conferences

Staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre must record and report any incident arising from the behaviour of a young person or young people.827 As discussed in Chapter 10, incident reporting at the Centre occurs in line with the AYDC Incident Reporting Procedure (‘Incident Reporting Procedure’) and the incident report template.828 The Incident Reporting Procedure came into effect on 1 July 2018.829 We understand it is still used today.830 We were told that staff receive incident reporting training during their induction and periodically during refresher training.831

The Incident Reporting Procedure states that the aims of incident reporting include to:

  • record ‘thorough, accurate and objective information’ about an incident, including injuries
  • provide ‘impartial and responsible assessment processes’ that ensure the seriousness of an incident is appropriately classified
  • ‘encourage mutual accountability between young people and staff’ for their behaviours and actions
  • support consistent decision making
  • ensure incident reports are appropriately escalated through management, the Department’s executive and Minister, as required
  • support ‘independent and external oversight of incident management’.832

As outlined in Chapter 10, the reporting staff member must also recommend a ‘level of seriousness’ for the incident for each young person involved against one of the following categories:

  • recorded incident
  • minor incident
  • detention offence.

The Operations Coordinator must sign off on all incident reports, noting any alternative recommendations.833 There is also a requirement for a ‘Management Assessment’, which involves the Centre Support Team considering:

  • the level of seriousness of the incident
  • identifying whether the police, Child Safety Services or a young person’s parents should be notified
  • whether any other actions, such as an independent investigation, should take place.834

Where an incident involves a detention offence or isolation, or the Centre Support Team cannot reach a decision in relation to the seriousness of the incident, the Centre Manager must then review the circumstances of the incident and complete the relevant parts of the Management Assessment, including considering whether any notifications or further actions are required.835 The Director, Strategic Youth Services, must decide whether any independent investigation of an incident is required.836

Under section 140 of the Youth Justice Act, the Secretary must be notified of any detention offences that the offender admits committing. The Secretary must then confer with the offender and any other relevant person before determining how the offence should be dealt with. As outlined in Chapter 10, the Secretary may deal with the offence by:

  • taking no action, ‘on the undertaking of the offender to be of good behaviour for a period not exceeding 2 months’
  • cautioning the offender
  • delaying the offender’s release from youth detention by no more than three days
  • filing a complaint against the offender.837

We note that in March 2022, Michael Pervan, the then Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (and later the Department of Communities), delegated his functions for dealing with a detention offence to the holders of several other roles, including the:

  • Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families
  • Director, Youth and Family Violence Services
  • Ashley Youth Detention Centre Manager
  • Ashley Youth Detention Centre Assistant Manager
  • Operations Manager (to a more limited extent)
  • Coordinator, Training and Admissions (to a more limited extent).838

While we have not received an exhaustive record of previous delegations of these functions, we note that similar delegations were in place (at least in practice) for many years before this.

The Youth Justice Act requires that a conference is held, where practicable, with a young person who has committed a detention offence.839 Standard Operating Procedure No. 24: Conferencing describes conferencing as ‘an opportunity for both the offender and victim to enter a restorative discourse and for the offender to take responsibility for their behaviour and to make appropriate reparation’.840 Standard Operating Procedure No. 24 also provides that sanctions may result from a conference, such as a ‘good behaviour bond’.841

We understand that for a conference to be held, the offender must admit to the offence and agree to take part in the conference.842 If possible, the conference should involve the victim, a support person, a guardian and appropriate staff representatives.843

As noted throughout the timeline and other sections in this case study, Centre management and staff allocated different levels of seriousness to the incidents involving Max, Henry, Ray, Albert and Finn. Despite detention offences being recorded against Albert and Finn, it is unclear whether conferencing took place.

Senior Quality and Practice Advisor

In line with Ashley Youth Detention Centre’s Referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor Procedure, clinical staff could seek the advice of a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor from the Department’s Children and Youth Services division after an incident had occurred and about managing the behaviours of a detainee.844 As outlined in Chapter 9 in relation to out of home care, specialised Senior Quality and Practice Advisors, and the Quality Improvement and Workforce Development Team they were in, were abolished during the Strong Families, Safe Kids redesign, which began in 2019.845 Secretary Pervan told us these roles were substantively replaced with new roles performing similar functions, with the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor functions substantively transitioning to the Senior Development Manager role.846

The purpose of making a referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor was to ‘access an independent and impartial resource’ that would ‘provide guidance in relation to ethical considerations and practice, and provide objective, evidence-based recommendations’.847

The Referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor Procedure required that:

  • a referral was made by the Clinical Practice Support Officer or the Multi-Disciplinary Team
  • the Multi-Disciplinary Team considered referring complex and critical cases to the Clinical Practice Support Officer in the first instance
  • if the Multi-Disciplinary Team considered the matter to be unsuitable for referral to the Clinical Practice Support Officer (due to urgency, complexity or a requirement for independent investigation), the referral could be made to the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor
  • the referral had to be endorsed by the Centre Manager
  • the referral had to be approved by the Director, Strategic Youth Services.848

As we discuss later in this chapter, a referral was made to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor after an incident involving Ray, Albert and Finn.

Serious Events Review Team

The Serious Events Review Team mentioned throughout this part is:

… a small team of senior practitioners who undertake reviews when a child [or] young person … known to Children and Youth Services (CYS) has experienced a serious event, such as death, serious injury or ‘near miss’.849

As described in Chapter 9, Ginna Webster, former Deputy Secretary, Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services, established the Serious Events Review Team in 2017.850 We were told this team was established in consultation with then Secretary Pervan.851

It is our understanding the Serious Events Review Team was disbanded in May or June 2020, but can be brought together on an ad hoc basis if required (refer to discussion in Chapter 9).852 The team’s former manager explained that its reviews usually involved the following process:

  • The Children and Families Executive referred a matter to the Serious Events Review Team for review, along with the terms of reference of the review.853
  • A Serious Events Review Team reviewer would undertake a comprehensive review of the matter in line with the terms of reference.854 Their review would include desktop analysis of all relevant data as well as interviews with relevant staff.855
  • The reviewer would prepare a draft review report, which was provided to a ‘Moderation Group’ for discussion.856 The Moderation Group comprised the Manager, Workforce Development; the Manager, Clinical Practice Consultants and Educators; and the Manager, Policy and Director Service Deployment.857 The Moderation Group was intended to run ‘fresh eyes’ over all aspects of the report, including editing and analysis.858
  • The final report would be provided to the Executive of the Department and the Serious Events Review Committee, which comprised representatives internal and external to the Department.859
  • The Serious Events Review Committee would consider the report and prepare advice to the Secretary.860

The former manager also explained the team’s role ‘was complete upon delivery of the final review reports’.861 The Children and Youth Services Executive was responsible for implementing any recommendations.862

  1. Max, Henry and Ray

Timeline of Responses to Harmful Sexual Behaviours at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 2018-2022

  1. Summary

Over an 18-month period in 2018 and 2019, there were at least six reported incidents where Albert or Finn had engaged in sexualised behaviours. These included:

  • making sexualised comments
  • discussing sexual activities with staff
  • simulating sexual acts on other young people
  • forcing residents to touch each other’s genitals
  • exposing their genitals and anus to other young people
  • forcibly exposing the genitals and anus of other young people
  • placing their hands down their pants in front of other young people.863

All but one of these incidents was recorded as a detention offence.864 Max, Henry and Ray were all placed in the Franklin Unit with Albert or Finn at various times, exposing them to the risk of harm.

We received evidence that Finn’s behaviours were serious enough to consider a transfer from Ashley Youth Detention Centre into the adult prison system. A transfer application was drafted in early 2019.865 That application identified that Finn ‘require[d] a high level of secure care because he represents a high risk to the security and safety of himself, other detainees, staff’ and the Centre’s operations.866 The application noted ‘numerous incidents of inappropriate sexual behaviour’ with other residents and other instances of violence and intimidating behaviours while at the Centre.867 The application also identified that Finn’s mental health difficulties contributed to his risk of offending generally.868 A report prepared by the Centre’s psychologist (and included with the draft application) stated that Finn posed ‘a High risk of future violence’.869 The application acknowledged that the Centre did not have the resources to support Finn to address his behaviours, such as access to full-time mental health specialists.870 We are unaware if the application to transfer Finn was ever lodged. It appears that Finn stayed at Ashley Youth Detention Centre at least until mid-2020 (whether as one uninterrupted admission or on multiple admissions).871 We discuss the appropriateness of sending young people to adult prison below in relation to Max, but note this detail here because it indicates the Centre was aware of Finn’s behaviours.

Max was only 12 years old when he was first admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the late 2010s.872 We note that we have received evidence, from Centre staff and Max himself, that Max’s behaviour during his ‘lengthy history at the centre’ could be complex and challenging.873 Ms Gardiner told us she considered the decision by other staff to place Max in ‘a unit with two detainees who had been observed to use sexualised behaviour’ may have been made on the basis that ‘[s]ome staff found [Max] difficult to manage, and I am aware some staff did not like [Max]’.874 Alysha gave evidence that Max was ‘one of the most disliked children by the staff group’.875

Max told us he believes the harmful behaviours he experienced when he was first detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre have had a lasting impact on his behaviour. He said: ‘The abuse and how much they could have stopped it but didn’t, is the main thing that has caused my behaviour problems’.876

On 6 August 2019, Henry was placed in the Franklin Unit with Albert and Finn.877 Although Henry was technically a few months older than both Albert and Finn, we understand he may have been vulnerable in other ways. We have seen evidence that some Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff expressed concerns about his ability to process and retain information and noted that he was ‘[e]asily influenced by negative peers’.878

Henry was housed with Albert and Finn despite their behaviours being known to managers and staff at the Centre and despite Henry’s care plan stating that he was ‘vulnerable when with older boys and unable to be safe’, as well as identifying that Henry had been the victim of an earlier incident in the Franklin Unit.879 The care plan further stated that Henry was ‘not to reside with [Albert] or [Finn]’.880 Staff later reported that Henry was placed in the Franklin Unit ‘because [Albert] and [Finn] would keep him in line’.881 On 8 August 2019, Henry requested that he ‘move units please anywhere’.882

Ray was first admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the late 2010s.883 Ray had an extensive history of serious mental illness.884 We are aware of multiple incidents and concerns during Ray’s time in the Centre. In this case study, we focus on Ray’s first admission to the Centre because the harmful behaviour he experienced was similar to that of Max and Henry.

When Ray first arrived at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, the Centre’s psychologist emailed Operations Management staff with critical information about Ray.885 The psychologist explained:

The stability of [Ray’s] mental health and the effectiveness of his care and management will strongly depend on his sense of safety and mitigation of stress. Thus, it will be important not only to carefully consider his unit and program placement, but also as far as possible to limit changes to his unit and group placements. Whilst I understand the operational difficulties arising from managing a group of youth all with their own set of complex needs, [Ray is] at a high risk of harm to himself and others.886

The psychologist identified that Ray experienced cognitive difficulties, suicidal ideation, hypervigilance, verbal and physical aggression and a ‘vulnerability to the influence of others’.887 To assist Ray during his time at the Centre, the psychologist made several recommendations to Operations Management, which were noted on Ray’s care plan.888 These recommendations included that Ray should be assisted with simple visual checklists outlining his daily schedule, that activities should be broken down so he did not get overwhelmed, and that he responded well to praise for good behaviour and gentle redirection if he was exhibiting signs of distress.889 The psychologist shared her view that Ray would be suited to placement with a particular young person, and that his interactions would need to be closely monitored because they may rapidly deteriorate.890

During his detention, Ray was involved in numerous incidents that involved violence from and against other young people. Some professional services staff at the Centre tried to stop Ray being placed in the Franklin Unit because they considered other young people in that unit posed a significant risk to Ray.891 Despite this, Ray was placed in the Franklin Unit. After a violent altercation with Albert and Finn, Ray tried to escape from the Centre.892

In late 2019, the Centre’s psychologist emailed the Centre Manager to advise of a young person in detention disclosing to her that staff had threatened to transfer him to the Franklin Unit, that he felt unsafe, and that he had stated that detainees get ‘stood-over, abused and raped’ in the Franklin Unit.893 The identity of the young person who disclosed these concerns to the psychologist is not revealed in the documents, but those concerns related to Albert’s and Finn’s behaviours.894

  1. 2018—Max is placed with older detainees and experiences harmful sexual behaviours

Max recounted to us that on his first admission to Ashley Youth Detention Centre he was placed in a unit with three older detainees, including Floyd (a pseudonym) and Ned (a pseudonym).895 Max told us he warned staff that he would be abused if placed with those detainees, but he was placed in the unit anyway.896 When the three detainees returned to the unit from the day’s activities, Floyd threatened Max.897

Max said that once the single staff member supervising the unit walked away into an office, Floyd exposed his penis to Max and told him ‘you’re going to be sucking this’.898 When Max refused, Max told us that Ned began slapping him, at which point Max punched Ned.899 Ned then began punching Max, knocking him to the ground, before jumping on his head.900 Max recalled that the supervising staff member shouted at the detainees and called for assistance but otherwise did not intervene to stop the abuse until other staff arrived.901

After the abuse, Max recalled he was moved to another unit. But Max was still placed with two detainees who were older and bigger than him, and he recalled that he was bullied and physically and sexually abused further, with the older detainees hitting him and pinching his buttocks.902 Max recalls that one of the detainees was Arlo (a pseudonym).903 He could not recall the name of the other detainee, but we know from other evidence available to us, including a Serious Events Review Team report, that the other detainee in the unit with Max and Arlo was Albert.904

About a week after he was moved to that unit, Arlo and Albert confronted Max, at which time Max says Arlo sexually abused him with a table tennis bat.905 We understand that Albert was also involved.906 Max told us nothing was immediately done to keep him safe after that incident. He remained in the unit with Arlo until he was eventually moved to a different unit for unrelated reasons.907 An incident report was prepared three days after the incident occurred, but it is not clear to us whether any staff were aware of the incident earlier than this because staff were outside the room responding to a request for help at the time it occurred.908 The incident report states it was prepared based on CCTV footage. It is also unclear to us how staff became aware of the incident and the existence of the CCTV footage.909

On his next admission to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Max was again placed in a unit with Floyd, the detainee who had sexually abused him previously:

Before I got taken to the unit, I asked the youth workers who I was going to be with. They told me that it was someone from the North West that I wouldn’t know. When I got to the unit I saw that the other person was [Floyd]. [Floyd] was the only other resident in there. I dropped all of my stuff and lost my shit and started screaming ‘what’s going on here’. The staff called a code black and while they were trying to restrain me, I assaulted one of the staff members. I was saying to the staff ‘why the fuck are you putting me back in here when he tried to rape me’. They said that I was exaggerating. They told me that if I didn’t calm down I would be put in isolation. After I calmed down, they told me that there was nowhere else I could go so I’d have to stay with [Floyd] in Bronte west.910

While Max notes that Floyd apologised to him, Max was still scared and decided that he ‘would do something that would get [him] moved from the unit’.911 Max damaged the ceiling in his room and was moved to another unit.912

It is unclear to us how meaningfully Centre staff considered Max’s concerns about his unit placement at the time of the previously mentioned incidents. However, we have received evidence that suggests the Multi-Disciplinary Team discussed Max’s relationship with Floyd as an issue relevant to his unit placement in August and September 2018 (after the Serious Events Review Team completed its review, referred to in the next section). At that time, the Multi-Disciplinary Team recommended that Max and Floyd not be placed in the same unit or program group, noting that Max’s desire to move units was likely related to his interactions with Floyd and that Max ‘does not operate well when housed with’ Floyd.913

  1. June 2018—The Serious Events Review Team reviews harmful sexual behaviours experienced by Max

The Serious Events Review Team carried out a review into the two instances of harmful sexual behaviours Max experienced. This review was prompted by notifications from Child Safety Services in March and April 2018 following a report from Max’s solicitor to Tasmania Police alleging that Ned had sexually abused Max at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.914 The Serious Events Review Team’s report covered the incident involving Floyd and Ned, as well as the incident involving Arlo and Albert.

In relation to the incident involving Floyd and Ned, the Serious Events Review Team investigated it as the ‘alleged “rape” of [Max] by [Ned]’ because the incident was notified to police in those terms by Max’s solicitor.915 The Serious Events Review Team broadly found that no rape or sexual abuse had occurred.916

The Serious Events Review Team’s report stated that Max told the investigator that Ned commanded Max to perform oral sex on him before Ned physically abused Max.917 We note that this is slightly inconsistent with Max’s evidence to us that it was Floyd who gave this command while exposing his penis to Max before Ned hit Max. Regardless, the report contained no detailed analysis of the sexualised behaviour and abuse experienced by Max, instead focusing on whether the notified allegation of a rape was substantiated. Indeed, Max’s experience of harmful sexual behaviour was met with no significant comment from the investigator other than the finding that ‘no sexual assault of [Max] by [Ned] has occurred at [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] on the information available’.918 We note that the Serious Events Review Team report did not mention Floyd’s involvement.919

The Serious Events Review Team’s report notes that the material the investigator reviewed ‘shows a response to the incident as consistent with the current [Centre] procedures’, including providing medical care for Max, conversations with Max encouraging him to report the matter to police, involving Max’s parents and conferencing with Ned once Max declined to make a formal complaint.920

Regarding the incident involving Arlo and Albert, the Serious Events Review Team found a significant issue in the original incident report. The incident report, which was written with reference to the CCTV footage of the incident, stated the following:

  • Supervising staff left the three young people unsupervised in the unit after staff attended to a code black emergency in another part of the Centre.
  • Arlo and Albert then harassed and abused Max, with Albert jumping on Max’s back and making sexually suggestive motions.
  • Albert pulled Max’s pants down before Max pulled them back up.
  • Albert continued to intimidate Max, approaching him with his hand down his pants.
  • Arlo removed his erect penis from his pants and encouraged Max to touch it, which Max did.
  • Max was obviously upset and appeared to be crying.
  • Arlo and Albert made comforting gestures to Max before staff returned to the unit.921

The incident report recorded that Arlo and Albert had both perpetrated abuse. Both were ‘conferenced’ in relation to ‘inappropriate sexual behaviour’, which meant they were required to meet and discuss the nature and impact of their actions with Centre staff.922

The investigator reviewed the CCTV footage as part of preparing the Serious Events Review Team report, finding the following:

  • The footage showed staff leaving the young people unsupervised in the unit, Albert jumping on Max’s back, Arlo and Albert harassing Max and Albert seemingly comforting Max when he became upset.
  • The footage did not show Albert making sexually suggestive motions while on Max’s back or Arlo removing his erect penis from his pants, but rather appeared to show him with a table tennis bat in his hand throughout the incident.923

The report noted that Arlo had ‘accepted full responsibility for the incident’ but denied the characterisation of the incident during conferencing, stating that it was a table tennis bat in his hand rather than his penis, and that this was consistent with the investigator’s review of the CCTV footage.924 This was also consistent with Max’s characterisation of the incident to the investigator when Max was interviewed, as well as his evidence to us, in that Arlo attempted to sexually abuse him with a ‘ping pong bat’.925 The report also noted Albert ‘agreed to having committed the offence’ as part of the conferencing process.926

The Serious Events Review Team found that neither Arlo nor Albert perpetrated a sexual abuse based on the information available to the investigator:

In conclusion, the CCTV footage of the incident does not clearly portray sexual motions by [Albert], nor does it clearly show the exposure of a penis by [Arlo]. [Max] now states that [Arlo] had a table tennis bat in his hand. This was also the claim made by [Arlo] during the Conferencing process. There is insufficient information to substantiate sexual assault based on the information available at this point in time.927

The investigator acknowledged the incident involving Albert and Arlo was ‘likely to be intimidating and frightening for [Max]’, but otherwise made no significant findings beyond the factual occurrence and characterisation of the incident.928

The limitations of the review were noted in the following comment from the investigator:

… [a] review of records at [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] found multiple Incident Records referencing ‘Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour’ involving youth detainees other than the three residents referenced in this Review. By nature of being a youth detention centre and the known pathway to offending behaviour resulting in detention, the residents of [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] are majority male, adolescent and are likely to have dysfunctional backgrounds including exposure to family violence, poor parenting, poor school attendance, interface with child protection services and general trauma history. The result of this can be poor social skills, impulsivity and skills in understanding the impact of behaviour on others. These factors can result in behaviours in a detention centre that are far from ideal within the community, but must be managed on a daily basis within a detention centre setting.929

The investigator went on to comment that:

It is outside the scope of [the Serious Events Review Team] to provide recommendations as to the response of [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] to such behaviours both at a Centre and individual resident level. However, it may be useful to consider expert review, advice and on-going consultation concerning this issue to support [the Centre] to assist residents to develop socially appropriate behaviours for transition to the community.930

The Serious Events Review Team’s report also stated that Centre management had ‘openly acknowledged the action of both Youth Workers leaving the residents unsupervised in the unit was in breach of procedure’ and the staff members involved had also acknowledged the error and its role in the incident occurring.931 Aside from the lack of staff supervision, the report noted that staff and management at the Centre ‘appear to have responded to this incident in a manner consistent with their procedures’.932

The report further noted that Max later raised concerns about being in a unit with Arlo and that the records reviewed showed ‘professional discussion and debate about this’ at the Centre.933 Minutes of a Centre Support Team meeting dated shortly after the incident involving Arlo and Albert and attached to the Serious Events Review Team’s report indicated that Max was upset by the incident but did not want to move units at that time.934 The minutes suggested staff were responding to Arlo and Albert’s harmful sexual behaviours and that Max would be offered counselling with the psychologist.935

Based on the evidence we received, we are concerned that Max was the victim of harmful sexual behaviours in the incident involving Albert and Arlo. Penetration, or attempted penetration, with a table tennis bat is a serious instance of harmful sexual behaviour. The Serious Events Review Team’s conclusion that because ‘sexually suggestive motions’ were not clearly visible on CCTV meant that harmful sexual behaviours did not occur is not, in our view, a sound one, particularly given the relevant incident report and the accounts from the young people involved supported a conclusion that harmful sexual behaviours involving a table tennis bat had occurred.

The choice of units in which Max was placed, in the context of his victimisation and subjection to harmful sexual behaviours by other young people in detention, continued to be an issue at the Centre for more than 12 months after the incident with Arlo and Albert. In this chapter, we further discuss Max’s subsequent subjection to other harmful sexual behaviours while detained in the Franklin Unit.

  1. 6 August 2019—Henry is placed in the Franklin Unit

On 6 August 2019, Henry was placed in the Franklin Unit with Albert and Finn.936 As previously outlined, this was despite a care plan for Henry stating that he was ‘not to reside with [Albert] or [Finn]’, that Henry was not safe being housed with older boys and that Henry had been the victim of an earlier incident in the Franklin Unit.937

There was a lack of evidence to explain why Henry was moved to the Franklin Unit. Documents later prepared by Centre Manager Stuart Watson stated that no risk assessment or Centre Support Team process appeared to have taken place before or after Henry was moved to the Franklin Unit.938 Whatever the reason for the move, Pamela Honan, Director, Strategic Youth Services, acknowledged in her evidence that ‘the decision to place [Henry] into [the Franklin] unit was not properly considered or risk assessed’.939

  1. 7 August 2019—Henry experiences harmful sexual behaviours

On 7 August 2019, an incident occurred involving Albert, Finn and Henry. We have reviewed the CCTV footage of this incident, which does not contain audio.940 The CCTV footage shows Henry seated in a common room in the Franklin Unit with Albert, Finn and another resident, Jonathan (a pseudonym).941 Henry was approached by Finn and Albert, who pulled Henry to the ground. During the incident, Finn and Albert pulled Henry’s pants down, exposing Henry’s buttocks and then Albert held a bottle near Henry’s exposed buttocks. After the incident, Albert and Finn left the room and Henry pulled his pants back up and retied the drawstrings. The incident lasted for approximately 20 seconds and staff members were not present. Jonathan remained in the room throughout the incident.

Finding—In August 2019, Henry (a pseudonym) was exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm and experienced preventable harm at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Henry was placed in the Franklin Unit despite a care plan for Henry stating that he was ‘not to reside with [Albert] or [Finn]’, that Henry was not safe being housed with older boys and that Henry had been the victim of an earlier incident in the Franklin Unit.942

The behaviours Finn and Albert expressed towards Henry were non-mutual or non-consensual sexual behaviours involving force and fall within accepted definitions of harmful sexual behaviours. Albert and Finn’s harmful sexual behaviours towards Henry were preventable.

  1. 8 August 2019—Staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre become aware of harmful sexual behaviours Henry experienced

It appears staff were first alerted to the 7 August 2019 incident the following day when Finn, Albert and another young person at the Centre, Frank (a pseudonym), joked about an attempted rape of Henry with a water bottle.943 That conversation was not documented until 10 August 2019 (the relevant incident report is described in the next section). Staff identified the incident as likely having occurred on 7 August 2019 and that the matter should be notified to the Operations Coordinator at the Centre, Maude (a pseudonym).944

On 8 August 2019, Albert and Finn were involved in other incidents in the Franklin Unit in which they made sexualised gestures and appeared to try to engage other young people in sexualised acts.

On 8 August 2019, Henry asked that he ‘move units please anywhere’.945 A staff member documented at that time that ‘staff are keeping a close eye on interactions between the new residents and the three Franklin residents’ and that Henry was ‘very uncomfortable and a bit nervous’.946

  1. 9 August 2019—The Centre Support Team discusses the harmful sexual behaviours Henry experienced

The first documented report about the 7 August 2019 incident was lodged on 9 August 2019. That report recorded that a staff member had heard Finn and Albert telling other residents: ‘[Henry] is a bitch, he won’t even come out of his room, we fucked him with a water bottle. He was resisting until we got his pants down’.947

An Interim Centre Support Team meeting took place on 9 August 2019. The minutes of this meeting stated:

Franklin staff noticed [Henry] removing himself from the general population and upon conversation with [Henry] he advised that during his time in Franklin he has been receiving unwanted attention from [Albert] and [Finn]. Footage for the times suggested in the conversation have been reviewed but this shows more attention towards [Jonathan] than to [Henry] as [Henry] is not present.948

The Centre Support Team determined that Henry and Jonathan should be immediately moved from the Franklin Unit and asked if they would like their parents notified.949 The minutes also noted that more information about behaviour and comments staff had heard or seen needed to be recorded before the next Centre Support Team meeting.950

Also on 9 August 2019, the Operations Coordinator, Maude, viewed the CCTV footage of the 7 August 2019 incident.951 Maude included the following description of the CCTV footage in another incident report relating to Albert, which she lodged on the same day:952

[Finn] walks toward [Henry] with [Albert] following. Both boys then grab [Henry] by the legs and pull him off his chair. [Henry] holding on firmly to his track pants, fights against [Finn] & [Albert] trying to pull his trackpants down. [Henry] ends up on his side. [Albert] reaches for the drink bottle and in a swooping manner brings it towards [Henry]’s buttocks. Both [Finn] & [Albert] quickly stand up and move towards the TV room entrance. [Henry] stands up and is seen to be pulling his track pants up which were clearly sitting below his buttocks at the back. During the ordeal it appears [Henry] holds onto the front of his trackpants. [Finn] has his back to the camera and is bent over the top of [Henry]. [Albert]’s face is [noticeable] to the camera and he is also bent over the top of [Henry].953

The incident report notes that the behaviour was not unusual or out of character for Albert.954 We were not provided with a copy of any corresponding incident report specific to Finn or Henry.

Maude recommended the incident be recorded as a detention offence for Albert and Finn.955 It is unclear whether Maude’s viewing of the CCTV footage or completion of the incident report occurred before or after the Centre Support Team meeting on 9 August 2019.

  1. 10 August 2019—Another incident report is lodged about the harmful sexual behaviours Henry experienced

An incident report was lodged on 10 August 2019 about the conversation between Albert, Finn and Frank that staff overheard on 8 August 2019.956 The report noted the following:

  • Albert said Henry had ‘put himself in his room because he was scared of being raped’ and Albert had told Henry that ‘he rapes little boys like him’.957 When the staff member asked whether Albert was joking, Albert laughed and said, ‘well yeah obviously—but not really’.958
  • Frank told Clive (a pseudonym), a youth worker, that Henry had locked himself in his room because ‘we tried to rape him’.959 When asked whether he was joking around, Frank said: ‘No, we actually tried to’.960 We note that Frank was not present at the incident on 7 August 2019.
  • Finn, Albert and Frank were talking about ‘pulling someone’s pants down, a bottle and holding someone down’.961
  • Finn repeatedly said: ‘I don’t want to go to prison for rape—I hope they do not check the cameras’.962
  • Finn stated the incident occurred while one staff member was in the toilet and the other was playing cards with another young person.963
  • Frank told Clive about another incident of sexual behaviour between young people, stating: ‘I told [Finn] that I’d give him a coke if he touched me on the dick and he did’. Finn and Albert confirmed the incident happened as Frank described.964
  • ‘In general, the sexualised talk in Franklin has escalated beyond normal “teenage boy” talk’ since Henry and Jonathan were moved to the Franklin Unit.965
  • Finn told the staff members present: ‘Can you please stop putting small boys with long hair in this unit, we have been locked up a long time and we take out our sexual frustrations on them’.966

We are not aware of the reason for the two day delay in lodging this incident report.

  1. 12 August 2019—The Centre Support Team discusses Albert’s and Finn’s harmful sexual behaviours

On 12 August 2019, the incident involving Albert and Finn on 7 August 2019, and the subsequent discussions between the young people in detention on 8 August 2019, were again discussed at a Centre Support Team meeting.

The minutes of this meeting stated that there would be ‘zero tolerance with this behaviour and talk’.967 The Centre Support Team was of the view that the level of seriousness of Albert’s and Finn’s behaviour warranted a ‘detention offence’ for each of them.968 It was recorded that conferences would be held with Albert and Finn and that neither would ‘progress further than orange [colour level under the behaviour management system] until they attend’.969 Albert (originally on the yellow colour level) and Finn (originally on the green colour level) were put down to the orange colour level, indicating disapproval of their behaviour under the behaviour management system.970 Under a section titled ‘Positive Words’ for each of Albert and Finn, it was commented that each ‘had [a] good week aside from their incident reports’.971

The minutes also recorded a discussion about Henry’s behaviour regarding an unrelated incident on 5 August 2019, but he was moved from the red colour level to the orange colour level and taken off being ‘unit bound’.972 There is no record of the impact of the 7 August 2019 incident on Henry. The only reference to Henry being subjected to harmful sexual behaviours was that ‘[Henry] was moved back to Bronte [Unit] due to some standover behaviour that [Henry] was subject to in Franklin’.973 We found the use of the phrase ‘standover behaviour’ surprising. We are concerned it may indicate a lack of appreciation of the seriousness of what occurred to Henry in the Franklin Unit, particularly because Operations Team staff had heard Finn and Albert talking about ‘raping’ Henry.974

The meeting minutes do not record any dissent in the decision to place Albert and Finn on the orange colour level.975 Ms Gardiner recalled, however, that she was present at that meeting and had made recommendations that were not followed.976 In our public hearings, Ms Gardiner told us she had disagreed with the decision to place Albert and Finn on the orange colour level, believing red was the most appropriate colour for this incident.977 Ms Gardiner further stated that the rationale at the meeting for not placing Albert and Finn on red was because ‘they would drop their bundle and that would cause some behaviour problems’, creating difficulties for Centre management.978

On 12 August 2019, Patrick Ryan, then Centre Manager, prepared and distributed a document titled AYDC Weekly Report.979 Referring to the 7 August 2019 incident, the report stated:

An incident involving sexualised behaviour in Franklin was considered on the 9 August 2019 and reconsidered at [the Centre Support Team meeting]. Appears to be silly behaviour but [detention offence] for conferencing.980

We don’t know who received this weekly report.

  1. 13 August 2019—Staff voice their concerns to the Centre Manager about the management of Albert and Finn

On 13 August 2019, Ms Gardiner emailed Mr Ryan and some members of the Centre Support Team to reiterate her view that the Centre Support Team’s response to Albert and Finn’s behaviour was inappropriate. She voiced the following concerns:

  • Moving Finn and Albert to the orange (not red) colour level was inconsistent with other Centre Support Team decisions and did not appropriately reflect the nature and seriousness of the offending.981
  • The rationale for moving Albert and Finn to the orange (not red) colour level was inappropriately influenced by concerns about Albert’s and Finn’s response to the colour level, and not on Henry’s wellbeing. Ms Gardiner criticised the rationale, which she identified as being that ‘on Red colour these two residents will “drop their bundle” or similar’, that the Centre would struggle to manage Albert and Finn on red, and that Albert and Finn were long-term residents and would be experiencing some sexual frustration.982
  • The Centre needed to notify Child Safety Services and the parents of the young people in detention, and to arrange support for all involved.983 She reminded Mr Ryan and the Centre Support Team that ‘in the community this would be [considered] a level of abuse, and we are mandatory reporters’.984
  • Staff were minimising Finn and Albert’s behaviour and needed training in relation to harmful sexual behaviours.985

On the same day, the Health and Community Services Union delegate emailed Mr Ryan on behalf of members to raise concerns about Centre Support Team decision making.986 The email stated that ‘conferencing and a slap on the wrist will not be seen by either myself or [union] members as appropriate in this circumstance’.987 The later Serious Events Review Team report stated that the delegate also noted there were inconsistencies in the Centre Support Team decision making, such as ‘awarding more severe consequences for physical assault than were awarded for sexual assault’.988

In his response to the delegate, Mr Ryan questioned why the members had approached the union and had not considered using internal mechanisms to address their concerns in the first instance.989 We are unaware of the steps Mr Ryan took, if any, to address the union’s concerns.

  1. 14 August 2019—The Centre Manager notifies the Director, Strategic Youth Services of the incident involving Henry

The Serious Events Review Team’s report regarding Henry dated 19 March 2020 recorded that, on 14 August 2019, Mr Ryan contacted Greg Brown, the then Director, Strategic Youth Services, via email to notify him of the incident and the differences in opinion among staff about the nature of the incident.990 The email (as extracted in the report) stated:

I have viewed the footage, and I do not view it as a sexual assault. But the centre is full of armchair critics and some [youth workers] have gone to their [Health and Community Services Union] delegate who has put his two cents worth in.991

We discuss Mr Ryan’s description of the incident below.

Henry also had an appointment with the Centre’s psychologist on 14 August 2019, during which he revealed he was feeling threatened and had isolated himself in his room for safety.992 After that appointment, Professional Services Team members noted that Henry was reluctant to talk about the incident, possibly due to fear of retribution.993 There is no clinical record indicating Henry attended any more individual sessions with the psychologist before his release from the Centre a few months later, but he attended group work, including sessions concerning healthy relationships.994

Evidence indicates Henry was offered an opportunity to make a complaint to police but he declined to do so.995 We do not know when that offer was made.

  1. 19 August 2019—The Centre Support Team again discusses the behaviours of Albert and Finn

Another Interim Centre Support Team meeting occurred on 19 August 2019.996 The minutes of this meeting recorded that Albert and Finn were moved from orange to yellow colour under the behaviour management system.997 The rationale for this change was not explained in the minutes, but the minutes do record that Finn had ‘quickly improved his behaviour following last week’s incidents’.998

The minutes recorded that the Centre’s psychologist ‘feels that there is a pattern of behaviour over more than a day with [Finn] & [Albert] that needs to be addressed’.999 It was noted that the psychologist would continue to work with Albert, but that Finn did not engage with the psychologist.1000 There was no suggestion of alternative therapeutic supports for Finn. The minutes also stated that ‘careful consideration’ was to be given to any unit or program placements with Finn and Albert, acknowledging the pair tended to ‘buddy up’ and display problematic behaviours.1001

The minutes of this meeting also suggested that Albert and Finn’s sexualised behaviour was affecting other young people in the Franklin Unit. The minutes record that Frank, who remained in the Franklin Unit with Albert and Finn, had been ‘intimidated by [others’] behaviour in the unit, which may be why his comments around sexualised behaviour have increased’.1002

At this point, neither Albert nor Finn had attended a conference about the 7 August 2019 incident. The minutes acknowledged the need to prioritise conferencing in relation to the incident.1003

The Centre’s psychologist took her own notes from this meeting, which included the following observations:

Provided the members of the [Interim Centre Support Team] meeting with a summary of the incidents reviewed on the Franklin video footage. Raised concerns regarding: the seemingly organised nature of the intimidation behaviour; repeated sexualised behaviours including indecent exposure, sexualised harassment and bullying, assaultive behaviour with a threat/intimidation of sexual violence; and non-sexualised bullying/intimidation.1004

… Mr Ryan and [a staff member] disagreed with the seriousness of the incidents, describing the incidents as ‘horseplay’ and comparing them to behaviours observed in the community in various sporting teams. Furthermore, Mr Ryan, [a staff member] and [another staff member] appeared to affirm the risk management and the sanctions taken as proportionate to the nature of the incidents (CST meeting minutes 12/08/2019). However, [one staff member] conceded that should the victims involved in the incident have been female, the response to the incident would have been different, ‘would have unleashed a war’.1005

A further concern was raised that in the context of frequent and ongoing moves of residents between units the steps taken to ensure the immediate safety of the victims (i.e. moving them to another unit) may be insufficient to provide them with a perceived sense of and actual safety at [the Centre]. [One staff member] acknowledged the concerns, stating that selection of residents to be placed in a unit with either [Finn] or [Albert] would require special attention whereby younger and more vulnerable residents may be deemed to be at high risk of victimisation.1006

Mr Ryan denies describing the incidents as horseplay and comparing them to behaviours of sporting teams.1007

In the Ashley Youth Detention Centre Weekly Report, dated 19 August 2019, it was noted that:

… sexualised behaviour by some residents last week was re-visited this week. Residents have moved units as a practical response. CPR and case conferencing are also practical and theoretical responses.1008

The extent of any therapeutic intervention provided to Albert and Finn is unclear.1009 We do not know the extent to which Albert continued to engage with the psychologist. We are also unaware of what other supports the Centre offered Finn after he declined to engage with the psychologist.

  1. 19 August 2019—Max is placed in the Franklin Unit

On or around 19 August 2019, Max was transferred to the Franklin Unit. Max’s placement in that unit raised concerns among the Centre’s professional services staff. These concerns appear to have arisen because of the presence of other detainees in that unit, namely Albert and Finn. As noted, this was the second time Max had been placed in a unit with Albert, who had previously been involved in an allegation of an incident of harmful sexual behaviour directed at him.

Notably, Max’s placement in the Franklin Unit with Albert and Finn occurred about two weeks after Albert and Finn had displayed harmful sexual behaviours towards Henry and at a time when the Centre’s management and staff were still considering the seriousness of that incident.1010

It is unclear to us why Max was placed in the Franklin Unit. The Centre Support Team meeting minutes from the day the decision was made to transfer Max do not reflect any discussion about his placement in the Franklin Unit.1011 Rather, those minutes state that Max was requesting a transfer and had been moved between different units (not Franklin) within the Centre.1012 We infer from this that the decision to place Max in the Franklin Unit was made after that meeting, likely by Operations Team staff without the direct input or consideration of the Centre Support Team.1013

  1. 21 August 2019—Centre management responds to concerns over Max’s placement in the Franklin Unit

On 21 August 2019, Ms Gardiner emailed her concerns about Max’s placement in the Franklin Unit to Mr Ryan and the Operations Manager:

I am raising the serious risk to [Ashley Youth Detention Centre], [Max] and Franklin residents of the placement of [Max] in the Franklin unit with the current residents.

Recently there has been a number of incidents of serious sexually inappropriate behaviour from [Albert] and [Finn] to other residents.

[Max] has been the subject of [Serious Events Review Team] review of incidents where he has reported being sexually assaulted by other residents. One of these incidents was by [Albert].

This unit placement is very inappropriate. It places [Max] at risk of being exposed to further sexual incidents, which he already feels vulnerable to. As well as puts [Albert] and [Finn] in a position of risk of continuing this behaviour, as they have done this in the past.

The decision also put[s] [the Centre] at risk from a significantly concerning incident occurring regarding sexualised behaviour.

I cannot imagine [Max] would feel very safe in this unit – with one resident who has previously been the subject of sexually inappropriate behaviour towards him, and now he is with two residents for who there is evidence of sexually abusive behaviour.

I request this [unit] placement be [reviewed] asap to ensure the safety of residents.1014

In her statement to us, Ms Gardiner referred to the placement of Max in the Franklin Unit as an example of some operational staff failing to adequately consult other Centre staff about placements and making placement decisions outside the processes of the Centre Support Team.1015

In response to Ms Gardiner’s concerns about Max’s placement, the Operations Manager appears to have immediately recognised the risk and addressed the issue, transferring Max to another unit.1016 In his response to Ms Gardiner, the Operations Manager also noted that the decision to place Max in the Franklin Unit had been made by other staff two days prior, while he was on leave.1017

Ms Gardiner told us she also raised concerns with Mr Ryan about the risk posed by Operations Team staff making placement decisions without proper consultation. Ms Gardiner stated that Mr Ryan’s response was that she should ‘read the “Unit Moves” policy’.1018 Ms Gardiner said that, after reviewing that policy, she told Mr Ryan the policy, as applied in practice, placed young people at risk and needed to be reviewed.1019

Mr Ryan has provided us with his own file note of his initial conversation with Ms Gardiner, which records her objection to the placement decisions and processes.1020 It also records Mr Ryan explaining that the levels of ‘[Operations Coordinator] and up can use’ the relevant procedure to make unit placement decisions.1021 Mr Ryan’s note also records that:

[Ms Gardiner] suggested that staff need supervision, and to involve [Professional Services and Policy] in unit moves. I explained that an operational decision can be made, if it’s based on operations. Thus any discussion on concerns go to the [Operations Coordinator] and/or [the Operations Manager].1022

We understood Mr Ryan’s note to mean that some Operations Team staff could make decisions about unit moves if there was an operational reason to do so. An example of an operational reason for a unit move might be damage to unit infrastructure that required a young person to be moved to a different unit.

  1. Observations—Placement decisions involving Max

We were concerned by the evidence that Max was placed in the Franklin Unit with Albert and Finn only a matter of weeks after these two young people had engaged in harmful sexual behaviours against Henry, and at a time when Centre management and staff were still considering the seriousness of that incident. We note that before Max’s placement in the Franklin Unit he had also been subjected to harmful sexual behaviours by Albert.

Ashley Youth Detention Centre was aware of concerns about Max’s safety. As previously outlined, Ms Gardiner had raised concerns soon after the decision was made to place Max in the Franklin Unit, making clear her disagreement with the decision considering Max’s vulnerability, the previous behaviour of Albert towards Max and the harmful sexual behaviours engaged in by Albert and Finn. A few days later, Ms Gardiner raised her concerns about Operations Team staff making placement decisions without proper consultation. We are concerned that operational matters were prioritised over protecting young people from the risk of harmful sexual behaviours.

While Max was ultimately placed in a different unit without incident, it appears that no Centre-wide steps were taken to ensure that Max or other vulnerable young people would not be placed in a unit with detainees who were known to engage in harmful sexual behaviours. There should be an integrated, consistent and trauma-informed approach to unit placements in youth detention.

Ms Gardiner’s diligence in identifying risks and advocating for Max’s safety is to be commended.

Finding—In August 2019, Max (a pseudonym) was exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Ashley Youth Detention Centre did not adequately consider the risk to Max of him being placed in the Franklin Unit, despite concerns being raised about Max’s safety. Max was exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm.

  1. 22 August 2019—A staff member reports the harmful sexual behaviours Henry experienced to Child Safety Services

A week after expressing her view that Child Safety Services should be notified of the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry, Ms Gardiner had received no response from the Centre Support Team or Mr Ryan, so she revisited the matter with Mr Ryan.1023 On 21 August 2019, Mr Ryan responded, stating there were ‘varying views on [the] level of seriousness of the matters’ and while he was not ‘convinced’ a Child Safety Services notification was necessary, he was ‘happy to take more argument on it’.1024 Ms Gardiner responded the next day, stating she would advise Child Safety Services of the incident and leave it to them to determine whether it was to be a notification that required further follow-up.1025

On 22 August 2019, Ms Gardiner reported the incident involving Henry to Child Safety Services’ Advice and Referral Line.1026 Advice and Referral Line records indicate Ms Gardiner reported that Albert and Finn were masturbating in the TV room before the incident with Henry.1027 Ms Gardiner also provided further information about an incident involving another young person on 8 August 2019 (where he was subjected to a resident ‘exposing himself and masturbating’) and lodged a care concern about Max in relation to his placement with Albert and Finn.1028

The records of Ms Gardiner’s call with the Advice and Referral Line also suggest there was a discussion about the need to notify police.1029 On 23 August 2019, Ms Gardiner emailed Mr Ryan, saying that Child Safety Services told her they would make a report to police.1030

Mr Ryan told us he had escalated the 7 August 2019 incident and Child Safety Services’ report to Mr Brown, who advised him to leave the matter to the police.1031 Mr Brown said he does not recall advising Mr Ryan to leave the matter to the police.1032

There appears to have been confusion, however, between Ashley Youth Detention Centre and Advice and Referral Line staff about who would notify police, with each entity believing the other would make the notification.1033 By early October 2019, no police notification had been made.1034 The Advice and Referral Line notified police of the incident on 3 October 2019 after an Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member

informed them the Centre had not made a referral about the incident.1035 The Advice and Referral Line file of the incident was closed on 11 November 2019.1036

Police records confirm that police were first notified of the incident on referral from Child Safety Services. However, they did not proceed with an investigation because ‘no formal complaint’ had been made.1037 We note that the lack of a formal complaint should not be the sole reason for police inaction, particularly when there may be serious barriers for a victim-survivor making a formal complaint.

  1. 22 August 2019—The Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychologist recommends risk management of harmful sexual behaviours

Also on 22 August 2019, the Centre’s psychologist emailed Ms Gardiner a spreadsheet she had prepared after reviewing footage of incidents in the Franklin Unit.1038 The spreadsheet summarised incidents of sexualised and non-sexualised threatening and harmful behaviours displayed by Albert and Finn, including the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry.1039 The summary does not appear to address all matters or incidents identified in the various incident reports lodged on 9 and 10 August 2019.

In the email to Ms Gardiner, the psychologist noted disagreement about the ‘nature and the seriousness of the behaviours’ seen in the Franklin Unit.1040 The psychologist reasoned that this disagreement could be explained by differences in individual and work experience, the extent of staff training and a:

… general tendency [among Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff] to minimise or dismiss young people’s sexually abusive behaviour as experimentation or play, or as a ‘phase’ that will pass with age … which inadvertently perpetuates the cycle of abuse.1041

The psychologist’s view was that Finn and Albert had displayed ‘concerning and developmentally inappropriate sexual behaviours’.1042

The psychologist recommended the following responses:

  • further investigation of the incidents
  • urgent development of clear risk management strategies, such as increased supervision of the young people who displayed sexually abusive behaviours
  • staff training
  • more discussion about appropriate therapeutic interventions.1043

Ms Gardiner forwarded the psychologist’s advice to Mr Ryan on the same day, noting the Centre had ‘some work to do to upskill staff in this area. It is a significant risk otherwise’ and repeating a request for education/training from a sexual assault service.1044 Mr Ryan responded to Ms Gardiner, stating that he believed the Department of Education had booked training for Centre staff through the Sexual Assault Support Service for the 2019 school year and encouraged Ms Gardiner to engage the Sexual Assault Support Service for resident programs.1045 Mr Ryan directed Ms Gardiner to work with the Learning and Development Manager, Strategic Youth Services at the Department of Communities to arrange staff training.1046

Ms Gardiner told us she was particularly concerned that:

… staff in leadership positions were not aware of [harmful sexual behaviours] and this had created a situation of sexual abuse in the Centre, and would create more risk for young people in the future if this was not addressed.1047

Over an extended period, Ms Gardiner had contacted several senior staff at the Centre and in the Department to request group training on harmful sexual behaviours, but she said she received no response.1048

Mr Ryan provided information to our Commission of Inquiry that during the time he managed the Centre, a number of relevant training programs were provided for staff.1049 He also made repeated attempts to arrange for the Sexual Assault Support Service to deliver training for Centre staff in relation to harmful sexual behaviours.1050 He stated that in 2019 the program was implemented for detainees at Ashley School, with the support of the Principal.1051 However, training for staff was not implemented because, according to Mr Ryan, successive directors did not support the training and Ms Honan noted the request but took no further steps to implement training.1052

Mr Brown informed us that sometime between October 2018 and October 2019, at his recommendation, the Department agreed to review staff training programs, including in relation to harmful sexual behaviours, at the Centre.1053 It is not clear if this review was undertaken, or what the outcome of any such review was.

Ms Honan told us that training for recognising and responding to harmful sexual behaviours is now offered to staff.1054 Such training will need to be supported by a cultural change of attitudes towards harmful sexual behaviours (refer to Chapter 12).

  1. 23 August 2019—The Centre Support Team again discusses the behaviours of Albert and Finn

On 23 August 2019, a further Interim Centre Support Team meeting was held. The meeting minutes reflect that Albert and Finn had progressed to the green colour level. There was no mention of the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry, progress in relation to conferencing with Albert and Finn, or any actions to address their behaviour.1055

Despite the recommendation of the Centre Support Team that Albert and Finn be dealt with by conferencing, it appears that conferencing never took place because of the following factors:

  • The Conference Convenor decided to pause the process until a Child Safety Services report was made and responded to.1056 The Conference Convenor also indicated that if police were notified, she would wait until the end of that process.1057
  • Police were not notified until 3 October 2019.1058
  • Henry was subsequently released from Ashley Youth Detention Centre in late October 2019.1059
  • Child Safety Services did not close their investigation until 11 November 2019.1060

Moving Albert and Finn to a green colour level appears to contradict the Centre Support Team decision made on 12 August 2019 that Albert and Finn would not progress beyond orange until a conference had been completed.1061 While we hold serious concerns about the Behaviour Management System and particularly its use as a tool for punishment, which we discuss in Chapter 12, it is important that if in use it should be applied equally and consistently. It is important that any behaviour management process should be experienced by children and young people in detention as fair, equitable and predictable to support strong relationships between detainees and to promote their sense of security.

We are concerned that Albert and Finn did not appear to receive conferencing or any other therapeutic support for the behaviours they had exhibited. It is also important that the Centre sends a clear message to children and young people displaying or experiencing harmful sexual behaviours that such behaviour is not acceptable.

  1. 9 September 2019—The Secretary is briefed about the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry

In his written statement to us, Mr Ryan confirmed he reviewed the CCTV footage of the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry.1062 He described the incident as ‘an attempt by two residents to remove the pants of a third resident’.1063 In a further written statement, Mr Ryan recalled that the footage showed an ‘attempt’ to pull Henry’s pants down and that Henry’s ‘trousers [were] pulled part way down but his underpants remained on’.1064 Mr Ryan states that he also showed the footage to Mr Brown, who ‘shared my view that it was appropriate to treat this as a sexualised incident, rather than a sexual assault’.1065

We asked Mr Brown about what information he received regarding this incident. He could not recall what information he received or when he received it and did not mention viewing the CCTV footage or his interpretation of it at the time.1066 He subsequently recalled viewing the CCTV footage but, aside from recalling that the footage was ’grainy’, he could not recall what it showed.1067 Mr Brown disputes that he and Mr Ryan shared a view as to how the incident should be described and treated.1068

On 2 September 2019, approximately one month after the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry, Mr Ryan prepared an issues briefing for Michael Pervan, the then Secretary of the Department of Communities, about the incident.1069 The issues briefing was cleared through Mr Brown on 3 September 2019, then by Ms Honan, who at that time held the role of Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services, on 6 September 2019.1070 The issues briefing confirms that Mr Brown had viewed the CCTV footage of the incident.1071

The issues briefing was titled ‘Sexualised incident between residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’.1072 Its stated purpose was to brief the Secretary on the ‘sexualised incident’ on 7 August 2019 and the related referral to police about the alleged abuse.1073

The issues briefing referred to the incident as a ‘sexualised incident’ and a ‘potential sexual assault’.1074 It described the CCTV footage as showing:

… the four residents in the [common] room … [Finn] and [Albert] approach [Henry] and grab his legs, pulling him off his chair, and attempting to remove his track pants. [Henry] holds onto his pants and is able to keep them up. [Albert] reaches for a 600-millilitre water bottle and brings it towards [Henry’s] buttocks for two to three seconds. The incident then ends.1075

We note that Henry’s buttocks were exposed, which this description implies was not the case.

The issues briefing also stated:

  • Henry had not made a complaint, but staff moved Henry from the Franklin Unit on 8 August 2019 as part of an ‘immediate operational response’ while an ‘inquiry’ continued.1076 Jonathan was also moved from the unit on 9 August 2019 because it was ‘considered prudent to do so’.1077
  • Albert and Finn were reported for a detention offence and referred to the psychologist.1078 The briefing does not acknowledge that Finn declined to engage with the psychologist.
  • Matters were and continued to be monitored via the Centre Support Team and Multi-Disciplinary Team processes.1079
  • The Professional Services Team and the psychologist considered the incident. Ms Gardiner still ‘held concerns that the matter was an assault’ and referred the incident to the Advice and Referral Line.1080
  • Representatives of the Advice and Referral Line agreed the incident was an alleged abuse and advised Centre staff to contact police.1081
  • The incident had been referred to police.1082 We note this is incorrect—a police referral was not made until 3 October 2019, almost a month after the Secretary approved the issues briefing.
  • To that date, police had ‘not been in contact’ with the Centre about this matter, ‘but historically do so upon receipt of such referrals’.1083
  • ‘[N]o further complaints or issues [had] been raised or identified since 8 August 2019’.1084 We note that the issues briefing does not clarify that the psychologist and the Health and Community Services Union delegate had separately raised concerns about the incident with Mr Ryan.
  • Police may charge Albert and/or Finn and the related detention offence reports had been filed pending the outcome of any charges.1085
  • Various incidents had occurred between Henry, Albert and Finn over the period of 7–8 August 2019, which ‘could be described as wrestling and/or adolescent behaviour, or as unwanted attention’.1086 These incidents were recorded and considered.1087

The issues briefing did not invite the Secretary to take any action or make any decision. The Department did not take any further action in response to the issues briefing.

Mr Ryan denied his description in the issues briefing was inaccurate but accepted the description could have been worded better.1088 When asked about the issues briefing during our public hearings, Mr Ryan emphasised his lack of control over the final product that went before the Secretary. Mr Ryan said it was common that the contents of briefings were changed as they were considered and edited by his superiors, through whom briefings were approved.1089 He commented that what he ‘initially authored isn’t exactly what the recipient gets’.1090

Mr Ryan provided a draft of the relevant issues briefing, dated 30 August 2019.1091 The contents of this draft are similar to the final product. Some important differences are that Mr Ryan’s draft:

  • stated that the allegation was referred to Child Safety Services, which had on-referred the matter to police to consider1092
  • attached the referral advice provided to Child Safety Services, containing the opinion of its author, Ms Gardiner1093
  • stated Mr Ryan had considered the incident and CCTV footage and ‘suggests the incident is sexualised behaviour, but not an Assault’.1094

The description of the incident contained in the draft and final briefing are the same. The two briefs indicate the matter is a ‘sexual incident’, but the original draft makes it clearer that Mr Ryan did not believe the matter to be ‘an Assault’.

The Director, Strategic Youth Services, who has since retired, could not recall many details of the 7 August 2019 incident or the issues briefing. He said:

I do not recall what information I received and when I received it in relation to this incident. I would be quite sure I would have initially received a phone call outlining basic details and possibly a follow up email. I would generally then receive the incident report and a follow up Issues Brief. I would advise the Deputy Secretary (generally verbally) then follow up with written details through email or an Issues Brief …

I do not recall whether I sought additional information or received additional information or not. In general practice, before clearing an Issues Briefing I would clarify any matters I was not sure about or felt required additional information. I am not sure if I did that on this occasion or not.1095

Ms Honan, as Acting Deputy Secretary, stated that she did not conduct any further investigation about the matter before approving the issues briefing.1096 Ms Honan noted that Mr Ryan and Mr Brown (both of whom had been involved in preparing the issues briefing) had seen the CCTV footage of the incident.1097 She also acknowledged that the matter had been referred to police and Child Safety Services, and that the young people had been referred to the psychologist about their behaviours.1098 She told us that, because of these actions, she had ‘no reason to doubt the content’ of the issues briefing.1099

In her statement to us, Ms Honan reflected that she considered the issues briefing of 9 September 2019 appeared to minimise the behaviour of Albert and Finn and did not, as noted in the Serious Events Review Team report, depict an accurate description of the 7 August 2019 incident, and was misleading.1100

Department Deputy Secretary Mandy Clarke also agreed the issues briefing minimised the incident and showed a lack of understanding of harmful sexual behaviours.1101

Secretary Pervan disagreed the issues briefing minimised the incident overall but acknowledged and accepted the later findings of the Serious Events Review Team that the briefing provided an inaccurate description of the incident.1102 Secretary Pervan considered that, in this respect, the issues briefing ‘painted the incident in a less severe light’.1103 Secretary Pervan gave evidence that if the issues briefing had been more accurate, he would have initiated the Serious Events Review Team’s review sooner.1104

It was not until Alysha raised concerns that Ms Honan may not have been fully informed about the incident that a Serious Events Review Team review began in December 2019.1105 We discuss this review further in this case study.

Finding—The issues briefing to the Secretary about the 7 August 2019 incident regarding Henry minimised the incident and was incomplete, which contributed to a delay in reviewing the incident

The following information was available to Ashley Youth Detention Centre and the Department:

  • Albert and Finn forcibly removed Henry from his chair and held him down.
  • Albert and Finn’s conduct was of a sexual nature.
  • Henry’s pants were forcibly removed to the extent that his buttocks were exposed.
  • Henry was isolating himself in his room, seemingly as a result of the incident and comments from Albert.
  • Albert and Finn had discussed a sexual abuse of Henry with other detainees and staff.

This information should have made it clear that an incident of serious harmful sexual behaviour had occurred. It should have been reported as such to the Secretary.

As a result of an insufficient briefing, the Department was not appropriately informed of the severity of the incident and the potential risk to other young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. In turn, the incomplete issues briefing likely contributed to the Department delaying action to investigate or otherwise manage the incident.

  1. 18 September 2019—The Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychologist alerts the Centre Manager of Henry’s exposure to a risk of harm

We were concerned by evidence that in the weeks following the incident, operational decisions meant Henry was again exposed to a risk of harm from Finn. On 18 September 2019, the psychologist raised concerns that Henry had been moved into a program group with Finn, despite the lack of any formal interventions and without consultation with the Multi-Disciplinary Team.1106 On 20 September 2019, the psychologist requested (via email) that Mr Ryan reverse this decision immediately.1107 In this email, she stated:

I believe that some of the reasons provided for the decision (this is secondary information as I was not at the morning meeting in person) were that the investigation is likely to be closed without any further actions due to the insignificant nature of the incident, and that [Henry] and [Finn] have since been in each other’s company (for example, in the dining hall) without any issues observed by the youth workers. As I am sure you can appreciate there are a number of issues with such rationale.1108

We understand the psychologist’s reference to an ‘investigation’ at this time refers to the internal consideration of the incident within the Centre and the Department, rather than an official investigation such as that subsequently undertaken by the Serious Events Review Team, as we have seen no evidence to suggest that a formal investigation started before December 2019 (discussed in a further section). It is unclear whether Henry was removed from the program with Finn.

Finding—In the weeks following the 7 August 2019 incident, Henry continued to be exposed to risk of harm at Ashley Youth Detention Centre despite widespread knowledge about these risks

Based on the evidence and findings covered in the Serious Events Review Team report into the incident, as well as our own viewing of the CCTV footage of the incident, it appears that Henry experienced serious harmful sexual behaviour on 7 August 2019.1109

Ashley Youth Detention Centre did not demonstrate an appreciation of the seriousness of the incident involving Henry on 7 August 2019. Some staff appeared to understand the seriousness of this incident. However, we were concerned that other staff described the matter as a ‘sexualised incident’.1110 This was despite multiple concerns being raised about this, including on:

  • 10 August 2019, when another incident report was prepared about Albert and Finn discussing the incident and making further sexualised comments
  • 12 August 2019, when the Centre Support Team discussed the sexualised behaviours of Albert and Finn
  • 13 August 2019, when Ms Gardiner emailed Mr Ryan and other members of the Centre Support Team emphasising that Albert and Finn’s behaviours were inappropriate
  • 19 August 2019, when the Centre Support Team again discussed Albert and Finn’s behaviour and the psychologist noted a pattern of behaviour that needed to be addressed
  • 22 August 2019, when Ms Gardiner reported the incident involving Albert and Finn to Child Safety Services.

This minimisation of the incident resulted in:

  • insufficient supports provided to Henry after the incident
  • not taking immediate action to protect Henry’s safety
  • failure to develop a program to address Albert and Finn’s behaviour
  • delayed reporting to police and Child Safety Services.

We are concerned the advice of staff who had knowledge and understanding of harmful sexual behaviours and the management of such behaviours, appears not to have been given as much sway as the concerns and views of operational staff.

Consequently, young people continued to be placed with Albert and Finn for several months and were at continued risk of sexual harm. We are particularly concerned by evidence that Henry was placed in programs with Finn in the weeks following the 7 August 2019 incident.

  1. September 2019—Ray is admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

In September 2019, Ray was admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Soon after Ray’s admission, the Multi-Disciplinary Team recommended the Centre Support Team place Ray on a Very Close Supervision order until more was known about his history and current mental health.1111 It does not appear that Ray was placed on a Very Close Supervision order until towards the end of his third month at the Centre (as discussed further in this section).

Approximately one week after his admission, Ray abused another young person and was isolated for 50 minutes.1112 Ray continued to be involved in a range of physical incidents in the weeks following his admission. Ray was again isolated after at least one other incident.1113 Ray’s mental health difficulties were not reflected in incident forms completed following these incidents.1114 Conferences were held with Ray regarding some of these incidents.1115 Following these conferences, Ray was directed to continue to see the psychologist.1116 In at least two conferences, it was noted that Ray was ‘very insightful about his behaviour’.1117

A version of Ray’s care plan was updated approximately one month after his admission. The care plan noted a recommendation by the Multi-Disciplinary Team that ‘a “Key Worker” be identified at each shift to support and monitor [Ray] and to report any behaviour concerns’.1118 The intention was not ‘that a worker be specifically dedicated to [Ray], but rather has a consistent oversight’, to help Ray build relationships and create some stability in his environment.1119 Later emails sent between Professional Services and Operations Team members suggest this recommendation was, at least initially, received positively by at least one Operations Team member.1120

We note there were discrepancies in the various incident reports concerning Ray, including forms apparently filled out without reference to the actual events, and some forms that were not filled out appropriately or were incomplete.

  1. 8 October 2019—The Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychologist reports harmful sexual behaviours to the Commissioner for Children and Young People

On 8 October 2019, the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’s psychologist contacted Leanne McLean, the Commissioner for Children and Young People, to advise her of the 7 August 2019 incident and another incident of harmful sexual behaviour in October 2019 by Albert and Finn.1121

  1. 13–14 November 2019—The Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychologist raises more concerns with the Centre Manager about Albert and Finn

On 13 November 2019, the psychologist emailed Mr Ryan to advise of a young person in detention disclosing to her that staff had threatened to transfer him to the Franklin Unit, that he felt unsafe and stated that detainees get ‘stood-over, abused and raped’ in the Franklin Unit.1122 This conduct referred to Albert and Finn’s behaviours.1123 We are unaware of which young person expressed this concern but based on the timing it appears unlikely to be (but could be) Max, Henry or Ray.

Mr Ryan told us he ‘was taken aback by her assertions because they didn’t square with [his] understanding of how residents were being treated or the history of complaints which had been received prior’.1124 In response to this email, Mr Ryan told us he:

  • spoke with Digby (a pseudonym), the co-manager of Professional Services (we note Ms Gardiner’s employment at the Centre ceased in mid-October 2019), and senior social workers
  • convened a ‘special meeting’ of managers on 20 November 2019 to discuss Albert and Finn’s behaviour
  • held regular weekly meetings for the remainder of 2019 and into February 2020 to monitor Albert and Finn’s behaviour and provide a ‘higher level of intervention’.1125

It is unclear to us what action was taken in response to the allegations that staff had threatened young people with a transfer to the Franklin Unit, separate from the response to the behaviours Albert and Finn exhibited.

In a meeting on 14 November 2019, the Multi-Disciplinary Team recommended that ‘no other residents will be placed in Franklin until a clear plan is in place’.1126

  1. 15 November 2019—The Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychologist documents her concerns about Albert and Finn in a letter to the Centre Manager

With the support of her supervisors in the Department to raise concerns, the Centre’s psychologist sent a letter to Mr Ryan on 15 November 2019.1127 This letter was also copied to the Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health and Barry Nicholson, Group Director, Forensic Mental Health and Correctional Primary Health Services, who were senior health staff in the psychologist’s reporting line.1128

The letter summarised ‘previously voiced concerns’ and identified the following concerns associated with the management of Albert and Finn:1129

  • There was a ‘[h]igh risk of harm and traumatisation to youth placed in the Franklin Unit, perpetrated by [Albert] and [Finn], on particularly younger residents, those smaller in physical stature and those with disabilities’.1130
  • There was a ‘chronic sense of being unsafe and risk of vicarious trauma to [Centre] residents in general who are aware of the incidents of intimidation and sexualised behaviour in the Franklin Unit and who are also aware of the lack of sanctions associated with these incidents’.1131
  • Current practice risked reinforcing to Albert, Finn and other young people that this kind of behaviour was an acceptable way ‘to get [one’s] needs met and is a successful strategy to keep one safe from the abuse of others’.1132
  • There was ‘insufficient and [in]accurate documentation’ at the Centre that could lead to courts or community agencies receiving misleading information.1133
  • There was a range of long-term risks, including ‘significant risk of physical and psychological harm, poor staff morale, and the corruption of the system entrusted with the care of some of the most vulnerable youth in the state’.1134

To mitigate those risks, the psychologist stated that ‘clear interventions and consistent enforceable sanctions’ were required as ‘a matter of priority’.1135 The psychologist identified a need to formally assess whether Ashley Youth Detention Centre was sufficiently resourced to address Albert and Finn’s specific needs and to prepare a management plan.1136

The psychologist also contended there was ‘evidence of lack of consultation and adherence to the decisions and recommendations made by the Centre Support Team and Multi-Disciplinary Team’.1137 She expressed her view that it was essential all professional disciplines across the Centre support implementing the management plan.1138

The psychologist recommended that, as an interim measure, other young people should not be placed in the Franklin Unit until safe measures had been implemented ‘to ensure their safety with regards to the abolishment of the clear pattern of “ganging-up” and victimisation’.1139

Mr Ryan gave evidence that the Director of Nursing and the Nurse Unit Manager had read the psychologist’s letter to him, dated 15 November 2019, and did not accept its assertions.1140

Emails sent in the week following 15 November 2019 indicate that the Director of Nursing and Mr Ryan spoke about the psychologist’s letter. In his statement, Mr Ryan noted an email he had sent to Piers (a pseudonym), who held a leadership role at Ashley Youth Detention Centre at the time, which reads in part that ‘[the Director of Nursing] states that he has been over [the psychologist’s] clinical notes, leading [the Director of Nursing] to state “I believe this to be an operational issue”’.1141

In evidence to us, the Nurse Unit Manager disagreed with Mr Ryan’s recollection that she reviewed the psychologist’s letter at the time, stating that she did not see the psychologist’s letter before 4 February 2020.1142 She did, however, recall a conversation with the Director of Nursing about ‘an alleged sexualised behaviour incident which occurred in early August’, but could not recall the exact date.1143 The Nurse Unit Manager told us that during this conversation, she expressed her opinion that she did not interpret the behaviours of Albert and Finn to be ‘a serious sexual assault’.1144 The Nurse Unit Manager told us she formed this opinion after she reviewed the CCTV footage and spoke with the young people in detention (including Henry), who she reported ‘all said that they were “just mucking around”, and that there was no intent to cause anybody harm’.1145 The Nurse Unit Manager said that, in hindsight, she believed ‘this was probably “bravado” and an attempt to deflect possible retaliation on [Henry’s] part’.1146 The Nurse Unit Manager stated that she would not have done anything differently, but had she been privy to all the information at the time, she could have supported the psychologist in monitoring Henry’s wellbeing.1147

The Director of Nursing also disagreed with Mr Ryan’s recollection, stating that he in fact agreed with the psychologist’s concerns.1148

Mr Brown could not recall the 7 August 2019 incident and retired from the Department in October 2019.1149

There is evidence to suggest that in response to the letter, Mr Ryan told the psychologist that a task team would be created to develop an intervention plan for Albert and Finn.1150

In an email to Piers on 22 November 2019, Mr Ryan noted that he had spoken with the psychologist on 21 November 2019 to discuss ‘action items’ and that ‘she appeared pleased’.1151

Mr Nicholson also told us the concerns the psychologist raised in her letter of 15 November 2019 were legitimate clinical concerns.1152 He stated that these concerns should have been taken seriously but were not.1153

We return to the discussion between the Department, the psychologist and the Centre below (refer to January 2020).

  1. Early December 2019—Behaviour management programs are initiated for Albert and Finn

In late November 2019, the Multi-Disciplinary Team tasked Alysha and the psychologist with creating and implementing an intensive behaviour management program for Albert and Finn.1154 In early December 2019, the psychologist and Alysha conducted a review into Albert and Finn’s behaviour over the preceding 12 months.1155

Alysha told us that as part of their review she and the psychologist reviewed the CCTV footage of the incident and other incidents from 7 and 8 August 2019.1156 Their review indicated there were five other incidents of intimidating behaviours in that period, including sexualised behaviour.1157 Albert and Finn were involved in all these incidents.1158

Alysha recalled that she and the psychologist also identified a series of incident reports prepared by youth workers that noted conversations in which Finn discussed serious sexual abuse perpetrated by Finn and Albert against younger and smaller boys in the Franklin Unit.1159 Alysha told us that those incident reports were marked as ‘recorded incidents’ and left blank in a number of sections, including regarding notifications, CCTV footage, the involvement of other agencies and further action to be taken.1160 Among these incident reports were documents lodged on 9 and 10 August 2019 in which staff reported discussions between detainees about the 7 August 2019 incident, as well as other harmful sexual behaviours by Albert and Finn.1161 We understand those reports cover the same incidents as those described above.

Alysha told us that she and the psychologist immediately notified Mr Ryan and Piers about the numerous incidents involving Albert and Finn.1162 We understand this occurred on or around 6 December 2019.1163

Alysha’s view was that the ‘most urgent’ task was to ensure the safety of other children and young people in detention and provide intensive therapeutic interventions for Albert and Finn.1164 Alysha told us she was concerned the issues documented in the incident reports had not been reported to police and that children were still being placed in the same unit as Albert and Finn.1165

Alysha’s evidence was that Mr Ryan and Piers ended the review she and the psychologist were conducting.1166

We asked Digby, the former co-manager of Professional Services, about the response to concerns raised about Albert and Finn. He responded that he was aware the psychologist, Alysha and another member of staff ‘undertook to develop an appropriate tailored management plan to meet the needs of both boys’ but that to his knowledge, the plan was never finalised.1167

Piers told us that Alysha and the psychologist were restricted from accessing files on advice from Mr Ryan.1168 Piers recalled the reason for that advice to be:

Prior to this both staff were freely accessing said files without authority and in some cases, it appeared to have no immediate bearing on their workloads especially in relation to the role that Alysha was employed to do.

In the case of [the psychologist], she was employed by Forensic [Mental] Health and as such being a separate department, there was a protocol to accessing clients’ files.

However, to compensate for this, a daily information meeting was started between [the psychologist], Operations Manager and Operations Coordinator to brief on incidents or concerns from previous shifts. She did have unrestricted access to incident reports and [Centre Support Team meeting] minutes.

Both staff were able to move forward with access to any files that they considered important to their work, however they needed to seek authority from their manager to do so.1169

In relation to developing a behaviour management plan for Albert and Finn, Mr Ryan told us that although he was aware Alysha and the psychologist were tasked with undertaking a review of Albert and Finn’s behaviours, he was not aware they were accessing ‘any and every file they wished, against the parameters’ set by the managers of the Professional Services Team.1170 He told us:

I spoke with [the co-managers of the Professional Services Team] about the unfettered access to files. Both assured me that this was not agreed to with anyone, but that their office was to work with [the psychologist] in preparation of the Plan. Both [managers] felt that … [Alysha] granted access to any file or correspondence sought and that this was against their set parameters. Both indicated that they would speak with all parties involved.1171

Mr Ryan denied that he interfered with the development of a behaviour management plan for Albert and Finn.1172 We understood him to mean that he did not interfere unreasonably or without justification, noting that he did engage with the managers of the Professional Services Team to raise concerns about access to files outside of ‘set parameters’.1173

  1. Early December 2019—Staff continue to raise concerns about Albert and Finn

Alysha told us that after speaking with Mr Ryan and Piers on 6 December 2019, she notified the Advice and Referral Line of all the incidents involving Albert and Finn.1174 The psychologist also made a mandatory report to Child Safety Services on 6 December 2019 about the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry.1175 On the same day, the psychologist emailed Mr Ryan stating that, following the discovery of the incident reports—which contained allegations of attempted rape and verbal threats of rape, incidents of sexual favours performed for compensation, and that sexual frustration was being taken out on younger residents in the Franklin Unit—she had made mandatory reports to Child Safety Services and the Commissioner for Children and Young People.1176

By December 2019, Ms Honan had assumed the role of Director, Strategic Youth Services (now Director, Youth and Family Violence Services).1177 On 6 December 2019, Mr Ryan forwarded to Ms Honan the psychologist’s email about her report to Child Safety Services.1178 Mr Ryan told Ms Honan that he did not agree with the psychologist’s assertions.1179 He also told Ms Honan that he had urged the psychologist to be cautious until he had checked the Centre Support Team records, but that the psychologist ‘declined to wait and said she had no option but to report those findings to [Child Safety Services]’.1180 He concluded the email by writing that the psychologist had ‘strong, emotive opinion in respect to this matter’ and that the Director of Nursing and the Nurse Unit Manager had recently disagreed with the psychologist.1181

Alysha told us that, on both 5 and 6 December 2019, she called Ms Honan’s Executive Officer to tell her about the incident reports and Mr Ryan and Piers’ response.1182 Alysha recalled that she told the Executive Officer she wanted to contact police about the matter immediately, but the Executive Officer told her to wait and to speak with Ms Honan the following week.1183 On 6 December 2019, Alysha also emailed the Executive Officer, stating:

I have reached a point where if I lose my job for reporting practices in place, it will be worth it to shine a light on the issues and practices that are currently in place at Ashley. Someone would need to further examine all residents incident reports to get a full picture of the lack of adequate documentation, follow up and interventions put in place to support staff, victims and perpetrators of said incidents.

Please note that it is my understanding there is currently [paper-based] handover and incident reports at Ashley. There are only originals and no copies electronically or paper based.1184

Alysha sent photographs of the incident reports to the Executive Officer.1185

In her response of the same date, the Executive Officer stated that she appreciated Alysha giving Ms Honan ‘an opportunity to discreetly investigate this first before contacting external agencies’ and assured Alysha that Alysha had met her duty of care.1186

  1. 6 December 2019—The Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychologist again reports harmful sexual behaviours to the Commissioner for Children and Young People

On 6 December 2019, the Centre’s psychologist again contacted Commissioner McLean after discovering the incident reports related to Henry.1187 The psychologist provided the Commissioner with the spreadsheet of incidents she had prepared in August 2019.1188 The psychologist was troubled that nothing had happened to manage Albert and Finn’s behaviours, despite her letter of 15 November 2019 to Mr Ryan outlining her concerns.1189

On the same day, Commissioner McLean contacted Ms Honan to discuss the psychologist’s disclosure.1190 Ms Honan confirmed she was aware of concerns but did not have all the information.1191 Ms Honan also confirmed that Mr Ryan had assured the immediate safety of all detainees over the weekend and that she would go to the Centre on the next business day to access information with a view to initiating a Serious Events Review Team review.1192

Commissioner McLean expressed support for Ms Honan’s approach during that conversation.1193 Commissioner McLean commented that it seemed to her that the motivation for examining unwanted sexual behaviours among children and young people in detention ‘was low’ and ‘perhaps influenced by a custodial environment’.1194 We understand this comment to mean Commissioner McLean was concerned that little attention was paid to harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre and that this attitude may have been influenced by a custodial rather than therapeutic attitude in the Centre.

  1. 9–10 December 2019—The Director, Strategic Youth Services initiates a review into the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry

Alysha told us she met with Ms Honan on 9 December 2019.1195 Alysha recalled that Ms Honan said the Department would conduct an internal investigation and report the matter to the police if necessary.1196

On the same day, Commissioner McLean followed up with Ms Honan, who confirmed there was a need for a Serious Events Review Team review.1197 Commissioner McLean supported initiating a review and advised Ms Honan she would write to the Department about the matter with the potential to refer it to the Custodial Inspector.1198

On 10 December 2019, Commissioner McLean wrote to Secretary Pervan to advise him of the psychologist’s concerns, enclosing the psychologist’s supporting material.1199 Commissioner McLean further advised of her contact with Ms Honan and of her support for an immediate review.1200 Commissioner McLean requested that she be kept up to date with the Serious Events Review Team process and advised that she may refer the matter to the Custodial Inspector.1201

We have received no evidence that the Custodial Inspector was notified of this incident or any other concerns the psychologist raised. During our public hearings, the Custodial Inspector, Richard Connock, told us he was not sure whether he had been informed at the time that the review was being conducted, but he agreed it was the kind of thing that would have been important for him to have been aware of.1202

We note that on 13 December 2019, there was an incident where three young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre accessed a roof, there was a stand-off, and the three young people were subsequently ‘unit bound’, with allegations of staff falsifying isolation records (we discuss this incident and the Centre’s response in Case study 3).1203

  1. Mid-December 2019—The Serious Events Review Team investigates the 7 August 2019 incident

The Serious Events Review Team’s investigation into the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry began in December 2019.1204

The terms of reference for the review were as follows:

Background and Services History

Review the process applied in recording, investigating, assessing and referral to required services of the alleged incident of sexual assault upon [Henry] in [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] in August 2019.

Determine and comment on the post incident management of this incident both for the alleged perpetrators, victim and other residents’ safety and wellbeing.

Assessment

Consider and analyse the presence/absence and quality of recorded information and assessments which guided the decisions made with regard to the placement, safety, referral to police/[Tasmanian Health Services], case planning and post incident management of [Henry] and others allegedly involved in this matter.

Planning, Services and Communication

Describe and analyse the quality of communication between [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] and other key internal and external stakeholders/service providers in this case.

Make comment on case processes, planning, and service provision and how these have served (or otherwise) to protect and enhance [Henry]’s safety and well-being at this time and over time.

Compliance with Legislation and Policy

Determine whether [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] has fulfilled its responsibilities as articulated in the Youth Justice Act 1997, Standard Operating Procedures and agency policy.

Findings and Draft Recommendations

Articulate findings from this review and provide draft recommendations regarding any actions that should be taken to address issues identified in the review, as they relate to the above Terms of Reference.1205

Veronica Burton, a former Serious Events Review Team member, conducted the review and wrote the final report. We heard evidence about the difficulties that Ms Burton and others experienced when seeking to access records relevant to the review.

As part of the review, Ms Burton read a wide range of documentation, including electronic and paper files, email communication, meeting minutes and daily diaries, and watched CCTV footage.1206 She also considered relevant legislation, policies and procedures.1207 Interviews were conducted with past and current Centre staff, including management.1208 We note that Mr Ryan said he was unwell and on extended leave during the period Ms Burton carried out the review and was largely unable to participate or contribute to the review process.1209

Both Alysha and Ms Burton told us about an occasion during Ms Burton’s review where they said Piers prevented Ms Burton from accessing files stored in a filing cabinet and told her that he could not find other files she requested because they had been archived.1210 Ms Burton told us that some of these records were provided by Stuart Watson when he replaced Mr Ryan as Centre Manager.1211 Ms Burton recalled that during her review, she was prevented from speaking directly with Henry and therefore, never heard his version of the incident.1212

Piers could not recall the Serious Events Review Team attending the Centre to discuss the 7 August 2019 incident.1213 He said that ‘at no time would I have restricted them from accessing any files or reports and would have made available to them what was available to me’.1214

Ms Burton also told us that Piers provided her with incident reports about the 7 August 2019 incident.1215 She believed these reports were not originals and had been rewritten.1216 Ms Burton told us she received a second set of incident reports from Alysha.1217 Ms Burton recalled that second set included different details about the incident, including the length of time the detainees were left unsupervised, who the matter was reported to and the severity of the incident.1218 Ms Burton also told us the second set ‘minimis[ed] how the … bottle was used’.1219 Ms Burton told us that her usual practice was to scan any hard-copy paper files and save them to the secure file system for the Serious Events Review Team and to then file the hard copies.1220 She stated she does not have ‘a clear memory of exactly doing that with those documents, but that was the process that I followed, so I can say with … almost 100 per cent confidence that that’s what occurred’.1221 Ms Burton stated that she no longer had access to the Serious Events Review Team files after leaving the Department.1222 We have only received one version of the relevant incident report from the Department, which Ms Burton believed to be the version she received from Piers.1223

Commenting generally on her engagement with Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff when conducting reviews into incidents at the Centre, Ms Burton told us she depended on the cooperation of Centre management to gain access to records and interviewees.1224 Her experience was that it was sometimes difficult to access all the information she needed, including interviewing children, without staff assistance, saying ‘I couldn’t go anywhere in the centre unless somebody took me because every door is locked and I needed somebody to escort me wherever I needed to go’.1225

Ms Burton also observed that her access to children and young people in detention was limited because they were usually housed in secure units and so she would ‘often only get the staff version of events’.1226 She said she was often not provided personal information or history about the young people involved.1227 She expressed concerns to us about an approach at the Centre of a ‘clean slate’ philosophy that did not view children’s history of significant trauma as relevant, noting ‘[it] is no way to run a therapeutic service’.1228

Ms Burton noted that while the Centre had an electronic filing system, it was not in use and ‘pretty much everything was paper file’.1229 Ms Burton told us that she depended on the Centre’s management to make paper files available to her and noted that this was different from other agencies, such as Child Safety Services, where Ms Burton would have automatic access to all electronic records.1230 Ms Burton recalled that in her dealings with Ashley Youth Detention Centre, she often encountered issues of missing documents, a lack of records and, if records were provided, concerns about their accuracy.1231 For example, Ms Burton recalled that, ‘because … file-keeping was so poor’, she would often depend on management to identify which staff were rostered on during an incident under review.1232

  1. December 2019—Ray is moved to the Franklin Unit

Towards the end of his third month at the Centre, Ray was transferred to the Franklin Unit because the unit he was in had to be evacuated.1233 At this time, Albert and Finn were still housed in the Franklin Unit.1234 Minutes of the Centre Support Team meeting held two days after Ray’s transfer to the Franklin Unit showed the team did not raise the possibility of transferring Ray out of the Franklin Unit after the incident that caused the transfer.1235

We note that at this point, there had been a Multi-Disciplinary Team recommendation that no young people be placed with Albert and Finn until both had received appropriate interventions. That recommendation was made about one month before Ray was placed in the Franklin Unit (on 14 November 2019). The Centre’s psychologist reiterated this recommendation following the placement of Henry in the Franklin Unit in the week before Ray’s transfer to the Franklin Unit. We also note, as outlined, that when Ray was admitted to the Centre, the psychologist had made a general recommendation about the need to ‘carefully consider’ Ray’s unit placement considering his mental health difficulties.1236

  1. December 2019—The Multi-Disciplinary Team raises concerns about Ray’s transfer to the Franklin Unit

In the days following Ray’s transfer to the Franklin Unit, minutes of a Centre Support Team meeting recorded that Ray had ‘settled well into Franklin’.1237

Minutes of a Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting held two days later included the following comments, under the heading ‘What are we worried about?’:

  • ‘Recent move to Franklin could be a concern for [Ray]’.
  • ‘[Ray] is highly suggestible to external influences’.
  • ‘There are concerns about the current mix of residents in Franklin’.1238

The following comments were made about the recommended next steps for Ray:

  • ‘Ideally to be moved from Franklin due to [Ray] being easily coerced and his ongoing mental health symptom’.
  • ‘Reside with peers who are not going to influence [Ray] in an adverse manner’.
  • ‘Youth workers reporting dysregulation. It is recommended a unit move’.1239

Around this time, Ray was made subject to a Very Close Supervision order.1240 A subsequent issues briefing (discussed below) indicates that this decision was made ‘during Centre Support Team and/or [Interim Centre Support Team] meetings’, which appears to be backed up by Centre Support Team meeting minutes of this period.1241 Centre Support Team meeting minutes around this time indicate some discussion about Ray’s placement in the Franklin Unit, with a set of minutes noting:

Concerns regarding [Ray] being housed in Franklin were tabled, but staff felt that by putting [Ray] on [Very Close Supervision] this would eliminate the concerns raised around him possibly being influenced by others in the unit, particularly given his unsettled mental health.1242

We asked Mr Ryan about the decision to place Ray in the Franklin Unit. He responded it was a ‘difficult’ time at the Centre, that there were a ‘number of very challenging residents’ and that Ray’s behaviours were ‘extreme’.1243 He said the options following the Multi-Disciplinary Team’s recommendation that Ray be moved from the Franklin Unit were either to move Ray out of the Franklin Unit or to keep him in the Franklin Unit under Very Close Supervision.1244

Mr Ryan said that to move Ray from the Franklin Unit to a less secure unit would have had ‘ramifications for [Ray] and for other residents and staff’.1245 Mr Ryan described Ray’s continued placement in the Franklin Unit under Very Close Supervision as ‘the “least worst” option’.1246 Mr Ryan also said a separate incident that occurred two weeks after Ray’s transfer to the Franklin Unit meant it was ‘very difficult to safely move [Ray] from Franklin to a less secure unit’.1247

The Very Close Supervision order required a supervising youth worker to always be within five metres of Ray when he was outside a locked building.1248 We are unclear as to why, in this instance, the Very Close Supervision order seemingly applied only when Ray was outside, given he was likely at the same or increased risk of harm by other young people when inside a unit. However, it appears from the relevant procedure that this was standard practice.1249 The practice was perhaps directed at managing an escape risk rather than protecting young people from harm.

Minutes of a Centre Support Team meeting held after the Very Close Supervision order was made recorded that he was ‘travelling well in Franklin’ but that he did ‘keep to himself’.1250

  1. 2 January 2020—An incident occurs involving Ray, Albert and Finn

Approximately three weeks after Ray was transferred to the Franklin Unit, he was involved in a verbal altercation with Albert, after which Ray initiated a physical altercation with Albert.1251 Finn also took part in this altercation and Ray received multiple punches to the head from Albert and Finn.1252 This incident occurred indoors.1253

Documents prepared in the days following the incident show that Alysha and the psychologist believed Ray was provoked to violence when Albert and Finn made light of Ray’s mental health difficulties.1254 The incident reporting form invited the reporting youth worker to select the option ‘the young person was incited/provoked by other young person/s’ under the heading ‘moderating factors’, but this was not selected.1255

We have reviewed the CCTV footage of this incident, which does not contain audio.1256 We consider the CCTV footage matches the account provided in the incident report prepared after the incident, except as noted next.

Immediately before the incident, Ray displayed signs of stress or anxiety. These included signs that the Centre’s psychologist had identified to Operations Management at the beginning of Ray’s admission.1257 The incident report stated that each of the three staff members present attempted to stop the incident by speaking to the three young people but that the incident did not end until three more staff members arrived after a ‘code black’ was called.1258 It is not apparent from the CCTV footage that any staff member attempted to de-escalate or redirect Ray—for example, by moving him away from other young people—as he began to show signs of distress before the incident. We accept, however, that it was difficult to understand any verbal de-escalation techniques staff might have used without audio available to us.

The arrival of extra staff members cannot be seen in the CCTV footage and appears to have happened outside the room. The CCTV shows that one of the three original staff members eventually intervened to redirect Ray out of the room and away from the incident. It is unclear from the footage why that staff member took several minutes to act in this way, especially when he appears to have finally acted without support or help from other staff. We were concerned to see that none of the original staff members present appeared to try to remove, restrain or redirect any of the three young people during lulls in the incident, including one instance where Albert left the room entirely (before returning to engage in the incident again). Alysha told us that immediately following the incident involving the three young people:

… I spoke to Patrick Ryan and [the then Acting Manager, Professional Services and Policy] about the need to report the assault to the police as well as the need to get Ray medically assessed. They insisted that it was a ‘fight’ between residents and that no police notification was required. He was not assessed by a doctor, nor was this attack reported to the police.1259

Alysha believed Ray was concussed, did not attend school due to the concussion and did not get medical care.1260

The Nurse Unit Manager’s notes from 2 January 2020 in relation to Ray indicate that ‘[n]il signs of concussion noted … and author advised [Ray] that if he experienced any of these symptoms to notify staff immediately’.1261 We are unclear whether Ray required any more help or got any further medical assistance.

The incident reports for each of Finn, Albert and Ray include a note that referral to police may be ‘pending’, but no further comments are made about when or if a referral would occur.1262 Ms Honan told us the incident was not reported to police ‘[d]ue to [Ray’s] mental health condition and that he was the instigator of this assault and other less serious unprovoked assaults towards detainees’.1263

Finding—Ray’s (a pseudonym) placement in the Franklin Unit at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in December 2019 was inappropriate and exposed him to preventable harm

Although there was no evidence before us that Ray was subjected to harmful sexual behaviours at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, he was involved in a physical altercation.

We are concerned that Ray was placed in the Franklin Unit in the first place and then not moved once concerns were raised. We hold these concerns because the Centre was aware of:

  • Ray’s vulnerabilities as outlined by the Centre’s psychologist on Ray’s admission to the Centre
  • concerns raised by the Multi-Disciplinary Team about the decision to place Ray in the Franklin Unit
  • the harmful sexual behaviours of detainees in the Franklin Unit, particularly Albert and Finn, which at the time of Ray’s placement in the unit had not been properly addressed
  • Ray ‘keeping to himself’ in the Franklin Unit, which could suggest Ray did not feel safe.

We acknowledge the evidence that Ray’s behaviour made him a risk to other detainees and that placing Ray in the Franklin Unit with Albert and Finn was the ‘least worst’ option. However, while we acknowledge that placement decisions at Ashley Youth Detention Centre likely involve a range of difficult decisions, we are not convinced that appropriate consideration was given to Ray’s ongoing safety in the Franklin Unit.

It is not apparent to us that the Centre considered transferring Ray to another unit under Very Close Supervision—the options appeared to be seen as Ray either being in a different unit or in the Franklin Unit under a Very Close Supervision order. We note that after the incident Ray was moved to another unit.

We are also not convinced that the Very Close Supervision order—which we understand to have related only to Ray’s movements in outdoor areas of the Centre—was enough to ensure Ray’s safety if he remained in the Franklin Unit. Having reviewed the CCTV footage of the incident between Ray, Albert and Finn, it does not appear that any youth worker was assigned to supervise Ray inside on that day. More appropriate supervision may have helped avoid the incident.

We are also concerned that Albert and Finn, who appeared to present similar threats to Ray, were not on Very Close Supervision orders.

At our public hearings, Ms Honan agreed the harm that Ray suffered in the incident was entirely preventable.1264 She also acknowledged there ‘could have been other strategies put in place to reduce the likelihood of [the incident] occurring’.1265 We agree and further consider that earlier de-escalation and intervention to stop the incident once it began would have minimised the degree of harm Ray suffered.

  1. 3 January 2020—The Centre Support Team discusses the incident involving Ray, Albert and Finn

Staff logs and minutes of an Interim Centre Support Team meeting held the day after the 2 January 2020 incident say that Ray was moved to another unit on the night of the incident.1266 A later issues briefing to the Secretary stated that Ray was moved from the Franklin Unit on 2 January 2020 in response to a different incident of property damage the day before the incident.1267 According to the Ashley Youth Detention Centre daily roll, Ray was not moved to the new unit until a day later (3 January 2020), suggesting that

he spent another night in the Franklin Unit immediately after the incident.1268 We do not know the reason for the discrepancy in these records, but they appear to be an example of inconsistent and poor record keeping at the Centre.

The minutes of the 3 January 2020 Interim Centre Support Team meeting state:

  • ‘Staff spoke to residents involved [in the incident in the Franklin Unit] and all agreed that it was over and they were happy to move forward’.
  • ‘[Ray] stated that he wished to stay in [the new unit] and it was decided that he could stay on the terms that there were no problems otherwise he would return to Franklin’.
  • ‘[Albert] and [Finn] both met with [Ray] separately for mediation … and they were all happy to move on from this’.
  • Ray was told that ‘if he wished to move back to Franklin at any stage that he was welcome to do so’.1269

Albert, Finn and Ray’s involvement in the incident was classified as a detention offence and all three young people attended conferences in the days after the incident.1270 It is not clear to us whether the detainees’ individual circumstances, including Ray’s mental health condition, were considered when determining an outcome for these young people.

  1. 3 January 2020—A staff member meets with the Director, Strategic Youth Services to discuss concerns about Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Alysha told us she met with Ms Honan again on 3 January 2020 to discuss her concerns about the Centre’s management of harmful sexual behaviours and Ray’s safety.1271 On 6 and 7 January, following this meeting, Alysha emailed Ms Honan copies of Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting minutes in which concerns about Franklin Unit placements were raised, along with a copy of the psychologist’s letter to Mr Ryan of November 2020 in which the psychologist highlighted the risk of placing vulnerable people in the Franklin Unit.1272

  1. 5 January 2020—Ray attempts to escape from Ashley Youth Detention Centre

Three days after the incident involving Albert and Finn, Ray climbed an internal fence in an apparent attempt to escape from the Centre.1273 We understand that Ray was still the subject of a Very Close Supervision order at that time, requiring a youth worker to be within five metres of Ray while he was outside a locked building.1274

The Operations Coordinator on shift, Chester (a pseudonym), emailed the Operations Manager about the incident.1275 Chester reported that Ray was stopped, ‘walked back’ to his unit ‘unassisted’ and was placed in isolation for 30 minutes.1276 A decision was made to place Ray on ‘unit bound’ until the next day’s Centre Support Team meeting.1277 We discuss the practice of ‘unit bound’ in Case study 3. According to Chester’s email, this incident immediately followed an earlier one involving Ray, in which he attempted to steal something from an out-of-bounds area.1278

In response to a notice to produce, the Department provided us with a copy of what appears to be a complete bundle of all incident reports relating to Ray for the relevant period.1279 In that bundle, we received a copy of the incident report about the earlier incident.1280 We have not been provided with a copy of the incident report relating to the escape attempt or associated isolation documents. It is unclear why we did not receive a copy of the incident report and associated isolation documents relating to this incident. This is concerning because we received allegations that staff tackled and handcuffed Ray.1281

Alysha told us she spoke to Ray after he returned to the unit.1282 She recalled that Ray told her he had tried to escape because ‘no-one was keeping him safe’.1283

  1. 6 January 2020—The Centre Support Team discusses the incident involving Ray, Albert and Finn

A Centre Support Team meeting was held four days after the 2 January 2020 incident involving Albert, Finn and Ray.1284 In relation to Ray, the minutes record that Ray ‘is always apologetic after incidents’ and notes that work was underway to refer Ray’s case to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor.1285 The minutes note that Ray had been ‘unit bound’ since his escape attempt the day before but do not record a decision to remove him from ‘unit bound’ at that time.1286 In relation to Finn and Albert, the minutes record separately for both of them that ‘[he] has had a great week aside from the one incident that let his week down’.1287

The Centre’s psychologist was present at this meeting.1288 We have viewed an email sent by a Case Management Coordinator and a member of the Centre Support Team, in the days following this Centre Support Team meeting. In that email, the Case Management Coordinator raised his concerns about how the psychologist’s presence was managed.1289 We understand that some members of the Centre Support Team requested the psychologist’s presence because her expertise was required in relation to Ray in particular.1290 The email recorded that Maude initially declined to allow the psychologist to attend, but when Centre Support Team members ‘insisted’, Maude agreed on the condition that the psychologist only listen and not speak.1291 The email also recorded that Mr Ryan agreed with the approach.1292 Alysha’s evidence was also that the psychologist had been allowed to attend on the condition that she not contribute to the discussion.1293

We asked Maude for her response to the allegation that she prevented the psychologist from contributing to the Centre Support Team meeting.1294 Maude did not respond to our request for a statement.

  1. 6 January 2020—A referral is prepared to engage a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor

Also on 6 January 2020, Mr Ryan requested that Ray be referred to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor.1295 It appears that Ms Honan either approved or directed that a referral be prepared.1296

On the same day that Mr Ryan instructed the Case Management Coordinator to prepare a referral to the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor, Alysha emailed Ms Honan requesting a meeting to discuss the incident between Ray, Albert and Finn, and the associated response.1297 The email said the Multi-Disciplinary Team had ‘strongly advised against’ placing young people who were ‘highly vulnerable, suggestable and at risk’ in the Franklin Unit, ‘for their own safety’.1298 The email also notified Ms Honan of Ray’s escape attempt, which had occurred when Ray was under Very Close Supervision.1299 Alysha queried the value of making a referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor when previous recommendations about Ray had not been followed.1300

Ms Honan’s response to Alysha was that Mr Ryan had asked Ms Honan for her ‘opinion about engaging a [Senior Quality and Practice Advisor] … because [staff] were at a loss as to how to manage [Ray]’.1301 Ms Honan suggested that a referral to the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor would ‘shine a light on the adverse responses to the advice of the Professional services staff to the [Operations] Managers’.1302 We understand Alysha also spoke with a member of the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor team, who shared a similar view to Ms Honan about how a referral could assist with the internal dynamics at the Centre.1303

In her emails with Ms Honan of that day, Alysha continually expressed her serious concerns about disregard for the advice of the Professional Services Team and the Multi-Disciplinary Team and failure to comply with policy, including the following:

  • Staff were not following the Multi-Disciplinary and Professional Services Teams’ advice about how to manage Ray (contrary to the suggestion that staff were simply ‘at a loss’ about how to manage Ray).1304
  • Decisions to place Ray and others in the Franklin Unit were directly contrary to advice, and the incident between Ray, Finn and Albert would not have occurred had Multi-Disciplinary Team recommendations been followed.1305
  • Operational staff had failed to comply with the terms of the Very Close Supervision order, enabling Ray to attempt an escape in the days following the incident with Finn and Albert.1306
  • The Centre’s psychologist had been instructed not to speak at the Centre Support Team meeting in relation to next steps for Ray.1307

We understand that the Centre’s psychologist reported the incident to Child Safety Services four days after the incident.1308 The report was made in conjunction with other reports the psychologist made involving Albert and Finn (as discussed earlier).1309 Specifically, the psychologist reported that Ray had significant mental health difficulties and was placed with Albert and Finn contrary to recommendations.1310 The psychologist also reported that the response from youth workers was ‘very delayed’ and that multiple workers were present during the incident but did not intervene.1311

The psychologist also raised the matter as part of a broader report of issues to her line manager in the Department (which we discuss further in this case study).

  1. 7 January 2020—A management plan is developed for Ray

After the 2 January 2020 incident involving Ray, Albert and Finn, Ms Honan ‘formally instructed’ Mr Ryan to ask Alysha (in consultation with the psychologist) to ‘set out clear strategies to manage [Ray] and also develop some recommendations’.1312 This was to occur in conjunction with the referral to the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor.1313

On 7 January 2020, Mr Ryan instructed Digby, the Manager, Professional Services and Policy, to prepare a management plan for Ray.1314

Ray’s final management plan, prepared by Digby, provided that:

  • Ray was to remain in a specified unit (not the Franklin Unit) ‘for the time being’ and that the psychologist and others were to be consulted ‘if practicable’ before a placement decision affecting Ray was made (such as adding others to his unit).1315
  • Ray was to remain under Very Close Supervision ‘until determined otherwise by both [the Multi-Disciplinary Team] and [the Centre Support Team]’.1316
  • Operations staff were ‘to be reminded of their responsibilities’ in relation to Very Close Supervision, given Ray’s escape attempt.1317
  • Alysha was to prepare a referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor and provide operational staff with ongoing clinical support.1318

Much of the management plan covered recommendations from the psychologist working directly with Ray, which had already been raised with Centre staff at the beginning of Ray’s admission and which were listed in his existing care plan.1319 The management plan also provided that a behaviour chart was to be developed—a task that the psychologist had undertaken to complete in the days following Ray’s admission.1320 We understand from minutes of a Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting approximately 10 weeks after Ray’s admission that the behaviour chart was to be ‘reintroduced’ for Ray, suggesting its use had been discontinued.1321 We are unclear about whether its use was intended for a short period or what kind of use Centre staff made of it.

We asked Digby about the 2 January 2020 incident and the responses to it, including the referral to the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor. He responded that he knew ‘nothing about this matter’.1322 This is surprising given his role in preparing the management plan in response to the incident.

  1. 8 January 2020—The Centre Support Team again discusses the incident involving Ray, Albert and Finn

On 8 January 2020, another Interim Centre Support Team meeting was held to discuss Ray, Albert and Finn.1323

In relation to Albert and Finn, the minutes of that meeting state:

In the follow up from this incident, both boys participated well in mediation and gave assurances that this behaviour will not occur again. During [Case Plan Review] both residents accepted their part in the incident. Conferencing will take place with all three residents involved in the incident. [The psychologist] and [Alysha] in consulting with staff post incident believe that there was considerable provocation from [Finn] and [Albert] in the lead up to the incident, but these details were not recorded on incidents for [the Centre Support Team]. Following discussion, it was felt that both [Finn] and [Albert] remain red until next [week’s] [Centre Support Team meeting] as they still pose a risk with their subversive/inciting behaviour.1324

In relation to Ray, the minutes noted he was still an escape risk.1325 A decision was made at the Interim Centre Support Team meeting to remove him from ‘unit bound’ (which we understand he had been since 5 January 2020, amounting to four days’ ‘unit bound’) in the interests of his mental health.1326 Ray was instead placed on an ‘individual program with operational staff taking him outside, one-on-one, with no other residents in the yard … when [staff] can operationally schedule it’.1327 As described in the section on isolation (Case study 3), we are concerned that ‘unit bound’ and ‘individual programs’ of this kind amount, in effect, to an isolation practice. We were not provided with details of Ray’s individual program as described here and remain unconvinced the individual program was any more supportive of Ray’s mental health difficulties than being ‘unit bound’. Ray remained under Very Close Supervision.1328

  1. 8 January 2020—A staff member reports concerns about the response to harmful sexual behaviours to the Director, Strategic Youth Services

On 8 January 2020, an Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member emailed Ms Honan with concerns about the culture and practices at the Centre.1329 The email stated: ‘I would take this information to the Manager of Ashley; however I feel that my concerns will be overlooked’.1330 In particular, this staff member outlined their concerns that Albert and Finn continued to engage in sexualised acts against young people, which had been ‘minimised by Patrick Ryan to the point where staff and other residents are now at risk of these two young people’.1331

The staff member also expressed concern that Operations Team staff and Mr Ryan were ignoring case management and the Centre’s psychologist, which was placing the ‘centre in danger’.1332 Ms Honan responded on the same day, saying the information would be taken into consideration.1333

  1. January 2020—The Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychologist informs the Department of Health about the poor response to the behaviours of Albert and Finn

In the months before and throughout January 2020, there were many communications and meetings between the Centre’s psychologist and her superiors in the Department of Health about the operation of Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1334

The psychologist informed her superiors of her various concerns about bullying at the Centre, her professional opinion being ignored (therefore putting children and young people in detention at risk) and the poor management of Albert and Finn’s behaviours.1335 There were also several communications among her superiors at the Department of Health and between the Director of Nursing and Mr Ryan about those issues.1336

In various correspondence, Department of Health staff expressed or were reported to have expressed the following views about the psychologist’s communications:

  • The psychologist had never worked in a custodial setting and had inadvertently got people offside by ‘explain[ing] the bullying which has been occurring’.1337
  • The psychologist was a ‘guest’ in the custodial setting at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1338
  • Placement of young people is an ‘operational issue’.1339

The Nurse Unit Manager told us that working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre as a health practitioner is not the same as working in the community or any other correctional facility.1340

On 13 January 2020, staff from the Department of Health met with the Centre’s psychologist to explain the differences between working in a custodial setting and working in the community.1341 The Nurse Unit Manager and Mr Nicholson, Group Director, Forensic Mental Health and Correctional Primary Health Services, told us there were no specific policies and procedures for Department of Health employees working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1342 We note there has been no specific custodial training provided to Department of Health staff working at the Centre.1343

The former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, explained to us that Department of Health staff are not employees of Ashley Youth Detention Centre and are limited in the performance of their duties while in the prison system.1344 They said the reality is that custodial staff may refuse to accept medical advice because custodial staff have overall responsibility for children and young people in detention and ensuring the good operation of the Centre.1345

Secretary Pervan confirmed that the then Department of Communities retained the ‘overall responsibility’ for the health, safety and welfare of young people at the Centre during the relevant period.1346 This is reflected in the memorandum of understanding between the Department and Correctional Primary Health Services.1347

  1. Observations—Department of Health’s response to concerns of harmful sexual behaviours

We are concerned the Department of Health did not attach enough weight to the issues raised by the Centre’s psychologist about the safety of children and young people in detention.

The response to the psychologist’s concerns appeared to focus on the role of the psychologist and the Department of Health staff in the Centre, rather than recognising:

  • her expertise in harmful sexual behaviours
  • the fact that young people in the Centre were displaying these behaviours
  • there was a need to protect other children.

We saw little evidence of advocacy from Department of Health staff for the safety of children.

While we accept that the then Department of Communities was ultimately responsible for the operations of the Centre over this period, we consider this a lost opportunity to respond to the concerning behaviours of Albert and Finn.

  1. 20 January 2020—The Secretary is briefed on concerns regarding Ray

Approximately three weeks after the incident between Ray, Albert and Finn, Kathy Baker, who was the Acting Secretary of the then Department of Communities for a short period at that time, signed off on an issues briefing to the Secretary titled ‘Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) resident [Ray] due to recent incidents’.1348 Mr Ryan prepared the issues briefing, which was cleared through Ms Honan and Mandy Clarke, Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services, Department of Communities.1349

The issues briefing:

  • noted Ray’s mental health difficulties and health history1350
  • briefly noted ‘recent’ incidents involving Ray, including the incident involving Albert and Finn and the escape attempt1351
  • stated work was ‘underway to identify the triggers and management of [Ray] leading up to and during these incidents, with a referral being made for a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor review’1352
  • stated that Ray was moved to the Franklin Unit for operational reasons over the period when the incident involving Albert and Finn occurred1353
  • stated that the Manager, Professional Services and Policy, had prepared an updated management plan for Ray, which became operational in the week after the incident involving Albert and Finn1354
  • clarified that before the updated management plan, Ray was the ‘subject of standard management’ through the Centre Support Team, Multi-Disciplinary Team and Case Plan Review1355
  • stated that Ray was being ‘closely monitored and well supported by the on-site Psychologist and Professional Services Team. [Ray] will be reviewed again at [a Centre Support Team meeting] on 20 January 2020 unless an earlier review is required in the interim’.1356

The issues briefing did not acknowledge that:

  • Professional Services and Health Team staff had raised several concerns about Ray since his admission to the Centre
  • moving Ray to the Franklin Unit, and exposing him to Albert and Finn, was contrary to the advice of both the Professional Services Team and the Multi-Disciplinary Team
  • while invited to attend Centre Support Team meetings that focused on considering and responding to Ray’s behaviours, the psychologist had been actively prevented from taking part in those meetings
  • the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor referral was intended to specifically identify failures by Centre staff to follow clear recommendations about Ray’s care.

As described above, each of these issues was known within Ashley Youth Detention Centre and the Department at the time the issues briefing was prepared.

Ms Honan told us the purpose of the issues briefing was to outline the complexity of Ray’s needs and behaviour and the revised management approach for Ray given the escalation of incidents. She said the matters above were not expressly raised in the issues briefing as they were yet to be analysed and assessed as part of the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor referral relating to Ray.1357 This is consistent with what Ms Baker told us about her understanding of the issues briefing’s purpose.1358

While we accept the purpose of the issues briefing guided its content, we are concerned it did not, on the face of it, provide all relevant context for the concerns regarding Ray.

The ‘Secretary’s notation’ on the signed copy of the issues briefing records the following:

  1. Thank you for the briefing and the ongoing care provided to [Ray], which is being managed on the advice of the Professional Services Team.
  2. What is the timeframe for the [Senior Quality and Practice Advisor] review to be completed?
  3. With a possible discharge date of 18 March 2020, can we please start preparing for [Ray’s] release and ongoing care for his condition outside of [Ashley Youth Detention Centre]1359

Given the issues briefing was signed off by Ms Baker, we understand this comment was not prepared or approved by Secretary Pervan.

Finding—The 20 January 2020 issues briefing on concerns regarding Ray at Ashley Youth Detention Centre was inadequate and incomplete

We are concerned the issues briefing to the Secretary about Ray, dated 20 January 2020, gave the impression that Ray’s behaviours had only begun to escalate immediately before the issues briefing and that Centre staff had acted in a timely fashion to address issues in a manner consistent with the Professional Services Team’s advice.

The briefing did not inform the Secretary that the Centre had been on notice of potential harm due to Ray’s vulnerabilities and the previous behaviours of Albert and Finn. It did not notify the Secretary that this potential harm eventuated in the 2 January 2020 incident.

Further, we are concerned the intended scope of the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor referral—being the need to identify and address breakdowns in internal processes and procedures that had caused recommendations of the Multi-Disciplinary Team and psychologist to be ignored—was not made explicit.

  1. 28 January 2020—Ashley Youth Detention Centre engages a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor

Ms Honan approved the involvement of a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor, and the Quality Improvement and Workforce Development Team was advised of this, approximately four weeks after the incident involving Ray, Albert and Finn.1360

Ms Honan told us the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor’s review began in February 2020 but was not completed because of a restructure of the Quality Improvement and Workforce Development Team, staff redeployment and the outbreak of COVID-19.1361

  1. 19 March 2020—The Serious Events Review Team reports its findings and recommendations about the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry

The Serious Events Review Team’s report on the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry, Albert and Finn was completed in March 2020.1362 There were more than 25 findings in the review team’s report, which covered decision making, incident management, supervision and support of children and young people in detention, communication, document and file management, workplace culture and staff support, training and supervision, and staffing resources.

The Serious Events Review Team’s key findings were:

  • There was ‘disagreement and conflict’ among staff about the seriousness of the incident.1363
  • The incident in question ‘constituted a sexual assault’ of Henry.1364
  • The incident should have been urgently reported to police and Child Safety Services, consistent with best practice principles, legislation and the Department’s guidelines.1365
  • Decision making in relation to the consequences for the offending child or young person in detention was ‘flawed and inconsistent with best practice principles, legislation and Departmental guidelines’.1366
  • There were several issues concerning the completion of incident reports, including a lack of detail and critical information, and no evidence of review or approval as required by internal policy.1367 The Serious Events Review Team concluded that such failings had ‘the potential to expose the staff and young people to an increased risk of harm and the wider service system to internal and external criticism and a loss of credibility’.1368
  • The Centre Support Team’s meeting minutes and the issues briefing provided to the Secretary did not ‘accurately portray the incident and, consequently, minimised its severity and indicated a concerning lack of understanding of sexual assault and its possible consequences’.1369
  • Conferencing with Albert and Finn did not occur, which was a breach of the available guidelines and legislation.1370
  • Anecdotal evidence suggested ‘the behaviour of the offenders may be impacting upon how they are managed by staff on a day to day basis which may in turn be placing residents, staff and the centre at risk’.1371
  • Centre staff did not have a ‘comprehensive understanding of the issues around sexual assault’.1372
  • A recommendation on Henry’s care plan that he not be placed with Albert or Finn had not been observed and, had it been, the incident would not have occurred.1373
  • Albert and Finn should have been under a higher level of supervision, given their history of abusive behaviour.1374
  • The use of Very Close Supervision was problematic and difficult to implement due to staff shortages and ‘differences of opinion’ among staff about when to apply it.1375
  • The review experienced ‘significant difficulties’ obtaining information and interviewing staff; the ‘provision of information to the review and cooperation with the reviewers was so problematic in this case that it may have been deliberately obstructive’.1376
  • Communications with executive management ‘did not accurately represent the incident and minimised the concerns which could lead to misconceptions, misunderstandings and poorly targeted and ineffective interventions’.1377
  • ‘[O]pen and honest communication’ appeared to be ‘discouraged’ at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, and communications were ‘disrespectful and inappropriate’.1378
  • The Centre’s filing systems were ‘inadequate, incomplete and confusing’ and did not ‘support services to young people’.1379
  • There was a ‘concerning lack of training, support, debriefing and supervision of staff’ at the Centre, contributing to an ‘unacceptably high risk of psychological and actual physical harm to staff and young people’.1380
  • Staffing levels were inadequate.1381
  • Ashley Youth Detention Centre had a ‘toxic workplace culture … characterised by distrust, suspicion, conflict and frustration’.1382

The Serious Events Review Team made 17 recommendations to the Department, including that the Department:

  • develops a strategy to ensure all Centre staff ‘are aware of the governing legislation, policies, procedures and practices’, with a particular emphasis on mandatory reporting, record keeping, the Behaviour Development System, case management and Very Close Supervision1383
  • develops ‘specific strategies to address the breaches of policy, procedure and practice that have been identified as part of the review’1384
  • clarifies and/or develops the policies, procedures and staff responsibilities for moving young people to a different unit1385
  • ensures there is a procedure for providing support to young people following incidents, including a mechanism for reporting and monitoring that support1386
  • ensures all staff are aware of grievance procedures and avenues for support when lodging or progressing grievances1387
  • reviews staff training, ‘with a focus on relevance and frequency and applicability to a trauma informed approach’1388
  • urgently develops a ‘mandatory, evidence based, trauma informed training schedule’ for staff, covering (at minimum): ‘trauma informed care; child development; attachment theory; the impact of trauma on children and young people; positive behaviour management; situational risk assessment; and disability, mental health and drug and alcohol issues in children and young people’1389
  • provides training to all staff in relation to understanding and responding to sexual abuse, and develops associated guidelines1390
  • ensures the Children and Youth Services’ ‘formal supervision model’ is implemented at the Centre as a matter of priority1391
  • develops a strategy to address the ‘identified issues related to the toxic culture that currently exists at [the Centre] as a matter of urgency’1392
  • conducts an inquiry into claims made about the Franklin Unit and the management of Albert and Finn.1393

The Serious Events Review Team’s report noted that ‘the review experienced significant delays due to difficulties in accessing information and arranging interviews with relevant staff’.1394

As described earlier in this case study, it was the policy for a Serious Events Review Team report to be considered by the Serious Events Review Committee before being supplied to the Secretary. Ms Burton told us she could not recall her report being presented to this committee.1395 Ms Burton believes her report was provided directly to Ms Honan.1396 Ms Burton also believes that none of the other reports she prepared following reviews of incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre were sent to the Serious Events Review Committee.1397

In our public hearings, Mandy Clarke, former Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families, Department of Communities, explained that because the Serious Events Review Team’s reviews were assessing Ashley Youth Detention Centre and were not focused on the Child Safety Services system, those reviews fell outside the terms of reference of the Serious Events Review Team.1398 As such, the reviews did not follow the usual process of going to the Serious Events Review Committee.1399

There were differences in views about the formal purpose of the Serious Events Review Team. Both Ms Honan and Ms Clarke gave evidence that the Serious Events Review Team was established for the ‘particular purpose’ of looking into infant deaths.1400

The members of the Serious Events Review Team told us that it was established not only to review child deaths but also to review serious injury and near misses across the Division of Children and Families within the Department, including Ashley Youth Detention Centre, and to make recommendations for improving service delivery.1401

The former Deputy Secretary for Children, Ginna Webster, who set up the Serious Events Review Team, also told us that its purpose, as directed by her, was to review incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre as well as elsewhere within Child Safety Services.1402

Secretary Pervan agreed with Ms Clarke’s distinction between official Serious Events Review Team reviews and other reviews conducted by members of the Serious Events Review Team, so it was appropriate the Serious Events Review Team report in relation to the 7 August 2019 incident was not provided to the Serious Events Review Committee.1403 However, Secretary Pervan provided a different explanation for the distinction.1404 He said that ‘[b]y the time that Ms Burton was asked to undertake the review, the [Serious Events Review Team] had been disbanded or returned to their substantive positions’.1405 He explained that the team was used to conduct the review in ‘recognition of the [Serious Events Review Team] skills’ and the reason the report took the form of a Serious Events Review Team review was ‘because that was the template structure that they used’.1406

Despite expressing this view, Secretary Pervan went on to agree with Ms Burton’s evidence that the Serious Events Review Team was formally dissolved in May or June 2020, after the review of the 7 August 2019 incident had concluded.1407 Secretary Pervan also told us that while the Serious Events Review Team is now not a standing investigative resource for the Department, it can be reconvened if required to undertake a specific investigation or review.1408

  1. Observations—The Serious Events Review Team review

We found the evidence about the process for considering the Serious Events Review Team review confusing. It appears there was general agreement that the Serious Events Review Team reviews relevant to Ashley Youth Detention Centre were not considered by the Serious Events Review Committee, but the reasons given for this varied.

We are concerned the Centre reviews did not go through the usual governance process. We consider this governance process important because it provides a mechanism to ensure problems are broadly acknowledged and shared, and for further accountability when addressing recommended reforms.

We discuss the disbandment of the Serious Events Review Team, and other similar incident review mechanisms, in Chapter 9.

  1. February 2020—Reviewer raises other concerns

During her Serious Events Review Team review of the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry, Ms Burton observed various other issues at Ashley Youth Detention Centre that were outside the terms of reference for the review. In addition to preparing the Serious Events Review Team’s report, Ms Burton sent Ms Honan memorandums outlining those other issues.1409

We have received and considered two of these memorandums, one dated 21 February 2020 and another dated 27 February 2020.1410 These memorandums raise:

  • concerns about a poor culture at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, including allegations of physical abuse between staff, bullying and sexual harassment1411
  • allegations that the Centre’s management had refused the psychologist’s request to access the files of young people in detention1412
  • alleged non-consensual sexual activity between a female young person in detention and several male young people in detention when the female in detention was housed with males1413
  • an allegation of historical sexual abuse of a young person in detention by staff member Lester (a pseudonym)1414
  • an allegation that Lester recently ‘strip searched’ a young person, outside the scope of his duties.1415

In addition to the above issues, Ms Burton told us she also prepared at least one memorandum for Ms Honan concerning reports that older detainees in the Franklin Unit were being used to ‘control’ younger detainees ‘by whatever means’ and that incident reports had been rewritten.1416 We have not been provided with copies of any memorandums that specifically addressed the use of older detainees to control young detainees, nor any additional memorandums, despite requesting Ms Burton’s files from the State.1417

Ms Burton told us she sent all memorandums to Ms Honan by email but that she did not receive a response.1418 We received evidence of at least one such email being sent in late February 2020.1419

We asked Ms Honan what action she took in response to the email and memorandum she received from Ms Burton in late February 2020. Ms Honan explained that the concerns about staff culture (including allegations of bullying and sexual harassment) had already been raised and were being investigated at the time.1420 She further stated that the allegation of non-consensual sexual activity between a female and male detainees had previously been investigated.1421

In relation to allegations about Lester, Ms Honan commented that Alysha had previously reported these and they had already been referred to People and Culture at the Department. Ms Honan also told us the allegation that Lester strip searched a young person was investigated and it was found that he ‘had not acted inappropriately’.1422 We discuss the Department’s response to allegations about Lester in Case study 7.

We understood Ms Honan’s response as suggesting that she considered the memorandums from Ms Burton were matters already known and that they did not require any specific follow-up (separate from processes already underway or concluded at that time).

  1. 20 May 2020—The Commissioner for Children and Young People receives the Serious Events Review Team’s report about the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry

Despite Commissioner McLean’s request to be kept up to date with the Serious Events Review Team’s review of the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry, it appears she did not receive any update until 18 February 2020, when Secretary Pervan notified her that there had been delays in the Serious Events Review Team’s review due to staff absences over the Christmas and New Year period.1423 Commissioner McLean received a copy of the final review report on 20 May 2020.1424

Evidence suggests that between May 2020 and January 2021, Commissioner McLean maintained regular contact with Ms Honan, Ms Clarke and Secretary Pervan, and received quarterly updates on the progress of implementing the Serious Events Review Team’s recommendations.1425 After that period, there does not appear to be any further correspondence in relation to monitoring implementation until May or June 2021. In May or June 2021, Commissioner McLean was provided the ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’ written by Stuart Watson, Centre Manager, setting out the steps the Department had taken in response to the recommendations.1426

  1. June 2021—The Department responds to the Serious Events Review Team’s report about the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry

Fiona Atkins, Assistant Manager at the Centre, told us she was part of the working group within Ashley Youth Detention Centre responsible for implementing the recommendations that resulted from the Serious Events Review Team’s review of the 7 August 2019 incident.1427 In June 2021, more than a year after the Serious Events Review Team’s report was finalised, Mr Watson emailed Ms Honan with his final ‘response’ to the Serious Events Review Team’s findings.1428

Mr Watson explained that the delay in his response to the Serious Events Review Team review was due to him just taking over the role of Manager at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in March 2020 (which we note was more than a year before), the COVID-19 pandemic, staff shortages and more immediate priorities.1429 Ms Honan attributed the delay in implementing the recommendations to the ‘interdependent’ and ‘large in scale’ nature of the recommendations, which required time to resource and sequence.1430 She stated that implementation had been progressing for 13 to 16 months, but it was not until the recommendations had ‘momentum towards completion’ that Mr Watson could complete the response.1431

That response summarised how a similar incident would be managed differently and identified the following improvements made to Ashley Youth Detention Centre’s processes since the 7 August 2019 incident:

  • Reports and CCTV are reviewed by the Operations Manager and then the Centre Support Team (now the Weekly Review Meeting).1432
  • Case/shift notes are reviewed by Ashley Team Support (formerly Professional Services) staff and feedback provided as part of a continual improvement process.1433
  • All stakeholders are now included at the conference held following an incident, and the process is facilitated by ‘experienced, qualified people that are legislatively aware’.1434
  • Victim-survivors are given immediate support and post-incident follow-up to ensure safety, health and wellbeing needs are met, and they are informed of their rights to make a formal complaint.1435
  • Staff are regularly rotated through all units, provided with professional supervision and enter Professional Development Agreements so they are consulted about their work preferences and the reasons behind them.1436

We are unaware if the response was provided to anyone in the Department other than Ms Honan and her Executive Officer.

Ms Honan’s evidence was that the recommendations of the review have been actioned and that she monitors their progress.1437

Ms Clarke said that ‘to the best of [her] knowledge the [Serious Events Review Team] recommendations were accepted’.1438 She told us the Centre’s management team was responsible for implementing the recommendations.1439 She later provided us with a Minute to the Strengthening Safeguards working group dated August 2021 that stated the last of the review’s recommendations had been implemented.1440

Secretary Pervan told us he had not received a ‘briefing on the progress of these issues’ and therefore, he did not answer some of our questions about the Serious Events Review Team, including how the Department has ensured the successful implementation of the team’s recommendations.1441 Secretary Pervan told us he understood that the recommendations had been accepted and ‘integrated into wider ongoing reforms’ at Ashley Youth Detention Centre but that Ms Clarke and Ms Honan were responsible for implementing those recommendations.1442

The Serious Event Review Team Information Sheet, dated August 2019, stated that the Children and Youth Services Executive was responsible for implementing any recommendations of a review, and the Minister for Human Services and the Secretary were to receive monthly updates.1443

The former manager of the Serious Events Review Team told us the Department’s executive was not required or expected to report to the Serious Events Review Team on implementing recommendations.1444 An undated version of the terms of reference for the Serious Events Review Committee, which the former manager of the Serious Events Review Team provided to us, stated that that committee played a role in monitoring ‘progress reporting against recommendation implementation’.1445 We note however, that as discussed above, Secretary Pervan and Ms Clarke explained that reviews of Ashley Youth Detention Centre were not provided to this committee.

Finding—The response to the Serious Events Review Team review of the 7 August 2019 incident did not follow a clear process for implementation and oversight

It appears there was no clear accountability or governance process for reporting against the recommendations of Serious Events Review Team recommendations concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre. As we observe in relation to the reviews themselves, strong governance structures ensure problems are shared and acted on.

Had a clear formal oversight and accountability process been adopted, there would have been mechanisms for the Secretary and the Minister to be regularly briefed and potentially for a body like the Serious Events Review Committee to provide additional oversight.

We find that acting outside the review structures resulted in a collective lack of ownership in the Department for responding to the Serious Events Review Team’s report on the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry.

  1. Post June 2021—Reforms are implemented in response to the Serious Events Review Team’s report

Ms Honan and Mr Watson identified the following improvements made to Ashley Youth Detention Centre practice and procedure following the Serious Events Review Team report:

  • A policy review working group was established, led by a senior policy officer, to revise all policies and procedures at the Centre. Finalised procedures are reflected in the electronic practice manual.1446
  • Training in mandatory reporting, case note and record keeping, the Behaviour Development Plan and Very Close Supervision was updated, delivered to staff and incorporated into the induction for new staff.1447
  • Case management procedures were under review and were a work in progress. In August 2022, Ms Honan told us she expected this review would be completed by the end of 2022.1448
  • Moving detainees to a different unit is now determined by the ‘Weekly Review Meeting’ (previously the Centre Support Team), and an additional risk assessment process is followed if safety concerns arise. Ms Honan told us that the on-call manager must approve any after-hours movement of young people.1449
  • Case note and incident recording is now electronic and centralised.1450
  • A new therapeutic practice framework and learning and development framework have been implemented, which are designed to help staff work with young people in a trauma-informed way.1451
  • Key positions that support operational roles have been reviewed and reclassified to ensure policy development, training and supervision is up to date and delivered by suitably skilled and qualified staff.1452
  • Recruitment has been centralised through the People and Culture Team.1453
  • There has been a change in leadership and a ‘significant focus’ on workplace behaviours.1454
  • A Senior Business Partner has helped staff to proactively manage complaints and to address conflict and concerns.1455
  • Security improvements have been made, including securing the courtyards for all units.1456
  • Workshops have addressed low morale and the Centre’s poor workplace culture.1457
  1. Mid-2021—Ray displays harmful sexual behaviours

It is notable that in later periods of detention at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Ray displayed an ‘emerging pattern of sexual disinhibition’, including making ‘sexually inappropriate comments’ and engaging in ‘increased sexualised talk’.1458 Eventually, staff raised concerns that he may sexually assault other young people at the Centre. We are not aware of any evidence that he did so. We are concerned, however, by evidence that Ray began displaying similar harmful behaviours in the months following his exposure to violent behaviours at the Centre. A failure to respond appropriately to harmful sexual behaviours may perpetuate the behaviour.

  1. December 2021—Max asks to be transferred from Ashley Youth Detention Centre to adult prison

Beyond the incidents noted above, Max was also involved in other incidents at the Centre that were unrelated to harmful sexual behaviours.1459 Max’s time at the Centre ended in late 2021 with him displaying continuing and increasingly challenging behaviours: ‘I just kept going and I would have code blacks called on me every day. I kept hitting staff and stuff like that’.1460 Max told us he behaved this way in an effort to get transferred from the Centre to an adult prison, despite being under 18:

Well, I had— as there’d be paperwork of me trying to request to move out of there, I put in request forms, and that’s what the [Centre Support Team is] there for, and they just kept coming back saying, ‘No, you’re not going to be able to move no matter what you do’. So then that made it even worse for me, because like, I felt I had the— I should be allowed to go to an adult prison, not sit in Ashley after everything that’s happened to me.

I don’t get treated like a kid up there, so why should I be there when just, like, I’ve had so much trauma and that there I just didn’t feel like, like, it wasn’t good for me, it wasn’t good for my headspace, so I just kept releasing all my anger on all—everyone.1461

In a Department Minute to Secretary Pervan dated 22 December 2021 about the proposed transfer of Max to the adult prison system, Max’s behaviour was summarised as follows:

[Max]’s current presentation includes frequent aggressive behavioural outbursts, extensive property damage, threatening/intimidating/assaulting staff, fighting with other residents, and high levels of emotional distress.

[Max] has had 17 incident / detention offences in November and 12 as at 20 December 2021. This includes attempted staff assaults, resident assaults including an assault on a 14-year-old resident, standoffs/riotous behaviour including inciting other young people to join him on three occasions, he has attempted to access staff security equipment on several occasions.

[Max] has increased threats to include threats of sexual assault against staff and other young people including exposing himself to other young people and staff.

[Max] poses a significant risk to staff and other resident safety and cannot be adequately managed to ensure safety of staff and other residents.1462

In an email from Ms Honan to Secretary Pervan on 8 February 2022, Ms Honan wrote that Max was transferred to the adult prison system because ‘his behaviour was too complex and high risk to manage at [Ashley Youth Detention Centre]’.1463 Based on Max’s evidence, the transfer appears to have been consistent with Max’s wishes and stated requests at the time. However, we were also told that Max had been experiencing high levels of emotional distress during this period and frequently changed his mind regarding the transfer.1464

Max told us that when he was transferred to adult prison, Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff told him it was his Christmas present.1465

A memorandum of understanding between the former Department of Health and Human Services (Children and Youth Services) and Department of Justice (Tasmanian Prison Service) executed in December 2014 governs and facilitates the transfer of young people between the Centre and the Tasmania Prison Service. This memorandum of understanding, which remains in effect, enabled Max’s transfer.1466

  1. Early 2022—Max asks to be transferred from adult prison back to Ashley Youth Detention Centre

It appears that in early 2022, when he was still under the age of 18, Max asked to return to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1467 As part of that process, Max contacted the Commissioner for Children and Young People, Leanne McLean, to advocate for his request.

Commissioner McLean wrote to Secretary Pervan on 17 March 2022, outlining Max’s experiences in the adult prison system.1468 Max had reported to Commissioner McLean that he was being exposed to long periods of isolation, was self-harming (which resulted in further restrictions on his movement) and was being housed with a large number of adults.1469 Commissioner McLean also noted Max’s desire to attend Ashley School.1470

Commissioner McLean asked Secretary Pervan that Max be allowed to return to the Centre.1471 Commissioner McLean noted that she was ‘not supportive’ of Max’s transfer to the adult prison system when the original decision was made.1472 Secretary Pervan responded to Commissioner McLean’s email on 20 March 2022, writing that ‘it is my determination that the information provided does not mitigate the significant risk that [Max] continues to present to the safety of other young people and staff at [Ashley Youth Detention Centre]’.1473

On 22 March 2022, in response to Secretary Pervan’s determination, Commissioner McLean made the following comment about the apparent inability of Ashley Youth Detention Centre to manage or address the challenging behaviours of a young person like Max:

Thank you for informing me of your decision that [Max] will remain at the [Tasmanian Prison Service], and the information influencing your decision. It is unfortunately an indication of the limitations of our current model, that these types of behaviours cannot be responded to in an appropriate therapeutic fashion within a youth-specific environment.1474

Commissioner McLean also asked Secretary Pervan for more information about Max’s circumstances, including:

  • how he would communicate the determination to Max, and inform Max whether he could seek a review of the decision through the Ombudsman
  • what measures were being taken to ensure Max’s wellbeing in the adult prison system, raising her concerns as to ‘who is responsible for the wellbeing of a child remanded to an adult facility’
  • how the decision to remand Max in the adult prison system was made following his earlier arrests, subsequent to his initial transfer from Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1475

We asked Secretary Pervan about his decision not to allow Max to return to Ashley Youth Detention Centre once Max was detained in an adult prison, and his response to Commissioner McLean’s other queries of 22 March 2022 about how Max would be provided with the appropriate therapeutic supports if he remained in adult prison. Secretary Pervan presented us with his email response to Commissioner McLean, dated 26 April 2022, more than a month after she sent him her queries. Secretary Pervan’s email made the following points:

  • He had assumed that Commissioner McLean, as Max’s advocate, would inform Max of the determination not to transfer Max back to Ashley Youth Detention Centre and any rights he had to review that decision.
  • Max’s wellbeing in the adult prison system was being supported by visits from his Community Youth Justice Worker and Child Safety Officer, the therapeutic services offered by the Tasmania Prison Service, as well as information provided by Ashley Youth Detention Centre authorities to the Tasmania Prison Service about Max, such as his ‘trigger points and associated behaviour management strategies’.
  • Upon Max’s previous arrest and him being remanded in custody, Secretary Pervan had formed the opinion that it was not practicable to detain Max at Ashley Youth Detention Centre based on the factors considered when Max was first transferred to the adult prison system.1476

Secretary Pervan acknowledged the limitations of Ashley Youth Detention Centre to be able to address the needs of children with complex needs and stated that the issue was ‘being taken into account in the design of the new facilities that will replace [Ashley Youth Detention Centre]’.1477

Finding—Ashley Youth Detention Centre was not equipped to meet the complex needs of children and young people, resulting in at least one young person being transferred to adult prison

Ashley Youth Detention Centre should be able to meet the needs of children displaying complex behaviours. It was not able to in early 2022, resulting in at least one young person being detained in adult prisons.

We remain concerned about how the needs of young people in detention are being met now, given Secretary Pervan’s indication that the complex needs of children and young people are being considered in the design for the new facility, which has not yet been built. It is unacceptable that the solution to a young person displaying challenging behaviours in youth detention is to transfer that young person to an adult prison, where they face further risk of sexual abuse.

Max’s specific circumstances are complicated somewhat by his admitted desire for such a transfer in late 2021 and his stated intention to escalate his behaviour to compel that outcome. However, once he requested a transfer back to Ashley Youth Detention Centre after experiencing the adult prison system—while still a minor—the Centre should have been in a position to manage and meet Max’s needs. In addition, any opportunity for Max to improve his behaviour and receive therapeutic care at Ashley Youth Detention Centre should have been properly assessed.

  1. Observations—Harmful sexual behaviours displayed by Albert and Finn

Ashley Youth Detention Centre was aware that Albert had displayed harmful sexual behaviours as early as January 2018, 17 months before the 7 August 2019 incident with Henry.1478 Records of multiple other incidents involving Albert and Finn, while not investigated in detail, suggest their behaviours were frequent and persistent and indicated a need for specialist treatment.1479

In addition, the Centre was notified, on multiple occasions by different staff, that not enough was being done to manage Albert’s and Finn’s harmful sexual behaviours and the risks these behaviours posed to other detainees, including Henry:

  • On 13 August 2019, Ms Gardiner and the union delegate raised concerns that the Centre’s response to the 7 August 2019 incident involving Henry was inappropriate.
  • On 22 August 2019, Ms Gardiner advised that she was reporting the incident to Child Safety Services.
  • On 18 September 2019, the Ashley Youth Detention Centre psychologist raised concerns about Henry being placed in a program with Finn, given Finn’s harmful sexual behaviours towards Henry on 7 August.
  • On 13 November 2019, the psychologist again raised her concerns about Albert and Finn’s behaviours in an email.
  • On 15 November 2019, the psychologist once more raised her concerns in a letter.
  • On 6 December 2019, the psychologist advised that she had made mandatory reports to Child Safety Services and the Commissioner for Children and Young People.

Even when attempts were made to address the behaviours of Albert and Finn, these were not progressed. We are concerned that Alysha and the psychologist’s review into the behaviours of Albert and Finn was quashed, seemingly by Centre management.

When asked about the management of Albert and Finn, a Case Management Coordinator at the Centre told us:

They weren’t managed appropriately because the senior decision makers were completely dysfunctional. One simple thing that would have helped was to separate [Albert and Finn] as they were a poor influence on each other.1480

Ms Gardiner stated that not addressing the needs of Albert and Finn ‘placed them at risk for being perpetrators of future sexual assault. [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] had a responsibility for rehabilitation for the detainees, and this was not addressed’.1481

In her evidence, Ms Honan expressed concern with the failure of Centre management to act on the advice of Ms Gardiner and the psychologist, saying ‘these were highly skilled practitioners, why their advice was disregarded is not okay’.1482

Some staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre raised serious concerns about harmful sexual behaviours, as well as other harmful behaviours, at the Centre. We were concerned that other staff at the Centre did not appear to appreciate the seriousness of Albert and Finn’s behaviour and the risk they posed to other children (and staff) and to members of the community after their release if they were not rehabilitated. We also query why Centre staff did not consider moving Albert and/or Finn out of the Franklin Unit.

  1. Observations—The Department of Communities’ response to allegations about placement decisions

As described in this case study, we received evidence that the Centre and the Department were made aware of allegations that older detainees were being used to threaten younger detainees. Specifically:

  • The psychologist emailed Mr Ryan on 13 November 2019 advising that a young person had reported to her they had been threatened with placement in the Franklin Unit and that detainees get ‘stood-over, abused and raped’ in that unit.1483
  • Ms Burton told us she reported the matter to Ms Honan by a memorandum prepared during her review of the 7 August 2019 incident.1484
  • Ms Honan acknowledged that Alysha reported the matter to her.1485

We asked Ashley Youth Detention Centre management and Department officials about the evidence from former Centre staff that misbehaving detainees had been threatened with transfers to the Franklin Unit so their behaviour could be ‘sorted out’.1486

In his statement to us, Mr Ryan did not answer our question about whether there was, at any time, a practice of using placement decisions to threaten or punish children or young people detained at the Centre.1487 He did state that he was not aware of any perception among children or young people in detention that they would not be protected against the risk of sexual abuse in the Franklin Unit until the Centre’s psychologist told him.1488

Mr Watson could not comment on practices before starting work at the Centre in 2020.1489 He said that a policy or practice of using older detainees to control or influence younger detainees was not presently in use, and he agreed any such practice or policy would be ‘totally inappropriate’.1490

In response to our question about whether there was a policy or practice of using some young people in detention as a threat to influence or punish the conduct of other detainees (particularly in relation to the Franklin Unit), Mr Brown told us that ‘[f]rom memory the [Behaviour Development System] and induction processes were the only policies used to assess where residents were placed’.1491

Ms Clarke also told us she had no knowledge of any practice of using placement decisions to punish children or young people in detention.1492 She confirmed that such conduct ‘would warrant a formal investigation’.1493

Secretary Pervan denied knowledge of any policy of Centre staff threatening young people with a placement in the Franklin Unit.1494 He stated that he had not been made aware of concerns with placement decisions until receiving a request for statement from us on 2 August 2022.1495

Ms Honan told us she became aware of the possibility of such a practice after Alysha raised the matter with her in late 2019. As described here, Ms Burton told us that during her investigation of the 7 August 2019 incident, she raised with Ms Honan reports that older detainees in the Franklin Unit were being used to ‘control’ younger detainees.1496

Ms Honan said that this issue formed part of the terms of reference of the Serious Events Review Team and Senior Quality and Practice Advisor reviews.1497 We note that the Senior Quality and Practice Advisor review was never completed and the referral does not raise the issue of using children and young people in detention in the Franklin Unit as a control mechanism.1498 We are unsure which Serious Events Review Team review Ms Honan was referring to, but note that the terms of reference of the review in relation to the Henry incident in August 2019 did not refer to the allegations that older detainees were used to control or threaten younger detainees.

Finding—The Department should have fully investigated allegations that staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre used older detainees to threaten or control younger detainees

We are concerned that the allegation that some staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre used older detainees to threaten or control younger detainees has not been fully investigated, despite this concern first being raised with Centre management in late 2019 and being subsequently raised with Department staff. We would have expected such an investigation to speak to children and young people in detention and staff about their views, particularly children and young people’s sense of safety. We remain concerned that some staff who are the subject of those allegations may still be working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

  1. 6 May 2022—A new unit placement procedure is put in place

In a statement provided to us, dated 27 July 2022, Secretary Pervan attached a copy of the Unit Commissioning, De-Commissioning and Allocation to a Young Person Procedure (‘Unit Placement Procedure’).1499 The new Unit Placement Procedure acknowledges that decisions about unit placement are ‘critical, as placement decisions can affect a young person’s health and wellbeing by either increasing or decreasing the risk of immediate or future harm’.1500 The following ‘critical requirements’ are identified in the policy to ‘ensure the safety of young people’:

All new arrivals will be housed in the admission induction unit.

Male and female detainees will be housed separately. Detainees that identify as transgender will guide their unit placement.

If deemed safe, young people from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds should room share.

Placement decisions about young people must be made in the best interests of all young people at the Centre.1501

We note that the new policy does not refer to harmful sexual behaviours or more broadly that safety should be a paramount consideration in placement decisions. We also consider that the policy lacks clarity on what ‘operational considerations’ may warrant decisions about unit placement and is generally unclear as to who has what power to make a placement decision in any given context (and who is required to review or may override such a decision). In Chapter 12, we discuss this policy, the importance of clear responsibility for decision making in placing children and young people in detention and the importance of clinically-led responses to safety concerns.

Finding—There is a lack of consistent policy and practice at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on unit placements

There continues to be a lack of clear policy and practice around placement decisions and unit moves at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, including who is responsible for the final decision and reviewing any decision.

This lack of clear process is concerning when children are displaying harmful behaviours and may cause a threat to the safety and wellbeing of other children and young people in the Centre.

There should be clear ultimate decision-making responsibility for placement decisions, which should consider the risks posed by young people who display harmful sexual behaviours.

  1. System observations—Max, Henry and Ray

It was apparent to us that systemic problems at Ashley Youth Detention Centre contributed to the risk of harmful sexual behaviours among detainees, as well as the failure to appropriately respond when these risks are realised. Combined, the treatment of Max, Henry and Ray—particularly their unit placements—highlighted several systemic problems. We discuss some of these earlier in the case study. Here we focus on others.

  1. Lack of thorough assessment, including risk assessment

It is our view that many staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre failed to appreciate the risks to Max, Henry and Ray. Consequently, Max, Henry and Ray were subjected to what we consider to be predictable and therefore, avoidable incidents of significant harm.

Henry’s placement in the Franklin Unit with Albert and Finn should not have happened given that staff knew Albert and Finn had ongoing and prolonged histories of harmful sexual behaviours. Max’s placement in the Franklin Unit should not have happened given that staff were aware that Henry had recently been subjected to harmful sexual behaviours by Albert and Finn. Given Ray’s clearly recorded mental health condition on his admission to the Centre, his mental health difficulties over his first months in detention and the escalation in his behaviours in the lead-up to his transfer to the Franklin Unit, Ray should not have been placed with Albert and Finn, who were known to engage in aggressive and violent behaviours.

No risk assessments were undertaken by operational staff with decision-making authority for placements about the suitability of the Franklin Unit for Max, Henry and Ray before these young people were placed in that unit. Rather, where risks had been identified by professional services staff, these were not given appropriate weight. Other operational considerations seem to have influenced the decisions about Max, Henry and Ray’s placements.

  1. Staff tensions

It was also apparent to us that tensions between staff and/or teams hindered collaborative decision making about the safety of detainees, which, if addressed, could have significantly mitigated the risks to Max, Henry and Ray.

We observed, on the evidence before us, a dysfunctional relationship or a culture of professional disregard between some operational staff on the one hand and some professional staff on the other hand, particularly during 2019 and early 2020. One staff member described the relationship between some teams as ‘caustic’.1502 We heard of allegations of professional staff being invited to attend meetings but not being allowed to speak. We observed a range of instances where some expert staff recommendations were ignored or their involvement in managing vulnerable detainees was explicitly denied by both operational staff and management. This meant decisions were being made without consultation and in contradiction to professional advice. In our view, this placed children and young people in detention at risk of sexual harm and ultimately contributed to the harm caused to Max, Henry and Ray. We are concerned that some of these staff tensions reflected a broader divide among staff about the philosophical approach to youth detention and whether a corrections or therapeutic focus was preferable.

The influence of Department employees, including the psychologist, was limited by and subject to the operational decisions of Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff, which prevented concerns about harmful sexual behaviours from being escalated further and prevented clinically-led decision making necessary for a therapeutic response.

We consider the psychologist’s repeated reports as indicative of her professional concern. We are concerned that her attempts to raise concerns appear to have been met with a lack of care.

We are also troubled by the alleged conduct of some staff towards other staff who raised concerns about harmful sexual behaviours, including unprofessional conduct, silencing, finger pointing and dismissiveness.

  1. Capacity to identify and respond to harmful sexual behaviours

It was apparent to us that some Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff lacked capacity to recognise and respond to harmful sexual behaviours between detainees. We consider that all staff should receive training on harmful sexual behaviours, particularly senior decision-makers.

If the response of Centre staff to incidents of harmful sexual behaviour is not therapeutic or trauma-informed, problems for young people, staff and the Centre as a whole, now and into the future, will continue with devastating consequences.

Max’s experiences at Ashley Youth Detention Centre highlight the ongoing cost of the Centre’s failure to meaningfully identify and address harmful sexual behaviours. When Max’s long history at the Centre is viewed holistically, we can see that he has become caught in a cycle of trauma and abuse. The 2018 Serious Events Review Team’s report into the harmful sexual behaviours Max experienced, while seemingly prepared by the investigator with diligence and in good faith, somewhat and perhaps unintentionally downplayed incidents that caused significant distress to Max. The broad outcome appears to have been a lack of appreciation for the harm caused to Max and an affirmation of the limited response by Centre staff to those incidents. Shortcomings in the response to Max’s experiences of harmful sexual behaviours appear to have contributed to Max using violence and harmful sexual behaviours against others.

It is disappointing and concerning that there were seemingly no therapeutic responses available to address the behaviours of Max within the youth custodial context. This is apparently the case despite the best efforts of individuals to have such therapeutic capacity built within the institutional context of the Centre.

  1. Serious Events Review Team

It appears that the Serious Events Review Team’s investigation into the incident involving Henry, although delayed, eventually led to several improvements to the Centre’s information systems, security systems and responses. These included:

  • centralising and digitising incident reporting
  • improvements to risk assessments for after-hours unit moves
  • improvements to staff training for incident reporting and mandatory reporting obligations.

We note that without that investigation, the actions and decisions of Centre staff regarding harmful sexual behaviours would not have been scrutinised and challenged. The Serious Events Review Team’s investigation highlights the importance of having a permanent, experienced and skilled investigative team available to the Department for when serious incidents occur. We note the importance of young people participating in decisions that affect them, including in investigations, is consistent with international obligations and child safe standards.

  1. Recent reforms

Ms Honan told us that harmful sexual behaviours would be managed differently if they were to occur at Ashley Youth Detention Centre today. She told us that:

  • Placement decisions are now subject to a risk assessment and are more thoroughly scrutinised at Weekly Review Meetings.1503
  • The Advice and Referral Line would be notified (Ms Honan did not clarify who would make the notification).1504
  • Clinical staff would better protect and support victim-survivors.1505
  • There would be a referral to police (Ms Honan did not clarify who would make the notification, but Fiona Atkins, Assistant Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, told us that referrals are made to police ‘upon the assessment of the [Centre Support Team] with the [Centre] Manager’s support’).1506
  • Incidents involving harmful sexual behaviours would be referred to the Sexual Assault Support Service.1507
  • Post-management of an incident would be more comprehensive and centralised with the Ashley Incident Management System. All electronic notes and witness statements would be quality assured by the Operations Coordinator and reviewed by the Assistant Manager before being forwarded to the Manager and Director.1508
  • Staff are now better able to address the behaviours of the kind presented by Albert and Finn due to the current Behaviour Development Program.1509
  • There is greater support for Operations Team staff from managers and practitioners in relation to enforcing boundaries and reinforcing pro-social behaviours.1510
  • A Risk Assessment Process Team would be convened to provide recommendations, practical support and advice in managing risk.1511
  • The Director would be informed about all incidents involving harmful sexual behaviours.1512
  • All incidents would be reviewed by the Commissioner for Children and Young People and the Custodial Inspector.1513
  • Young people engaging in harmful sexual behaviours would be referred to services and safety precautions would be placed around them.1514

Ms Honan also stated that staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre would be supported to:

… call out and address not placate intimidating behaviours. Focus on rewarding positive behaviours when they do occur using the changes within the [Behaviour Development Program] system would have been used to incentivise change. Improvements to incident management reporting and the quality and detail of information now contained in [Weekly Review Meeting] minutes further safeguard the minimisation of incidents and under reporting of them.1515

Secretary Pervan told us that where a young person is subjected to harmful sexual behaviours by another young person, they are ‘supported therapeutically’ by the onsite nurse, medical officer and psychologist, and the young person’s care plan is updated and overseen by the Multi-Disciplinary Team.1516 That said, we received information that the position of onsite psychologist at the Centre has not been filled since November 2021.1517 Secretary Pervan did not confirm whether mental health support is offered to a young person engaging in harmful sexual behaviours. He did state that Ashley School provides programs on healthy relationships, consent and sexual decision making.1518

The Nurse Unit Manager told us that in the event of an incident of harmful sexual behaviour, she would ensure Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff were ‘aware’ and that ‘conferencing is scheduled to address the behaviours of concern’.1519 She also stated that longer term supports through services such as family planning would be enlisted to ‘tailor the delivery of a safe sex education session, which cover aspects of healthy sexual relationships and behaviour, as well as legal boundaries (such as consent)’.1520

Ms Honan acknowledged that Ashley Youth Detention Centre is only in the early stages of adopting trauma-informed practice.1521 Her evidence was that the concept is understood by staff but ‘the breakdown is probably in having the skillset and the clinical oversight and guidance about working with that’.1522 We received evidence from Ms Atkins that Operations Team staff still lack the training, skill and resources to respond to and manage young people displaying harmful sexual behaviours.1523

Despite that information regarding the current practice for responding to incidents of harmful sexual behaviour at the Centre, we also received information that the functions and powers of the Commissioner for Children and Young People to review such incidents is limited, and entirely dependent on being notified of such incidents.1524 Commissioner McLean informed us she has not been formally contacted by the Department to review any harmful sexual behaviour incidents at the Centre, despite making requests to be notified of such incidents.1525 Further, Commissioner McLean told us that, in situations where she has provided feedback to the Centre and the Department about the way an incident of harmful sexual behaviour has been or should be handled, she is generally not provided with a response to such feedback by the Centre or the Department.1526 Notably, in a recent instance where Commissioner McLean was contacted by a young person regarding an incident of harmful sexual behaviour at the Centre, she requested advice from the Department in late April 2023 regarding measures taken in response to this incident, however, as at 11 July 2023, had not received a response from the Department.1527

  1. Harmful sexual behaviours—2022–23

In early 2023, the Tasmanian Legislative Council was conducting its Inquiry into Tasmanian Adult Imprisonment and Youth Detention Matters. Some submissions to that inquiry raised concerns about, among other things, the behaviours of detainees, staff safety and the lack of a clear understanding of therapeutic and trauma-informed care, and questioned if it was appropriate for a detention setting.1528 In particular, two submissions we read were by retired police officers who had answered a call in late 2022 to work at Ashley Youth Detention Centre to address immediate staffing shortages. They described similar concerns. One described the challenging behaviours of young people in the Centre this way:

Indecent assaults are common practice with resident on resident fondling and touching and resident on youth worker touching. There were many times where I asked a resident if they wished to make a complaint—the answer was always similar, ‘just playing, joking around (normally an expletive), just having fun’. Of the many sexual contacts I witnessed, resident on resident, not one complaint was made.

In my case I was touched on the breasts on occasions and being asked ‘if I liked it’, being touched on the backside and in other sexual ways. I was frequently being asked about my sexual activity the night before and on one occasion and in front of other residents and a youth worker (female) a resident asked ‘if I liked it up the bum’.

The resident was severely chastised by the other youth worker and me and, as was a common practice, said ‘can’t you take a joke’. This was the similar response in all inappropriate touching—‘only joking’.

I witnessed many vicious assaults—resident on resident and resident on youth worker.1529

While not described as such in the submission, this is a description of harmful sexual behaviours. It echoes, for us, comments made in the 2018 Serious Events Review Team report, which said inappropriate sexual behaviour by children and young people in detention ‘must be managed on a daily basis’ in the Centre and noted that ‘it may be useful to consider expert review, advice and [ongoing] consultation concerning this issue to support [the Centre] to assist residents to develop socially appropriate behaviours for transition to the community’.1530

We are concerned these sexualised behaviours may have become normalised within the Centre.

Finding—Ashley Youth Detention Centre has been aware of harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre and has not taken steps to protect children and young people from these

While this case study has focused heavily on events from 2018 to 2022, and identified specific failings in relation to those events, we are concerned that these events and the response of the Centre and the Department echo a pattern across many years at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

We heard too many accounts, from as early as the 2000s, of children and young people being harmed by the sexualised behaviours of other detainees, sometimes facilitated by, or with the knowledge or implicit approval of, staff.

At times staff have failed to respond to known risks of harm, allowing vulnerable children and young people to be placed with or exposed to young people who pose a risk to their safety.

When harmful sexual behaviours did occur, staff or Centre management often failed to respond appropriately—whether by not removing the risks, not supporting the victim-survivor, or punishing them for making a complaint. When some staff raised concerns about the risk of harm to certain children or young people in detention, those concerns were sometimes not given appropriate weight within the culture and operations of the Centre.

We hold serious concerns about allegations that, at times, staff have used unit placement or threats of unit placement with other detainees known to display violence and harmful behaviours to threaten, intimidate or control more vulnerable children and young people.

Case study 3: Isolation in Ashley Youth Detention Centre

  1. Overview

The inappropriate isolation of children and young people in detention is a breach of their human rights. It is well recognised that isolating a child or young person adversely affects their mental health and wellbeing. In recognition of the harm isolation can cause, the Youth Justice Act 1997 (‘Youth Justice Act’) and Ashley Youth Detention Centre policies and procedures outline strict requirements for when isolation can be used in the Centre. It must never be used as punishment.

We heard about multiple practices at the Centre that involved at least some isolation of young people. However, these practices were not formally labelled as ‘isolation’ or responded to in line with the requirements for the use of isolation. Examples of the labels used were:

  • routine Centre-wide ‘time out’ or ‘quiet time’
  • ‘unit bound’
  • ‘individualised programs’
  • ‘segregation’
  • non-association
  • the ‘Blue Program’.

As outlined below, it appears to us that at least occasionally, these isolation practices involved locking a young person alone in their unit or their room and operated outside the isolation procedures. The evidence indicates these practices also involved segregating young people for days or weeks at a time from:

  • the routine of the Centre
  • programs and education
  • their peers.

Irrespective of the name used, and perhaps slight differences between each practice, from a child’s perspective, these were isolation practices. The effect on their mental health and wellbeing would have been the same. For this reason, we refer to these practices as isolation practices.

Often, these isolation practices were connected to the Behaviour Development System at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. As discussed in Chapter 10, the Behaviour Development System (now known as the Behaviour Development Program) is an incentive-based behaviour management protocol that allocates privileges or restrictions to a young person based on a colour coding—green, yellow, orange or red—that corresponds with their level of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviour as judged against a set of criteria. As described in Chapter 10 and below, isolation practices were often used with ‘bad’ colour ratings corresponding to ‘bad’ behaviour.

The inappropriate use of isolation practices over many years speaks to organisational factors the National Royal Commission identified as relevant to the risk of child sexual abuse in youth detention. We discuss these factors in Chapter 10, but particularly relevant in this context are:

  • the use of strict rules, discipline and punishment
  • cultures of disrespect for children
  • cultures of humiliating and degrading treatment of children
  • cultures where children’s voices are not encouraged, and their welfare is not prioritised
  • group allegiance among staff and among managers.1531

When isolating young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre is unauthorised, unregulated and unreported, the risk of, and opportunities for, the physical and sexual abuse of young people increases. Such belittling and dehumanising practices also reduce the likelihood of children and young people making disclosures of child sexual abuse because their sense of what is right and wrong, trust in adults at the Centre, and self-worth have been undermined.

We also heard about other forms of isolation—such as ‘restrictive practices’ and ‘lockdowns’—that involved all children in the Centre being restricted to their units or rooms for operational reasons. These practices were often a result of staff shortages rather than targeted actions to manage specific children. We are conscious these practices are isolation by another name, are human rights abuses, and have the same impact as other isolation practices on children’s health and wellbeing, although we do not address them in this case study. We discuss our concerns about staff shortages and our recommendations for increasing staffing numbers in Chapter 12.

In this case study, we briefly summarise the law and policies relating to isolating children and young people in detention, highlighting that the use of isolation is intended to be strictly regulated and monitored. We then outline what we heard about detainees’ experiences of isolation, drawing from the victim-survivor accounts we provide in Case study 1. We then discuss how various forms of isolation practices were adopted over many years at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, often, we suspect, with the knowledge of Centre management, the Department, and the Tasmanian Government at the time. We conclude with several findings about the inappropriate isolation of children and young people at the Centre, namely that:

  • the use of isolation as a form of behaviour management, punishment or cruelty and contrary to the Youth Justice Act has been a regular and persistent practice at Ashley Youth Detention Centre since at least the early 2000s, and the conditions that enabled this practice still exist today
  • the Department, and sometimes the Tasmanian Government, have been on notice about potentially unlawful isolation practices at Ashley Youth Detention Centre since at least 2013, and have not taken sufficient action
  • there was a consistent failure to include the voices of children and young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in any reviews, investigations or policy changes relating to isolation
  • Ashley Youth Detention Centre and the Department failed to support children and young people in detention who were subjected to isolation practices.

This case study covers a series of concerning allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff. We acknowledge there have been and are staff at the Centre who have sought to do their jobs lawfully and appropriately. References to problematic practices by ‘staff’ in this case study are not intended as a reference to all staff at the Centre, unless explicitly stated in a specific context.

  1. The law and policies

As outlined in Chapter 10, disciplinary measures involving ‘placement in a dark cell, solitary confinement or any other punishment that may compromise the physical or mental health or wellbeing of the child’ violate article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and are strictly prohibited.1532

The Youth Justice Act and Ashley Youth Detention Centre’s isolation policy, the Use of Isolation Procedure dated 1 July 2017 (‘Isolation Procedure’), recognises the seriousness of isolating a child or young person by limiting the practice to certain situations.1533 Overall, these instruments show there are strict requirements for subjecting a child to isolation in the Centre to protect them from the harm this practice causes. We understand similar strict requirements have existed in previous iterations of isolation procedures. In this section, we outline the requirements set out in these instruments as context for the isolation practices discussed in subsequent sections. We also show that when practices that amount to isolation are not recognised as such, these protections are not provided to children and young people in detention.

The Youth Justice Act defines ‘isolation’ as ‘locking a detainee in a room separate from others and from the normal routine of the detention centre’.1534 What constitutes the ‘normal routine’ of a detention centre is not defined in the Youth Justice Act. Tasmanian courts have not substantively considered it.

Combined, the Youth Justice Act and the Isolation Procedure provide that:

  • Isolating a detainee is only permissible if their behaviour poses an immediate threat to the safety of themselves, another person or property, or it is in the interest of the security of the Centre, and when all other reasonable steps have been taken to ‘prevent the harm’.1535 Isolation as a form of punishment does not satisfy one of these purposes.
  • Isolation should be for the ‘minimum time necessary to ensure the safety of individuals or property’, with a goal of reintegrating the young person ‘into the group as safely and as quickly as possible’.1536
  • There are strict requirements about who in the Centre can authorise isolation, being the Centre Manager or their delegate, and for what time periods.1537
  • There are strict requirements for the level of supervision and observation of children and young people in isolation.1538

Below, we discuss several occasions where isolation or related practices were used in response to Centre-wide ‘incidents’. The Isolation Procedure offers examples of situations where isolation might be authorised in the interests of Centre security. These examples include:

  • to prevent or control a security breach, including incidents such as, but not limited to:
    • a riot
    • a power failure
    • a perimeter breach
    • an escape or attempted escape
  • to allow order or control to be restored to the Centre (or to prevent its anticipated loss).1539

These examples suggest that isolation must only be used in the interests of the security of the Centre in the most serious of situations. The Isolation Procedure explains that such incidents ‘may result in more than one young person requiring isolation at a time, or the entire Centre being locked down’.1540

The Isolation Procedure requires that an authorisation of isolation must be given at the time the decision to isolate the young person is made; that is, not before the decision, afterwards, or on the condition that certain events occur.1541 The Centre Manager must be satisfied ‘that isolation is a reasonable intervention under the circumstances’, and that its use will comply with both the Youth Justice Act and the Isolation Procedure.1542 The Centre Manager must assess and determine the conditions for the care and treatment of the young person while in isolation. They must also consider the particular needs and circumstances of the child or young person.1543

The Centre Manager sets the conditions of isolation, including the period of isolation and the observation schedule.1544 Other conditions may include specifying items that are safe and therapeutic to be left with the young person, for example, ‘playing cards, reading material or drawing material’, and access to a support person, cultural advisor, or youth worker.1545

Once isolation is authorised, the Operations Coordinator at the Centre must ensure, among other things, the young person is advised:

  • why they are being isolated
  • their period of isolation
  • how they can seek help while they are isolated.1546

The Youth Justice Act does not prescribe a maximum period of isolation. The Isolation Procedure sets out tiered maximum isolation periods. It requires the Centre Manager to ‘seek to set the shortest period of isolation that is appropriate in the circumstances’.1547 The Isolation Procedure prescribes the following periods of isolation:

  • an initial period of no more than 30 minutes, which an Operations Coordinator can authorise
  • an extension of the initial period to three hours (including the first 30 minutes), which the Centre Manager (or their delegate) must authorise.1548

The Isolation Procedure allows for the period of isolation to be extended to a maximum of 12 hours.1549 To extend isolation beyond three hours, the Centre Manager must:

  • review the observation records prepared during the isolation period
  • consult with the Correctional Primary Health Services nurse and/or medical practitioner and available members of the Multi-Disciplinary Team
  • consult with the Director, Strategic Youth Services on the outcome of the discussion with the Correctional Primary Health Services nurse, medical practitioner and/or Multi-Disciplinary Team members1550
  • complete the ‘Authorisation for Extension of Isolation’ form, noting any new conditions of the isolation or change to conditions.1551

The Youth Justice Act and the Isolation Procedure require the Centre Manager to set a schedule for observing young people in isolation, with observations to occur at intervals of no more than 15 minutes.1552 The Isolation Procedure requires shorter intervals where there are particular concerns about a young person’s wellbeing.1553 For example, young people who may be at risk of self-harm must be subject to observation intervals in line with the relevant suicide and self-harm procedure.1554

At the time of the 2019 roof incident that we discuss later in this case study, the relevant instrument of delegation provided that the power to isolate a detained young person under section 133(2) of the Youth Justice Act (and therefore to extend the period of isolation) was delegated to the Operations Manager or the Director, Strategic Youth Services, only ‘if the Detention Centre Manager is on leave, is uncontactable, or is unable for any other reason to perform the relevant function’.1555 The Operations Coordinator and youth workers ‘performing the duties of the Operations Coordinator’ also had the power to isolate a detained young person for up to 30 minutes (but no more).1556

In 2021, the delegation instrument was revised. The most critical change regarding isolation was that the Assistant Manager could exercise, without any conditions, the Centre Manager’s power to isolate a young person under section 133(2) of the Youth Justice Act.1557

In addition, the Isolation Procedure places obligations on the staff member(s) observing the isolated young person, including to:

  • speak to the young person
  • assess whether their mental health has deteriorated
  • assess if the young person still poses an immediate threat to themselves, others, or the security of the Centre
  • record their observations.

If circumstances change, they must take appropriate steps.1558 Any engagement between the young person and the observing staff member(s) does not bring the isolation period to an end or restart the time limits.1559

Consistent with the legislative requirement that isolation only be used as a short-term tool to address immediate safety or security concerns, the Isolation Procedure requires consideration to be given to ending isolation as soon as the young person’s behaviour has sufficiently settled, or isolation is no longer necessary in the interests of the security of the Centre, irrespective of the set isolation period.1560

At the end of a period of isolation, the Operations Coordinator must check the ‘Authorisation for Isolation Form’ to determine what post-isolation conditions have been set.1561 If considered necessary, the Operations Coordinator or Centre Manager must put a post-isolation plan in place to address matters such as:

  • the implementation of post-isolation conditions
  • the level of observation required for the young person as they resume their normal routine
  • a review of behaviour goals and strategies to prevent further periods of isolation.1562

Debriefings with other young people and staff should also occur if required.1563

The Operations Coordinator or youth worker must also inform the young person when their isolation has ended.1564

  1. What we heard from victim-survivors about isolation practices at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

We heard evidence about isolation practices at Ashley Youth Detention Centre from young people who had been detained there, and their families. Those young people described the circumstances in which isolation was used at the Centre, the length of isolation incidents, and the conditions under which they were held in isolation. The accounts we received referred to various periods of detention during the past two decades, when individuals were aged between 11 and 17 years. As noted earlier, it was not possible for our Commission of Inquiry to test the veracity of all allegations of abuse, but we identified many common themes in the accounts we heard.

Some experiences shared by victim-survivors included their recollections of:

  • different degrees or kinds of isolation, ranging from being held in a cell alone to being confined to a unit1565
  • long periods of isolation, including for several weeks1566
  • inappropriate isolation used for a range of reasons, including as part of the induction process, as punishment for bad behaviour or self-harm, against victims of assault or as retribution for making complaints1567
  • being isolated, or isolating themselves, to keep themselves safe from other young people1568
  • poor isolation conditions, often with limited or no access to therapeutic programs, education and health care, or without appropriate bedding and sufficient food1569
  • handcuffs and physical restraints being used to place a young person in isolation, or while they were in isolation1570
  • isolation traumatising and confusing young people, contributing to long-term negative effects on a young person’s mental health and wellbeing.1571

We heard that many new arrivals to the Centre were isolated as part of the induction process. Ben (a pseudonym) told us that when he first arrived at the Centre in the early 2000s, he was placed in a ‘holding cell’ for 72 hours of mandatory observation, where he was given only a mattress and a thin blanket.1572 Simon (a pseudonym) told us that when he arrived at the Centre for the first time in the mid-2000s, he was locked in a cell for two days.1573 Erin (a pseudonym), who was at the Centre in the mid-2010s, some years after Ben and Simon, described how she was ‘unit bound’ by herself for about a week each time she was admitted as ‘part of the normal introduction’, and that she was only allowed out for one or two hours per day during that time.1574 She said this experience resulted in ‘massive trauma’, that now she ‘can’t deal with being trapped inside’ and that she ‘found the COVID lockdowns really hard’.1575

We were told that, besides being a feature of the admissions process, isolation was sometimes used to punish young people. Simon described how he was placed in isolation two or three times after committing detention offences, refusing to go to bed when directed or not listening to staff.1576 He recalled that staff members would say he was being isolated as punishment for those behaviours.1577

We heard concerning evidence about isolation being used against detainees as punishment for complaining or when a young person was assaulted.1578 Fred (a pseudonym), who first went to the Centre in the mid-2000s, described two incidents where he was ‘locked down’ as punishment after being assaulted by other young people. He told us this was a ‘pretty normal’ response to assaults.1579 Fred said that ‘several’ times it was only him who was ‘locked down’, not those who had assaulted him, and that he was told this was because he ‘was an annoyance to the unit’.1580 Erin also described being kept in her room because of threats of assault made against her by other young people.1581

Brett Robinson, who was detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the late 2000s, described his experience in a similar way:

When you were locked down, they would come in to your cell at 8.00 am in the morning, take all of your bedding away and then give it back to you at the end of the day. You were not able to do any programs or school. You weren’t allowed to watch TV. They would take out any excess stuff that was considered a privilege. You’d be left with a book or two and maybe a puzzle.1582

Erin told us that sometimes when staff locked young people in their room over the weekend, they would make the isolation worse by disorienting them:

They would tell you that it was six o’clock in the morning when it was actually ten o’clock. They would leave a curtain up over your door so you couldn’t see the sun and didn’t know what was going on around you. You’d miss out on your lunch and they wouldn’t let you out of your cell until one o’clock in the afternoon. They did these things to mess with you and make your life really hard.1583

Some victim-survivors told us that, while in isolation in the early to late 2000s, they would often only be allowed an hour a day to make a phone call or to exercise.1584 One witness described how, in the mid-2000s, they only had access to a bucket as a toilet.1585 Another said, in the early to mid-2000s, staff members would first ‘bash’ him up before placing him in a ‘freezing cold’ cell.1586

We also heard young people were sometimes physically restrained when being placed in isolation, or once in isolation.1587 Brett Robinson, who was first admitted to the Centre in the late 2000s said:

I was hog tied and left in my cell, then put into lockdown. I [brought] it up in the weekly meeting. The staff responded by saying, ‘If you want to misbehave, then there are steps put in place to deal with you’. When the workers who hog tied me came back on shift, they just laughed and said, ‘What did you think was going to happen?’1588

Two witnesses told us that, after attempting suicide, they were held in isolation, were subjected to further physical or psychological abuse by guards and were not provided with any counselling assistance. Ben, who was at the Centre from the early to mid-2000s, said that after stealing medical supplies with other young people and attempting suicide, he was stripped naked, flogged and ‘locked down on 23-hour-a-day lockdowns for weeks on end’.1589 Ben recalled that, once he was released from lockdown, he was on and off the ‘non-association program’, which meant being locked down for 23 hours a day with a book, pen, pad, mattress and bedding.1590

Charlotte (a pseudonym), who was first admitted to the Centre in the early 2000s, told us that, after a confrontation with a staff member at the Centre, she was locked in her cell for four days.1591 At the start of her isolation, she set her cell on fire and attempted suicide. She recalled:

After about 10 minutes the room filled up with smoke ... The sprinklers went off, but no one came for ages. Then they just opened the viewing panel in the door. They could see me in the shower with blood on my arms and just left me there. I was in that room alone for 4 days ... I got water and toast for tea. I was wet from the sprinkler ... I didn’t have any bedding. I had to wear the wet, burnt, smelly clothes. When they finally came to get me a few days later they … stripped me down to nothing with 2 female staff. … Then they finally gave me some clothes and left me alone again all night until the next day. Then I was sent back to the unit and locked down for a week ...1592

Charlotte said she was upset, hungry and confused during her isolation and again attempted suicide.1593

We heard of a family member’s perception that her attempts to limit the use of isolation practices on her child seemed to make things worse for him. Eve (a pseudonym) described how her son Norman (a pseudonym), who was first admitted to the Centre in the early 2010s, was ‘in lockdown all the time’, with limited exercise and sunlight.1594 She was concerned these practices were having a negative effect on Norman’s mental health.1595 Eve said trying to raise the issue with management at the Centre appeared to have negative consequences for Norman. One such consequence was being placed on frequent self-harm observations.1596

These accounts were deeply troubling to us, particularly given the consistency across accounts and the patterns that emerged, because they suggested that during the early 2000s to at least the mid-2010s, unlawful and harmful isolation practices were part of how children and young people detained at the Centre were commonly treated.

  1. Practices that involve isolation

Two of the most common isolation practices we heard about that operated outside the formal policy framework for isolation at Ashley Youth Detention Centre were ‘unit bound’ and the ‘Blue Program’. We heard about these isolation practices, which often operated outside the policy framework, being used up to early 2020 (noting we also heard about restrictive practices for operational reasons, which amount to isolation, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and staff shortages from 2020 to 2023).

  1. The practice of ‘unit bound’

The unit bound practice appears to have a long history at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. However, we could not identify a specific policy on unit bound or any formal definition of the practice.

We received confusing evidence about what constituted unit bound. One long-term staff member told us the unit bound practice was governed by a ‘combination’ of policies and procedures.1597 Two other long-serving staff members told us the policy that governed the Behaviour Development System also governed the use of the unit bound practice.1598 Madeleine Gardiner, former Manager, Professional Services and Policy at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, said she was ‘not aware’ of a specific policy relevant to unit bound, and the practice appeared to be based on a ‘case-by-case’ assessment of the security risk associated with the young person being in the shared areas of the Centre.1599

We put a series of questions to past and present staff of the Centre about the:

  • rationale or criteria for the use of the unit bound practice
  • nature of its operation
  • difference between being unit bound and being in isolation under the Centre’s Isolation Procedure.

The responses we received were, at best, inconsistent.

In her evidence to us, Fiona Atkins, Assistant Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, described the unit bound practice as a temporary response to a young person’s escape risk, that is, where they had attempted to escape, actually escaped or said they intended to escape from the Centre.1600 This rationale was echoed by some other Centre staff.1601 Another staff member described a sliding scale of risk. They said a young person would be isolated in their room when they presented as a risk to themselves, others or the Centre, but the unit bound practice would be used in cases of lesser risk, where separating a young person from others was still considered necessary for safety.1602 Another staff member said repeated threats or attempts to assault other young people were identified as possible reasons for using the unit bound practice.1603

We understand a decision to place a young person on unit bound was usually made by the Centre Support Team at the Centre. 1604 Ms Gardiner said the decision to put a young person on unit bound was made by the Operations Manager, the Centre Manager, the Operations Coordinator, or the Centre Support Team.1605 The Centre Support Team also decided a young person’s rating under the Behaviour Development System, either during weekly meetings or at ad hoc interim meetings.

In terms of the practical operation of the unit bound practice, Ms Atkins said being unit bound meant the young person had access to unit-based activities, underpinned by an ‘individualised program’ prepared by a program coordinator.1606 It appears the nature and content of any ‘individualised program’ was a matter of discretion. There was a degree of inconsistency in the evidence we received as to the extent to which the young person would have access to common areas of the unit, Ashley School, the gym and outdoor areas.1607

Samuel Baker, Principal of Ashley School, told us that a young person’s colour level (sometimes referred to as status or rating) on the Behaviour Development System affected the number of hours of face-to-face schooling they received each day, and the nature and content of that schooling. He said young people who were unit bound due to a red colour rating could not attend woodwork, art and ‘fit gym’—because equipment in those classes could be used as a weapon—but could continue to attend all other classes.1608 Those young people were required to remain unit bound when school activities, such as woodwork, were scheduled.1609 We also heard from staff at the Centre that young people who were unit bound were not permitted to attend school until they agreed to not behave in the ways that caused them to be placed on unit bound.1610

There was a lack of clarity in responses about the degree to which young people who were unit bound were physically isolated from their peers. Pamela Honan, Director, Strategic Youth Services, described the unit bound practice as one ‘where a young person is allowed out of their room but they are still contained within the confines of a locked unit’.1611 Ms Honan acknowledged she was unclear whether young people on unit bound were allowed to associate with other young people within the confines of the unit. She agreed the unit bound category appeared to be ‘a form of isolation by another name’.1612 Ms Gardiner was more certain in her characterisation. She contended that unit bound involved ‘isolating people from the general routine of the Centre’ or the ‘general activities of the Centre’, as well as from their peers.1613

  1. The Blue Program

We understand that from early 2011 to December 2013, Ashley Youth Detention Centre had what was commonly referred to as a Blue Program.1614 It was also formally reintroduced for a short period (at least three months) in 2019 with the knowledge of the Department (refer to Section 9 of this case study). As will become apparent throughout this case study, the Blue Program appears to have been adopted informally at other times, possibly as the unit bound practice.

One version of the Behaviour Development System (dated 2013) referred to the blue category in that system as ‘full segregation’ and outlined that:1615

This colour level is for those young people who are unable to function under the normal provisions of the BDS [Behaviour Development System] and require an intensive level of supervision, such as full segregation from other young people. Refer Intensive Support Program ISP ...

Young people on this level would currently pose an immediate threat to the security and safety of the Centre including both staff and young people. This would include such things as attempt[ed] or complete absconding, assaultive behaviour, possession of a lethal weapon or facsimile of a lethal weapon or persistent history of contraband possession and/or use. Their behaviour may also be considered to be a primary source of inciting other young people to behave in a way that is subversive and/or disruptive to the order of the Unit/Centre.1616

Evidence received from staff at the Centre suggests the Blue Program involved at least some form of isolation. At our public hearings, Sarah Spencer, a youth worker at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, acknowledged the Blue Program ‘involved a lot of isolation’.1617 One staff member told us that a young person on the Blue Program was ‘in isolation for up to [eight] hours at a time’.1618

Some previous staff told us the Blue Program and ‘unit bound’ were essentially the same practice. However, it is important to note that unit bound practices were not limited to periods when the Blue Program was officially in operation. As Ms Gardiner explained:

My understanding is that ‘Unit Bound’ and being on colour ‘Blue’ on the [Behaviour Development System] was the same, which I learnt from an email from Patrick Ryan [Centre Manager] on [4 September 2019] … that was a response to the Commissioner for Children explaining that for a young person to be ‘Unit Bound’ was part of the Blue colour of the Behaviour Development System (BDS). This definition of Blue and ‘Unit Bound’ was never communicated clearly to myself until this time. My understanding and observation of the ‘Unit Bound’ or ‘Blue colour’ was that a young person was not in isolation but was confined to the unit for parts of the day, they did not participate in the general activities of the Centre, and they received individual timetabling of activities. I understood that the young person was escorted to use the gym or other areas of the Centre, when it was possible to do this, to ensure the safety of the Centre was not compromised. I am not completely clear on the parameters of ‘Unit Bound’ practices, as there was no policy/procedure at the time regarding a detainee being ‘Unit Bound’ and as can be seen in the response to the Commissioner for Children, this practice was used at the discretion of the Centre Manager, to maintain safety and security of the Centre.1619

Alysha (a pseudonym), former Clinical Practice Consultant, who started working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre after the Blue Program ceased official operation (for the second time) in 2019, noted that staff continued to conflate the Blue Program with the unit bound practice.1620 Alysha observed that:

Whilst the blue category was not part of the systems practice manual while I was at the Centre, it was regularly referred to and seemingly accepted as a standard practice despite occasionally being acknowledged as something that should not be said. I was present at [Centre Support Team] meetings where Operations staff would discuss putting children ‘on the Blue Program’. It would be noted that ‘we can’t say that anymore’, so the meeting minutes would reflect that the child was either ‘unit bound’ or on an ‘individual support program’. 1621

Ms Spencer also told us staff referred to the Blue Program, even though it was not officially in operation. When asked if the Blue Program was reintroduced in 2019, she said:

I don’t know that I’m officially aware of that. I don’t think so. As in, how recent? …

I don’t think so. I think there was some isolation around a riot, but I don’t believe that it was an official Blue Program. People around the Centre may have used that word just because that’s what they related it to because of their previous history, but I don’t think it was officially called that, I think it was just in regards to managing these particular young people that had a pretty serious riot.1622

  1. Concerns raised about the Blue Program in 2013

On 12 September 2013, Deputy Chief Magistrate Michael Daly delivered judgment in the case Lusted v ZS.1623 The judgment included significant criticism of the operations of Ashley Youth Detention Centre, in particular the use of isolation and similar practices. Following the sentencing of the young person in that case (referred to as ‘ZS’ or ‘Z’) for assaulting a staff member at the Centre, Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly thought it appropriate and necessary to make further comments regarding Z’s experiences at the Centre while on remand. The need for these comments arose because during proceedings, Z disclosed he had been locked in his room for three weeks as punishment for destroying property.1624

The comments of Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly in Lusted v ZS are relevant to the use of isolation and similar practices at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly expressly stated in Lusted v ZS that the Court’s understanding of ‘the colour scheme’ (being the Blue Program and the Behaviour Development System) was minimal.1625 The Court received no information of ‘practical value’ about the system beyond the experiences of the young person in question in the case.1626 However, Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly noted it would be a ‘very serious issue of grave concern’ if a young person had been isolated outside the ‘strict provisions of [section] 133’ of the Youth Justice Act.1627

Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly issued a series of questions to the then Secretary of the Department on 26 July 2013 about whether Z’s experiences at the Centre may have constituted abuse or neglect.1628 These questions related to factual issues, such as whether Z had been confined to his room and the circumstances of that confinement, and clarification about whether that confinement and the Blue Program constituted isolation for the purposes of the Youth Justice Act.1629

Child Protection Services, on behalf of the Secretary, responded to these questions on 30 July 2013. Part of its response was as follows:

[The Blue Program] does not involve the isolation of a young person. Neither is it a punishment. It is a Program put in place where a young person is able to function under the normal provisions of the Behaviour Development System and requires an intensive level of supervision and support. It may limit the access for the young person involved to some areas of the facility and it may involve periods of segregation from other residents.1630

It is apparent to us that the response did little to clarify the specific experiences of Z or the broader issue. The response appears to suggest that because the Blue Program was part of the Behaviour Development System, which was part of the ‘routine’ of the Centre, a young person under the Blue Program was not in isolation. The response provided no clarification on what meaningful distinction, if any, existed between confinement or ‘segregation’ of a young person under the Blue Program in response to adverse behaviours and the use of isolation as punishment. Indeed, after seeking further clarification, to which the Department provided no response, Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly stated in his judgment that the Secretary’s initial response was ‘so vague that it was of no practical value’ and ‘wholly inadequate’.1631

Consequently, Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly said in his decision that:

In relation to Z’s isolation, for the purposes of this exercise it is open to me to conclude that what happened to Z while in the custody of the Secretary was that he was placed in isolation in a manner unauthorised by the Youth Justice Act 1997, [section] 133. Further, on the material before me, I fear that unauthorised isolation may [be] a normal part of the management of youths in detention or on remand.1632

Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly was further critical of the Secretary’s approach to addressing concerns raised by authorities outside Ashley Youth Detention Centre regarding the use of isolation, as well as the use of practices that are substantively isolation being applied outside the statutory framework.

We note these criticisms are highly relevant to subsequent events at the Centre in the years that followed the decision of Lusted v ZS.

  1. Our observations

We conclude that from 2013, the Department and, we presume, the Tasmanian Government were made aware and put on notice of isolation practices that contravened Tasmanian law and human rights principles to which Australia was a signatory, with concerns raised that these were not one-off but routine practices.

  1. Concerns raised about unit bound and similar practices in 2016 and 2017

During his time as Commissioner for Children and Young People, Mark Morrissey raised the issue of isolation with the Department, including what he viewed as substantively similar practices referred to by other names.

In April 2016, in a letter to the then Secretary of the Department, Michael Pervan, Mr Morrissey raised concerns that isolation was being used as a form of punishment against young people in detention.1633 Specifically, Mr Morrissey relayed complaints he had received from two young people in detention that they had been kept in isolation for a week as punishment for their involvement in an incident at the Centre.1634 In the letter, Mr Morrissey expressed his clear disapproval of the practice. He stated that it ‘would be reasonable to conclude’ that the young people had been isolated ‘contrary to various international and national standards’. He also noted that concerns about isolating young people in detention had previously been raised in 2013 (in relation to the isolation of Z, discussed above).1635

Later in April 2016, a Minute to the Secretary with the subject line ‘[Ashley Youth Detention Centre] – Commissioner for Children letter and emerging concerns’ was drafted by staff in Children and Youth Services and provided to Secretary Pervan. Secretary Pervan approved the Minute on 6 May 2016.1636 The Minute noted that:

  • the Commissioner for Children and Young People had formally advised the Secretary of concerns relating to the use of isolation as a punishment at Ashley Youth Detention Centre
  • the Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services, had previously raised concerns surrounding staff capability at the Centre
  • the Director, Services to Young People (this role later became Director, Strategic Youth Services), had also recently identified major challenges at the Centre, including in relation to the culture of the Centre, which was considered to influence how staff members responded to the behavioural issues of young people in detention.1637

In the Minute, Secretary Pervan was advised that the then Deputy Secretary and Director had undertaken an informal preliminary assessment of the matters raised by the Commissioner for Children and Young People, and ‘consider[ed] it likely that the claims of the children and the concerns of the Commissioner are accurate’.1638 Further, the then Director had determined that:

  • many staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre had been in their roles ‘in excess of 15 years’
  • there was a negative culture at the Centre, with some staff subscribing to a punitive approach when dealing with young people
  • the delivery of therapeutic care to young people, and adherence to their human rights, had not evolved at the Centre so as ‘to meet the requirements of a modern detention centre and community expectation’
  • the Centre’s internal complaints mechanism framework was inefficient, not transparent, and did not include a formal register or a review process for complaints.1639

The Minute appeared to suggest considerable concern about the practices of current staff. It recommended with some urgency, that a ‘profiling of required skill base’ for staff be undertaken with human resources involvement ‘to ensure rules surrounding staffing and any profiling of positions affords natural justice and procedural fairness and are undertaken in line with rules of the State Service’.1640 We infer from these statements that the authors were recommending an effective spill of staff positions, which is an exceptional recommendation for a Deputy Secretary and a Director within a Department to make. The Minute also recommended establishing an ongoing mandatory training calendar.

The Minute stated the issues identified regarding isolation practices ‘have remained embedded at [the Centre] for a significant period’ and that ‘[c]onsistent concerns have been raised over a number of years, by a number of stakeholders’.1641 The Minute stated that in June 2013, the Secretary at that time had instigated a ‘Taskforce’ for Ashley Youth Detention Centre to identify and implement changes that would ‘improve the day to day lives of the young detainees’. The Minute stated that the Taskforce made 16 recommendations, including ‘removing “quiet time” for residents twice a day where they are confined to their room’.1642

The Minute further noted that in 2015, a review into the governance and management arrangements at the Centre identified shortfalls in leadership, culture and the capacity of staff.1643 In response to the review, the Government had agreed to multiple actions, including that the practice of ‘Time Out’—which the Minute stated ‘equates to Isolation at law’—be ceased, and that staff at the Centre were to ‘work across teams when requested to do so rather than working solely in the allocated smaller team groups’.1644

The Minute recommended that Secretary Pervan approve and resource an immediate ‘change management process’ at the Centre to introduce a therapeutic model and associated training for staff, as well as new governance structures to ensure the Centre’s operations met legislative requirements.1645

The Minute further recommended to Secretary Pervan that immediate action be taken to:

  • review policies and procedures relating to ‘time out’, isolation and behaviour management in line with best practice across other jurisdictions, legislative requirements, and requirements under various national and international human rights treaties and conventions
  • consider a formal change management model to help Centre staff understand where ‘[d]etention in Tasmania needs to move to’
  • review and amend the internal complaints framework to direct all complaints from young people to the then Director in the first instance, who could record complaints in a formal register and review and monitor systemic issues at the Centre
  • develop a formal register in relation to incidents of isolation to ensure compliance with the law
  • investigate whether young people in detention were receiving the same level of education as young people engaged in mainstream education
  • develop programs that create pro-social pathways after school hours and on weekends for young people in detention
  • implement outstanding actions from previous reviews relevant to the treatment of young people in detention.1646

The Minute concluded that, should immediate efforts to reform the Centre not occur, there was a significant risk to the reputation of the Department and the Minister, as well as a ‘strong prospect of litigation for human right breaches or failures to comply with legislative obligations’.1647 The Minute emphasised to the Secretary that:

Without purposeful effort to support true quality of care in detention for the youth of Tasmania under strong and contemporary leadership, it is unlikely that significant change requirements could succeed.1648

We note that, in an undated letter to Mr Morrissey in response to issues raised in his letter of 6 April 2016, Secretary Pervan did not substantively address the issue of isolation. Secretary Pervan observed the matters raised in Mr Morrissey’s letter were not isolated incidents but likely to be ‘systemic and embedded within all interactions between the staff and young people’.1649 In his letter to Mr Morrissey, Secretary Pervan did not relate the Department’s observations there were likely human rights breaches occurring at the Centre. We consider this a missed opportunity to transparently recognise the potential harm being done to children and young people at the Centre. Such recognition and engagement are important to enable a Commissioner for Children and Young People to perform their function appropriately.

On 9 November 2016, Mr Morrissey emailed the Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services, and other departmental officials after reviewing the Ashley Youth Detention Centre daily roll and noticing two young people were listed as ‘unit bound’.1650 Mr Morrissey sought clarification regarding the conditions the young people experienced while being unit bound, particularly whether they were locked in their rooms, separated from other young people (young people who were in the same unit and in the Centre more broadly), excluded from school or other programs and made to eat meals separately.1651

On 10 November 2016, the Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services replied to Mr Morrissey, stating the term ‘unit bound’ was used to describe the placement of a young person on a ‘separate routine’.1652 A separate routine was defined in the Ashley Youth Detention Centre Standard Operating Procedure as follows:

A young person may be placed on a Separate Routine where their behaviour presents a risk to others or to the security of the Centre but which can be managed without resort to isolation. It may involve restrictions on contact with other specific young people or certain programs and areas of the Centre. It may also entail closer supervision and/or restriction to a particular Unit. This strategy can be used to deal with risks such as threats of harm to self and others, threats of escape and subversive and inciting behaviour. A Separate Routine can only be approved by the [Centre Support Team] or [Interim Centre Support Team], must be reviewed at least twice a week and must be discontinued as soon as the level of risk permits.1653

The 10 November 2016 response to Mr Morrissey noted the terms ‘unit bound’, ‘separate routine’ and ‘individual program’ were often used interchangeably, and they had not ‘been considered a form of isolation as a Youth Worker is always present’. However, the response noted other jurisdictions had interpreted being separate from other children and young people in detention to be isolation.1654 The Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services noted:

At this stage Individual Programs provide [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] staff with the flexibility to manage quite challenging behaviours, safely, without resorting to isolation. As more work is done to increase the range of therapeutic responses available to staff, the need for Individual Programs delivered as a Separate Routine will be reviewed.1655

The Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services further observed that,
at that time, a revised policy regarding isolation was being prepared for the Centre, which would require a ‘significant amount of policy work’ to define ‘normal routine’, including ‘separate routine’ and ‘induction routine’.1656 He invited the Commissioner for Children and Young People’s involvement in this process.

On 11 November 2016, Mr Morrissey wrote to the then Minister for Human Services, copying in Secretary Pervan. This letter addressed several issues, including the use of isolation at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and the Commissioner for Children and Young People’s ‘concerns about a lack of clarity around what isolation is and around the current legislative prohibition on its use as a punishment’.1657

Mr Morrissey noted that, at Ashley Youth Detention Centre:

... there may be a view that if a young person is locked up with a youth worker, then, regardless of anything else, that will in and of itself negate categorisation of treatment as isolation. I have indicated my disagreement with such an approach.1658

Mr Morrissey expressed the view that a practice should be considered isolation if a young person was separated from other young people and from the normal routine of the Centre.1659 He supported this view by referring to the approach taken in Victoria, where legislation defined isolation in similar terms to the Youth Justice Act.

Mr Morrissey was similarly direct in expressing his concern about the Centre’s
‘resort to practices similar to if not identical to isolation but which are referred to by other terminology’.1660 He noted the need to clarify different, seemingly interchangeable terms such as ‘unit bound’, which may amount to isolation where a young person was the sole occupant of the unit to which they were confined.1661

On 18 November 2016, Secretary Pervan responded to Mr Morrissey’s concerns, copying in the Minister for Human Services.1662 Secretary Pervan stated:

  • procedures at the Centre relating to restrictive practices, including isolation, were under review
  • the draft revised Isolation Procedure had ‘a much greater focus on isolation as a prohibited action, except for in very specific circumstances’
  • isolation should be a ‘last resort’.1663

He indicated the use of isolation was, at least partially, a result of a lack of therapeutic responses:

As more work is done to increase the range of therapeutic responses available to staff it is expected that the use of isolation as a strategy to manage unsafe behaviours should reduce. To this end, staff have undertaken refresher training in Non Violent Crisis Intervention (NVCI) and are currently participating in Trauma Informed Care training.1664

Secretary Pervan’s response also acknowledged Mr Morrissey’s concerns regarding practices that are ‘similar to isolation, but which are referred to by other terminology’ and referred to the ‘work’ to define ‘normal routine and separate from others’, including potentially needing to make legislative changes.1665 The response did not substantively address Mr Morrissey’s concern that isolation may be used under a different name and with significantly fewer protections in place to prevent harm to young people in detention.

On 4 January 2017, Mr Morrissey again emailed the Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services (copying in Secretary Pervan) seeking clarification regarding a complaint from a young person at the Centre about isolation practices.1666 Mr Morrissey stated it appeared the young person was, in effect, being held in isolation despite such isolation being alternatively defined as ‘unit bound’, and that this was causing ‘significant distress’:

I have been provided with a copy of [the young person’s] individual program and note that he is unit bound—he takes his meals in the Unit, does not participate in the normal routine of the Centre and does not mix with any of the other boys. He is the sole resident of his Unit …

If [the young person] is being kept separate from the normal routine and from the other detainees, please advise how this does not amount to ‘isolation’ as defined in the new Procedure governing Isolation …1667

The Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services responded later the same day.1668 Beyond providing details of the individual young person’s circumstances (the young person had rejoined regular programs at the Centre that day), he disagreed the circumstances constituted isolation but did not elaborate on why.1669 The Acting Deputy Secretary did note the ‘individual program’ standard operating procedures and arrangements would need to be reviewed.1670

On 11 January 2017, Mr Morrissey again emphasised in an email to the Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services that, in his view, these practices constituted isolation:

I believe that what is occurring is actually isolation, based on the content of the revised SOPs [Standard Operating Procedures]. My reason for saying this is that [the young person] was also on his own—essentially unit bound, separate from other detainees—and on individual program. The old SOP dealing with isolation referred to ‘separate routine’—which appears to be how [the young person] was treated.1671

On 19 January 2017, Mr Morrissey sent another email to the Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services regarding the same young person. It appears this young person was again being held separately from other young people at the Centre and was ‘very upset and escalating’.1672 Mr Morrissey noted he had raised ‘on a number of other occasions’ that isolation is ‘highly counterproductive to a therapeutic approach’ and ‘often will directly contribute to escalating distress and behaviour issues’.1673 His frustration at the continued practice of isolating this young person, seemingly in preference to alternative therapeutic options for de-escalating and managing behaviour, was evident from his correspondence.1674

  1. Our observations

It is our conclusion that, during 2016 and early 2017, the Department and the Tasmanian Government were again made aware and put on notice of routine isolation practices that potentially contravened Tasmanian law and human rights principles to which Australia was a signatory. The Department had internally acknowledged the veracity of these concerns through the 2016 Minute, which appeared to us to be an urgent call to action from the Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services and the Director at the time to address routine human rights abuses the Centre.

We were deeply troubled that, despite the 2016 Minute’s internal recognition that unlawful isolation practices were likely occurring, we saw no evidence of action taken to remedy the ongoing human rights abuses being perpetrated against the young person for whom Mr Morrissey had repeatedly advocated. The Department failed to act in the best interests of this young person and any other children subjected to potentially unlawful isolation practices during this period.

We note some in the Department appeared to take the view that the reference to ‘separate from others’ in relation to isolation under the Youth Justice Act meant that a young person in detention would not be in isolation if a youth worker was present. We share Mr Morrissey’s view that ‘separate from others’ should be taken to mean separate from other young people in detention, particularly given that Victoria adopted this approach in relation to the same phrasing in its legislation.

We note that this view by the Department had resonances with its 30 July 2013 response to Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly, which appeared to focus closely on the term ‘routine’ in the definition of isolation. It appeared to suggest that because the Blue Program was part of the Behaviour Development System, which was part of the ‘routine’ of the Centre, a young person in detention under the Blue Program was not in isolation.

We note how the Youth Justice Act is interpreted and applied remains relevant given that the Tasmanian (and Victorian) legislative definitions of ‘isolation’ continue to refer to locking a young person in detention in a room separate from others and from the normal routine of the Centre. We consider a plain language description of the daily experience of a child or young person on the Blue Program or who is unit bound would help determine whether a child is in isolation under the Youth Justice Act.

  1. Continuing concerns in 2017

On 19 February 2017, Mr Morrissey wrote to the Custodial Inspector, Richard Connock, requesting his opinion on whether the practices that Mr Morrissey had been discussing with departmental officials for several months amounted to isolation.1675 Mr Morrissey observed to Mr Connock that ‘the interpretation of what constitutes isolation remains an irresolute issue’.1676

On 2 June 2017, Mr Morrissey wrote to Ginna Webster, who was Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services at the time, again raising the issue of isolation and concerns over the use of definitions. He noted no progress appeared to have been made since January 2017:

My primary concern relates to the use of separate routine for the young people. I have formed a general view that it is indeed likely to be isolation. Separate routines at times extend for considerable periods. A therapeutic strategy for these young people may be able to offer less isolating options.1677

At that time, Mr Morrissey also noted he had not received a reply from Mr Connock in response to his request for an opinion in February.1678 Mr Morrissey told us he left the role of Commissioner for Children and Young People in October 2017, after deciding the momentum for influencing reforms in the role had stalled, and that it was time for a change.1679 In Chapter 18, we discuss Mr Morrissey’s belief that on a number of occasions the independence of his role was undermined. It is unclear if Mr Connock ever provided a formal response or opinion on the issue to Mr Morrissey. While Mr Connock recalls being in regular contact with Mr Morrissey at around this time, he told us he had no recollection of the email.1680 We are pleased to note that on 1 July 2017, a new Isolation Procedure was introduced by Ms Webster, as delegate of the Secretary of the Department, under section 124(2) of the Youth Justice Act.1681 This is the procedure outlined in Section 2 and it clearly identifies that isolation should be used as a last resort and as a short-term tool to address immediate safety or security concerns. In the following section, we note ongoing concerns about formal isolation practices under this procedure. In Chapter 12, we identify further improvements to the Isolation Procedure.

  1. Reviews of unit bound and similar practices in 2018 and 2019

A subsequent report by Mr Connock, titled Custody Inspection Report: Inspection of Youth Custodial Services in Tasmania, 2018 was published in August 2019.1682 The inspection of Ashley Youth Detention Centre for this report occurred in February 2018, seven months after the introduction of the new Isolation Procedure.1683 In the report, Mr Connock considered the isolation practices that engaged the Centre’s official Isolation Procedure.1684 Mr Connock identified serious failures regarding the use of official isolation, including the failure to:

  • regularly review and monitor instances of isolation
  • meet minimum observation requirements while young people are held in isolation
  • keep proper records regarding young people being held in isolation, including:
    • it appeared staff were copying and pasting different incident reports
    • documentation intended to explain or justify the use of isolation was incomplete.1685

The report did not discuss other isolation practices, such as unit bound practices or segregation, being used at the Centre outside the formal isolation safeguards.

  1. Our observations

We conclude the Department and the Tasmanian Government were made aware in 2019 that, despite implementing a new policy and staff training in response to issues raised over the previous six or more years, formal isolation practices at the Centre continued to raise concerns for oversight bodies.

  1. The reintroduction of the Blue Program in March 2019
  1. The decision to reintroduce the Blue Program

On the evening of 7 March 2019, staff of Ashley Youth Detention Centre were notified by email from Patrick Ryan, Centre Manager at the time, that the Blue Program was being reintroduced for three months, at which point a decision on its continued use would be made.1686 Greg Brown, then Director, Strategic Youth Services in the Department, was forwarded this email soon afterwards.1687 Mr Brown was in this role between December 2017 and October 2019. Reference to the Blue Program in this section refers, unless noted otherwise, to the form of the program that was reintroduced in 2019.

The details of the Blue Program were set out in a series of documents Mr Ryan distributed to staff.1688 In these documents, the Blue Program was described as a program to be used where a ‘young person persistently breaks the rules of the Centre and is at risk to themselves or others’ [emphasis in original].1689

Examples of situations that may attract a blue colour code were identified as attempts to escape, violent or assaultive behaviour, possession of a weapon and other behaviours that are ‘disruptive to the order of their Unit or the Centre broadly’.1690

The relevant policy documentation stated:

Whilst on Blue colour, which puts them outside normal Centre routine, the young person must be able to participate in an intensive support program that permits them to continue with their education, work, recreation or therapeutic activities until they are able to participate effectively in normal programming and normal Centre routine …

Being placed on Blue colour is not the isolation of a young person, but a management tool used to manage the behaviours of individuals who consistently refuse to adhere to the rules and good order of the Centre or are unable to assimilate with the broader [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] community [emphasis in original].1691

The documentation also listed the following key practice under the program:

A young person is fully segregated from Ashley School, daily programs and activities, other young people in their Unit (subject to risk assessment) and the normal routine of the Centre.1692

The process for placing a young person on the Blue Program involved initial consideration by the Centre Support Team or Interim Centre Support Team (an ad hoc meeting of the Centre Support Team), followed by Mr Ryan or his delegate ratifying the decision.1693 The Centre Support Team or Interim Centre Support Team would then decide the ‘nature of the intensive support program’ for the young person while on the Blue Program, including the extent of any restrictions on the movement of that young person.1694 A young person’s eligibility to take part in Centre activities and programs in their unit was subject to a risk assessment.1695

Communications to staff and young people at the Centre emphasised the Blue Program was not a ‘punishment option for difficult behaviour but rather an opportunity to maintain safety and security, as well as allowing the young person time to settle and be
re-integrated back into normal routine’.1696

Mr Ryan confirmed to us that when young people on the Blue Program were in their room, their door was locked and there was no other person in the room with them.1697 However, he disagreed the Blue Program was isolation of the kind prohibited by the Youth Justice Act.1698 Instead, he stated it was ‘working under a program’ and that the program was part of ‘normal routine’, accordingly bringing it in line with the Centre’s Isolation Procedure and the requirements of the Youth Justice Act.1699

Mr Ryan’s evidence was that the reintroduction of the Blue Program followed two significant events of property damage at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. The first occurred on 25–26 February 2019 and the second on 6–7 March 2019.1700 Mr Ryan explained these incidents had ‘raised serious concerns for the wellbeing of the residents as well as staff’.1701 Mr Ryan told us, ‘immediate steps needed to be taken to better deal with serious incidents’ and described the reintroduction of the Blue Program as a temporary ‘circuit breaker’ in response.1702

We were provided with various Centre Support Team meeting minutes for the period following the reintroduction of the Blue Program. Those minutes indicate that children sometimes remained on the Blue Program for long periods. For example, the minutes of 12 March 2019 show that on that date, three young people were on the Blue Program.1703 Minutes of Centre Support Team meetings held over the following two weeks show that one of those young people remained on the Blue Program up to at least 25 March 2019 (at least 18 days).1704 Another of those young people remained on the Blue Program until at least 1 April 2019 (at least 25 days), at which point he was moved to the red colour level and placed on unit bound.1705 Over this period, Mr Ryan provided Mr Brown with email updates detailing the number of young people on the Blue Program, and providing their names, where relevant.1706

Mr Brown told us in his statement that he did not recall when he was briefed about the Blue Program, but he noted Mr Ryan ‘would have briefed me verbally through phone calls or at meetings and followed up with emails or even an Issues Brief’.1707

Regarding the reintroduction of the Blue Program, Mr Brown said:

From memory it was reintroduced by the Manager [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] as a result of an incident involving a number of residents but I cannot recall any specific details. I do not recall whether I had any involvement in its reintroduction outside of being briefed by the Manager and me then briefing the Deputy Secretary and/or Secretary. If I had a role in its operation or implementation it would have only been a decision-making delegation, but I do not recall any.1708

Mr Brown told us he did ‘not recall having any concerns about the use of isolation/unit bound/blue program’.1709

  1. Our observations about the reintroduction of the Blue Program

It is our view that, in March and April 2019, the Department was aware, or should have been aware, that a behaviour management approach had been reintroduced. A magistrate, a Commissioner for Children and Young People, and a 2016 departmental Minute to the Secretary had previously identified this approach as a likely human rights violation amounting to unlawful isolation. As outlined in the following section, the new Commissioner for Children and Young People was raising concerns about isolation practices prior to and while the Blue Program was being reintroduced.

While the Department confirmed it was aware of the reintroduction of the Blue Program in 2019, Secretary Pervan told us he does not recall being notified of matters concerning the reintroduction of the Blue Program in or around 2019. He said he only became aware of these matters through our Commission of Inquiry.1710

We consider that, despite reassurances that the Blue Program was not to be used as punishment, the excessive time children and young people were unit bound (18 or 25 days) may have reasonably felt like punishment to those young people.

  1. Concerns raised by the Commissioner for Children and Young People in 2019

The reintroduction of the Blue Program involved, in part, what appears to be a concerning chain of correspondence between the Centre’s management and Leanne McLean, Commissioner for Children and Young People, following her appointment to that role in November 2018. The relevant aspects of that correspondence are described below.

On 4 March 2019, before the 6–7 March 2019 incident, Commissioner McLean wrote to Mr Ryan and Mr Brown stating that several young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre were unit bound. Commissioner McLean requested a copy of the policy or procedure that guided the decision to place the children on unit bound.1711 Mr Ryan responded (copying in Mr Brown), requesting a few days to collate the information.1712

On 7 March 2019 at 5.57 pm, Mr Ryan notified staff at the Centre that the Blue Program had been reintroduced temporarily.1713 Approximately 30 minutes later, at 6.26 pm, Mr Ryan responded to Commissioner McLean’s request for information, noting:

  • the unit bound activities she had identified formed part of the response to the 25–26 February 2019 incident
  • the Behaviour Development System had previously recorded unit bound practice ‘within the Blue Program’ and the Blue Program was reintroduced in a temporary capacity
  • Mr Ryan would provide a copy of the revised Behaviour Development System the next day.1714

On 7 March 2019, at 6.35 pm, Mr Ryan instructed the then Assistant Manager of Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Piers (a pseudonym), to ‘amend the [Behaviour Development System] with the stuff I sent in the other email’, stating that once that was complete, Mr Ryan would forward a copy of the Behaviour Development System to Commissioner McLean.1715

We note that Mr Ryan’s response to Commissioner McLean gave the impression the Blue Program had been temporarily reintroduced in response to the 25–26 February incident. However, we question the accuracy of this for two reasons:

  • Mr Ryan only emailed staff on 7 March 2019 that the Blue Program had been reintroduced temporarily, which was days after the 25–26 February 2019 incident and after Commissioner McLean’s email.
  • Mr Ryan instructed Piers to ‘amend’ the Behaviour Development System on 7 March 2019 before its release to Commissioner McLean.

When this inconsistency was put to Mr Ryan during our public hearings, he did not accept the correspondence suggested that he was implementing a program that was not otherwise reflected in the Behaviour Development System at the time.1716 Instead, he stated his instructions to Piers merely reflected his desire to ensure the version of the Behaviour Development System provided to Commissioner McLean was current.1717 He explained this was because there were ‘a number of different copies’ of the Behaviour Development System at the Centre at the time.1718

Mr Brown was copied into the email correspondence between Mr Ryan and Commissioner McLean.1719 We are not aware of any separate response made by Mr Brown to that correspondence.

At best, this explanation during our hearings indicates a dysfunctional record and policy management system at the Centre, where the applicable policy was difficult to determine or locate. Such poor record keeping creates a risk of the incorrect or inconsistent application of the Centre’s policies, many of which give operational effect to important legislative obligations.

At worst, the correspondence with Commissioner McLean suggests an attempt to mislead her as to the formal status and use of the Blue Program and the authorisation for placing children and young people on ‘unit bound’.

Mr Ryan gave evidence that the reintroduction of the Blue Program followed ‘consideration through consultation and meetings’, including with the Centre Support Team and the Multi-Disciplinary Team at the Centre.1720

Given the timeframes involved, it is difficult to conclude the program was given thorough consideration before its reintroduction. Centre staff had, at most, approximately one week following the end of the first incident referred to by Mr Ryan (25–26 February 2019) to consider the appropriateness of the Blue Program. Further, Mr Ryan suggested the 6–7 March 2019 incident also contributed to the decision to reintroduce the program. If so, it appears the decision was reached only a matter of hours following the conclusion of that incident, as Mr Ryan’s directive on the Blue Program was issued on the evening of 7 March 2019.

Ms Gardiner, who jointly held the Professional Services and Policy Manager role with another staff member at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in March 2019, denied being formally consulted on the matter.1721 She asserted that, instead, she learned about the reintroduction of the Blue Program along with other staff when the email was sent to Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff on the evening of 7 March 2019.1722 She considered any consultation with the Centre’s Professional Services Team about the reintroduction of the program was minimal, and she was not aware that any consultation occurred with other senior managers at the Centre.1723

We have considered the Multi-Disciplinary Team and Centre Support Team meeting minutes available for the period 1 February 2019 to 10 March 2019. We have been unable to identify in those minutes any discussion of the reintroduction of the Blue Program. We also considered the draft meeting minutes of a Behaviour Development System Review Committee at the Centre, which met at least three times between November 2018 and February 2019.1724 Draft minutes of a meeting that Committee held on 19 February 2019 noted attendees unanimously supported establishing a working group to consider whether the Behaviour Development System was ‘consistent with the [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] “therapeutic direction”’.1725 Otherwise, there was no suggestion in minutes available to us that this Behaviour Development System Review Committee was asked to consider or consult on the reintroduction of the Blue Program.

We received evidence that the other Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Digby (a pseudonym) (who held that role jointly with Ms Gardiner) was the person responsible for the Behaviour Development System and was involved in preparing the relevant Blue Program documentation.1726 Digby had made Mr Ryan aware of the Blue Program’s problematic history.

In an email to Mr Ryan dated 7 March 2019, Digby stated:

Just briefly the Blue Colour Category was first introduced in early 2011 to cater for the deep Red residents who had to be managed intensively for a period of time. It was rescinded in December 2013 (although fondly remembered by some staff) because it had become more broadly used (for some residents who didn’t really need it) and was considered in some quarters to be a punishment option.1727

In April 2019, Mr Ryan prepared a draft Issues Briefing to the Minister updating the Minister on matters relating to the February and March incidents.1728 That draft Issues Briefing noted:

The [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] Behaviour Development System was amended to reintroduce the Blue Program as an interim measure for three months. The program is an individual intensive support program and affords some segregation from other residents. It was reintroduced after the second incident and was considered through the Centre Support Team (CST) meeting following. 1729

This briefing and Mr Ryan’s response to the Commissioner for Children and Young People appear inconsistent. The Issues Briefing suggests the Blue Program was reintroduced after the 7 March 2019 incident, whereas Mr Ryan’s response to the Commissioner suggests the Blue Program was introduced in response to the 25–26 February 2019 incident. Mr Ryan disagreed the documents were inconsistent and told us the Blue Program was only reintroduced after the 7 March 2019 incident.1730

We were not provided with a final version of this Issues Briefing. It is unclear to us what information was provided to the Deputy Secretary, Secretary or Minister about the reintroduction and operation of the Blue Program.

This was the second Commissioner for Children and Young People and the third external party to raise concerns about the Blue Program with the Department, in addition to the Custodial Inspector’s concerns about formal isolation practices.

  1. Attempts to reform the 2019 Blue Program

We understand concerns were raised within the Centre about the Blue Program at the time of its reintroduction in 2019. Ms Gardiner’s evidence was that she and other members of her team considered the Blue Program to be lacking any therapeutic benefit.1731 Ms Gardiner told us she:

... considered the [Blue Program] highly unsuitable for a young person who was displaying highly aggressive/violent and dysregulated behaviour. Whilst in the short term the security and safety risk of the Centre needed to be addressed, the content and delivery of the program was not trauma informed, developmentally appropriate or designed to meet the needs of the cohort of young people in the Centre.1732

She noted her concern the Blue Program interfered with the rights of young people to educational opportunities secured under the Youth Justice Act and international standards.1733

On 16 March 2019, Ms Gardiner emailed Mr Ryan with suggestions ‘to improve the program to provide support to young people to [meet] their developmental and trauma needs’.1734 Those suggestions included:

  • reviewing the content of the individual programs from a literacy perspective, to ensure they could be understood appropriately by young people (noting the generally low literacy among young people at the Centre)
  • reducing the ‘cognitive heavy’ content of the programs, which Ms Gardiner considered unhelpful in a context where young people were on the program because of assaultive or threatening behaviour, suggesting a level of distress
  • adopting adjunct programs that address trauma and complement trauma-informed practices, such as programs that can ‘calm the brainstem and limbic system’
  • consulting with the Health Team at the Centre and the Australian Childhood Foundation for help in program development
  • ensuring youth workers were appropriately skilled and trained to deliver the content of the individual programs.1735

Ms Gardiner recalled Mr Ryan’s initial reaction to her suggestions as ‘being open to improvement’.1736 Mr Ryan responded to Ms Gardiner’s email positively, stating he saw her role as ‘guiding residents and staff’.1737 He noted, however, there would ‘need to be some “selling” of [Ms Gardiner’s suggestions] to staff’.1738

Ms Gardiner described how her Professional Services Team then developed a series of measures to improve the Blue Program content and delivery, based on trauma-informed practice and attachment theory, and building on the work of the Australian Childhood Foundation.1739 She said her team worked ‘a bit on the run’, given the program had already been put in place.1740 She recalled that, on a daily basis, her team would develop individual programs for each of the young people on the Blue Program, which involved roughly hourly alternations between therapeutic program content, such as psychological support or education, and ‘calming regulation activities’, such as using the gym one-on-one with a youth worker or more meditative activities, such as puzzles.1741

Ms Gardiner considered the modified Blue Program, as developed by her and her team, was positive in the sense that it appeared to work by bringing children quickly off the program and back into the Centre’s general activities. However, she did not have sufficient time to evaluate its success.1742

Ms Gardiner conceded the version of the Blue Program as modified by her team still involved a degree of isolation, where children might be left alone every second hour or so (in between therapeutic program delivery). However, she considered, on balance, that young people had more contact with others than on the original planned 2019 Blue Program.1743

We were interested to hear Mr Ryan’s view that he thought Ms Gardiner considered the reintroduction of the Blue Program ‘was the best thing that could have happened in the circumstances …’.1744 Based on the evidence available, it is difficult to reach a conclusion that Ms Gardiner supported the reintroduction of the Blue Program; rather, she appears to have worked to improve the Blue Program once it was in use.

At this time, even with the improvements Ms Gardiner implemented, the evidence available to us showed the Blue Program often (if not always):

  • segregated children from other children and young people in detention
  • denied children and young people the right to take part in the usual educational programming offered through Ashley School
  • involved children and young people being locked in their rooms for hours at a time
  • sent children and young people to bed at an excessively early time for an adolescent
  • locked children and young people in their room from this early time until the morning.

It remains unclear to us what, if any, opportunities children and young people had to take part in activities with other young people in their unit. However, we consider it likely they were segregated from other children and young people all or most of the time.

  1. Departmental correspondence about the Blue Program

We were given a draft email from Mr Brown dated 21 May 2019 intended for Ginna Webster—who, at that time, had become the Secretary of the Department—that refers to the ‘Blue Program’, ‘unit bound’, ‘reflection activities’ and ‘individualised programs’, but not isolation:

In March the Blue Program was reintroduced in response to two major incidents at [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] and following the incidents the Centre was unsettled. Three residents were put on Blue after the major incidents.

The ‘old’ Blue Program (developed over 20 years ago) had the resident unit bound and used some reflection activities. Whilst it contained [an] excellent sense of security and structure for residents and staff, some of the theories it was developed from have been superseded by more contemporary theory and it does need to have a thorough review to ensure it aligns with a therapeutic model of care.

With its reintroduction, it was quickly identified that the reflection activities were not supporting the residents to progress i.e. ‘move up colours’ on the Behaviour Development System (BDS) used by the Centre. As a result, elements of the program were changed and an active support program was introduced. This became a daily schedule for Blue residents in the unit, with daily psychology, case management and education programs, as well as scheduled exercise and gym sessions. This resulted in two of the Blue residents progressing up the colours at the next week, and progress was much improved. The Professional Services and Policy (PS&P) staff developed daily individualised program timetables and documents to support the Blue Program, so it was an increased support program.

Due to complex presentations and behaviour by the Blue residents, [the Centre] initiated a [Senior Quality Practice Advisor] referral for further advice regarding the Blue program to ensure [the Centre] was considering all available therapeutic options for the residents on Blue, however the referral was declined by [Quality Improvement and Workforce Development]. Notwithstanding this, a review of the reintroduction of the Blue Program is to be undertaken in the near future. The review will consider how the program aligns to therapeutic care, and supports young people who are displaying highly dis-regulated behaviour, as occurred in the recent major incidents.1745

We are concerned this correspondence—and specifically the reference to the young people ‘progressing up the colours at the next week’—suggests that they were on the Blue Program or unit bound for days.1746

Secretary Webster told us she did not recall receiving this email, although she accepted it was possible she did. She also noted that nothing in the email indicates that the Blue Program was correlated to a form of isolation.1747

  1. Further concerns raised by the Commissioner for Children and Young People in 2019

We received evidence of a further attempt by Commissioner McLean, in late 2019, to clarify the nature of isolation practices at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

On 22 August 2019, Commissioner McLean wrote to Secretary Webster seeking clarification about the difference between unit bound and formal isolation, and how a decision about placing a young person on unit bound was reached.1748

Commissioner McLean raised the following concerns:

  • The Behaviour Development System did not clarify when and how a decision was made for a young person to be unit bound.1749
  • The colour allocated to a young person did not appear to necessarily result in a young person being unit bound, ‘suggesting that a decision to confine a young person to their unit is not solely covered by the [Behaviour Development System]’.1750
  • It was unclear whether it was mandatory for a young person who was unit bound to be provided with an individual program.1751

Commissioner McLean requested a copy of the policy or procedure governing decisions to confine a young person to their unit, and the criteria relevant to such a decision, as well as clarification of the difference between isolation and unit bound.1752

Commissioner McLean’s request was forwarded to Mr Brown, who then asked that Mr Ryan and Ms Gardiner prepare a draft response and associated Issues Briefings.1753 On 4 September 2019, Mr Ryan emailed a staff member at the Centre a draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary regarding Commissioner McLean’s request, for forwarding to Mr Brown.1754 The draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary contained the following observations:

  • Young people on unit bound were ‘from time to time confined to their unit … as a result of the governing Behaviour Development System’ used at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1755
  • Commissioner McLean’s statement that it appeared a decision to place a young person on unit bound was ‘not solely covered’ by the Behaviour Development System was partially correct.1756 Mr Ryan explained that ‘there is an element of discretionary decision making for resident movement’ and that the colour rating held by a young person ‘can determine an activity the resident may or may not participate in, ratified at Centre Support Team meetings’.1757
  • Regarding individual programs, Mr Ryan explained the Program Assessment Team terms of reference, ‘holds a strong premise and rationale of addressing programs for young people diversely and/or individually’.1758
  • Mr Ryan confirmed there was ‘not one policy or procedure that governs decision making processes’ at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1759 Instead, the Behaviour Development System provided direction complemented by Centre Support Team, Multi-Disciplinary Team and Program Assessment Team processes.1760

Regarding the difference between isolation and unit bound, Mr Ryan explained in the draft Issues Briefing:

As previously mentioned, being ‘unit bound’ refers to residents who are from time to time confined to their unit as a result of the governing Behaviour Development System (BDS) and related procedures used at [the Centre]. Each of these are underpinned by [the Centre] striving to provide a safe and secure environment for young people in detention. ‘Isolation’ is described in the Use of Isolation Procedure and the Youth Justice Act 1997 as ‘locking a detainee in a room separate from others and from the normal routine of the Centre’. Being ‘unit bound’ is within the normal routine of the Centre, in that it is programming and/or an Individual Timetable for a resident. The resident is not locked in a room within the unit, nor kept from other residents. ‘Unit bound’ is generally reserved against the Programmed day of 9 am to 4.30 pm, and outside opportunities of exercise and visits are always availed.1761

In his email to the staff member, Mr Ryan commented: ‘[o]n reflection, I’m happy that there is no prescription for “unit bound”. It’s good, tactical work across many areas of the Centre when we do “unit bound” a resident’.1762

At this time, Mr Ryan also prepared a draft Issues Briefing to the Minister and a draft response to Commissioner McLean.1763

The final Issues Briefing to the Minister, prepared by Mr Ryan, reviewed by Mr Brown and cleared by Secretary Pervan broadly reflected the matters Mr Ryan raised in the Issues Briefing to the Secretary.1764 Secretary Pervan was newly appointed to Secretary of the Department at this time, having ceased responsibility for youth justice for a brief period from 9 May 2018 to 2 September 2019 because of a restructure.

In Secretary Pervan’s response to Commissioner McLean on 11 September 2019, he stated no unit bound procedure was in place.1765 He explained to Commissioner McLean:

There is no separate Unit Bound Procedure in use at [the Centre]. The term refers to residents who are from time to time confined to their residential unit as a result of the governing Behaviour Development System (BDS) and related procedures used at [the Centre]. Each of these are underpinned by [the Centre] striving to provide a safe and secure environment for young people in detention.

In any detention centre, there is an element of discretionary decision making for resident movement. The [Behaviour Development System] affords a colour status to a resident, which can determine an activity the resident may or may not participate in, ratified at Centre Support Team meetings. Work Health and Safety Risk Assessments complement the decision-making process. Multi-Disciplinary Team and Program Assessment Team meetings also complement and aid the decision-making process. 1766

Secretary Pervan also offered the following distinction between unit bound and isolation to Commissioner McLean:

‘Isolation’ is described in the Use of Isolation Procedure and the Youth Justice Act 1997 as ‘locking a detainee in a room separate from others and from the normal routine of the Centre’. Being ‘unit bound’ is within the normal routine of the Centre, in that it is specific programming and/or an Individual Timetable for a resident. The resident is not locked in a room within the unit, nor kept from other residents. ‘Unit bound’ is generally reserved against the programmed day of 9 am to 4.30 pm, and outside opportunities of exercise and visits are always availed.1767

Mr Brown is identified as the departmental contact in the Secretary’s letter to Commissioner McLean and was copied into the correspondence.1768 We understand Commissioner McLean raised concerns about unit bound with Centre management at least once more.1769

  1. Our observations

We observe that Commissioner McLean was the second Commissioner for Children and Young People to find it necessary to make persistent requests for clarification about the Blue Program and the practice of making young people in the Centre unit bound, and to question whether this amounted to isolation.

In our view, all formal correspondence regarding the Blue Program lacked a plain language description of the daily experience of children and young people in detention who were on the Blue Program, and the number of hours on average they were confined to their room or unit and segregated from other young people in the Centre. Clarity regarding these matters is material to Commissioner McLean’s concern about whether the Blue Program was a form of isolation.

We are also very concerned that the Blue Program was reintroduced despite prior internal and external conclusions that the Blue Program did amount to a form of isolation. There was a missed opportunity in the Department to scrutinise why the Blue Program had previously ceased before accepting its reintroduction. This missed opportunity meant a further cohort of children and young people detained at the Centre were subjected to the isolation practices inherent in the Blue Program.

Finally, we assume that Commissioner McLean (like Mr Morrissey before her) was asking questions and raising concerns about the Blue Program because of her engagement with children and young people detained at the Centre. There is no evidence in any departmental documentation provided to our Commission of Inquiry that children and young people detained at the Centre were ever given an opportunity to provide their experience of the Blue Program.

Failing to consider the benefits of engaging with and hearing the voice of children and young people about the Blue Program, particularly following the clarifications the Commissioner for Children and Young People requested, was a further missed opportunity by the Department that may have helped to identify the isolating features of the Blue Program and their impacts on children and young people more clearly.

We conclude that, because of these missed opportunities, isolation practices that were potentially outside the standards set by law, policy and international conventions continued at Ashley Youth Detention Centre for significant periods throughout 2019.

  1. Roof incident December 2019

In December 2019, several young people in detention gained access to the roof of buildings at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. In this section, we consider this incident and the Centre’s response of placing the children in isolation or related practices. We discuss allegations that isolation records were falsified after these young people were isolated. While the handling of this matter raises multiple questions about many practices, including the use of restraints and incident management procedures, we focus here on the use of isolation. Our summary of events relies heavily on a subsequent independent investigation of this matter.1770

We note the Centre’s Isolation Procedure (effective 1 July 2017), discussed earlier, is relevant to how this incident was managed.1771 At the time of the 2019 roof incident, the relevant instrument of delegation provided that the power to isolate a detained young person under section 133(2) of the Youth Justice Act (and therefore to extend the period of isolation), was delegated to the Centre’s Operations Manager or the Director, Strategic Youth Services, only ‘if the Detention Centre Manager is on leave, is uncontactable, or is unable for any other reason to perform the relevant function’.1772

  1. The incident

Around noon on Friday 13 December 2019, three young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre—Arlo, Elijah and Joseph (all pseudonyms)—accessed the roof of Ashley School, where they threatened staff with items dislodged from the roof.1773 During the next approximately three hours, staff members at the Centre negotiated with Arlo, Elijah and Joseph to come down from the roof.1774

During this period, Ashley School and its offices were evacuated, and some young people were moved around the Centre while restrained with handcuffs.1775 Mr Ryan, the Centre Manager, provided updates to Ms Honan, the Director, approximately every half hour.1776 By this time, Ms Honan had assumed the role of Director from Mr Brown. Mr Ryan notified police of the incident but their attendance was not requested.1777 Welfare checks were carried out for staff, and there was some evidence to suggest the same was done for young people not involved in the incident.1778 Other young people were kept in their designated units, but routines and programs that could be carried out safely within each unit continued, as well as very limited access to the gym if available.1779

At approximately 4.00 pm, negotiations with Arlo, Elijah and Joseph were successful. They were escorted in handcuffs to a unit that had been emptied of other young people.1780 Each had minor injuries to their feet or hands.1781 No staff or other young people were injured.1782 The Centre returned to normal operations and routine soon after.1783

  1. The Centre’s response: isolation and unit bound

Immediately following the incident, Arlo, Elijah and Joseph took showers and were given food.1784 An Operations Coordinator, Chester (a pseudonym), authorised an initial period of isolation for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph, for approximately 30 minutes.1785 The Acting Operations Manager, Maude (a pseudonym), extended the initial period of isolation by two-and-a-half hours.1786 The three young people were then sent to bed (that is, continued to be locked in their rooms alone), consistent with the 7.30 pm bedtime for young people on the ‘red’ colour in the Behaviour Development System.1787

The immediate isolation after the incident was noted in an email to Ms Honan.1788 Ms Honan also received a further email that the Operations Manager (whom we understand to have been Acting Operations Manager, Maude) was considering extending the initial 30-minute isolation period.1789 Ms Honan was last substantively updated at 5.11 pm on 13 December 2019 by being copied into an email from Mr Ryan to Centre staff thanking them for their work.1790 In that email, Mr Ryan stated that ‘rehabilitation continues to occur after the incident, this evening and into next week’.1791

Before Mr Ryan left the Centre for the weekend, he spoke with Maude and Chester.1792 In her evidence to the investigation of the incident, Maude stated she told Mr Ryan at this time that ‘individual programs’ would likely be used for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph over the weekend, and the Centre Support Team would review these programs on Monday 16 December 2019.1793 Her evidence was that Mr Ryan gave no instructions about the use of isolation and instead, he said he would leave the issue to Maude and Chester to manage.1794 In his evidence to the investigation of the incident, Chester shared Maude’s recollection of these conversations.1795

On the morning of Saturday 14 December 2019, an acting Operations Coordinator and a youth worker at the Centre prepared ‘individual programs’ for each of the three young people involved in the incident.1796 Arlo, Elijah and Joseph were placed on a rotating program of exercise, in-room activities and in-unit activities, separated from one another and from the other young people in detention.1797 Their programs included multiple hours alone in their rooms each day, with intervals of being within their unit, and an option of one hour of exercise in the gym ‘if available’.1798 The periods in their room ranged from one hour to three or four hours, with different activities offered.1799 We understand the programs involved no contact with other children and young people.1800 Professional Services Team members generally did not work on weekends and had no input into the individual programs.1801

The individual programs continued over the weekend until the morning of Monday 16 December 2019.1802 Neither Mr Ryan nor the On-Call Manager were contacted over the weekend to authorise any periods of isolation.1803

Maude reported that, on the morning of Monday 16 December 2019:

... staff weren’t keen for the three residents to leave their unit until their attitude had shifted and staff were satisfied that they were going to follow appropriate direction and work with the staff and not against them. There was concern about them causing more damage. The three residents were unit bound at that time although they could access the unit common-room.1804

On the same morning, a Centre Support Team meeting was held, during which the individual programs for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph were discussed.1805 The Program Coordinator at the time raised concerns about the individual programs during that meeting, later saying:

... [the individual programs were] in no way therapeutic or considered and it seemed to me that the young people involved had not had time outside and only very limited time out of their rooms; it was also clear that there were lengthy periods of isolation.1806

Notably, the minutes of that Centre Support Team meeting stated that ‘[f]rom observations over the weekend, it would appear that the boys have little remorse for their actions’.1807

Evidence provided to us indicates that Arlo, Elijah and Joseph each remained unit bound up to and including 24 December 2019 (at least 11 days).1808 There is also evidence to suggest the three young people may have been offered time outside the unit occasionally during that period, possibly with a peer.1809 While Interim Centre Support Team meeting minutes of 19 December 2019 suggest a decision was taken that day for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph to come off unit bound, this is inconsistent with the evidence of the daily rolls.1810

  1. Our observations of isolation practices in December 2019

From our analysis, it appears that in December 2019, three young people at the Centre were subjected to isolation practices for at least 11 days that potentially did not comply with Tasmanian law or policy or international human rights standards. Again, we consider that irrespective of intent, being unit bound for this length of time may have reasonably felt like punishment to the young people involved.

  1. December 2019 Issues Briefing

On Monday 16 December 2019, Mr Ryan prepared an Issues Briefing for the Minister about the roof incident. Between 16 and 20 December 2019, this briefing was passed through Ms Honan, Mandy Clarke (then Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families) and Secretary Pervan, before being noted by the Minister on 7 January 2020.1811 The Issues Briefing provided a summary of the events of 13 December 2019, noted injuries to each of Arlo, Elijah and Joseph, and provided estimates of the cost of damage to the Centre’s property.1812 The Issues Briefing commented that staff ‘responded immediately and appropriately’—an assessment that could be considered premature, given the Issues Briefing stated a full review of the incident would follow.1813

The Issues Briefing did not disclose that the three young people had been isolated immediately following the incident or placed on individual programs, which, in our view, amounted to isolation, over the weekend following the incident.

We asked Secretary Pervan whether he considered the Issues Briefing sufficiently informed the Minister about the sanctions imposed on the three young people. Secretary Pervan responded that the sanctions were not ‘central’ to the Issues Briefing ‘in the circumstances’.1814 He said the content of an Issues Briefing was ‘guided by the request’ for the Issues Briefing, and there were regular opportunities for the Minister to ask any follow-up questions, including through ‘daily dialogue’ between the Department and Ministerial advisers and more formal regular meetings.1815 Secretary Pervan did not confirm the Minister was advised at this time of the use of isolation, but stated he considered it ‘highly unlikely’ that the Minister was not made aware of these matters in the days following the event.1816 We are unaware of any other correspondence or meeting minutes that might be evidence of an update to the Minister on these issues, or a request for such an update. We did not seek confirmation from the relevant Minister on this issue.

Ms Clarke gave evidence that she considered the Issues Briefing provided ‘sufficient information in relation to the description of the actual event itself’.1817 She thought the possible reason for the lack of information about how the young people were managed after the incident was a lack of knowledge about the matter among ‘Department executives’.1818

We are unclear about the usual process for reporting isolation to the Department. We know that Centre management made some reports to Ms Honan that identified isolation had been used in response to the 2019 roof incident. However, we are not aware the Centre Manager routinely reported all uses of isolation to the Director, as opposed to doing so only where it formed part of a response to a critical incident on site. Further, we are unaware of any notification by Centre management or Department staff to the Deputy Secretary or Secretary of the use of isolation or unit bound in response to this incident. We are concerned the evidence shows there was no requirement to formally report, in writing, all uses of isolation to senior Department officials.

We were advised by Ms Honan that the Issues Briefing included an overview of the incident that had occurred on the weekend based on immediate information available to Ms Honan at the time.1819 Ms Honan said that when she cleared the briefing, ‘the information contained in it was correct and the immediate containment and management of the standoff, appeared compliant with the Restraint (Handcuffing) and Isolation policy and procedures’.1820 Ms Honan also told us she was not consulted about any periods of isolation or the use of handcuffs in the management of the incident.1821

We understand it is normal practice for management at the Centre to perform an internal review following a significant incident, as had been foreshadowed in the above Issues Briefing. The review was incomplete as of 20 February 2020, when Secretary Pervan appointed an independent investigator to investigate the incident and associated response.1822

  1. Concerns raised by staff about the incident

In late December 2019 and in January 2020, staff at the Centre raised concerns through multiple channels about the immediate response to the 2019 roof incident.

During this time, Ms Honan received communications from staff members who alleged that (among other things):

  • isolation had been used without authorisation in response to the 2019 roof incident1823
  • staff had been asked to backdate or sign isolation forms for practices that had occurred over the weekend in question1824
  • operations staff had failed to appropriately consult with the Professional Services Team during the incident, placing the three young people involved in the incident at a high risk of harm.1825

Regarding the use of isolation without authorisation and the falsification or backdating of isolation records for the weekend of 14–15 December 2019, the allegations included:

  • On Monday 16 December, Mr Ryan stated to the then Assistant Manager, Piers, that the isolation forms for the weekend were incomplete, and Mr Ryan directed Piers to ask the Operations Coordinators on shift that weekend to complete them.1826
  • In the week beginning Monday 16 December, Piers began to pressure Maude to get other staff to sign isolation forms for 14–15 December.1827 This included staff who had not been involved in the decision to isolate the young people.1828 Maude reported to the independent investigation into the 2019 roof incident that those staff had declined to sign the forms because they thought the forms were forgeries, as isolation had not been appropriately authorised.1829 Maude alleged that Piers told her ‘[y]ou’re just going to have to put on your steel-capped boots and get the staff to sign them’.1830
  • Chester and a youth worker prepared some detail for the isolation forms, with reference to the individual programs that had been prepared.1831
  • Chester eventually signed some isolation forms that had been prepared in the days following Monday 16 December, but told Maude he was uncomfortable about doing so.1832

In her statement to us, Ms Honan described her initial inquiries of staff about the post-incident management, particularly as it related to the completion of isolation paperwork. On 16 January 2020, as the internal review had not been completed, Ms Honan asked Mr Ryan to provide copies of the isolation forms, daily logs, individual programs and other notes prepared and produced in the period from 13 to 19 December 2019.1833 She sought an independent investigation because of the seriousness of the concerns and the number of staff who would need to be interviewed to understand what had occurred.1834 We discuss this independent investigation in the next section.

In addition, a psychologist working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre wrote to the Head of Department, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, Tasmanian Health Service (who was responsible for the Health Team at the Centre), raising the following concerns:

  • Arlo, Elijah and Joseph had been out of their room for only approximately
    two-and-a-half hours a day on the Saturday and Sunday following the incident.1835
  • Aside from verbal threats to a staff member who had not been on site since the incident, there appeared to be no reason to continue to isolate the young people, and that the apparent ‘lack of remorse’ on behalf of the young people seemed to motivate the decision to keep them isolated.1836
  • Attempts by the psychologist to obtain information about isolation decisions in the days following the incident had been disregarded by Mr Ryan and Piers.1837
  • Centre management had asked operations and professional services staff to backdate documentation, or sign documentation containing misleading and/or false information about the isolation decisions.1838

The former Head of Department, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, who received the psychologist’s notification, told us she understood that the psychologist was interviewed by a representative of the Department of Communities in mid-January 2020.1839 We understand the psychologist was told an investigation would follow.1840 The psychologist’s notification to the Tasmanian Health Service about this issue was one of many concerns the psychologist raised with their superiors at this time. We discuss other concerns that the psychologist held about the Centre’s responses to harmful sexual behaviours in Case study 2.

  1. The independent investigation of the incident

On 18 February 2020, Ms Clarke cleared a Minute to the Secretary requesting approval to appoint an investigator to investigate the December 2019 roof incident and associated post-incident management.1841 The Minute identified a series of ‘potential issues relating to the incident’s management, both during and post the incident’, including:

  • the alleged use of physical force when moving young people around Ashley Youth Detention Centre, including the use of handcuffs1842
  • concerns about the management of the response1843
  • allegations that senior staff members directed operations and professional services staff to retrospectively sign documents authorising the isolation of Arlo, Elijah and Joseph, where no such authorisation had been sought1844
  • the falsification of isolation records, including records of a young person’s program activities and observations during periods of isolation.1845

The Minute noted the investigation may give rise to consideration of a subsequent breach of the State Service Code of Conduct investigation.1846

On 20 February 2020, Secretary Pervan approved the appointment of an independent investigator to investigate the incident and associated response.1847 The scope of the investigation was to:

  • prepare a chronology of the events during and immediately after the incident
  • detail the management strategies for other young people at the Centre during the incident, including the methods used to move them around the Centre
  • examine the involvement of operations and professional services staff throughout the incident and in the post-incident management
  • identify procedures, legislative provisions and any other relevant directions or guidelines relevant to the incident, and to assess compliance with these in the identified period
  • assess the effectiveness of the management response to the incident
  • identify whether Arlo, Elijah and Joseph were subject to a period of unapproved isolation following the incident and, if so, to detail:
    • the processes used to implement and maintain that isolation
    • the decision-making and approval processes followed
    • the basis for that isolation
    • the programs provided to the young people during the period of isolation, and the involvement of operations and professional services staff in decisions relating to isolation
    • whether the period of isolation complied with the Centre’s policies and procedures, the legislative framework and any other relevant direction or guidelines
    • the preparation of documentation to support the isolation of young people.1848

While the investigator was not instructed to consider whether there had been a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct, the investigation appears to have been ordered with a view to consider whether there had been any behaviour that should be the subject of disciplinary action.1849

The investigator took statements or obtained answers to questions from Centre staff members significantly involved in the incident.1850 The substantive report summarised the statements and attaches the full statements. Despite requesting them, we were not provided with the full statements.1851 The investigator did not interview young people at the Centre.

The investigator’s final report is dated 26 March 2021 and addressed to Secretary Pervan.1852 While the report did not contain formal recommendations, it noted a range of matters for the Secretary’s consideration.

Regarding the use of isolation, the independent investigator made the following observations:

  • The initial 30-minute period of isolation was appropriately authorised by the Operations Coordinator in line with the Isolation Procedure and relevant delegation instrument.1853
  • The extension of the initial period of isolation was likely to have been inconsistent with the Isolation Procedure and delegation instrument.1854 The investigator considered that Maude had authorised the extension ‘in good faith’ but, in fact, she was only entitled to authorise the extension if Mr Ryan was on leave, uncontactable or unable to authorise it for some other reason.1855 The investigator noted Mr Ryan’s view that he was ‘uncontactable’ if his ‘door was closed’ or he was ‘on the toilet’—a view the investigator disagreed with.1856
  • Arlo, Elijah and Joseph were in fact isolated over the weekend, despite on-duty youth workers having a ‘misinformed/misguided’ view that no isolation was taking place and instead, the young people were simply on ‘individual programs’.1857 Accordingly, isolation of the young people over the weekend occurred without appropriate authorisations under the Isolation Procedure.1858
  • The evidence from Maude and Chester was that Mr Ryan was aware individual programs would likely be used to manage Arlo, Elijah and Joseph over the weekend and that Mr Ryan provided no instructions to staff about isolation.1859 Mr Ryan contended that Operations Coordinators knew that approvals were required for the continuation of isolation.1860
  • There was scope to conclude Centre management should have more actively ensured professional services staff were available out of hours to help prepare weekend programs for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph.1861
  • Young people not otherwise involved in the incident had been confined to their units for the duration of the incident, with some suggestions they had been given access to in-unit programs where possible.1862

A key issue that emerged from the report regarding isolation was that several staff understood themselves to be carrying out the Blue Program, or a program that mirrored the Blue Program in form and substance.1863

Mr Ryan and Piers denied that Mr Ryan had instructed staff to use the Blue Program for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph over the weekend.1864 However, the youth workers ‘had the Blue Program in mind’ when preparing the individual programs for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph.1865 An Operations Coordinator who worked over the weekend said he understood the young people to effectively be on the Blue Program:

The [Centre] used to run a Blue Program for very bad behaviour with any resident involved being placed under isolation and doing lots of activities in their room with specifically prepared individualised programs. In January/February 2019 Patrick brought the Blue Program back in for a short period of time (or at least what was called an Individualised Program Routine) because of a particular event that had taken place that involved five residents in one standoff and about four or five others in another.

Over the weekend of 14 and 15 December I was under the impression that the Blue Program (or at least the Individualised Program Routine) that had been reintroduced by Patrick would apply. The terminology Blue Program wasn’t used; however, that is what I, and I believe the other staff involved over the weekend, thought was to occur with individualised programs for the three residents.1866

Statements received from staff members, and internal correspondence the investigator obtained, stated staff did not think isolation forms were needed because these had not been required in the past for the Blue Program.1867

Regarding the appropriate management of the young people over the weekend, the investigator invited Secretary Pervan to consider:

  • whether Mr Ryan and Piers should have been more ‘actively’ involved in ensuring weekend programming for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph was appropriate, including whether Mr Ryan did enough to make sure that weekend staff understood that any use of isolation was to be in line with the Isolation Procedure1868
  • whether relevant delegations concerning the Isolation Procedure were appropriately followed, including whether it was appropriate for Mr Ryan to contend that he was ‘uncontactable’1869
  • whether it was reasonable to confine the young people not directly involved in the incident to their units, noting that the young people ‘would not seem to have been locked down (potentially meaning isolated) as that term is understood’1870
  • the extent to which Professional Services Team members were now available after hours and over the weekend to assist with program management.1871

The investigator also suggested the Department perform a complete review of isolation routines at the Centre, specifically regarding how isolation periods were extended.1872

Regarding the concerns raised about the subsequent falsification or backdating of isolation documents, the investigator observed the following:

  • It was a ‘significant issue’ that Chester signed the various isolation forms when he had acknowledged his view was that no isolation had occurred over the weekend.1873
  • It was clear Chester and Maude had felt pressure to complete or backdate isolation forms because of Piers’ and Mr Ryan’s actions.1874
  • Piers disagreed that Mr Ryan placed pressure on him to have the isolation forms completed.1875
  • Piers acknowledged he had pressured Maude when he conceded he may have told her to ‘tough it up a little bit’.1876
  • Mr Ryan and Piers had pressured Maude and, in turn, Chester to complete the isolation documentation.1877

The investigator noted Mr Ryan’s and Piers’ actions occurred in situations where they would likely have been aware the appropriate authorisations had not been sought. He said:

... it is difficult … to understand why Ryan (through [Piers]), and [Piers] himself, pressed for the completion of [isolation documentation] when, on the balance of probabilities, both would have been aware that isolation was not conducted in accordance with [the Isolation Procedure] …

It is also difficult … to understand why [Maude] was pressured, and in turn pressed [Chester], to complete (backdated) isolation forms when on the balance of probabilities it was known by Ryan and [Piers] that isolation was not conducted in accordance with [the Isolation Procedure].1878

Regarding potential breaches of the State Service Code of Conduct, the report concluded:

In my view, you need to bring your mind to whether there were any breaches of the State Service Code of Conduct by Ryan, [Piers], [Maude] or [Chester] in the context of the completion of the isolation documentation [referenced in the body of the report].

In the context of the involvement of [Maude] and [Chester] in the completion of the related isolation documentation, in my view you should consider whether there are mitigating circumstances associated with the pressure that the evidence suggests to me was being applied by Ryan and [Piers]—more [Piers] but through Ryan in my assessment—to [Maude] and, in turn, [Chester] to have isolation documentation completed.1879

By the time the report was delivered, on 26 March 2021, Piers and Maude had been suspended from employment for reasons unrelated to the 2019 roof incident or the findings of the report, and Mr Ryan had left the Centre for an alternative role.1880 Chester remained working at the Centre.1881

In summary, the report of the independent investigator, which was addressed to Secretary Pervan, raised concerns about the carrying out of isolation routines at the Centre, specifically in relation to how isolation periods were extended. It provided evidence the Blue Program was still believed to be used in practice, if not in name. It also raised serious questions about whether formal isolation procedures were being followed and identified isolation records had been amended retrospectively.

Once more, there was a missed opportunity to hear directly from children and young people affected in a critical incident investigation, which at the very least, would have alerted children and young people at the Centre that some action was being taken to assess the appropriateness of their treatment during and following the December 2019 roof incident. We suspect that, if asked, Arlo, Elijah and Joseph would have believed they were unit bound as punishment for their involvement in the roof incident. We saw no evidence there was an acknowledgment or apology by the Department for the extended, and potentially unauthorised, isolation that Arlo, Elijah and Joseph experienced over the weekend, or an assessment of potential harm caused.

  1. The Department’s response to the independent investigation

On 22 December 2021, Secretary Pervan cleared an Issues Briefing to the Minister for Children and Youth, which provided updates on a series of concerns raised about Ashley Youth Detention Centre in 2020, via the Office of Cassy O’Connor MP.1882

Relevantly, the Issues Briefing, as cleared by Secretary Pervan, stated that regarding:

  • the lack of authorisation to put children into isolation after the December
    2019 roof incident and the alteration of documents, ‘the incident has been externally investigated’ and the ‘investigation has been finalised and appropriate action taken’1883
  • the allegation that Mr Ryan had directed or pressured other staff to forge or backdate paperwork in relation to isolation records, ‘[t]his incident has been independently investigated and finalised, per the above information’.1884

It is not clear to us that ‘appropriate action’ had been taken in relation to the matter, nor that the matter had been ‘finalised’. We understand that various disciplinary processes related to the matters raised in the independent investigation report remained underway at the time of this Issues Briefing. We were advised the Department had either ‘acted or is waiting to take action’ against each of Mr Ryan, Maude and Chester regarding the roles they played in the December 2019 roof incident.1885 A summary of the status of each matter, as we understand it, is set out next.

  1. Department’s response to Mr Ryan

In October 2021, the Department decided not to engage with Mr Ryan regarding the matter, due to health and wellbeing concerns.1886 On 17 February 2022, Department representatives met with Mr Ryan to discuss concerns raised in the independent investigator’s report, including that Mr Ryan had:

  • failed to apply the instrument of delegation appropriately under the Youth Justice Act1887
  • applied pressure on employee/s to complete isolation authorisation forms, knowing the Isolation Procedure had not been followed and approval for isolation had not been sought1888
  • applied pressure on employee/s to incorrectly complete isolation authorisation forms, to show retrospective compliance with the Isolation Procedure.1889

Mr Ryan denied the allegations. The Department concluded Mr Ryan’s ‘actions (or inactions) most likely did not breach any internal practice guide, process or procedure’.1890 The Department determined to not take any further action in relation to the matter.1891 The reason given for not pursuing an Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation was that it was ‘unlikely an investigation focused on the State Service Act 2000 would yield any further information [than] has already been obtained’.1892

This view appears inconsistent with the original purpose and scope of the independent investigation and calls into question the necessity and usefulness of carrying out a lengthy investigation in the first place.

In a letter to Mr Ryan dated 4 April 2022, Secretary Pervan advised:

Whilst I do consider that more could have been done in relation to ensuring that correct policies and procedures were followed in relation to the events from 13 to 16 December 2019, I do not consider that further action is required by me given you are no longer assigned duties at [the Centre].

I consider it important that I take this opportunity to document expectations in relation to your new role as Manager Silverdome.

I would like to remind you of existing policies and procedures, specifically in relation to delegations, which are available on Communities Tasmania’s intranet. I would like to outline to you that it is important that you obtain written clarification if, at any time, you require clarification in relation to these.1893

  1. Department’s response to Chester

In or around late 2021, representatives of the Centre and the Department’s People and Culture team met with Chester to discuss allegations that he had:

  • backdated and signed isolation authorisation documents relating to the December 2019 roof incident, knowing that they were incorrect and to retrospectively show compliance with the Isolation Procedure1894
  • prepared backdated isolation authorisation documents for staff who worked between 13 and 16 December 2019, to retrospectively show compliance with the Isolation Procedure.1895

We were advised that, as of August 2022, the Department’s People and Culture team was still waiting to finalise Chester’s statement due to his significant absences from work since the meeting.1896

  1. Department’s response to Maude

We were told the Department has concerns that Maude pressured Chester to backdate and sign isolation authorisation forms relating to the December 2019 roof incident, knowing they were to retrospectively show compliance with the Isolation Procedure.1897 We understand those concerns had not been put to Maude as Maude was suspended from her employment for other reasons.1898

  1. The Department’s response to system issues

Ms Honan advised us that the report of the independent investigation into the December 2019 roof incident was not shared with her until 19 May 2021, some weeks after its 26 March 2021 completion.1899 She stated that no specific action was taken in response to the findings, on the basis that ‘many of the issues and considerations identified … had been addressed or were [a] work in progress as previous recommendations in [Serious Event Review Team] reviews’.1900 She identified these steps as including:

  • changes to incident reporting and review
  • changes to leadership and collaboration across teams
  • clarification of the isolation process
  • supporting staff to work in compliance with policy and procedures.1901

Ms Honan noted that such an incident would now be managed in a completely different way, and that:

  • all staff, including managers, are ‘now informed’ about procedures concerning the use of force, isolation and delegation and would obtain necessary authorisations consistent with those procedures1902
  • incident reporting is now managed electronically and is centralised, ‘requiring more timely and comprehensive details with multiple review delegations’ and resulting in greater transparency and accountability1903
  • the unit bound practice and Blue Program are no longer in use at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1904

At our public hearings, Ms Honan expressed confidence the unit bound practice and Blue Program were no longer in use at the Centre.1905 When asked what gave her such confidence, she said:

I think there’s several aspects to it. One of them is that the staff that were authorising it and condoning it as a legitimate practice are no longer there. The staff that are there, i.e. the new managers have—it’s been very clear with them and from them with staff. There is much clearer documentation and accountability around practices and procedures, and as an independent, I guess, litmus test and validation that these practices are no longer used we’re fortunate to have the Commissioner for Children have an advocate that’s also on site three days a week often, sometimes a little less but often frequently; the Commissioner herself is up there on a monthly basis and I have every confidence that the young people would speak up if this was a practice that was occurring.1906

Secretary Pervan noted a key response to the December 2019 roof incident was to replace the Isolation Procedure with a ‘new directive’, although he did not describe what that new directive entailed.1907 He also identified the following steps taken in response to the December 2019 roof incident:

  • the development of an Ashley Youth Detention Centre Practice Framework (‘Practice Framework’) and Learning and Development Framework (we discuss these documents in Chapter 12)
  • ‘upgrade[s]’ to the training coordinator role
  • the development of new policies and procedures in line with the Practice Framework
  • the provision of oversight and risk assessment activities by the Multi-Disciplinary Team alongside the ‘development of appropriate safety planning and behaviour management’.1908

Secretary Pervan did not provide further detail about what these developments involved in practical terms.

We are aware that in December 2021, the instrument dealing with delegation of authorities and powers at the Centre was revised. Critically, the revised delegation instrument provides as follows:

  • The Assistant Manager of the Centre is a delegate who may exercise the Centre Manager’s power to isolate a young person under section 133(2) of the Youth Justice Act.1909 That delegation is not subject to any conditions.1910
  • The Director, Strategic Youth Services or the Centre Operations Manager may exercise the Centre Manager’s power to isolate a young person under section 133(2) of the Youth Justice Act, only if the Centre Manager and the Assistant Manager are ‘on leave, uncontactable, or unable for any other reason to perform the relevant function’.1911
  • An Operations Coordinator may exercise the Centre Manager’s power to isolate a young person in line with section 133(2) of the Youth Justice Act. However, the delegation does not extend to authorising isolation for a period of more than 30 minutes.1912
  • A youth worker may exercise the Centre Manager’s power to isolate a young person in line with section 133(2) of the Youth Justice Act. However, the delegation is only to be exercised if the delegate is performing the duties of the Operations Coordinator and does not extend to authorising isolation for a period of more than 30 minutes.1913
  1. Our observations

We note, with concern, the following aspects of the immediate response to the December 2019 incident, including that:

  • The Operations Team seemed to understand the purpose of isolating Arlo, Elijah and Joseph to be punishment, despite isolation as punishment being prohibited under the Youth Justice Act and the Isolation Procedure.1914
  • A number of staff believed isolating Arlo, Elijah and Joseph over the weekend after the incident was being carried out under the Blue Program.1915 Mr Ryan denied he had instructed staff to use the Blue Program for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph.1916 However, the independent investigator found the youth workers ‘had the Blue Program in mind’ when preparing the individual programs for Arlo, Elijah and Joseph.1917 This suggests the Blue Program remained in use (at least informally) at the Centre until at least the end of 2019.
  • One youth worker, with more than a decade’s experience at the Centre, told the independent investigator his understanding of isolation procedures was ‘very blurred’.1918 It is concerning that a youth worker with this degree of experience was not clear on how isolation practices should work at the Centre.

We are concerned that some problems with the Isolation Procedure remain. Revisions to the delegation instrument in 2021 expand the number of delegates who may exercise the power to isolate a young person under section 133 of the Youth Justice Act. However, this revised version of the instrument does little to clarify the circumstances in which the Centre Manager or Assistant Manager are ‘on leave, uncontactable, or unable for any other reason to perform the relevant function’. It is unclear why such clarifications have not been made, given this was one of the issues raised in the 2019 investigation. It is concerning, too, that this phrase is a condition of many other delegated powers, including in relation to searches.

Despite the claims of clearer documentation or improved training and understanding about isolation procedures, we also query the extent to which the Isolation Procedure and associated delegations reflect current practice. Specifically, we note that Stuart Watson, Centre Manager, stated that extensions of periods of isolation beyond three hours may be approved by the Director.1919 Fiona Atkins, Assistant Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, similarly expressed the view that extensions of isolation periods beyond three hours require authorisation from the Director.1920 These responses do not reflect:

  • the Isolation Procedure, which only requires that the Centre Manager consult the Director1921
  • the wording of the Authorisation for Extension of Isolation form, which states that ‘[e]xtensions beyond [three] hours from initial time of Isolation requires that the Detention Centre Manager (or Delegate) review and consult with [the Multi-Disciplinary Team] and Director’1922
  • the conditions of the 2021 delegation instrument, which provides that the Director may only exercise the power to isolate a young person under section 133(2) of the Youth Justice Act in instances where the Centre Manager and Assistant Manager are ‘on leave, uncontactable, or unable for any other reason to perform the relevant function’.1923

We commend an approach that seeks to ensure that extensions of isolation periods beyond three hours receive a high level of authorisation and oversight, given the serious nature of such a practice. However, we are unaware of any written requirement that complements the Isolation Procedure or the 2021 delegation instrument and requires the Director’s approval to extend a period of isolation.

We are concerned that despite revisions to the delegation instrument, a common understanding of who has the power to authorise isolation, and in what circumstances, appears to remain elusive to Centre management and Department officials.

  1. Roof incident March 2020

In March 2020, there was another incident where young people at the Centre gained access to a roof. Ms Honan, Director, Strategic Youth Services, told us this incident threatened the safety of staff and other young people because of the number and unpredictability of the young people involved.1924 The Centre’s response again involved isolation. We discuss the incident and response next in relation to isolation practices. Other concerns were raised regarding this incident, including allegations of harmful sexual behaviours and workplace health and safety concerns, but we have focused on isolation practices. We were unable to find consistent evidence in relation to the allegations of harmful sexual behaviours, and therefore do not address those matters.

The incident and the response demonstrate continued confusion about appropriate ways to respond to children and young people and the use of isolation practices. We understand the relevant isolation policy at the time of the incident was the Isolation Procedure, which is presently in force and described in Section 2.1925

  1. The incident

On Friday 6 March 2020, staff and young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre were threatened by four young detainees, who also caused property damage.1926

At approximately 2.30 pm, four young people jumped the inner yard fence at the Centre and climbed onto shipping containers at the back of the Ashley School building.1927 A request for assistance (‘code black’) was called and available staff responded by positioning themselves to block possible exit routes from the space.1928 Staff began to negotiate with the young people but were unsuccessful.1929

The young people made a hole in the roof of a shipping container and found items stored inside they could use as weapons.1930 They threatened to harm any staff member who approached them and threw small objects at staff.1931 Eventually, the young people jumped from the roof of the shipping container armed with hammers and metal bars, and staff moved inside the Centre to keep safe.1932 The young people then gained entry to the stores building and, while armed with makeshift weapons, climbed onto the roof of the Bronte Unit and continued to threaten staff from there.1933

At that time, three staff members and four other young people were inside the Bronte Unit.1934 A decision was made to evacuate the Bronte Unit.1935 Staff and two of the young people inside the unit were evacuated first.1936 When staff returned to evacuate the two remaining young people, staff found they had entered the roof cavity of the unit with the help of the four young people who had broken through the external roof.1937

The incident report suggests police were notified, asked to attend and arrived on site at about 4.30 pm.1938 At approximately 5.00 pm, two young people left the roof and again attempted to gain access to the stores building, where they were restrained by police.1939 Both were temporarily placed in the admissions holding cell before being escorted to their respective rooms.1940 Both young people were seen by the Centre’s nurse.1941

The four remaining young people stayed on the roof for about five hours more.1942 They continued to make threats, as well as sexual comments, to staff and police, and were still armed with makeshift weapons.1943 One young person gained access
to a circular saw.1944 The four young people then broke into the Bronte Unit’s staff office, accessing the security drawer.1945 At approximately 6.30 pm, police with shields were moved into the Centre.1946 A member of the Professional Services Team attempted to contact the families of the young people involved in the incident.1947

At about 10.00 pm, one young person came down from the roof, escorted by police.1948 The three remaining young people made a series of demands, including for pizza and bottles of Coke.1949 They also asked for guarantees about the unit they would be moved to, that they would not spend any time in their rooms, and that they would be allocated a ‘yellow’ colour status under the Behaviour Development System.1950 The young people received the requested food and drink and were assured that they would be placed in the unit of their choice once they came down from the roof.1951

By 11.00 pm, all remaining young people had come down from the roof.1952 They were escorted by police to their unit with no injuries, and their families were notified of the safe conclusion of the incident.1953

We understand that all young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre who were not involved in the incident were confined to their units during the incident—about eight-and-a-half hours.1954

We note this incident occurred just before the 11 March 2020 announcement by the World Health Organization that COVID-19 was a pandemic.1955

  1. Disagreement about the Centre’s response

Mr Ryan was the Centre Manager on the day of the incident. He told us he was very stressed at the time and, aside from a few hours the following Wednesday, after days off and sick leave, this major incident occurred on his last day of employment at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1956

Soon after the March 2020 roof incident, Stuart Watson took over as Acting Manager of Ashley Youth Detention Centre.1957 He was appointed permanently to the position of Manager, Custodial Youth Justice (‘Centre Manager’), in March 2021.1958

Towards the end of and immediately following the incident, there was a dispute between Ms Honan and the Centre’s management about how the young people involved in the incident should be managed over the following days. We understand that Mr Ryan as Centre Manager, Mr Watson, then the Assistant Manager, Piers, then the Acting Operations Manager and Ms Atkins, as On-Call Manager over the weekend, were involved in telephone discussions with Ms Honan. We received different accounts of this discussion.

Mr Ryan told us he shared many phone calls and emails with Ms Honan as the incident unfolded and once it had concluded.1959 This included an email from Mr Ryan to Ms Honan on the day of the incident, Friday 6 March.1960 Mr Ryan added he called meetings with senior staff during the incident about planning for the weekend, and he told senior staff to raise the plans with Ms Honan.1961 Mr Ryan stated Ms Honan provided no support in relation to how the young people could be managed, but he did not elaborate on this.1962

Ms Honan’s evidence was that, at about 9.00 pm on the evening of the incident (before it had concluded), Mr Ryan and Ms Honan corresponded about the planned approach to the young people over the weekend.1963 She provided us with copies of some of that correspondence.1964 Ms Honan explained that Mr Ryan proposed ‘a combination of rolling isolation and unit bound practices for the proceeding [three] day, long weekend for all of the young people involved in the standoff’.1965 This is evidenced by copies of ‘program forecasts’ that Mr Ryan provided to Ms Honan on the evening of 6 March 2020, which he described as involving ‘multiple [i]solations’, whereby ‘[e]ach resident would be effectively in and out of their room, but collectively [isolated for] more than 3 hours per day’.1966 Ms Honan told us she considered this to be a similar response to that used after the December 2019 roof incident, except the approach was provided to Ms Honan to ‘endorse’.1967 Ms Honan’s evidence was that Mr Ryan gave no reasons for the need to use isolation and unit bound procedures in this way.1968 In her view, there were too many ‘unknown factors’ at that time, as the incident was still ongoing, making the proposal ‘premature’.1969

Ms Honan emailed Mr Ryan, stating: ‘[h]aving … compare[d] [Mr Ryan’s proposed response] to the isolation procedure … the more uncomfortable I am with it’.1970 Ms Honan proposed an alternative approach, which included a combination of placing the young people on ‘red’ colour ‘once the initial immediate isolation procedure is expired’ and ‘[r]estricted activity and closer supervision but not constrained to rooms’.1971 She requested that Mr Ryan reassess the situation the next morning.1972 Ms Honan said she received a further proposal from Mr Ryan at 10.21 pm on the night of 6 March 2020, asking her to endorse it.1973 Ms Honan told us that at the time she would not endorse the proposal and instead told Mr Ryan he should rely on the expertise of the Centre’s management and the Professional Services Team to determine the best way forward.1974

During a later discussion about the incident with Department officials, Digby (a pseudonym), a former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, said the discussion centred on Ms Honan’s proposal of a ‘reset’ based on a therapeutic approach and his and others’ focus on ‘de-escalation and restoration, which is a critical part of any therapeutic approach’.1975 He expressed concern the direction being proposed was ‘a new way for which there had been no training, no guidelines, policies or procedures, no practice experience’.1976

During our hearings, Mr Watson said he also considered the plan proposed by Mr Ryan and others was inappropriate.1977 Mr Watson stated the correct approach would have been to have rehabilitation at front of mind.1978 He explained the starting point should be that if the young person was non-violent, non-aggressive and non-threatening, they should be out of their room.1979 He considered this approach gave young people a chance to rehabilitate and ‘move forward’.1980

Ms Honan conceded to us that appropriate management of young people was not her area of expertise, and that four or five staff employed at the Centre in addition to Mr Ryan did have the expertise and operational knowledge required to inform the approach.1981 We note the Isolation Procedure provides that, for isolation periods extending beyond three hours, the Centre Manager or their delegate should ‘consult’ with various professionals at the Centre and speak with the Director about the outcome of those consultations. This suggests there is no expectation the Director would have specialist knowledge to inform isolation decisions.

It seems apparent there was no agreed policy or procedure being used to guide the response. However, we agree with the observations of Ms Honan that, when read alongside the Isolation Procedure, the proposed approach was concerning and there was no clear rationale for isolation at that time.

  1. The Centre’s response: isolation and unit bound

The evidence available to us indicates the six young people involved were all unit bound for at least four days after the incident, with some unit bound for as long as seven days.1982

Ms Honan’s evidence was that the eventual approach taken towards the young people involved in the incident partly reflected her suggestions.1983 She considered the Isolation Procedure was followed appropriately in the days following, as decisions to isolate the young people were ‘based on immediate risk and safety assessment[s]’ and were authorised by herself and the On-Call Manager where extensions beyond three hours were required.1984

According to Mr Watson, the young people were not punished but were dropped to ‘red’ on the Behaviour Development System.1985

The day after the incident, Ms Atkins, Coordinator, Admissions and Training at Ashley Youth Detention Centre at that time, emailed Ms Honan regarding ‘continued and ongoing risks … if all young people are to associate’.1986 Ms Atkins highlighted, among other things, that:

  • there were several young people who had intended to take part in the incident and there was talk among the young people of retribution for those who did not get involved
  • at that stage, staff had indicated that if ‘all young people’ were to be allowed out of their rooms, six staff would ‘walk off’, leaving the Centre significantly understaffed
  • one young person was believed to have a weapon at that time
  • significant damage to the Bronte Unit meant it could not be used in the near future.1987

Ms Honan responded to Ms Atkins’ email, welcoming the new information, classifying it as serious, and stating that it ‘change[d] the position significantly’.1988 She noted she ‘absolutely support[ed] the staff concerns’.1989

We understand all young people were locked in their rooms until at least 3.00 pm on Saturday 7 March 2020.1990 The next day, Sunday, a fight broke out between some young people who had been involved in the incident and some who had not.1991 The related incident report stated that before the fight, young people not involved in the roof incident had been:

... [expressing] resentment towards the residents who had caused them to be unjustly locked in their rooms for 8 hours on Saturday morning [7]th of March [and] saying it was unfair [the] roof incident didn’t come with consequences as many had consequences in the past for … similar behaviour.1992

Staff held a debrief meeting in the days following the 2020 roof incident, which was also attended by an external counsellor.1993 Mr Watson, Mr Ryan, Ms Atkins and Ms Honan did not attend this meeting, but Piers did.1994 In the debrief, staff commented that management had handled the situation well, praised how staff supported one another during the incident and commended the Professional Services Team’s response over the weekend following the event.1995 The debrief minutes identified there was a ‘[h]istory of [young people] doing stand offs with no consequence for [their] action[s]’.1996 The minutes also indicated that the staff felt that the overall understanding of the Isolation Procedure could be improved.1997

The debrief minutes contained a series of other recommendations and observations. Specifically, the staff sought an explanation from management or the Director about why the decision was made to lock down all the young people in the Centre and not just the young people involved in the incident.1998

  1. The Department’s response to the incident

We are not aware of a formal investigation being conducted specifically into the isolation of children and young people after the March 2020 roof incident. We understand there was an internal review of ‘the serious incident on 6 March 2020 itself,’ but this was more limited than the investigation into the 13 December 2019 roof incident discussed in Section 10 (which considered the extended series of events following the incident, including staff responses).1999

  1. Reforms since March 2020

Ms Honan gave evidence there had been changes at Ashley Youth Detention Centre since the March 2020 incident. 2000 She highlighted changes to the Practice Framework, which outlines a model of care provided at the Centre. Ms Honan reflected that the Practice Framework in place at the Centre at the time of the 2020 roof incident had grown organically and she considered that there were not ‘many people that had any clarity about … the practice framework across the Centre, and they had selectively picked pieces out of it or operated almost autonomously … under intuition’.2001 She acknowledged youth workers did not understand or use the Practice Framework in appropriate ways.2002

Soon after the incident, Adjunct Associate Professor Janise Mitchell, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Australian Childhood Foundation, in partnership with Southern Cross University, prepared a report for the Department titled Through the Fence and into Their Lives: Ashley Youth Detention Centre Trauma Informed Practice Framework, dated April 2020.2003 We discuss this report in Chapter 10 but note here that it proposes a ‘scope of works and methodology for the further development and implementation of an integrated and tailored practice framework’.2004

Ms Honan also discussed the siloed nature of the working relationship between the Operations Team and the Professional Services Team, and considered that if staff were to respond to a similar event today, they would do so in a more collaborative way.2005 She further stated a more trauma-informed practice at the Centre had ‘evolved’
from the recommendations of the Through the Fence report.2006

On 26 March 2021, Secretary Pervan received the report of the independent investigation into the December 2019 roof incident, which we describe in Section 10.

  1. Our observations regarding the March 2020 roof incident

It is apparent from the evidence available to us, including the concerns Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff raised with Ms Honan, that there was a high level of stress and tension among staff following the March 2020 roof incident, as well as a lack of understanding about the decisions made in response to the incident and the reasons for them. It appears the lack of understanding was partly due to insufficient training in responding to major incidents (which we have not discussed here). There was also a lack of understanding of the therapeutic framework intended to guide the response.

Of particular concern, the minutes of an all-staff meeting following the incident recorded the view that staff needed to improve their understanding of, among other things, the Isolation Procedure and that associated training was required.2007 Most of the staff who attended this debrief had (at that point) been working at the Centre for a substantial number of years, some for more than a decade.2008 As we noted earlier in our system observations of the December 2019 roof incident, it is alarming that staff members who had worked at the Centre for a significant period felt the need to improve their understanding of important procedures such as the Isolation Procedure.

We were also left with an overwhelming sense that a clear and measured response to the March 2020 roof incident was hampered by workplace tensions. The distress and concerns of staff about the response to the incident were no doubt heightened by the lack of any cohesive or communicated response plan by management and disagreement between senior decision makers.

This degree of dysfunction at the Centre at a senior level and in relation to long-term staff members’ ignorance of key procedures relevant to managing young people in detention after incidents of this kind, has put children and young people in detention at risk. It is unacceptable that experienced staff members at the Centre and the Department do not have the knowledge or skills to respond decisively, lawfully and effectively to incidents that threaten the security of the Centre. It is also not acceptable that management cannot provide decisive, lawful and effective guidance to staff when confronted with an incident of this nature because they are engaged in disputes among themselves about what constitutes a lawful and appropriate response.

We found it difficult to know whether, after these 2020 reforms by the Department, the necessary cultural change had occurred to stop what appeared to have been a systematic use of isolation outside parameters set by international conventions since the Centre was established. We acknowledge Secretary Pervan’s evidence of policy change and workforce development to address the issue but note these were strategies that had been trialled repeatedly in the past and failed to create sustained change. We also recognise the evidence of Ms Honan that the changes that gave her confidence inappropriate isolation practices were no longer occurring were that ‘the staff that were authorising it and condoning it as a legitimate practice are no longer there’. We were also somewhat reassured by the regular presence at the Centre of the Commissioner for Children and Young People and her advocate, until we received further evidence from the Commissioner in July 2023 (refer to discussion in Section 13).

  1. The Department’s response to the use of isolation at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

In response to our requests for information, as well as during our public hearings, Secretary Pervan provided several explanations to us about the use of isolation practices—historically and recently—at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

We asked Secretary Pervan to comment on whether it was appropriate to isolate a young person in detention in the manner described in Lusted v ZS.2009 He responded that ‘[u]nder no circumstances is the isolation of a young person as described in the case of Lusted v ZS appropriate’.2010 He observed that the staff member who acted to isolate the young person in that case was relying on an ‘incorrect’ interpretation of the Youth Justice Act.2011

Secretary Pervan was also asked whether the isolation of Z, as described in Lusted v ZS, was accurately recorded in the isolation register. He responded:

No. Records from 2013 were stored in physical hard copy files in a locked filing cabinet and in excel spreadsheets which were stored on an external hard drive. The information on the forms during this period was minimal and often not populated or signed off. With respect to this case, the records appear incomplete and have been inaccurately recorded in the isolation register. This may not have been classified as ‘isolation’. A practice developed known as the ‘Blue Program’ which was known to be for purported restricted movement and unit bound. The ‘Blue Program’ was not a formalised or approved program and was not contained in any policy or procedure documents from the time. It does appear, however, that it had some level of acceptance among [Centre] staff as being operationally utilised at that time.2012

In a further request for statement, we asked Secretary Pervan to explain the meaning of ‘unit bound’. He explained that:

... unit bound is … the situation where a resident, as a result of decisions made in response to the specific needs and behaviours of the resident, is not scheduled for activities outside the unit and therefore remains within the unit. The resident is not locked into their rooms nor kept from contact with other residents although there may be restrictions on contact with specific residents. Unit bound is not a formal status, and there is no specific policy governing it, but is a description of the current circumstances of the resident.2013

Secretary Pervan added that when a young person is unit bound, they continue to have an educational program, which is monitored through the Multi-Disciplinary Team.2014 Depending on risk assessment, some aspects of the educational program (for example, the Ashley School woodworking program, which involves sharp tools) may not be available.2015 He continued:

In the past, ‘unit bound’ has been used interchangeably with the terms ‘separate routine’ and ‘individual program’, both of which appeared on early versions of the isolation procedure and have been, at times, used in a manner similar to the Blue Program ...2016

In the next paragraph of his statement, Secretary Pervan explained:

[The Blue Program] … was intended to be for tightly restricted movement and unit bound detainees. A Blue Program appears to have been in place in 2013 and a version of the Blue Program was put into place as a category within the framework of the Behaviour Development System. It was inserted into a draft (Version 2.8) for a period in 2019 and implemented within [the Centre]. Neither the Blue Program nor the Blue category were approved by the Department. The Blue category of the [Behaviour Development System] was implemented within [the Centre] without agency approval. The Blue Program and the Blue category are both based on incorrect interpretations of policies and procedures to manage behaviours. They are unlawful (in my personal view) and inconsistent with approved practice.2017

When discussing the present status of the unit bound practice and the Blue Program, Secretary Pervan said:

In short, the use of the Blue Program and unit bound have been ceased and replaced by a Use of Isolation procedure that is monitored and enforced. I am also aware that the Commissioner for Children and Young People monitors the use of isolation and is regularly provided with data to enable that monitoring.2018

In the same statement, Secretary Pervan commented on how decisions are made regarding the use of isolation practices. He said:

I do not have concerns in regard to how decisions are made in relation to the use of isolation, where isolation is recognised as isolation. There should be no decision made to implement a Blue Program or category under the Behaviour Development System.

As stated above, ‘unit bound’ is a term to describe the circumstances in which some restrictions on the participation of the resident outside their unit have been put into place as a result of the [Multi-Disciplinary Team]. I do not have concerns about the procedure for the operation of the Multi-Disciplinary team or the decisions made by that team. It may be however that the term ‘unit bound’ should perhaps be replaced with another term which has less historical associations and better describes the current program for the young person concerned.2019

In a discussion about whether isolation could constitute torture, Secretary Pervan stated:

Without wanting to go to a specific case, only because I don’t have that detail in front of me, as I understand—and it’s a superficial understanding—the definition of ‘torture’ in that document goes to intent, and there was, I believe, looking at the past, a use of restrictive practice to—it would be argued by the staff involved it was used as a disciplinary measure, but yet the intent was to cause people to feel bad, it wasn’t for their safety, it wasn’t for any other purpose but to punish them. 2020

In his written evidence to our Commission of Inquiry, Secretary Pervan stated unequivocally that both the Blue Program and unit bound were no longer in use at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. However, he expressed his faith in the discretion of the Multi-Disciplinary Team at the Centre to limit the participation of a young person in activities of the Centre and advocated for a new term for the practice. This raises significant concerns that unit bound practices, in some form, continue to be used at the Centre, despite representations to the contrary.2021 We hold serious concerns that practices substantively similar to unit bound, and involving isolation of a young person within the plain meaning of the term, may still be continuing at the Centre, given the
long-term and systematic use of unit bound over previous years.

In her evidence to us, Ms Atkins, Assistant Manager at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, referred to Standard Operating Procedure No. 15 as current policy. This procedure states, in part, the following:

Separate Routine

A young person may be placed on a Separate Routine where their behaviour presents a risk to others or to the security of the Centre but which can be managed without resort to isolation. It may involve restrictions on contact with other specific young people or certain programs and areas of the Centre. It may also entail closer supervision and/or restriction to a particular Unit. This strategy can be used to deal with risks such as threats of harm to self and others, threats of escape and subversive and inciting behaviour. A Separate Routine can only be approved by the [Centre Support Team] or [Interim Centre Support Team], must be reviewed at least twice a week and must be discontinued as soon as the level of risk permits.2022

We note the description of ‘separate routine’ in the Centre’s current procedure reflects the exact wording quoted to Mr Morrissey by the Acting Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services, in November 2016, when he sought clarification on the use of unit bound practice on two young people. As discussed above, that response from the Acting Deputy Secretary acknowledged:

  • the terms ‘unit bound’, ‘separate routine’ and ‘individual program’ were often used interchangeably
  • separating a young person from other young people at the Centre was concerning
  • a revised policy was being prepared to resolve the different ‘designations’ being given to essentially the same practice.

Critically, the Isolation Procedure at Ashley Youth Detention Centre does not appear to have been revised to resolve the different designations, nor to articulate that what is, in substance and effect, a practice of isolation (even if it is part of a broader program that is not associated with the Isolation Procedure) must accord with legislative requirements. Further, there do not appear to be any safeguards currently in place, besides the consideration of the Multi-Disciplinary Team, to ensure that young people are only held in isolation while being unit bound or on ‘separate routine’ in line with the Youth Justice Act.

We note the contradictory evidence of Secretary Pervan regarding the potential use of unit bound and the Standard Operating Procedure regarding ‘separate routine’, which suggests the policy conditions that enabled potentially unlawful isolation practices to become systematic still prevail.

We further note that since 2020, children and young people detained at the Centre have experienced significant periods of isolation for operational reasons, due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and staff shortages. We note that following a visit to the Centre in November 2022, the United Nations Committee against Torture (responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) stated that it was ‘seriously concerned’ about the use of isolation practices at the Centre.2023 The committee also stated it considered that current practices contravened the Convention and the associated United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (also known as the Nelson Mandela Rules).2024

  1. Isolation practices in 2023

In July 2023, Commissioner McLean informed us that, since August 2022, there had been a deterioration of conditions for children and young people in detention, and that isolation practices continued to be used at the Centre.2025 She advised that over the previous six months, her office had observed (among other practices):

  • Individual young people being referred to as ‘unit bound’ by staff during conversations, on office noticeboards, and in Weekly Review Meeting … minutes;
  • The extended use of unit-specific lockdowns … and the extended isolation of individual young people, with one young person likening these practices to the ‘Blue Program’;
  • Moving or threatening to move young people to units that experience more frequent lockdowns as a means of responding to and/or managing behaviour;
  • The reintroduction of ‘quiet time,’ which sees young people restricted to their rooms every day between 12:30pm – 1:15pm, sometimes without staff being present in the unit …2026

This is extremely concerning.

In response to Commissioner McLean’s comments, the Government acknowledged that restrictive practices continued to occur at Ashley Youth Detention Centre due to staff shortages (discussed in Chapter 12).2027 Timothy Bullard, Secretary, Department for Education, Children and Young People, also stated:

The [Commissioner for Children and Young People] has expressed concern that young people at [Ashley Youth Detention Centre], particularly those in the Franklin Unit, have been locked down in response to their behaviour. I am advised that young people in the Franklin Unit have been subject to the same restrictive practices as other young people at [the Centre]. I understand that some residents may perceive that they are being treated differently if they are in their rooms while others are out of theirs. This is not the case, as restrictive practice means that young people are out of their rooms at different times of the day, depending on the number and experience of staff present in [the Centre] and the need to accommodate any association issues between young people.2028

We note that the Government’s response did not address Commissioner McLean’s observations:

  • that staff were referring to individual children as ‘unit bound’
  • of extended isolation of individual young people
  • that daily 45-minute ‘quiet time’ had been reinstated.

As such, the Government’s response did not address all our grave concerns about the continuing use of isolation at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. As we only became aware of these concerns in July 2023, we were unable to continue to explore these specific matters. This evidence reinforces our concerns that the cultural and policy conditions that enabled isolation practices to occur continue to exist today.

  1. Our observations

We remain extremely concerned that isolation practices may be continuing at the Centre at the time of writing and there may not have been the broad sweeping cultural change required to address this.

Finding—The use of isolation as a form of behaviour management, punishment or cruelty and contrary to the Youth Justice Act has been a regular and persistent practice at Ashley Youth Detention Centre since at least the early 2000s, and the conditions that enabled this practice still exist today

Whether described as isolation, unit bound, the Blue Program, segregation, individual program, separate routine, time out or some other term, practices that amount to isolation have been regularly and consistently used at Ashley Youth Detention Centre over many years, despite being contrary to the legal and policy frameworks that are intended to govern the appropriate use of isolation.

The accounts of young people in detention from the early 2000s to at least the mid-2010s consistently mention unlawful and harmful isolation practices, sometimes used as routine practice (such as on admission) and sometimes used as punishment for the conduct of the young person. While we do not comment on the veracity of each individual account, we have given weight to the consistency of their accounts across many years (and the resonances they have with terminology and events in more recent years).

From 2011, the Blue Program, which adopted a practice of unit bound, existed at the Centre as part of the Behaviour Development System, but was, in the words of one longstanding staff member, ‘rescinded in December 2013 (although fondly remembered by some staff) because it had become more broadly used (for some residents who didn’t really need it) and was considered in some quarters to be a punishment option’.2029

From 2016–17, concerns were raised that at least two children in the Centre were being unit bound as punishment for their involvement in an incident at the Centre.2030

In March 2019, the Blue Program was formally reintroduced with the knowledge of the Department. This involved children and young people in detention being unit bound for excessive periods (ranging from 18 to 25 days) in response to an incident

at the Centre. While the reintroduction of the Blue Program came with warnings to staff that it was not a form of punishment, it was attached to the Behaviour Development System. Given the excessive time children spent in isolation while on the Blue Program and the program’s reintroduction after an incident at the Centre, the children and young people in question must have experienced it as punishment.

In December 2019, despite the shift away from the formal Blue Program, three young people were again unit bound for 11 days in response to an incident at the Centre. They were sometimes isolated in their rooms for one hour to three
or four hours at a time.

In March 2020, six young people were again unit bound in response to an incident at the Centre, some for seven days.

We note that since the COVID-19 pandemic and until as recently as August 2023, children have been subject to frequent and regular lockdown practices for operational reasons. These are another form of isolation.

Given the recent evidence we received from the Commissioner for Children and Young People, and the Department’s response, we are concerned that some children and young people at the Centre may still be being placed on ‘unit bound’, being isolated for extended periods, and being subject to daily ‘quiet time’.

We are concerned the culture of using a systematic practice of isolating children as punishment or a method of behaviour management is still a risk in 2023, particularly with the lack of clarity around policies such as the segregation procedure.

As outlined in the evidence described here, isolation practices, irrespective of their label, have often involved segregating children and young people from other children and young people, denying them the right to take part in the usual educational programming offered through Ashley School and being locked in their room or unit. Such practices create an institutional culture that increases the risk of child sexual abuse and reduces the likelihood of a young person disclosing such abuse.

Finding—The Department, and sometimes the Tasmanian Government, have been on notice about potentially unlawful isolation practices at Ashley Youth Detention Centre since at least 2013, and have not taken sufficient action

We are particularly concerned the Department, and sometimes the Tasmanian Government, were put on notice several times about isolation practices that contravened both Tasmanian law and human rights principles to which Australia was a signatory, including:

  • In 2013, Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly commented that a young person had been subjected to ‘isolation in a manner unauthorised by the Youth Justice Act’ and noted his concern that ‘unauthorised isolation may [be] a normal part of the management of youths in detention or on remand’.2031
  • During 2016–17, the then Commissioner for Children and Young People raised multiple concerns about the practice of unit bound with the Department and the Tasmanian Government, the veracity of which was acknowledged internally by the Department in the 6 May 2016 Minute.
  • In 2018, the Custodial Inspector identified serious inadequacies regarding the use of formal isolation, including the failure to:
    • regularly review and monitor instances of isolation
    • meet minimum observation requirements while young people were held in isolation
    • keep proper records, including providing a reason for the isolation.
  • During 2019, the current Commissioner for Children and Young People raised questions on several occasions about the practice of unit bound and the reintroduction of the Blue Program.
  • On 26 March 2021, the report of the independent investigation into the response to the December 2019 roof incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre raised concerns about the use of isolation routines at the Centre, specifically in relation to how isolation periods were extended.2032 It provided evidence the Blue Program was still believed to be used in practice, if not in name. It also raised serious questions about whether formal isolation procedures were being followed, and that there had been retrospective amending of isolation records.
  • In July 2023, Commissioner McLean told us that she had written to the Department ‘persistently’ in 2022 and 2023 noting the deteriorating conditions experienced by children and young people at the Centre in relation to restrictive practices, rolling lockdowns and low staffing numbers.2033 The Department acknowledged to us in August 2023 that low staffing numbers had continued to necessitate the use of restrictive practices such as lockdowns despite recent and ongoing recruitment efforts.2034

These concerns expressed by multiple entities external to the Department offered the Department, and the State, multiple opportunities to address serious concerns about the safety of children and the abuse of their human rights. We consider these to ultimately be lost opportunities. We were particularly concerned the Department failed to scrutinise why the Blue Program had previously ceased before accepting its reintroduction in March 2019. These missed opportunities meant further cohorts of children detained at the Centre were subjected to likely unlawful isolation practices.

We were also concerned that the Department’s response to queries often lacked a plain language description of the daily experience of children subjected to the practices of concern. This reflects the concern expressed by Deputy Chief Magistrate Daly that the response he received from the then Secretary was ‘so vague that it was of no practical value’ and ‘wholly inadequate’.2035 These responses were accompanied by interpretations of the legal definition of isolation, which could be seen as contrary to the best interests of children and their mental and physical wellbeing.

There were also multiple occasions when concerns about isolation practices were raised in the Department. We found the 6 May 2016 Minute to be extraordinary in its sense of urgency and concern about human rights breaches, its mention of the long retention of a significant number of staff and the culture of the Centre, and its effective call for a spill of staff.

We, too, hold serious concerns about the culture of Ashley Youth Detention Centre. We do not know whether, when the Blue Program was reintroduced in March 2019, longstanding staff identified to Centre management that the Blue Program had previously been identified as unlawful and resulted in policy change during a time when they worked at the Centre, or if they voiced concerns about its use.

We consider Digby’s email comments regarding staff attitudes towards the Blue Program, including it being ‘fondly remembered’, and Ms Honan’s assessment of ‘staff that were authorising it and condoning it as a legitimate practice’ as extremely disturbing. Further, we observed in the evidence made available to us (and as described here) a continued use of the Blue Program by staff, even when it was no longer formally in use. We were gravely concerned about the culture

of resistance noted by Commissioner McLean in her correspondence suggesting this remained the case as late as July 2023 after extensive airing of concerns about these practices in our public hearings. We hold concerns that a punitive culture may have been supported and applied by some staff at the Centre, who may have taken opportunities to nullify reforms and return to more punitive practices whenever they arose. Given staffing changes, we do not know if staff who may hold a more punitive youth justice orientation continue to work at the Centre.

The Department demonstrated, at best, naivety in repeatedly addressing poor and potentially unlawful isolation through training and policy change, and accepting lack of staff knowledge as an explanation, despite many staff, including operational leaders, having long employment histories at the Centre.

The Department needs to have a clear policy on the appropriateness of providing training, counselling or direction to Centre staff members who have repeatedly demonstrated resistance to change.

Finding—There was a consistent failure to include the voices of children and young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in any reviews, investigations or policy changes relating to isolation

We are concerned that too often the voices and experiences of children and young people are ignored, which can reduce their sense of safety and trust, including trust in disclosing sexual abuse. Children’s voices must be heard in decisions that affect them and be taken seriously in the application of Child and Youth Safe Standards.

While we observed two Commissioners for Children and Young People raising concerns about the Blue Program and/or being unit bound, presumably a consequence of their engagement with young people detained at the Centre, we saw no evidence that young people were ever given an opportunity to provide their experience of the Blue Program or being unit bound to people or bodies undertaking reviews of isolation practices at the Centre.

The failure to identify the benefits of engaging with and hearing the voice of children and young people about the Blue Program, particularly following the clarifications requested by Commissioners for Children and Young People, was a further missed opportunity by the Department that may have helped to identify the impact of isolation practices in the Blue Program on children and young people in detention. Because of these missed opportunities, isolation practices that were potentially outside the standards set by law, policy and international conventions continued at the Centre.

Finding—Ashley Youth Detention Centre and the Department failed to support children and young people in detention who were subjected to isolation practices

Despite the many times potentially unlawful isolation practices were raised by external entities, and acknowledged internally, we saw no evidence the Department went through an open disclosure process with children and young people who were or had been in detention to acknowledge that they had been subjected to inappropriate isolation practices. Nor have we identified any records that indicate the Department sought to assess or mitigate mental health impacts of unlawful isolation practices on children and young people in detention who had experienced them.

Case study 4: Use of force in Ashley Youth Detention Centre

  1. Overview

As outlined in Chapter 3 and Chapter 10, the National Royal Commission identified that some institutional contexts significantly increase the risk of child sexual abuse occurring.2036 The National Royal Commission described ‘closed’ institutions as presenting the highest risk of child sexual abuse.2037 Youth detention centres are characteristically ‘closed’ institutions.2038

The National Royal Commission described how closed institutions can become ‘alternative moral universes’, where the institution wholly establishes and maintains its own norms and rules.2039 Acts of sexual abuse against children and young people are more common where the ‘alternative moral universe’ of an institution:

  • fosters a culture of tolerance for humiliating and degrading children
  • routinely uses force or violence against young people
  • normalises aggression.2040

Research also shows that in institutions where the routine use of force or violence against young people is permitted, staff can become desensitised. This makes it easier for them to minimise the seriousness of, or tolerate, ongoing harm, including sexual harm, to children and young people.2041 Where trust is undermined, children and young people are unlikely to disclose abuse when it occurs.2042

In this case study, we consider the use of force at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. First, we consider the laws and policies governing the use of force, which reinforce that the use of force against a child in detention is only permitted in exceptional situations.

Next, we consider what victim-survivors told us about their experiences of the use of force while in the Centre from the early 2000s to the early 2020s. This is a summary of the evidence we outline in Case study 1. While we do not test the veracity of these individual accounts, we draw conclusions about their consistency, including force being used as punishment and a method to sexually abuse children. Viewed as a whole, these accounts suggested a pattern of some staff using force instead of de-escalation techniques to manage young people’s behaviour at the Centre.2043

We then discuss a series of instances where excessive force was used at the Centre during 2016–17, which echoed the direct accounts we heard in relation to failures to use de-escalation techniques in managing young people’s behaviour. We discuss several reviews into these examples of the use of force during 2016–17, which raise concerns about whether the Department and the Tasmanian Government have always responded adequately to the inappropriate use of force.

  1. The law and policies

International law prohibits the use of restraint or force against young people in detention, other than in exceptional circumstances.2044 The Youth Justice Act 1997 (‘Youth Justice Act’) prohibits the use of physical force against young people in detention, unless the force is reasonable and necessary to prevent harm to the young person or anyone else, or for the security of the detention centre, or is otherwise authorised.2045

The Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (‘Inspection Standards’) provide that force must only be used ‘when it is necessary to prevent an imminent and serious threat of self-harm or injury to others, and only when all other means of control have been exhausted’.2046 The Inspection Standards also state:

  • the use of force must only occur for ‘the shortest time required’2047
  • force should never be used as punishment or to obtain a young person’s compliance2048
  • force should never be used to humiliate or degrade a young person2049
  • all instances of the use of force should be recorded, investigated and reported2050
  • cameras should be used to record planned interventions involving the use of force2051
  • a young person who has been subjected to a use of force should be given health care after the incident.2052

The Inspection Standards also require that only approved techniques and restraints should be used. The young person should be given an opportunity to speak with staff who were not involved in the incident after the use of force.2053

The use of force at Ashley Youth Detention Centre is also guided by the Centre’s internal policy, the Use of Physical Force Procedure, dated 10 December 2018 (‘Use of Force Procedure’).2054 Consistent with the Youth Justice Act, the Use of Force Procedure prohibits the use of force other than in specific, limited situations. It states:

The use of physical force is a prohibited action, unless it is reasonable and necessary to prevent harm to a person or property. Where it is reasonable and necessary, the minimum amount of force must be used for the shortest time possible. The goal is to ensure the safety of all concerned and to help the young person regain control of their behaviour as quickly as possible.2055

The Use of Force Procedure provides that physical force may be allowed where it is reasonable and necessary to:

  • conduct a search
  • prevent a young person from injuring themselves or anyone else
  • prevent a young person from damaging property
  • ensure the security of the detention centre
  • place a young person in isolation.2056

When there is a risk of a child or young person’s behaviour requiring use of force, the Use of Force Procedure suggests a (non-exhaustive) list of strategies to reduce the chance of an incident occurring or escalating. This includes:

  • using de-escalation strategies known to work with the young person
  • talking to the young person in a calm and non-threatening way
  • changing their routine
  • changing their unit placement.2057

When force is required, staff must ensure that minimal force is used, as outlined in the Minimising the Use of Physical Force and Restraint Practice Advice.2058 Staff must not use excessive force.2059 ‘Excessive force’ is defined in the Use of Force Procedure as:

  • more force than is needed or for longer than is needed
  • any force or level of force continuing after the need for it has ended
  • any force that might compromise the young person’s breathing
  • knowingly wrongfully using force.2060

The Use of Force Procedure explicitly states that disciplinary or criminal proceedings may follow an excessive use of force.2061

In this case study, we outline some accounts of the use of force at the Centre that are alleged to have taken place before the current Use of Force Procedure and Inspection Standards were adopted in 2018.

  1. What we heard from victim-survivors about the use of force at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

This case study covers a series of concerning allegations regarding the use of force by some staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre over many years. We acknowledge there have been and are staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre who have sought to do their jobs lawfully and appropriately. References to ‘staff’ in this case study are not intended as a reference to all staff at the Centre, unless explicitly stated in a specific context.

As discussed in Case study 1, we heard evidence about some staff using force, violence and restraints against young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. While we do not comment on the veracity of each individual allegation outlined in victim-survivors’ accounts, we give weight to the commonality between accounts of the use of force at the Centre, including:

  • force, restraints and physical violence being used to facilitate staff members’ sexual abuse of young people, or in connection with sexual abuse, including while conducting strip searches of the child. To avoid doubt, we consider strip searches that include touching of a child’s anus or genitals or penetration of a child’s anus or vagina to be child sexual abuse
  • young people being restrained as part of isolation practices
  • force, restraints and violence being used to punish young people for not following orders or for reporting abuse
  • staff perpetrating violence against young people, and encouraging violence among young people, as a form of humiliation.

Ben (a pseudonym) was 11 years old when he was first detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the early 2000s. He was in and out of the Centre many times throughout his childhood and teenage years.2062 Ben recalled multiple instances where he said staff used force against him as punishment, reprisal or to manage his behaviour.2063 He recounted that, on his first admission to the Centre, he reported abuse by older boys against him. He told us that, in response, staff restrained him, stripped him naked and verbally abused him.2064

Ben also recalled one occasion when, having tried to escape, he said he was ‘belted’, stripped naked, handcuffed behind his back, and had his feet cuffed together, before being placed in isolation.2065 He told us he was left handcuffed and unable to move off the floor of the room where he was isolated for about five hours.2066 He said he was then isolated for a further three weeks.2067

Ben told us that after multiple rapes and other instances of sexual abuse by staff during his time at the Centre, he became angrier and more aggressive.2068 He said that as his behaviour escalated, he was often restrained by staff and targeted for further abuse.2069 He said the amount of abuse perpetrated by staff against him was ‘a blur’ and led to an attempt to ‘[die by] suicide’.2070 Ben recounted that following this suicide attempt, he was ‘flogged’ and put into isolation, where every couple of days, he would be ‘belted’ by staff.2071 Ben stated that he twice suffered broken bones because of physical abuse by staff members.2072

Ben told us that some of the Centre staff did not have the skills to effectively manage the aggression and violence some young people displayed.2073 He said maintenance staff at the Centre were sometimes called in to resolve incidents and to restrain young people.2074 Ben said staff normalised violence and abuse against young people, and that on ‘countless occasions’ he witnessed new staff being ridiculed by long-term staff because they did not join in on restraining young people.2075

Simon (a pseudonym) was 10 years old when he was first admitted to Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the early 2000s.2076 Simon recalled staff using force when carrying out strip searches. He recounted how staff told him they would need to hold him down during a strip search.2077 When Simon refused and asked staff to perform a ‘normal’ search instead, three staff members wrestled him to the ground and spread his buttocks.2078

Simon also told us he was often physically abused by Centre staff for minor transgressions, such as refusing to go back to his room.2079 He said that he and other young people would be ‘smashed up’ by staff for not going to bed on time, or ‘slipping up [and] doing something simple like a kid does’.2080 He recalled that staff regularly left him with bruises and grazes.2081

Simon told us he generally did not complain about poor treatment while he was at the Centre, because he was afraid that staff might physically abuse him if he did.2082 We heard from other victim-survivors who were detained at the Centre at various times between the early 2000s and late 2010s that they were afraid of violent reprisals from staff members if they reported abuse.2083

Charlotte (a pseudonym) was 12 years old when she was first admitted to the Centre in the early 2000s.2084 Like Ben, Charlotte recalled a violent episode following an instance of self-harm. She told us that when she self-harmed while in lockdown, a staff member entered her room and slammed her head against the bed base, saying she ‘needed a flogging’ and she was ‘making more paperwork’ for the staff.2085

Fred (a pseudonym), who was detained at the Centre in the mid-2000s, described often being restrained by staff while they were strip searching him.2086 Fred recalled that during one strip search, three or four staff held him down and put their knees on him.2087

Fred said that most of the time he was at Ashley Youth Detention Centre during the mid-2000s he felt ‘rough housed’ by staff, never knowing when they were going to ‘lash out’.2088 Fred told us staff at the Centre would hit him on the back of his head, push him and jump on him.2089 He recalled that when some young people from his activity group escaped from the Centre, staff handcuffed him and screamed at him to ‘interrogate’ him for information about the other boys’ whereabouts.2090 Fred also told us he witnessed a staff member dragging a young girl naked from the shower by her hair, before handcuffing her.2091 Fred said staff generally treated the young people in the Centre roughly, including the youngest children.2092

Fred further described how staff treated violence between children and young people at the Centre ‘like a sport’, and often provoked young people into using violence against each other.2093 Fred said the young people housed in the Franklin Unit called the unit the ‘gladiator pit’, because staff would stand back and observe violent fights, waiting until a fight was almost over before taking any action.2094 Other victim-survivors detained at the Centre between the mid-2000s and late 2010s similarly recounted that some staff appeared to enjoy the violence that broke out between young people at the Centre.2095

Warren (a pseudonym), who was detained at the Centre in the mid-2000s, told us that some staff would ‘bring their bad mood to work’ and would be ‘physical’ with the children and young people whom they did not like.2096 He recounted how staff would pin his arms behind his back, hurting his shoulders, and ‘ram [his] head into the walls’.2097 He said the staff who he alleges abused him were consistently on the same shifts, working together.2098

Warren also reported that he was raped by staff on numerous occasions, while other staff members restrained him to facilitate the rapes.2099 Otis (a pseudonym), who was at the Centre after Warren, similarly reported the use of violence by staff in the context of sexual abuse.2100 He said that when the staff were not happy with the sexual acts he was forced to perform, including oral sex and rape, they became physically violent and threatened to take away his bedding or his canteen privileges.2101 Otis also told us he was physically abused when he tried to yell out as he was being sexually abused.2102

Brett Robinson, who was detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre during the late 2000s and early 2010s, similarly reported the use of force in the context of strip searching. Brett described an incident where, after he refused to remove his boxer shorts for a strip search, a staff member forcefully removed Brett’s shorts, then inserted his finger in Brett’s anus, saying, ‘Welcome to Ashley, boy, you do as you’re told’.2103

Brett also told us that staff would tell him to go to his cell and if he ‘didn’t move straight away they would manhandle you back to your cell for no good reason’.2104 Brett reflected that if the staff members had just told him to hurry up, he would have gone.2105

Erin (a pseudonym), who was detained at the Centre in the mid-2010s, also told us she regularly witnessed staff members physically abusing other children and young people at the Centre.2106 She recalled bad physical abuse, particularly against boys at the Centre, which sometimes resulted in broken arms and legs.2107

Max (a pseudonym), who was detained at the Centre in the late 2010s, told us he lashed out at a staff member during a strip search on him in an area of the Centre where there were no cameras.2108 Max said the staff member punched him and reminded him that ‘there are no cameras up here’.2109

Max also alleged physical abuse by staff following a stand-off in the early 2020s, where he said he agreed with a staff member that he would drop his weapon if no one touched him and he was allowed to return to his room.2110 Max recalled that when he dropped the weapon he was restrained by four staff members who ‘belt[ed] the absolute shit out of [me]’ before he was handcuffed and taken to his cell.2111 Max told us his nose was bleeding, but he was left alone for an hour with no nurse sent to check on him. He had to resort to using toilet paper to stop the bleeding.2112

  1. Reviews of use of force incidents (2016–19)

In July 2016, a series of incidents occurred at Ashley Youth Detention Centre during which young people were alleged to have damaged property at the Centre. While the incidents raised issues regarding worker safety, there were also concerns relating to how Centre staff used force and isolation to manage the incidents.2113 We are aware of three reports prepared in response to these incidents—a Report to the Minister for Human Services (August 2016) and a Critical Incident Investigation Report (undated), both prepared by the Department, and a WorkSafe Tasmania report (February 2017).2114

Additional incidents involving the use of force occurred in November and December 2017, during which children and young people in detention were restrained by Centre staff. One young person was placed in isolation because of a perceived threat that he would assault other young people and staff.2115 The Department initiated an internal review of the incidents in 2018.2116 In 2019, the Ombudsman completed a preliminary inquiries report into one of the 2017 incidents in response to a complaint received from a young person in detention about the use of force by Centre staff.2117

The occurrence of these incidents in 2016 and 2017 suggested to us that, at least until recently, there was an ongoing culture of excessive, unreasonable or possibly illegal uses of force by some staff at the Centre. This reflects many of the experiences we were told of by witnesses who were detained at the Centre at various times since 2000, as described above.

Below, we briefly describe the nature of the incidents that occurred in 2016 and 2017. We then outline the major findings of each of the five reports prepared in response to the incidents by various arms of the State and oversight bodies, including the failings those reports identified and the recommendations they made.

  1. 2016 incidents of use of force and associated responses
  1. Uses of force on 14 and 15 July 2016

On 14 and 15 July 2016, a series of incidents involving several young people in detention occurred at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (‘the July 2016 incidents’).2118 We summarise below the aspects of the incidents that are relevant to our consideration of the uses of force. The summary is drawn from the subsequent reviews.

On the evening of 14 July, three young people detained at the Centre broke windows (including one window in the unit’s common room) and armed themselves with pieces of broken glass.2119 Tasmania Police attended the incident. Centre staff negotiated with the young people to disarm themselves.2120 The incident eventually concluded. Centre staff (but not nurses) inspected the young people’s hands for injuries, and the young people went to bed.2121

The following morning, 15 July 2016, two of the young people involved in the incident the previous evening entered the common room of the unit where they were housed. A maintenance worker had covered the room’s broken window with cardboard.2122 CCTV footage shows the young people appeared ‘animated’ or ‘agitated’.2123 An incident unfolded where a staff member appeared to attempt to block one young person gaining access or getting close to the broken window.2124 One of the young people attempted to ‘charge’ at the staff member who was standing between him and the broken window.2125 Two additional staff members stepped in, and the young person (who had ‘charged’ at the staff member) retreated to sit on a table tennis table in the common room.2126 One of the three staff members (the ‘third staff member’) then approached the table tennis table, grabbed the young person by the shoulder, pulled him forward, swung him off the table and began pushing him by both shoulders towards his room.2127 The third staff member and another staff member followed the young person into his room, before exiting about 15 to 30 seconds later.2128 The next day, the young person alleged the third staff member had entered his room and punched him.2129

Soon after that young person was escorted to his room, another staff member put the other young person into a headlock and wrestled him to the ground.2130 Three staff members pushed this young person down a hallway and into his room.2131 The young person then tried to push the door open and one staff member ‘kick[ed] him back in his room in ... the torso region’.2132

Later that day, at about 12.30 pm, another young person was kicking the broken window in the common room.2133 A staff member engaged verbally with the young person and consequently the young person left the common room and entered the dining room.2134 Two staff members, including the third staff member from the incident earlier that morning, then walked into the dining room, grabbed this young person, and escorted him to his room.2135 When the young person reached the door of his room, he stopped, at which point the third staff member grabbed him, put him in ‘a full nelson hold’ and lifted him off the ground.2136 The third staff member then carried the young person down the hallway and threw him into another room.2137

Three reports were prepared in response to the July 2016 incidents. We describe the findings of each report below.

  1. Report from Department to the Minister for Human Services (August 2016)

The July 2016 incidents were reported to the Minister for Human Services on 18 July 2016.2138 On 12 August 2016, following a detailed review of CCTV footage, the Minister was given a ‘full Information Brief’ on the matter.2139

The Minister sought a further detailed report.2140 On 19 August 2016, the Department delivered a report to the Minister about the incidents.2141 The report examined the possible use of excessive force, focusing on the actions of one particular staff member, against young people during the incidents.2142

The report noted that, while the specified staff member had been trained in non-violent crisis intervention, the restraints used were not consistent with the non-violence crisis intervention manual.2143 The report noted that the use of force appeared to be ‘excessive to that which might be considered reasonable’, given the young person was seen calmly sitting before the use of force.2144 The report stated that, during the incidents, de-escalation strategies did not appear to have been followed before staff resorted to force, and that the use of a ‘nelson’ hold by the third staff member on a young person, where force was applied to the young person’s neck and the young person was completely lifted off the ground, contradicted the type or use of authorised restraints in the Centre’s training and operating procedures.2145 There is no sign in the report that its authors spoke to the young people involved in the incidents.2146

The report contained an action plan that stated the following should occur:

  • proceed to act immediately in relation to the staff member, including:
    • starting Employment Direction No. 4—Suspension and Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct processes
    • appointing an appropriate independent investigator
    • requesting the worker to be absent from the workplace on full pay2147
  • develop a change management process, including allocating $300,000 to appoint a senior change manager and develop a training package2148
  • develop a WorkSafe Corrective Action Plan2149
  • continue a review of priority practices and procedures2150
  • develop a process to ensure the timely review of all critical incidents2151
  • deliver risk assessment training in August 20162152
  • develop a proposal to strengthen the use of multidisciplinary teams to support a therapeutic-informed approach.2153

Secretary Pervan referred the conduct of the staff member in question to Tasmania Police, suspended the staff member on full pay as per Employment Direction No. 4, and started a formal process under Employment Direction No. 5, to run in parallel with the Tasmania Police investigation.2154 Ultimately, the disciplinary process resulted in counselling, a reprimand and a temporary reassignment of duties.2155 The police laid charges, however these were ultimately dismissed by the Magistrates Court, which found that the use of force was appropriate in the circumstances.2156

  1. Critical Incident Investigation Report (undated)

Besides the report to the Minister for Human Services, the Department prepared a Critical Incident Investigation Report for WorkSafe Tasmania regarding the incidents on 14 and 15 July 2016.2157

The report categorised the events as five separate incidents occurring over the two-day period. It reviewed CCTV footage, policy and procedure documents, investigation reports and witness statements.2158 The report noted difficulties due to:

  • delays in receiving statements from staff
  • inconsistencies between individual statements
  • lack of CCTV coverage in certain areas in the Centre
  • lack of audio accompanying the CCTV footage.2159

It appears the authors of the report did not speak to young people at the Centre.2160

The report made several findings, including:

  • Despite statements from staff suggesting they feared for their safety and that the young people were acting in a ‘riotous manner’, no staff member activated their duress alarm or called a ‘code black’ as per the relevant Standard Operating Procedures.2161
  • The actions of staff were ‘contrary to policy’ and identified an ‘organisational deficiency’.2162
  • The actions of staff highlighted deficiencies in staff training and staff capability related to emergency response, risk reduction, de-escalation of violent behaviour, and sound decision making to support proactive risk awareness and safety.2163
  • The CCTV footage did not appear to reveal de-escalation strategies.2164
  • The restraint the staff members used did not comply with non-violent crisis intervention training.2165
  1. WorkSafe Tasmania Investigation Report (February 2017)

A WorkSafe Tasmania investigation, starting on 29 July 2016, was also conducted into the July 2016 incidents.2166 The investigation report indicated that several factors led to significant deficiencies in Ashley Youth Detention Centre’s current safety management system. These factors were ‘training, consultation, resourcing, communication and, particularly, risk identification and effective management and control’.2167 The investigation report noted ‘the use of isolation, the use of force, and … a less institutionalised appearance within the facility’ were all factors that contributed to the July 2016 incidents.2168 There is no sign the authors of the investigation report spoke to young people at the Centre.2169

WorkSafe Tasmania indicated that, while it recommended that no prosecution action be undertaken against any party, the Secretary of the Department was required to provide monthly status reports regarding the implementation of a remedial corrective action plan and a comprehensive safety management plan.2170 The remedial corrective action plan included, as a high priority, to ‘[r]eview, evaluate and reinforce the agenc[y] culture. Ensuring compliance with the programme, policies and procedures (change management process identified and approved)’ within 12 months.2171

  1. 2017 incidents of use of force and associated responses
  1. Use of force incidents occurring between November and December 2017

In 2017, three more incidents of possible excessive use of force occurred at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. We summarise these incidents here, drawing from the descriptions in the subsequent reviews.

In November 2017, an incident occurred where a young person assaulted an Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member.2172 The young person was ‘placed on his stomach’ on a couch and restrained, before being isolated.2173

In December 2017, an incident occurred involving a young person being ‘taken down’ by staff onto his back on a wooden bench, which he had jumped on after it appears he was informed that he was being moved to another unit.2174 When the young person was on his back, a staff member ‘grasp[ed] [the young person] around the neck or head’, while four staff members restrained and handcuffed him.2175 The young person was then dragged off the bench by the handcuffs, wrist locked and escorted to his room.2176 CCTV footage showed the entire incident occurred within a minute of the staff members entering the TV room where the young person had been sitting.2177 The young person was left handcuffed in his room for more than two hours. He complained that staff members used excessive force when they entered his room to remove the handcuffs.2178

During that December 2017 incident, another young person attempted to involve himself in the incident between the young person and four staff members.2179 That other young person was ‘flung’ or ‘thrown’ from one staff member to another while the other young person was being restrained.2180

Later that month, a young person who appeared ‘angry’ was restrained on a wooden bench.2181 CCTV footage showed that staff did not appear to engage non-violent crisis intervention processes before engaging in restraining the young person.2182

  1. Department’s Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (2018)

The incidents described above involving the use of force between November and December 2017 were reviewed by the then Director, Strategic Youth Services and Deputy Secretary, Children and Youth Services.2183 It was agreed to establish an Incident Review Committee to review the incidents.2184 The specific findings of the review regarding the use of force in relation to these incidents are unclear. The report, however, includes the following comments:

  • In several instances there did not appear to be appropriate de-escalation techniques adopted before the restraints.2185
  • There was a lack of clarity about policies and procedures regarding the supervision and movement of young people and the use of handcuffs, contributing to a lack of clarity about how to manage non-complying young people and how to safely escort them without causing injury.2186

The review did not speak to the young people involved in the use of force incidents.2187

The report included recommendations relevant to the use of force and staff practices, including:

  • an incident with a use of force component must be downloaded from the CCTV footage in its original form and securely stored on a separate drive2188
  • further training and information sessions were to be provided on isolation procedures and relevant delegations2189
  • there should be greater clarity in the Centre’s Supervision and Movement of Young People Standard Operating Procedure on the required numbers of staff when moving compliant and non-compliant young people in detention2190
  • Ashley Youth Detention Centre should be given its own training budget and:
    • a fixed-term position for a training manager should be created as a matter of urgency
    • the training manager should undertake a full audit of the training for each staff member
    • a permanent position for a training facilitator and assessor at the Centre should be created
    • the possibility of professional qualifications for all employees at the Centre should be explored2191
  • onsite discussions should be held with management providing clear guidelines and clarifications about their roles and responsibilities regarding how employees are managed, including their ongoing professional development2192
  • the Centre Manager must review every incident involving the use of force2193
  • future legislative amendments should consider changes to the definition of the word isolation, noting that the term, as defined under the Youth Justice Act, was ‘not considered to be appropriate terminology for a youth detention centre’ and, if possible, ‘this should be replaced with language more appropriate to a therapeutic environment [the Centre] is striving to achieve’2194
  • all staff are to be trained and undertake regular review training regarding verbal judo or similar de-escalation techniques and motivational interviewing techniques by suitable qualified persons2195
  • a Use of Force Review Committee be established, and a percentage of all incidents be reviewed by the Committee. That this Committee should have a maximum of four people and include representatives from:
    • the Centre’s Training Manager or representative from Professional Services
    • Human Resources
    • Workplace Health and Safety
    • Quality Improvement and Workforce Development.2196

We understand the Human Resources, Workplace Health and Safety, and Quality Improvement and Workforce Development units were based in the Department and not Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

While it appears the review considered staff used inappropriate force, the Department decided that no action would be taken against the staff members involved in these incidents ‘due to gaps in training and procedures’ at the Centre.2197

  1. Ombudsman’s preliminary inquiries into the assessment of a use of force incident (December 2019)

In January 2018, the Ombudsman received a complaint from a young person involved in one of the use of force incidents described above (involving the young person being ‘taken down’ by staff onto his back on a wooden bench, in December 2017).2198 After the Department completed its review (described above), the Ombudsman’s office conducted a preliminary investigation of the specific incident relating to the complaint.2199 This included considering the Department’s 2018 internal review.2200 In December 2019, Ombudsman Richard Connock provided a preliminary inquiries report to Secretary Pervan.2201

In his report to the Secretary, the Ombudsman questioned the quality and thoroughness of the Department’s 2018 internal review (referred to above), describing it as ‘perfunctory’.2202 Among other criticisms of the internal review, the Ombudsman stated the Department had failed to gather basic evidence to inform its assessment of the use of force against the young person who had complained to him, including:

  • speaking to that young person about his version of events
  • detailing any injuries the young person may have suffered
  • reviewing what training on the use of force had been provided to staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2203

The Ombudsman also noted the internal review had not included an assessment of whether the use of force was excessive against criteria in the Youth Justice Act relevant to what constitutes ‘reasonable force’.2204

The Ombudsman further noted in his report to the Secretary that the Department had been aware for some time there were gaps in the training of staff members at the Centre in relation to the use of force.2205 The Ombudsman emphasised that an independent review of Ashley Youth Detention Centre, undertaken in 2015 (refer to Chapter 10), had identified that ‘[a] number of people who are involved in the training of Youth Workers expressed concerns at Youth Workers preferring to use physical means of dealing with young people rather than the de-escalation techniques emphasised in the training’.2206

The Ombudsman also emphasised that documentation relevant to a therapeutic change program that Ashley Youth Detention Centre had adopted before 2016, known as the ‘Ashley+ Approach’, had included significant investment in training, but that such training was not working. He quoted the Ashley+ Approach:

In December 2016 there was a majority of Youth Workers and staff [at Ashley Youth Detention Centre] with 10+ years experience in the Centre. The majority of these staff were originally trained for operating in a corrections rather than therapeutic environment. This training and the transition over recent years from a corrections focus to a rehabilitation and treatment focus are often at odds and despite significant investment in training some staff continue to operate from a corrections philosophy.2207

We are particularly concerned by the observations of the Ombudsman that:

Rather than supporting the Department’s position that there are gaps in training, the reports appear to be demonstrating that there has been training provided but that there is an underlying cultural issue affecting its adoption.2208

The Ombudsman highlighted several similarities between the use of force incident in December 2017 and the earlier use of force incident that occurred in July 2016. According to the Ombudsman, these similarities included:

  • de-escalation attempts appear to be limited
  • the use of force was questionable
  • there were no obvious immediate threats to the staff involved.2209

The Ombudsman questioned why the Department had not sought advice about whether the use of force in December 2017 amounted to an offence, considering that the use of force during the July 2016 incidents had been referred to Tasmania Police.2210 The Ombudsman said it became apparent to him, when following up the December 2017 incident, that ‘an unwritten reason for not pursuing any formal action in this case was due to concerns about already low staff morale following the prosecution in 2016’.2211 The Ombudsman characterised this rationale as ‘concerning’, considering that ‘[t]he paramount consideration for the Department should be the safety and care of the vulnerable children in its care’.2212

At the end of his report to Secretary Pervan, the Ombudsman suggested the Department implement a formal process to ensure greater oversight of the use of force by Centre staff, namely that the Ombudsman’s office be notified of all future use-of-force incidents at the Centre.2213

  1. Systems observations

During 2016 and 2017, there appear to have been multiple instances of the inappropriate use of force at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. While one incident was raised with police, we remain unclear why others were not, despite the Department being aware of these incidents. We hold serious concerns regarding the Ombudsman’s view that the Department appears to have placed undue emphasis on low staff morale as a reason to not take proportionate action, particularly in relation to the December 2017 incident. Staff morale should not be given priority over the safety of vulnerable children. We are also very concerned by the reliance in multiple reviews on additional staff training and policy clarification as the solution to addressing excessive use of force, particularly considering evidence that:

  • training had been provided
  • the conduct was inconsistent with existing policies on use of force
  • there appeared to be cultural resistance to the adoption of the practices recommended by the training.

Finding—The excessive use of force has been a longstanding method of abusing children and young people by some staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, and the Department and Tasmanian Government have not always responded appropriately

We find that, during the period under examination by our Commission of Inquiry (2000 to the early 2020s), some staff at the Centre have used excessive force as a method of humiliation, control and abuse of children and young people. While we have not tested the veracity of the individual allegations provided by children and young people previously detained in the Centre, we note patterns in the descriptions of the use of force from the early 2000s to the early 2020s. There were similarities between the type and circumstances of the violence across the allegations. Witnesses described force being used as punishment, and the accounts, viewed as a whole, suggested a pattern of some staff using force instead of
de-escalation techniques to manage young people’s behaviour. Most, if not all, of the accounts we heard describe an excessive, unreasonable or likely illegal use of force by some staff at the Centre. We heard this force was sometimes used to facilitate child sexual abuse, including through strip searching.

The series of incidents of inappropriate use of force during 2016–17, documented by the Department and other arms of the State, echoed these accounts. The various reviews identified:

  • the use of force other than as a last resort
  • little or no use of de-escalation attempts
  • the use of force when there were no obvious threats to staff or others
  • use of force that was injurious or dangerous and outside accepted practice for when force is required.

The Department and the Tasmanian Government were aware of some of these instances of force. Except for the one referral to police and a disciplinary process, we are not convinced there was an adequate response from the Department from 2016 to 2017. We are concerned by an apparent lack of disciplinary response in some instances and little evidence of supports provided to the children and young people involved. We are also concerned that instances of excessive use of force may not have been consistently reported to authorities outside the Centre.

We are particularly concerned that ‘gaps in training’ were accepted as an excuse for excessive use of force by staff members at the Centre. We share the views of the Ombudsman when he said the problem is more likely an ‘underlying cultural issue’ affecting the adoption of training. The Department should have a clear policy on the appropriateness of providing training, counselling or direction to Centre staff members who have repeatedly demonstrated resistance to change.

Finding—The Department’s responses to excessive use of force do not represent a child-centred approach in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child

We note with concern that, while the Department and Tasmanian Government were aware of excessive use of force against children and young people in detention, there are no records that suggest:

  • an open disclosure process was initiated, acknowledging that the use of force was inappropriate and offering an apology—an open disclosure approach to abuses by staff of children in detention is essential to enabling a culture of disclosure and to children believing their right to be free from violence and abuse will be upheld
  • young people’s views and experiences were always sought in the investigations and reviews into what happened to them, or to inform the policies and reforms designed to enhance their care—the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Child and Youth Safe Standards are clear on the critical importance of children taking part in decisions that affect them
  • physical and psychological impacts of excessive use of force were adequately assessed and responded to.

Finally, concerns regarding staff morale should not be prioritised above the best interests of children.

Case study 5: A response to staff concerns about Ashley Youth Detention Centre

  1. Overview

Alysha (a pseudonym) began her role as a Clinical Practice Consultant at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in October 2019.2214 Her duties comprised professional consultation and support to the Centre’s staff, including on interventions and complex cases, and promoting the application of a therapeutic approach in youth detention.2215

Alysha told us about the difficulties she experienced at the Centre. She described a ‘toxic, misogynistic and dangerous’ internal culture that she felt affected her and the young people at the Centre.2216 Alysha said she witnessed or learned of conduct at the Centre that harmed young people or put them at risk of harm, including sexual abuse. She also said she experienced sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination from other Centre staff.

Alysha told us how she attempted to raise her concerns about the Centre’s culture with members of Centre management and Department officials who oversaw the Centre’s operation.2217 In particular, between December 2019 and January 2020, Alysha told us she reported a series of allegations regarding the treatment of young people at the Centre and agitated for an appropriate response. Those allegations included:

  • an incident of historical sexual abuse against a young person at the Centre by a serving Centre staff member (who we refer to as Lester (a pseudonym))2218
  • incidents of harmful sexual behaviours between young people at the Centre
  • instances of staff misconduct, including:
    • unlawful strip search and isolation practices
    • using older children in the Centre who displayed harmful sexual behaviours ‘as a means of controlling’ younger children
    • placing younger children in detention with older children with what Alysha said was the ‘express intention’ of exposing younger children to sexual abuse.2219

The above allegations, and the Department’s substantive responses to them, are discussed in Case studies 2, 3 and 7.

Alysha told us she also reported her experiences of sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination to Centre management and the Department. While Alysha acknowledged that some of this conduct occurred at the beginning of her tenure at the Centre, she felt the sexual harassment and bullying she experienced ‘escalat[ed]’ during her time there.2220

Alysha said she considered the treatment she received at the Centre was in response to her ‘speaking up about improper practices and advocating for children who were at risk’.2221 For example, she told us how bullying from at least one co-worker ‘gradually worsen[ed]’ as Alysha:

  • attempted to supervise Operations staff (a practice within Alysha’s job description)
  • recommended that matters were reported to police
  • ‘advoca[ted] against a highly punitive approach towards the children’
  • suggested therapeutic alternatives to proposed action by Centre staff.2222

Alysha took leave from her role in late April 2020 due to what she described as ‘safety concerns and stress’.2223

In 2021, Alysha raised matters concerning alleged workplace sexual harassment and bullying at the Centre directly with the then Premier, the Honourable Peter Gutwein MP.2224

On 10 September 2021, Premier Gutwein appointed Melanie Bartlett to undertake a review ‘of the responses to and processes conducted by the [Department] in relation to any complaint made by [Alysha] concerning workplace bullying, assault or sexual harassment’.2225 The Department was not aware of Alysha’s meeting with the Premier and the contents of that discussion until after this time and did not prepare the terms of reference for Ms Bartlett’s report.

On 20 September 2021, Alysha made a formal complaint about a number of matters, including the way Michael Pervan, former Secretary of the Department, and Pamela Honan, Director, Strategic Youth Services, responded (or failed to respond) to the reports Alysha had made (and which Mr Pervan and Ms Honan either were, or should have been, aware of) regarding child sexual abuse, harmful sexual behaviours and staff misconduct at the Centre. Ultimately, Alysha’s specific complaints against Secretary Pervan and Ms Honan were dismissed. We refer to this complaint as ‘Alysha’s September 2021 complaint’. We discuss different aspects of Alysha’s complaint and the associated responses below.

We understand Alysha has now resigned from the State Service. The circumstances of Alysha’s leave of absence and resignation are beyond the scope of our Commission of Inquiry. However, Alysha’s September 2021 complaint raised serious questions about whether high-ranking Department officials had responded appropriately to the concerns she raised about the risks faced by young people detained at the Centre and the culture there, including risks of child sexual abuse.

As then Secretary of the Department, Secretary Pervan had the portfolio responsibility for the welfare of children detained at the Centre. That responsibility is recognised in the Youth Justice Act 1997 (‘Youth Justice Act’), under which the Secretary is designated as ‘guardian’ of children in detention.2226 Specifically, the Youth Justice Act states that the Secretary is responsible for (among other things) the ‘safe custody and wellbeing’ of young people in detention.2227 Similarly, Ms Honan described her role as Director as encompassing oversight of the ‘safe and secure operations of’ Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2228 Such oversight roles are now embedded within the Department for Education, Children and Young People. These roles are critical parts of the departmental infrastructure that ensures the welfare of young people in detention, including protecting them from sexual abuse.

Accordingly, Alysha’s September 2021 complaint raised serious concerns about whether the Department acted appropriately to ensure the safety of young people at the Centre. More broadly, her complaints invited interrogation of the effectiveness of the broader system within the Department to ensure such welfare. In this context, we consider the way the State and Department responded to the complaints against Ms Honan and Secretary Pervan provides valuable insight into the State and Department’s recent attitude and approach towards complaints about how reports of child sexual abuse and associated matters are managed at the Centre.

  1. Complaints Alysha made against Ms Honan and Secretary Pervan

On 20 September 2021, Alysha’s lawyer wrote to Paul Turner SC, Assistant Solicitor-General (Litigation), Department of Justice, setting out complaints Alysha made against Ms Honan and Secretary Pervan (‘September 2021 Letter’).2229 Alysha made six complaints against Ms Honan. Alysha alleged that Ms Honan knew, or ought to have known, of the sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination Alysha suffered during her time at the Centre. Alysha also complained that Ms Honan failed to respond appropriately to Alysha’s reports of such behaviours. Alysha also alleged that Ms Honan:

  • discouraged Alysha from reporting allegations of Lester’s serious sexual assault and/or rape of a young person at the Centre, and/or attempted to ‘shut down’ or ‘frustrate’ investigations of those allegations (‘allegations of child sexual abuse by staff’) (noting Alysha reported allegations about Lester in January 2020)
  • discouraged Alysha from reporting harmful sexual behaviours between young people at the Centre, and attempted to ‘shut down’ and/or ‘frustrate’ investigations of those matters (‘allegations of harmful sexual behaviour’)
  • knew of, and failed to address, staff misconduct and staff non-compliance with policies and laws, including isolation and strip searching practices, and the intentional exposure of young people to a risk of physical and sexual assault (‘allegations of staff misconduct’).2230

In relation to Secretary Pervan, Alysha alleged that he:

  • mishandled Alysha’s sexual harassment complaint against a Centre staff member
  • knew, or ought to have reasonably known, of misconduct at the Centre regarding isolation and strip-searching practices, and the intentional exposure of young people to a risk of physical and sexual assault, and failed to respond appropriately.2231

Alysha claimed the above actions and failures amounted to breaches of the State Service Code of Conduct by Ms Honan and Secretary Pervan (refer to Chapter 20 for a discussion of the State Service Code of Conduct).2232

We discuss allegations regarding child sexual abuse by staff, harmful sexual behaviours by detainees, isolation, strip searching, the intentional exposure of young people to a risk of physical and sexual abuse and the Department’s response to those allegations, in greater detail in Case studies 2, 3, 4 and 7. Notably, in Case study 7, we accept evidence that the Department failed to fully investigate Alysha’s report regarding Lester at the time of her report in January 2020.

In this case study, we focus on the State and Department’s response to Alysha’s September 2021 complaint. We identified elements of the State and Department’s management of Alysha’s complaint that are concerning. These elements explain recent systemic deficiencies in attitudes and responses to allegations of failures by departmental officials in taking steps to protect children in detention from abuse.

  1. Fragmentation of complaint

As described above, in September 2021, Alysha raised matters personally with the Premier. She also directed a letter to the Office of the Solicitor-General that shared her concerns about the Centre—concerns she had previously raised within the Centre or with Ms Honan.2233 Several reviews and investigations were initiated in response to Alysha’s various complaints about how the Department managed the concerns, including:

  • independent preliminary assessment and investigation into Alysha’s complaints against Secretary Pervan (started in September 2021 and completed in March 2022) (‘Bowen Investigation’)
  • internal preliminary assessment of Alysha’s complaints against Ms Honan (started in September 2021 and completed in June 2022) (‘Preliminary Assessment’)
  • independent investigation into the State’s response to Alysha’s allegations of the workplace bullying, assault or sexual harassment she experienced at the Centre (started in September 2021 and finalised in October 2021) (‘Bartlett Review’).

These reviews and investigations were conducted by different people, and different areas of the State or Government were involved.

In this section, we briefly discuss the focus of each response to identify that:

  • some matters of serious concern Alysha raised appear to never have been addressed
  • taking this approach was a missed opportunity for the State and the Department to identify and address systemic matters.

In the remainder of this case study, we focus on problems with the Preliminary Assessment of Alysha’s complaints against Ms Honan.

  1. Bowen Investigation

In September 2021, an independent investigator, Peter Bowen, commenced an investigation into the complaints against Secretary Pervan. We understand this Investigation was initiated by the then Premier, the Honourable Peter Gutwein MP.

Mr Bowen conducted an initial review of Alysha’s complaints against Secretary Pervan to determine whether there were reasonable grounds to believe Secretary Pervan had breached the State Service Code of Conduct.2234 That initial review concluded that there were reasonable grounds for such a belief in relation to some complaints.2235 As a result, Mr Bowen carried out a more thorough investigation of those complaints for which reasonable grounds existed.

The Bowen Investigation report was finalised on 30 March 2022.2236 Ultimately, Mr Bowen dismissed the complaints or otherwise declined to investigate them on the basis that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that Secretary Pervan had breached the State Service Code of Conduct.2237

We acknowledge that the Bowen Investigation was conducted independently and do not comment on how it was conducted or its findings, aside from commenting on the decision to respond to it as a separate complaint.

  1. Preliminary Assessment

On 28 September 2021, the Office of the Solicitor-General forwarded Alysha’s complaints regarding Ms Honan to Mandy Clarke, Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families, Department of Communities.2238

Ms Clarke then conducted a Preliminary Assessment of Alysha’s complaints to determine whether there was reason to believe that Ms Honan had breached the State Service Code of Conduct.2239 Kathy Baker, then Deputy Secretary, Corporate Services, Department of Communities, reviewed the Preliminary Assessment.2240 As discussed further in this case study, we are unclear about who the final decision maker was.

The Preliminary Assessment did not deal with Alysha’s allegations about workplace sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination. Instead, it deferred to the work of the Bartlett Review, stating:

The author is cognisant at the time of completing a preliminary assessment the Tasmanian Government commissioned an Independent Review which examined all matters concerning sexual harassment, workplace bullying and discrimination raised by the complainant.

The author is of the understanding the appointed Independent Reviewer met with the complainant to discuss the matters. The author made a decision that it was inappropriate for this preliminary assessment to make specific commentary of the matters given the Independent Review process will provide procedural fairness to the complainant to support a resolution to the matters.2241

Accordingly, the Preliminary Assessment conducted no analysis and reached no conclusions about Ms Honan’s actions relating to Alysha’s allegations of workplace sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination.

We are unaware of any steps the Department of Premier and Cabinet took to ensure the Department knew of the scope and limitations of the Bartlett Review. The evidence available to us suggests that, at least as late as the end of November 2021, the Bartlett Review report had not been provided to the Department.2242 The wording of the Preliminary Assessment suggests the author was unclear as to the status of the Bartlett Review (let alone its scope of findings) at the time the Preliminary Assessment was finalised (June 2022).

The Preliminary Assessment concluded that the Department ‘did not identify nor source any evidence which suggests that there is a reason to believe that Ms Honan has breached the [State Service Code of Conduct]’ and no further action was taken.2243 Ms Baker communicated the outcome of the Preliminary Assessment to Alysha on 30 June 2022, by letter attaching a copy of the Preliminary Assessment.2244 This was some nine months after Alysha made her complaint.

  1. Bartlett Review

As outlined in Section 1, on 10 September 2021, the Premier appointed Ms Bartlett to undertake a review ‘of the responses to and processes conducted by the [Department] in relation to any complaint made by [Alysha] concerning workplace bullying, assault or sexual harassment’.2245 We understand the Bartlett Review was managed by the Department of Premier and Cabinet. The Bartlett Review was conducted in September and October 2021. The report was finalised on 22 October 2021.2246 The scope of the Bartlett Review, as set out in its terms of reference, was narrow. It focused, as directed, on the Department’s response to allegations of workplace bullying, assault and sexual harassment the Department had previously received. Consistent with its terms of reference, the Bartlett Review excluded new allegations of bullying, assault and sexual harassment, which the Department had not previously received, including those contained in the letter from Alysha’s lawyer to the Office of the Solicitor-General. Matters not considered by the Bartlett Review included:

  • Alysha’s allegations that she was bullied by other Centre staff as a response to ‘her needing to report matters that she had observed at [the Centre]’, because these complaints were not formalised, and available evidence showed Alysha considered the issues ‘to have been satisfactorily resolved’2247
  • Alysha’s allegation regarding a Centre staff member swerving their car towards her, because she had not previously reported the matter to any Department staff member and had made no formal complaint on the matter previously2248
  • the Department’s response to Alysha’s complaints against Secretary Pervan and Ms Honan that were raised in September 2021, given the Department’s response was ongoing.2249

We note also that discrimination was not within the scope of the Bartlett Review (despite the Department’s incorrect belief, as set out above).2250 The Bartlett Review found no deficiencies in the processes the Department used to resolve Alysha’s previous complaints, but commented on:

  • the delays in the investigation and the Secretary’s decisions about the previous complaints
  • how the outcome of the investigation was communicated to Alysha.2251

We do not discuss those findings here.

  1. Our observations

The State and/or the Department separated Alysha’s September 2021 complaint into three different investigations. We are concerned this fragmented approach obscured the totality of Alysha’s concerns about child sexual abuse occurring at the Centre and ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the State and Department’s response to the matters she raised. Overall, Alysha’s September 2021 complaint about Ms Honan and Secretary Pervan stemmed from the same set of allegations, including her concerns about:

  • the abuse of young people in detention
  • a toxic workplace culture within the Centre that accepted bullying, harassment and discrimination of staff and tolerated (if not enabled) the abuse of young people in detention
  • a departmental culture that minimised reports or complaints about such practices or actively sought to harm staff who made such reports or complaints.

The complaints against Secretary Pervan and Ms Honan were approached on an individual level as disciplinary matters and were divided between the Department of Premier and Cabinet and the then Department of Communities, respectively. Each disciplinary process focused on the activities or matters within the respective control of Secretary Pervan and Ms Honan to form a view about whether either official had engaged in misconduct, as Alysha alleged.

We acknowledge that Alysha’s complaints about Secretary Pervan and Ms Honan were conveyed in individual disciplinary terms. Still, by dividing Alysha’s complaints about Secretary Pervan and Ms Honan and focusing immediately on the disciplinary issues, the State lost an opportunity to see that the complaints potentially disclosed systemic problems or failings at a departmental (as opposed to an individual) level related to the care and protection of children in detention.

Our analysis of the Department’s response to some of Alysha’s allegations, including allegations of child sexual abuse by staff and harmful sexual behaviours in Case studies 2 and 7, highlights multiple systemic problems that could have been identified by an appropriate response to Alysha’s complaints.

In addition, separating the complaint and the responses to it meant the State missed an opportunity to consider whether Alysha’s alleged experiences of sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination were reprisals for her efforts to report child sexual abuse, harmful sexual behaviours and other misconduct at the Centre. The Bartlett Review’s terms of reference meant that it focused on previous complaints about workplace sexual harassment, bullying and assault while the Preliminary Assessment excluded consideration of workplace matters because of the existence of the Bartlett Review and the incorrect belief that it would address all workplace bullying allegations.

Alysha’s view was that the sustained and escalating sexual harassment, bullying and discrimination she experienced was a direct response to her ‘speaking up’.2252 We are not aware that any government department or official acknowledged or was tasked with considering any potential nexus between Alysha’s attempts to highlight issues at the Centre and the alleged mistreatment she experienced. While we are not in a position to determine whether Alysha was targeted by staff for raising concerns about children and young people, we are concerned the fragmentation of Alysha’s September 2021 complaint left a significant issue unaddressed and may dissuade those who seek to raise concerns about risks to young people in detention.

We are also concerned that a response that separates elements of a complaint means the complainant must engage with multiple investigations, which is onerous, and may, again, deter people from raising concerns.

We do not consider the failure of the State or Department to recognise the systemic issues in Alysha’s September 2021 complaint is attributable to the manner or form in which Alysha expressed her concerns about Secretary Pervan and Ms Honan. It was not her role to guide the State or Department to understand or acknowledge systemic problems in the issues she raised. A complaint or concern must always be addressed for its substance, not its form. We also accept Alysha was only reacting to actions or inactions she was aware of. Her efforts highlight the difficulties associated with raising complaints of this nature.

We appreciate that Alysha’s September 2021 complaint started disciplinary procedures that engaged important principles, such as privacy and procedural fairness, which may require complaints to be dealt with individually or compartmentalised. However, we do not consider that such procedures must necessarily occur at the expense of acknowledging that such complaints can provide valuable information about the appropriate operation of the Department as a whole. An alternative approach that involved the appointment of a single investigator to investigate the complaints against the two individuals and the Department as a whole would have reduced risks associated with fragmentation.

  1. Preliminary Assessment

In the remainder of this case study, we consider how the State responded to the complaint about Ms Honan specifically and identify several problems regarding:

  • how the Preliminary Assessment was allocated and managed
  • delays in conducting the Preliminary Assessment
  • the Preliminary Assessment becoming a quasi-investigation and containing many inaccuracies.
  1. The process for allocating and managing the Preliminary Assessment

We were concerned that Ms Clarke and Ms Baker were inappropriately allocated the Preliminary Assessment as they had an actual, real or perceived conflict of interest in the substantive matters of the complaint. We were also concerned that there was no clear decision maker in this Preliminary Assessment. We set out our concerns below.

  1. Conflicts of interest

As described earlier, Alysha’s September 2021 complaint was directed to the Office of the Solicitor-General. Ms Clarke told us that on 28 September 2021, the Office of the Solicitor-General ‘forwarded’ Alysha’s complaint to Ms Clarke by email.2253 In her evidence at our hearings, Ms Clarke also referred to the complaint having been referred from the Office of the Solicitor-General to the Deputy Secretary.2254 Ms Baker told us that the complaint was ‘referr[ed]’ from the Office of the Solicitor-General to Ms Clarke.2255

By the Office of the Solicitor-General ‘providing’ or forwarding’ Alysha’s complaint to Ms Clarke it is not clear whether:

  • the Office was seeking to have Ms Clarke carry out a Preliminary Assessment
  • Ms Clarke understood the referring or forwarding of the complaint as a direction to do so
  • the Office was simply forwarding the relevant portion of the complaint to Ms Clarke as the manager to whom Ms Honan reported and to determine herself how to respond.

We received no evidence that the Office of the Solicitor-General played a role in managing the response.

Both Ms Clarke and Ms Baker are listed as the ‘decision-makers’ on the Preliminary Assessment form, with Ms Clarke identified as the ‘preliminary assessor’ and Ms Baker identified as the ‘reviewer’.2256 Ms Clarke explained that the reason the matter was referred to her as Deputy Secretary was because Secretary Pervan had a conflict of interest in the matter (as Alysha had also made a complaint about Secretary Pervan).2257 Ms Baker, in responding to a query about Ms Clarke’s role in conducting the Preliminary Assessment, also noted Secretary Pervan’s conflict of interest.2258

We commend the State’s early recognition of Secretary Pervan’s conflict and his consequent inability to take part in the Preliminary Assessment. We were concerned that Ms Clarke and Ms Baker were involved in carrying out the Preliminary Assessment. Ms Clarke and Ms Baker had been involved in the Department’s response to some of the matters Alysha had initially reported to Ms Honan, both personally and as executive managers of their respective areas in the Department.

Ms Clarke and Ms Baker’s involvement in responding to some of the substantive matters in Alysha’s complaints, particularly relating to the allegations about child sexual abuse by staff and harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre, included:

  • Ms Baker was notified of the allegations about child sexual abuse by staff on 10 January 2020, the day after Alysha raised this concern with Ms Honan.2259
  • Ms Baker directed People and Culture to consider the matter in January 2020.2260
  • Ms Baker understood that People and Culture had undertaken ‘extensive file searches’ shortly after Alysha’s report to determine whether information relating to the allegation was held on Lester’s file or there had been prior Abuse in State Care Program claims against Lester.2261
  • Ms Clarke became aware of the allegations against Lester in September 2020 and was involved in the response from that point.2262
  • Ms Baker and Ms Clarke attended key Strengthening Safeguards Working Group meetings in the Department to discuss how the Department managed allegations against Lester and other allegations of child sexual abuse against staff, at least up to Lester’s suspension from the State Service in November 2020.
  • Ms Baker (and later, Ms Clarke, who was the Deputy Secretary with portfolio responsibility for child safety) knew that Lester continued to be on site at the Centre through much of 2020.
  • As the Deputy Secretary, Corporate Services, Ms Baker was responsible for the People and Culture division. This division reported allegations of abuse against Lester to police in November 2020.

In Case study 7, we accept evidence that the Department initially failed to investigate Alysha’s report to Ms Honan about Lester. We base this conclusion on a statement Ms Clarke made in an internal email dated 21 September 2020, where she said in relation to an issues register recording matters relating to allegations of abuse at the Centre:

The Issues Register captures the issue that was raised by an AYDC employee [Alysha] which Pam [Honan] forwarded earlier today. This came to light during a discussion I had with Pam today and dates back to January 2020. It does not appear that any investigation has been undertaken on this matter, and I note [Lester] is also the alleged abuser.

I would suggest these are serious allegations relating to [Lester] … A HR file review needs to occur, and the abuse in state care file may inform us as to whether a police report was made at the time.2263

We note that Ms Clarke was not aware of the allegations against Lester until around this time and the steps Ms Clarke took in September 2020 ultimately resulted in the Department assessing and responding to reports about Lester.

The Preliminary Assessment provided the following details about Ms Clarke’s involvement in the Department’s response to Alysha’s report regarding harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre:

  • On the day that Ms Honan received Alysha’s report, ‘Ms Honan discussed the matter with the Deputy Secretary Children, Youth & Families [Ms Clarke] which triggered the commissioning of a Serious Event Review of the incident’.2264
  • The Serious Events Review Team terms of reference were ‘developed and approved’ by Ms Clarke (together with a member of the Serious Events Review Team).2265
  • Ms Clarke received the Serious Events Review Team’s report on 27 April 2020.2266

We were concerned by Ms Baker’s proximity to the departmental response to Alysha’s report about Lester, and Ms Clarke’s proximity to the departmental response to Alysha’s report about both Lester and incidents of harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre.

We understand the purpose of the Preliminary Assessment to have been to determine whether there was reason to believe Ms Honan had breached the State Service Code of Conduct. In doing so, Ms Clarke and Ms Baker were investigating the appropriateness of Ms Honan’s conduct in responding to Alysha’s reports for a disciplinary process. Their task was not, ostensibly, to inquire into the appropriateness of the Department’s response to those reports more broadly, or the actions or inactions of other Department officials (including their own). However, we are concerned that, in investigating the appropriateness of Ms Honan’s actions, Ms Clarke and Ms Baker were indirectly reflecting upon their own responses to some of the reports Alysha made.

We asked Secretary Pervan, Ms Baker and Ms Clarke whether they considered it was appropriate for Ms Clarke and Ms Baker to carry out the Preliminary Assessment, given their respective roles in responding to Alysha’s reports.2267

Secretary Pervan said he considered their involvement in the Preliminary Assessment to be appropriate but provided no further comments or justification for his view.2268

In her written statement, Ms Clarke declined to comment on this request, deferring to the view of Secretary Pervan.2269 When asked about the matter during our public hearings, she said:

… over the years I’ve certainly assessed individual directors or managers over time. I have no issue - I mean, I have professional working relationships with directors, I had a particular interest in this, I actually did want to assure myself, as I’ve said, so I felt I was best placed to. I was across detail, and so, perhaps you’re saying, is there a perceived conflict of interest? I guess that then goes to who else would have been in a position to do that preliminary assessment because one of the reasons it was referred from the Office of the Solicitor-General to the Deputy Secretary was, Alysha was making a complaint about the Secretary as well, so there were different arrangements in place, which is why it ended up being the Deputy Secretary.2270

Ms Baker also acknowledged that Secretary Pervan was likely to have a view on the potential conflict, but commented in relation to Ms Clarke:

I note that the referral of the complaint was from the Office of the Solicitor General to Ms Clarke and given the allegations were against a Senior Executive Officer, it is my view that it was appropriate that Ms Clarke was the most suitable person to undertake the preliminary assessment. She had the requisite skills, knowledge and experience to undertake this in an objective and fair manner. I don’t consider that because Ms Honan reported to Ms Clarke that it meant she could not complete the assessment.2271

We asked the State whether it had identified any actual, potential or perceived conflict of interest relating to the investigation, management or determination of Alysha’s complaints against Ms Honan. In a response received from the Department for Education, Children and Young People, we were told that the State had not identified any such conflict of interest.2272

We are not convinced the process for referring the matter to Ms Clarke and Ms Baker adequately considered or reflected upon the extent to which Ms Baker and Ms Clarke may have each had a conflict of interest in this matter—that potential conflict being that in investigating the suitability of Ms Honan’s actions, Ms Clarke and Ms Baker were indirectly reflecting upon their own responses to some of the reports Alysha made. Ms Baker and Ms Clarke have both expressed to us that they do not consider they had any conflict of interest. We consider it would have been preferable, subject to any overriding requirements in Ms Honan’s instrument of employment, for the complaint against Ms Honan to have been outsourced to an independent assessor, as was done in relation to the complaint against Secretary Pervan.

Finding—The Department should not have conducted the Preliminary Assessment and this reflects systemic problems

We were concerned by the lack of evidence provided to our Commission of Inquiry about the appropriate allocation of the Preliminary Assessment, including the extent to which the State considered the appropriateness of Ms Clarke and Ms Baker’s involvement in the Preliminary Assessment.

Ms Clarke and Ms Baker were involved in processes that were under direct consideration in the Preliminary Assessment. These processes included initiating, conducting or directing the scope of investigations relating to Alysha’s complaints regarding Lester and (in Ms Clarke’s case) responding to allegations of harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre. Each had a personal interest in demonstrating the suitability of Ms Honan’s (and, by extension, theirs and the Department’s) response to Alysha’s reports. In that context, we consider there are serious

questions about whether Ms Clarke and Ms Baker had actual, potential or perceived conflicts of interest such that they should not have been allocated or conducted the Preliminary Assessment.

As described above, Ms Clarke contended that the question of her and Ms Baker’s conflicts ‘goes to who else would have been in a position’ to conduct the Preliminary Assessment. We disagree that no other person was suitable to undertake the Preliminary Assessment. We were not convinced that an independent reviewer, such as a Secretary from another Department or the Head of the State Service, could not have been appointed to undertake this task. More objective reviewers may have been better placed to identify systemic concerns and to divert them for consideration appropriately (beyond the narrow forum of the disciplinary action against Ms Honan).

These problems reflect systemic matters we have observed elsewhere. The absence of clear direction and policy guidance relating to preliminary assessments raises the risk of conflicts of interest not being recognised and understood. We are not confident the process for initiating and conducting a preliminary assessment was well understood because:

  • the complaint was forwarded to Ms Clarke by the Office of the
    Solicitor-General
  • Ms Clarke and Ms Baker were allowed to conduct the Preliminary Assessment without apparent acknowledgment or management of their actual, potential or perceived conflicts of interest.

We do not consider the Preliminary Assessment should have been structured in this way.

We consider it is a critical systemic issue that the Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct process does not provide for situations where there is or may be a conflict of interest, as there was in this instance.

Poor or unclear processes for complaints, including the Preliminary Assessment process, can undermine people’s confidence in making complaints about child sexual abuse or responses to it.

  1. Lack of a clear decision maker

We were unable to determine who was the decision maker regarding the Preliminary Assessment.

Ms Clarke and Ms Baker are listed as the ‘decision-makers’ on the Preliminary Assessment form.2273 The Preliminary Assessment form does not state that any other person played a role in managing, conducting or determining the outcome of the assessment.

Before our public hearings, Secretary Pervan, Ms Baker and Ms Clarke were asked several questions about the Preliminary Assessment.2274 In response to some questions, Secretary Pervan responded:

… I was advised by Kathy Baker that a complaint had been received and due to potential conflict of interest, Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke would manage it. As a result, I do not have any further information to give.2275

We understand that Secretary Pervan’s evidence is that he did not ‘manage’ the Preliminary Assessment and that Ms Baker and Ms Clarke managed it instead.

We also asked Ms Clarke questions about the Preliminary Assessment, including whether she was satisfied that the Preliminary Assessment was conducted adequately and was an accurate and complete document.2276 Ms Clarke did not respond to this question, stating that ‘[a]s the decision maker [Secretary Pervan] is best placed to answer this question’.2277 In her procedural fairness response, Ms Clarke told us Secretary Pervan was the decision maker. She told us that this is demonstrated by Secretary Pervan approving and signing a Minute regarding Alysha’s complaint on 30 June 2022.2278

We also received evidence that the Office of the Solicitor-General was provided the Preliminary Assessment, although we are unclear for what purpose.2279 We outline the timing of their involvement in more detail below.

After the hearings, we asked the State to describe how it managed Alysha’s complaint against Ms Honan, including by identifying each person:

  • responsible for investigating, managing and determining the complaint and its outcome, the period during which they held that responsibility and the extent of their responsibility
  • who provided input into the investigation, management and determination of the complaint, the nature of any such input and how the input was provided.2280

In response, the Department for Education, Children and Young People confirmed Ms Clarke undertook the Preliminary Assessment, which Ms Baker then reviewed.2281 This response aligns with our understanding of Ms Baker and Ms Clarke’s evidence, as well as the information presented in the Preliminary Assessment.2282

The Department also told us that Secretary Pervan ‘manage[d]’ Alysha’s complaint against Ms Honan.2283 The Department did not explain the nature of that role. For example, we are unaware whether Secretary Pervan’s role involved all or any of the following:

  • making a final decision on whether to start an investigation under Employment Direction No. 5 (that is, an investigation into a possible breach of the State Service Code of Conduct) based on Ms Clarke and Ms Baker’s assessment
  • providing advice or guidance to Ms Clarke and Ms Baker about how to conduct the Preliminary Assessment
  • only providing administrative oversight of Ms Baker and Ms Clarke as their line manager but otherwise not participating in the decision making.

The Department did not identify any staff member adopting the role of decision maker or making a determination or decision, although noted the list of people it identified was not exhaustive.2284

We do not consider Secretary Pervan played a decision-making role regarding the Preliminary Assessment. However, we remain unclear as to the extent of his ‘management’ role as suggested by the Department.

The lack of a clear decision maker is concerning. In the usual course of events, the purpose of a preliminary assessment is to assist the Secretary to reach a conclusion about whether reasonable grounds exist to begin an investigation under Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct (refer to Chapter 20 for a discussion of disciplinary processes).

When asked about the disciplinary process in place at the time of the Preliminary Assessment, Ms Baker explained that an investigation would begin only if the ‘Secretary, Communities Tasmania form[ed] a reasonable belief that [the] code [may] have been breached’.2285 The Acting Executive Director, People and Culture, similarly noted that the decision to begin an investigation relied on the Secretary’s view that reasonable grounds existed to believe that a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct may have occurred.2286 It was explained that:

Essentially a preliminary assessment is the collection and organisation of relevant information that can be progressed to the Head of Agency [i.e., Secretary Pervan] to consider whether he can form a reason to believe a breach of the Code may have occurred.

[People and Culture], in conjunction with operational managers / directors, and relevant Deputy Secretaries, review the information as part of the preliminary assessment.

Usually, it is the Deputy Secretary Children Youth and Families who briefs the Head of Agency in relation to whether a [disciplinary] process should be commenced in relation to an AYDC Official.

At times, this may also be the Deputy Secretary Corporate Services.2287

Ms Baker told us that the Secretary of the former Department of Communities could not delegate the power to decide to commence an investigation under Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct.2288 Ms Baker told us that a delegation is not required to undertake a Preliminary Assessment.2289 It is unclear who would have made a decision to take disciplinary action against Ms Honan had it been recommended by the Preliminary Assessment.

Finding—The State does not have a clear process for initiating a preliminary assessment when the Secretary has a conflict of interest, including identifying a suitable decision maker

We were concerned by the lack of a clear decision maker for the Preliminary Assessment in the context of Secretary Pervan’s recognised conflict of interest.

Had the Preliminary Assessment recommended disciplinary action against Ms Honan, it is not clear who would have made the decision to take such action. We were particularly concerned that we received inconsistent evidence about the nature of the role of decision maker in a preliminary assessment.

We also remain confused by:

  • the lack of clarity about Secretary Pervan’s role as manager
  • the role of the Office of the Solicitor-General in forwarding Alysha’s complaint about Ms Honan and in receiving the Preliminary Assessment once it was complete.
  1. Delay in finalising the Preliminary Assessment

There was an unacceptable delay in responding to Alysha’s September 2021 complaint.

Alysha’s complaints regarding Ms Honan were sent to the Office of the Solicitor-General on 20 September 2021. The decision based on the Preliminary Assessment was not finalised and communicated to Alysha until 30 June 2022, some nine months later.2290

We have serious concerns about the substantial time taken to finalise the Preliminary Assessment, as the complaint included concerns about the handling of allegations of child sexual abuse by staff and harmful sexual behaviours. Such complaints must be addressed quickly to ensure any ongoing risk to children is addressed.

We understand the timeline for completion of the Preliminary Assessment was:

  • The Office of the Solicitor-General forwarded Alysha’s complaints regarding Ms Honan to Ms Clarke on 28 September 2021.2291
  • Ms Clarke sent her initial assessment to Ms Baker on or around 20 January 2022.2292
  • Ms Baker completed her review of Ms Clarke’s initial assessment before 9 February 2022 (according to Ms Baker’s statement to our Inquiry) or on 28 March 2022 (according to the date noted in the Preliminary Assessment).2293
  • On 28 March 2022, Ms Baker forwarded the Preliminary Assessment to the Office of the Solicitor-General.2294
  • A meeting between the Office of the Solicitor-General and Ms Baker to discuss the Preliminary Assessment was scheduled for 24 February 2022, but abandoned following the announcement that day of the decision to abolish the Department.2295
  • Ms Baker followed up with the Office of the Solicitor-General twice in late March 2022 and once in early June 2022.2296
  • Ms Baker communicated the final Preliminary Assessment to Alysha on 30 June 2022.2297

We have not received any documents confirming when the Preliminary Assessment was forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor-General. Based on the above timeline Ms Baker presented to us, we understand the Preliminary Assessment was with the Office of the Solicitor-General for approximately four months before Ms Baker communicated it to Alysha on 30 June 2022.

The Department for Education, Children and Young People told us the former Department of Communities ‘did not pursue finalisation of correspondence’ with Alysha in relation to the Preliminary Assessment because Alysha obtained new legal representation after March 2022.2298 We are unclear why a change in legal representation might delay communication of the outcome of the Preliminary Assessment.

As discussed in Chapter 20, the Integrity Commission publishes guidelines on the management of misconduct in the public sector. Relevantly, it provides the following guidance on the timeframes for conducting preliminary assessments and investigations:

  • The initial handling of a complaint should take between three working days and one week.2299
  • A preliminary assessment and decision on whether to investigate should take up to two weeks.2300
  • A simple investigation should take up to three months. A more serious or complex investigation should take between three and 12 months (and ‘ideally’ no longer than six months).2301
  • A decision in response to an investigation should take no longer than two months, depending on a range of factors.2302

As this is guidance only, the Department is not required to comply with these timeframes.

We asked Secretary Pervan, Ms Clarke and Ms Baker to comment on whether they considered it was standard or acceptable for the Preliminary Assessment to take nine months to complete.

Secretary Pervan responded:

It is not standard but not unusual in cases without a participating victim, no participating or direct witnesses and no documentary evidence in an investigative process limited by the powers available under the State Service Act 2000.2303

As described above, we were told Ms Clarke completed her task of conducting the initial assessment by around 20 January 2022, approximately four months after the Office of the Solicitor-General forwarded the complaint on to her.2304 Ms Clarke ended her role as Deputy Secretary for Children, Youth and Families on 11 February 2022. She was not with the Department when the Preliminary Assessment was finalised.2305 Of the delay in completing the Preliminary Assessment, Ms Clarke said:

The timeframe for completing the preliminary assessment in my view and by my standards was not acceptable.

I am extremely disappointed that the assessment took this length of time. I acknowledge [Alysha] had been out of the workplace for some time and did not have up to date information and the matters raised by [Alysha] were important and serious and a more timely response was warranted.

There were a number of contributing factors as to why I was unable to complete the assessment sooner. The closure of [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] announcement in late September did divert my attention to preparing Youth Justice Reform planning and documents.

This meant the assessment was completed out of hours which I acknowledge is not satisfactory.2306

Ms Baker also said that competing priorities contributed to the delay, stating:

... the volume of work that [Ms Clarke, then] Deputy Secretary, [Children, Youth and Families] was undertaking at the time was significant. I consider the load on that role to be unsustainable. The nature of my own role often required work to be reprioritised, [one] such example which is relevant was needing to respond to the Government announcement to abolish the Department.2307

Ms Baker noted that while she ‘pursue[d] the matter for settlement with the [Office of the Solicitor-General] on multiple occasions’, she recognised that the Office had its own ‘competing priorities’.2308

Ms Baker shared Ms Clarke’s disappointment with the delay, acknowledging that the ‘timeframes are not ideal’ and ‘could have been improved’.2309

Finding—The delay in the Preliminary Assessment was not acceptable and risked exposing children to ongoing harm

It concerns us that the Preliminary Assessment took significantly longer to finalise than the two-week timeframe recommended by the Integrity Commission. Indeed, the Preliminary Assessment even exceeded the recommended timeframe for a complex investigation of a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct. Delaying a response to a complaint about child sexual abuse or harmful sexual behaviours can result in a failure to address any ongoing harm to children, where the alleged abuser remains in their position. While we note that Lester had been suspended from November 2020, and so presented no immediate risk to child safety, there were still potential risks of harmful sexual behaviours being inadequately managed (which the Preliminary Assessment might have uncovered). In addition, unaddressed poor responses to allegations of abuse increase the risk of abuses going undetected.

As described above, Ms Honan’s role is an important part of the Department’s management structure that ensures the safety of children and young people in detention, including to protect them from sexual abuse. In our view, allegations that Ms Honan was not taking appropriate steps to respond to reports of harm to children and young people at the Centre should have attracted a swift response from the Department. Failing to do so may have placed children and young people at continued risk of harm.

This delay also had the unfortunate effect of drawing out the process and we are concerned about the degree to which this contributed to unnecessary stress on Alysha. We are unaware of attempts any person took to keep Alysha updated on the status of the Preliminary Assessment during this time.

We are also not aware that any person took steps to request the matter be allocated to another person; for example, an independent reviewer. We note the matter was with Ms Clarke for several months and she appeared to have submitted the initial assessment immediately before vacating her role.

It is concerning that, when asked whether the timeframe to complete the Preliminary Assessment was standard or acceptable, Secretary Pervan told us that it was ‘not standard, but not unusual’.

We have given weight to the heavy workload under which both Ms Baker and Ms Clarke were operating and understand this likely contributed to the delay. We are concerned the role of Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families was under-resourced and the scope of responsibility too broad, which may have contributed to the delay. This role had responsibility for Child Safety Services (including the Advice and Referral Line and out of home care) and Ashley Youth Detention Centre,

among other things (refer to Volume 4). This role carries significant responsibility for some of the State’s most vulnerable children. The State must resource these functions adequately. For these reasons, we consider the delay to be reflective of broader systemic problems about the value placed on resourcing child safety.

  1. Purpose and nature of the Preliminary Assessment

As discussed above and in more detail in Chapter 20, we understand the Department undertakes preliminary assessments to collate relevant information and determine whether there is reason to believe a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct may have occurred (being the threshold for the commencement of an investigation under Employment Direction No. 5).2310 When describing to us how preliminary assessments are conducted, we were told: ‘It is important to outline that preliminary work is not investigation work, it is a preliminary assessment, determining if, and how, to proceed’.2311

The Integrity Commission’s Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector states the purpose of a preliminary assessment is to ‘quickly collect information so that someone in a position of authority can decide ... whether there is a reasonable suspicion of misconduct and ... the most appropriate way to deal with the matter’.2312 As noted, the Integrity Commission recommends that preliminary assessments be conducted in three working days to verify basic factual information.2313 It is not intended to become a quasi-investigation.

Based on this evidence, we would have expected the Preliminary Assessment to quickly ascertain whether Alysha had made complaints to Ms Honan and whether, on the face of it, there could have been serious questions about Ms Honan’s response to these complaints.

In our view, features of the Preliminary Assessment, particularly in relation to the allegation about child sexual abuse by staff, were more closely aligned with a fully-fledged investigation into the reports that Alysha made, straying well beyond the narrow focus of a preliminary assessment. In particular:

  • The Preliminary Assessment took a long time (refer to discussion above).
  • Ms Clarke consulted a large volume of material as part of her assessment.2314
  • The Preliminary Assessment addressed multiple matters that would appear more relevant to a full investigation into a possible breach of the Code of Conduct, including:
    • comparisons with other allegations made about Lester
    • weighing up of the veracity and consistency of Alysha’s allegations.

Concerningly, the Preliminary Assessment appeared to consider the likelihood of the truth of the allegations against Lester and did not restrict itself to the appropriateness of responses to alleged child sexual abuse by a staff member.

In particular, the Preliminary Assessment compared the information received by Ms Honan from Alysha in January 2020 with other reports of Lester’s behaviour received by the Department in August and November 2020.2315

Before our public hearings, we asked Secretary Pervan, Ms Baker and Ms Clarke each to explain the relevance of the discrepancies identified by the Preliminary Assessment between Alysha’s report and information later received by the Department.

Secretary Pervan declined to respond to our request, deferring to Ms Baker and Ms Clarke’s knowledge.2316

Ms Baker and Ms Clarke differed on the relevance of the analysis. Ms Baker responded:

The preliminary assessment sought to highlight the records that the Assessor (and in my case the Reviewer) analysed. It highlights the discrepancies between the initial report, what was reported via [Alysha’s] representative at the time … and what was reported in The Nurse podcast. It does highlight that the Department was dealing with varied information that needed to be worked through thoroughly in an attempt to verify what [Alysha] had reported.2317

We consider this comment indicates Ms Baker understood the purpose of the Preliminary Assessment to be about determining the truth of Alysha’s report about Lester. In that context, discrepancies between reports of abuse may be relevant.

Conversely, Ms Clarke responded:

The preliminary assessment included information where discrepancies were identified and the witness statement [was] for [Alysha’s] information only. The information had no relevance on the adequacy of Ms Honan’s response. As the author I was very aware that I was not able to fully disclose a range of information to [Alysha]. The intention in sharing the discrepancies and information about the witness statement was an attempt to demonstrate to [Alysha] that the Department made every effort to identify all potential avenues of information that related to the matter she raised.

On reflection the intention of including this information may have been communicated differently to make this intention clear.2318

We understand Ms Clarke’s response to suggest that the discrepancy between reports was not relevant to the Preliminary Assessment and that this detail was included for other, external reasons. Ms Clarke appears to have considered that the purpose of the Preliminary Assessment was to assess the adequacy of Ms Honan’s response.

These responses are consistent with the varied evidence we received about the scope and purpose of the Preliminary Assessment more generally. In our public hearings, Ms Clarke described the Preliminary Assessment of Alysha’s complaints in relation to Ms Honan as taking a form ‘similar to other preliminary assessments’.2319 She said it did not involve ‘drilling into the actual specific detail of the actual individual complaints’.2320 Rather, Ms Clarke said the Preliminary Assessment required ‘assessing the detail that was available that would form reasonable grounds for a breach of the Code [of Conduct]’.2321 During our public hearings, Ms Baker described the Preliminary Assessment as ‘preliminarily assessing … whether Ms Honan had responded appropriately or not appropriately to Alysha’s report’.2322

As described above, the purpose of the Preliminary Assessment was to ‘quickly collect information’ so the decision maker could determine whether there was reason to consider Ms Honan may have breached the State Service Code of Conduct, and to trigger a full investigation.2323 Its purpose was not to determine the reliability or truth of the content of Alysha’s report or to assess the allegation against Lester.

Finding—The Preliminary Assessment was, at least in part, a quasi-investigation into the substantive reports made by Alysha (a pseudonym) about child sexual abuse by staff, due to a lack of clarity about preliminary assessments

By engaging in this substantive assessment of the accuracy of Alysha’s report in relation to Lester in particular, it appears the Preliminary Assessment strayed into an investigation of Ms Honan’s response and the veracity of the allegations of child sexual abuse.

A full investigation of Alysha’s reports to Ms Honan was well beyond the purpose of the Preliminary Assessment—being to determine whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that Ms Honan may have breached the State Service Code of Conduct and so should have been further investigated. While an investigation of the accuracy of the allegations against Lester was an activity the Department should have undertaken, we disagree it was an appropriate feature of a preliminary assessment.

If the Preliminary Assessment had stuck to its task, there would have been an earlier opportunity to assess the need for an independent investigation into Ms Honan’s response to Alysha’s reports. Had this occurred, some inaccuracies in the investigation we highlight below may have been avoided.

Across many of our case studies, we have found that preliminary assessments stray into becoming quasi-investigations but without all the protections attracted by a formal investigation, including independence and procedural fairness. This is a systemic problem across many agencies.

  1. Flaws in the Preliminary Assessment

We consider the Preliminary Assessment was better understood as a quasi-investigation. As a quasi-investigation, we had serious concerns about its accuracy, the thresholds applied in the Preliminary Assessment, and the impression the Preliminary Assessment gave about the adequacy of the Department’s response to the matters Alysha raised concerning child sexual abuse and harmful sexual behaviours at the Centre. We discuss our most critical concerns below.

  1. Inappropriate threshold for responding to reports of abuse

Building upon the discrepancies it identified between Alysha’s report and later information received by the Department (described above), the Preliminary Assessment concluded Alysha’s report regarding Lester ‘[did] not provide information that would lead a reader to conclude without doubt a serious sexual assault [and/or] rape was perpetrated by [Lester]’, but contained ‘concerning information’ that ‘did warrant further assessment’.2324

We have had the benefit of reviewing Alysha’s initial email notification to Ms Honan and the Manager, Human Resources and Workplace Relations, of the former Department of Communities, sent on 9 January 2020.2325 In that email, Alysha referred to an earlier conversation with the manager about the same issues raised, stating that she wished to ‘follow up [that] conversation’ with an email ‘for [her] own peace of mind’.2326 Alysha then provided further details of the conversation she had with Ira (a pseudonym), a Centre staff member, during which he told Alysha about an event involving Lester several years earlier.2327 Relevantly, Alysha wrote:

  • … [Ira] was working alongside [Lester]
  • They were working in what was known as the ‘Secure unit’
  • [Ira] described this in his story as a unit where only a few select staff were allowed to work, and that [it] was very secure, with a doorbell used if anyone needed to go into it
  • He described walking into a room where a child … was being “punished”
  • [Lester] was standing over the child laughing
  • The young boy was completely naked and on all fours (hands and knees) on the floor
  • [Lester] was standing over him, behind him[.]2328

The manager acknowledged receipt of Alysha’s initial email in an email later the same afternoon, copying in Ms Honan.2329 That evening, Alysha sent a further email to Ms Honan and the manager, in which she shared the following further details:

  • This was the beginning of [Lester] being involved in office work due to him not being allowed to work with children.
  • [Ira] said that judging by how the centre was run at this time, he is highly doubtful it went through HR.

  • [Ira] said that [Lester] was often abusive towards the little ones, not so much the big kids.
  • [Another Centre worker] recalled that he heard the same had happened though he did not know that someone had seen [Lester] in this position. He thought it was common knowledge that something of this sort had happened, when [Lester] was removed from working with the young people.
  • The child was [aged under 15] or so and small at the time.2330

We note the Department subsequently obtained a witness statement from Ira in November 2020, some 10 months after Alysha’s report.2331

We hold concerns about the Preliminary Assessment’s conclusion that Alysha’s report regarding Lester ‘[did] not provide information that would lead a reader to conclude without doubt a serious sexual assault [and/or] rape was perpetrated by [Lester]’.2332

This statement appeared to suggest the Department was applying a test that Alysha’s information about Lester was required to lead Ms Honan to conclude, without a doubt, that misconduct had occurred and that such misconduct was a serious sexual assault or rape, before Ms Honan was required to respond. While not explicitly stated in the Preliminary Assessment, we are concerned the implication of this statement is that this is a threshold to meet for a report of child sexual abuse to result in action by the Department. We have been given no other reasonable explanation as to what else this language could mean.

We asked Secretary Pervan, Ms Clarke and Ms Baker to comment on whether such a test was applied in the Preliminary Assessment and, if so, from where that test was derived.

Secretary Pervan declined to respond to our request, stating that Ms Baker advised him that Ms Clarke and Ms Baker would manage this complaint.2333

Ms Baker’s responses to our questions on multiple matters concerning the Preliminary Assessment are difficult to interpret as we cannot easily determine which of her answers responds to which question. On our best understanding, her response to our question about the application and origin of this test was more relevant to investigating the substance of the allegations against Lester than investigating Ms Honan’s conduct:

We sought at the time [that Alysha] emailed [her complaint] … to try and validate what information the Department may hold in relation to [Lester]. [Ira’s] statement was key information for the Department to put the matter to the Secretary for his consideration and to suspend [Lester] as it was through [Ira’s] firsthand account we were able to verify that [Lester] was in a room and with a naked child on hands and knees. From [Ira’s] statement he said [Lester] was clothed and [Lester] was standing at the head of the young person. This was different to how [Alysha] described in her email (she advised [Lester] was standing behind the young person and standing over him).2334

Ms Clarke, in her written statement, said that as the author of the Preliminary Assessment she ‘did not apply any test’.2335 She continued:

In the context of [Alysha’s] complaint relating to [Lester] the purpose of the preliminary assessment was to assess information to identify if there were reasonable grounds that suggested Ms Honan may have “discouraged from reporting [Lester] and/or attempted to shut down and/or frustrate investigations”.2336

Ms Honan also told us she did not personally apply a threshold to the allegation and she immediately passed on the allegation to Ms Baker.2337

We received no answer as to why the Preliminary Assessment referred to, and appeared to place weight on, the view that Alysha’s report did not provide information that would ‘lead a reader to conclude without doubt a serious sexual assault [and/or] rape’ had occurred. Neither Secretary Pervan, Ms Clarke nor Ms Baker pointed us to any standard that required Alysha’s report to meet such a high threshold.

In response to the suggestion that the Department applied any threshold, Ms Baker recently told us there are examples outside the matters that Alysha raised where there is evidence the Department acted.2338 We were unable to seek details of these examples from Ms Baker before finalising our report.

We are concerned the conclusion in the Preliminary Assessment demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the seriousness of Alysha’s report. Having considered the reports Alysha made, we consider the information she supplied indicated, at the very least, that serious misconduct of a sexual nature (or sexual abuse) may have occurred. This includes the allegations that:

  • the child was naked, on the floor and alone in a room with Lester
  • that room was in a building that had strictly limited staff access
  • the incident was of such a nature that it appeared to result in Lester being moved to a role that prevented him working directly with children
  • Ira had told Alysha that Lester was often abusive towards younger children.2339

The suggestion that Ms Honan needed to reach such a high threshold in relation to Alysha’s report before acting is concerning for several reasons. In setting that higher threshold, the Preliminary Assessment creates the impression that the Department was seeking to justify Ms Honan’s (and, by extension, the Department’s) response to Alysha’s report on the basis that Alysha did not clearly communicate an allegation of ‘serious sexual assault’ or rape. This view is problematic, as it minimises reports of child sexual abuse that do not involve rape or what it describes as ‘serious sexual assault’.

In addition, the suggested threshold indicates Department staff are not sufficiently trained (or expected) to identify risks to children except where they are unambiguously stated in the most serious of terms. This is concerning given that many staff, including Ms Honan, Ms Clarke and Ms Baker, are mandatory reporters under the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997, under which they have an obligation to report where they believe or suspect on reasonable grounds or know that a child has been, or is being, abused or neglected.2340

We are concerned this threshold places a significant onus on the reporter to express their report in a way that will cause the Department to take notice. This is an inappropriate burden to place on reporters of child sexual abuse. Further, reporters may have many reasons not to provide certain details about offending or may simply not know enough to identify serious offending. In our view, it is more desirable to require the Department to be actively aware of indicators of sexual abuse and to respond accordingly.

Further, suggesting that only reports of rape or ‘serious sexual assault’ will be taken seriously may deter prospective reporters from reporting behaviours that appear to:

  • place children at risk
  • possibly constitute a boundary violation
  • indicate grooming.

In addition, taking such an approach would render many children and young people’s reports of abuse ineffective, as we know that they often disclose abuse incrementally. Their first report may not amount to rape or a serious sexual assault.

Lastly, requiring the person who receives a report of child sexual abuse to form a conclusion ‘without doubt’ about the veracity of the report circumvents the disciplinary and criminal justice processes established to undertake this task. Even a full misconduct investigation need only satisfy a balance of probabilities test.

  1. The Preliminary Assessment gives an inaccurate impression of the suitability of the Department’s response to Alysha’s reports

We were concerned by statements in the Preliminary Assessment that appeared to give an inaccurate impression of the suitability of the Department’s response to the matters Alysha reported to Ms Honan.

Referrals to the police and Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme

In relation to allegations of child sexual abuse by staff, Alysha alleged Ms Honan ‘sought to instigate an internal investigation of the matter and discouraged reports being made to the “Strong Families Safe Kids” referral line and/or Tasmania Police’.2341 Alysha also alleged Ms Honan ‘took unreasonable steps in “investigating” this matter prior to referring it to the appropriate agencies and/or took steps that reasonably frustrated the investigation’.2342

In response, the Preliminary Assessment relevantly stated:

  • ‘No records were sourced during [the Preliminary Assessment] to indicate Ms Honan discouraged a report being made to Strong Families Safe Kids Referral Line and/or Tasmania Police’.2343
  • ‘All information was provided to Tasmania Police and the Registrar, Registration to Work with Vulnerable People’.2344

In our view, these statements suggest that appropriately timed steps were taken to inform relevant agencies of the allegation against Lester. However, the Department reported the allegation against Lester to the police and the Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme on 6 November 2020—approximately 10 months after Alysha’s initial report.2345

We consider the timing of these reports to external agencies to be material to the appropriateness of Ms Honan’s and the Department’s response. By failing to acknowledge the delay in reporting by the Department, the Preliminary Assessment failed to appropriately assess the reasons for that delay (and Ms Honan’s contribution to it, if any). Rather, the Preliminary Assessment appeared to simply accept the delay. This suggests the Department did not consider the reporting of the allegations against Lester to be urgent. Nor did it appear to consider the potential risk posed by Lester to other children with whom he had contact in his role at the Centre. This is indicated by the fact that the allegations against Lester are simply categorised in the Preliminary Assessment as ‘historical’.2346

The Department’s knowledge of other allegations made against Lester

In relation to allegations of child sexual abuse by staff, the Preliminary Assessment stated:

Following receipt of information from a third party the Department commenced a comprehensive review of the Tasmania Abuse in State Care Ex-Gratia Scheme records. The review found no application had been received in any one of the four Tasmanian Abuse in State care Ex-Gratia Scheme rounds in relation to the matter reported by the complainant or the third party.

At the time of completing this preliminary assessment the Department of Communities Tasmania has not received a request for information under the National Redress Scheme that relates to the matter raised by the complainant and/or is aware of any civil proceeding that may have relevance to the information provided by the complainant.2347

These statements are narrow and only confirm no claims or reports had been made that corroborate the specific allegation reported by Alysha in relation to Lester. While we accept the Preliminary Assessment, as a quasi-investigation, was primarily investigating Ms Honan’s response to Alysha’s allegations, we consider that, having determined to report upon Abuse in State Care Program and other allegations in the Preliminary Assessment, additional allegations against Lester are relevant to that response.

The Preliminary Assessment neglected to acknowledge various allegations of Lester’s sexual abuse of young people (unrelated to the specific allegation Alysha reported in relation to Lester) which were known to either Ms Clarke or Ms Baker (or both) when the Preliminary Assessment was finalised. These included the following claims:

  • Four claims made under the Abuse in State Care Program (including at least two claims made as early as 2008). Those four claims were known to the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, of which Ms Baker and Ms Clarke were members, by October 2020.2348
  • One other allegation of child sexual abuse of which Ms Clarke became aware in April 2021.2349

We asked Secretary Pervan, Ms Baker and Ms Clarke whether they considered the above statements in the Preliminary Assessment to be misleading.

Secretary Pervan said:

... while the Department was aware of other claimants and allegations against [Lester], we had not received [an allegation by the victim-survivor] arising from the incident described in [Alysha’s] complaint.2350

Ms Baker and Ms Clarke responded similarly. They acknowledged other allegations concerning Lester but noted the lack of allegations about the specific incident Alysha reported.2351 Ms Baker did, however, concede that ‘[w]ith the benefit of hindsight, [the statements] could have been better worded’.2352

Ms Clarke and Ms Baker emphasised they were concerned not to disclose personal information about Lester (including other allegations made against him) to Alysha through the Preliminary Assessment. During our public hearings, Ms Clarke told us she did not include this information in the Preliminary Assessment because Ms Clarke ‘wasn’t absolutely sure what [she] could disclose’ to Alysha.2353 Ms Baker made a similar comment, stating that:

… I don’t think that [the statements that the Department had not received other reports of the allegation] was misleading. I think we could have better worded the disclosure in that report. Being mindful of what could be disclosed, but also bearing in mind that the matter that we were preliminarily assessing was whether Ms Honan had responded appropriately or not appropriately to Alysha’s report. I don’t think that it’s misleading but I think that we could have possibly worded it better.2354

We consider there was good reason to reflect upon those other matters when conducting the Preliminary Assessment to assess Ms Honan’s conduct. For example, the four claims made under the Abuse in State Care Program were not known to the Department until late 2020. Again, by not acknowledging these claims or the timing of their discovery, the Preliminary Assessment failed to consider their relevance to the complaint regarding Ms Honan’s conduct (or others).

Reason for suspension from work

The Preliminary Assessment stated the Department did not suspend Lester from work ‘in relation to an allegation of serious sexual assault or rape as alleged by [Alysha] and in the Parliament in November 2020’.2355

We are unaware of what evidence was relied on to substantiate that statement in the Preliminary Assessment. However, the statement is inconsistent with the evidence we received. Specifically, we note:

  • A Minute recommending the commencement of an investigation of Lester under Employment Direction No. 5 referred in detail to the allegations Alysha initially reported (and that Ira later recounted in his witness statement).2356 The Minute also attached Alysha’s initial email of 9 January 2020, which is described above.2357 The Minute was cleared by Ms Baker on 7 November 2020 and approved by Secretary Pervan on 8 November 2020.2358
  • In a letter to Lester notifying him of the commencement of an investigation under Employment Direction No. 5, the Secretary specifically referred to the allegations Alysha initially reported (and that Ira later recounted in his witness statement).2359
  • In his written statement, Secretary Pervan confirmed the basis for his decision is ‘recorded in the documentation for the [Employment Direction No. 5 decision]’.2360 We understand this includes the Minute he approved on 8 November 2020 inviting Secretary Pervan’s approval to commence a formal investigation under Employment Direction No. 5.

We acknowledge the 8 November 2020 Minute also refers to claims made previously under the Abuse in State Care Program. However, in our view, the above documents indicate that Secretary Pervan’s decision to start the investigation process under Employment Direction No. 5 was predicated on Alysha’s report and Ira’s confirmation of the account in that report.

We were surprised by the Preliminary Assessment’s insistence that Alysha’s report did not contribute to the decision to suspend Lester, despite the above evidence. That insistence appeared to downplay the relevance of Alysha’s actions to the Department’s ultimate response, inviting a view that her information was of little consequence or importance and (accordingly) did not warrant a thorough response from Ms Honan or the Department.

  1. The Department’s view regarding the accuracy of the Preliminary Assessment

We asked Secretary Pervan, Ms Clarke and Ms Baker whether they considered the Preliminary Assessment to be accurate and complete.

Secretary Pervan replied affirmatively but did not provide reasons for his view.2361

Ms Clarke would not express a view on the accuracy or completeness of the Preliminary Assessment in her written statement.2362 She said that as ‘the decision maker [Secretary Pervan] is best placed to answer this question’.2363

Ms Baker did not respond to this question. However, Ms Baker commented that, in her view as reviewer, the Preliminary Assessment ‘was adequate’.2364

We do not agree the Preliminary Assessment into Alysha’s complaint about Ms Honan was accurate or complete.

Finding—The Preliminary Assessment gave a false impression of the adequacy of the Department’s response to reports made by Alysha about child sexual abuse by staff

As described above, we consider the Preliminary Assessment was conducted as a quasi-investigation into the matters Alysha reported. In that context, we are concerned by several flaws in the investigation, including that it:

  • adopted an inappropriate threshold for responding to child sexual abuse allegations
  • was misleading in terms of the Department’s response to some of Alysha’s allegations, including in relation to:
    • referrals to the police and the Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme in relation to Lester
    • the Department’s knowledge of other allegations made against Lester
    • the reasons for Lester’s suspension.

It is unacceptable that the Preliminary Assessment stated that referrals regarding Alysha’s report of Lester’s alleged behaviours had been made to the police and the Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme but did not acknowledge the timing of those reports was many months after Alysha’s initial report to Ms Honan.

It is also unacceptable that the Preliminary Assessment narrowly stated that no Abuse in State Care Program claims or other allegations had been made in relation to the matter Alysha reported regarding Lester, while failing to acknowledge allegations relating to Lester (but not otherwise related to the specific allegations Alysha reported) known to Ms Baker and Ms Clarke by late 2020, and a further unrelated allegation known to Ms Clarke by April 2021.

We consider that without further clarification, these statements gave the false impression there were no other matters known to the Department relevant to the issues in question at the time of the Preliminary Assessment. This includes whether there was a risk that Lester posed a threat to children detained at the Centre.

It is also unacceptable that the Preliminary Assessment failed to acknowledge the view formed by Ms Clarke herself in September 2020 that, at that time, Alysha’s January 2020 report of Lester’s suspected abuse had not been investigated by the Department.

Together, the above statements in the Preliminary Assessment gave a misleading impression that the Department had responded in a timely and appropriate way to Alysha’s reports. They had the effect of overstating the appropriateness of the Department’s actions (beyond merely those of Ms Honan) and ultimately directed the Preliminary Assessment away from relevant lines of inquiry, including what steps Ms Honan or other Department staff should have taken to better respond to Alysha’s concerns.

It is also unacceptable that the Preliminary Assessment minimised the relevance of Alysha’s report in the decision to suspend Lester from work.

We do not accept Ms Baker and Ms Clarke’s evidence that the content of the Preliminary Assessment was limited by what could be disclosed to Alysha, such that they needed to exclude relevant evidence. Disclosure to Alysha was not the purpose of the Preliminary Assessment and should not have guided the way it was undertaken, particularly if it contributed to incomplete or inaccurate findings.

  1. System problems

The Preliminary Assessment was finalised in the weeks and months before our public hearings regarding Ashley Youth Detention Centre. It provides a very recent snapshot of the Department’s attitudes and approaches to reports of child sexual abuse and those who make such reports.

We asked Secretary Pervan, Ms Baker and Ms Clarke to each comment on whether they considered the State’s response in 2022 to Alysha’s complaints about Ms Honan represented a significant current failure to respond to reports about the handling of allegations of child sexual abuse.

Secretary Pervan said:

I would respond by pointing out that both Ms Clarke and Ms Baker are highly experienced managerial professionals. While I was not involved in this process I am aware that the approach they took was meticulous and involved discussions with the Office of the Solicitor-General. [Alysha’s] complaints were made to Ms Honan during a complex period of change with respect to the State’s consideration and response to allegations of child sexual abuse raised through financial redress applications.2365

Ms Baker responded:

As the Reviewer of the Preliminary Assessment, I don’t agree that this was a significant failure. The timeframes could have been improved, and I would also like to acknowledge [Alysha] bringing this matter to the [Department’s] attention.2366

Ms Clarke replied:

As the Official that undertook the preliminary assessment I do not agree the Departments’ response in 2022 to the complaint raised by [Alysha] in relation to Ms Honan’s response to her complaint represents a significant current failure to respond to complaints about the handling of allegations of child sexual abuse. In the context of [Alysha’s] complaint against Ms Honan regarding [Lester] the purpose of the preliminary assessment was to assess the available information to identify if there were reasonable grounds that suggested Ms Honan may have “discouraged from reporting [Lester] and/or attempted to shut down and/or frustrate investigations” as alleged by [Alysha]. At the time the preliminary assessment was unable to identify any information that suggested Ms Honan “discouraged from reporting [Lester] and/or attempted to shut down and/or frustrate investigations”.

We are not convinced by these responses.

In our view, the responses to Alysha’s September 2021 complaint indicate the following themes and attitudes in the Department’s handling of reports of child sexual abuse and related matters:

  • There was a culture within the former Department of Communities that failed to understand the behaviours that amount to child sexual abuse, considering only reports of rape or serious sexual assault would attract a thorough and timely response and applying a criminal standard of proof for disciplinary processes.
  • Matters of relevance to child safety did not always attract urgent responses, and lengthy delays in investigating those matters did not raise significant concerns among Department staff.
  • The former Department of Communities relied heavily on reporters to provide the right information in the right order and form before considering allegations about possible child sexual abuse.2367
  • Senior staff of the former Department of Communities did not identify actual, potential or perceived conflicts of interest in conducting a preliminary assessment.
  • Matters raised in complaints were on occasion siloed at the expense of engaging with the intent of the complaint.
  • There was a failure within the State to recognise that bullying, harassment or discriminatory behaviours can be inextricably linked to an official’s reports of child sexual abuse and illustrate a culture that does not promote or value child safety.
  • There was a failure within the State to recognise that complaints against individuals can represent systems’ failures that require a broader lens and response.
  • Preliminary assessments appear to be used sometimes as quasi-misconduct investigations while avoiding the requirements of those investigations.
  • There is no clear process for determining a decision maker for a preliminary assessment when the Secretary has a conflict of interest.

Case study 6: A complaint by Max
(a pseudonym)

  1. Introduction

In Case study 1, we outlined the experiences of Max (a pseudonym), who was first detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the late 2010s.2368 In addition to Max’s general experiences at the Centre, we have prepared an additional case example outlining an allegation that Max made during our Commission of Inquiry and how the Centre and senior management in the Department responded to that allegation.

Max’s allegation was that a person in a managerial role (‘the manager’) at Ashley Youth Detention Centre offered him incentives to not meet with or complain to our Commission of Inquiry about his treatment at the Centre. This is a very serious allegation. Recognising the significance of this matter and the fact that there were differing accounts of what occurred, we have outlined the accounts of the different people involved in this allegation, which includes Max’s account, as well as evidence from Ashley Youth Detention Centre’s management and the Commissioner for Children and Young People.

In line with our practice of not proactively seeking out victim-survivors and other vulnerable people who had not voluntarily engaged with or provided information to our Commission of Inquiry, we did not contact another detainee who was said to have been a witness to the conversation between Max and the manager, and we did not rely on any evidence relating to this person.

We discovered the relevance of some witnesses to this matter late in our Inquiry, after our public hearings, when we received written notes from the Commissioner for Children and Young People. The timing of this discovery limited our ability to seek statements and test this evidence.

In the end, despite considering the matter carefully, we did not have enough evidence to draw a conclusion, on the balance of probabilities, and make a finding in relation to Max’s allegation. Instead, our focus has been on how the Centre and the Department responded to that allegation.

We consider that the Department’s approach to responding to Max’s allegation was inappropriate and unacceptable given the nature and seriousness of the allegation. We consider the Centre’s approach fell short of acceptable process. We consider the response to Max’s allegation justifies a finding that the Centre and the Department did not appropriately respond to the allegation.

  1. Max’s recollection

Max spent time at Ashley Youth Detention Centre from 12 to 18 years of age.2369 In Case study 1, we share some of Max’s recollections of his experiences at the Centre.

Max told us that while detained at the Centre he engaged with the former Commissioner for Children and Young People ‘to complain about what was happening at Ashley and the way the youth workers were treating me’.2370 He said that this pattern of engagement continued when a new Commissioner, Leanne McLean, was appointed.2371 Max told us that the way staff treated him changed once he started making complaints about his treatment:

After I started speaking to the Children’s Commissioner the staff started treating me like shit. They stopped giving me food and drinks when I asked for them and would say ‘you get what you get when you get it’. Before I started calling the Children’s Commissioner they would just give things to me when I asked for it.2372

By his own account, Max was involved in some serious incidents at the Centre, including:

  • Max was involved in a ‘stand-off’ with other detainees. Ashley Youth Detention Centre policy documents define a ‘stand-off’ as ‘a situation in which neither of two opposing groups or forces will make a move until the other one does something, so nothing can happen until one of them gives way’.2373 Max told us that staff sexually assaulted him during a strip search after this incident.2374
  • Max consumed items from a package smuggled in by a fellow detainee, which Max told us led to him being physically restrained and invasively strip searched by staff while he resisted and attempted to hit a staff member.2375
  • Max described an incident in which he attempted to hit a staff member and described other workers ‘hitting, kicking and kneeing’ him as a result.2376

Throughout his evidence and in his statement, Max acknowledged his own (sometimes destructive) behaviours and actions.

In late 2021, while detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Max heard about our Commission of Inquiry and the planned closure of the Centre.2377 Max told us: ‘Once I saw that the Commission of Inquiry was starting up and Ashley was going to be shut down, I thought that was the best thing that could ever happen’.2378

At this same time, Max was complaining to Commissioner McLean about his treatment at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2379 He said that Commissioner McLean asked him whether he would like to speak to our Commission of Inquiry.2380 Max recalled that he agreed to speak to us as ‘an opportunity to tell my story’.2381

Max told us that the manager found out about his planned session with a Commissioner because it was organised by the Centre and Commissioner McLean.2382 Max recalled:

About a week before I was due to meet the Commission of Inquiry, [the manager] came to see me and [another detainee] in [our unit]. He asked us ‘why are you having a meeting with the Commission?’ I said, ‘to tell them about everything that happens in this shit-hole’. He said ‘they don’t need to hear all that bullshit. They’ve got enough going on with fake allegations as it is’. He told us that if we said good things and don’t go telling lies he’d make it worth our while. He said that we would get to move to the step-down unit and that we would get to go off property at least twice a week. [The other detainee] and I both looked at each other and agreed to it as soon as he said it. It was a filth [good] deal … 2383

Max told us during our public hearings:

[The manager], he pretty much tried to bribe me—well, not ‘pretty much’, he did; he said that he’d give us MA+ games … he’d let the other person that done it as well with me go off-site … he’d let us move to the new unit. Like, he’s giving us all these things, and straightaway we’re thinking, we can’t get any of them; yep, we’ll definitely do that.2384

On 10 November 2021, Max attended a session with a Commissioner held at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Commissioner McLean also attended this session. Max later told our Commission of Inquiry that before this session he was unsure whether he should ‘tell the truth or act like it was all fine’.2385 Max recalled that: ‘I went into the meeting and was asked what I wanted to speak about. I said I wanted to speak about how good the centre was. I said how great the centre was and how they help kids’.2386 Max told us in a later statement to our Commission of Inquiry and during our public hearings that the information he gave in his session with a Commissioner was untrue. He said he ‘just went in there and said that, how good Ashley was, which was a load of shit’.2387 He stated: ‘I fed them up on bullshit. I regret doing it now’.2388

Max told us that after his session with a Commissioner he spoke to the manager and told him that he ‘had said everything [at the Centre] was good’.2389 Max recalled asking the manager when he would be moving to a new unit and when he would be able to go off-property.2390 Max said that the manager told him he would have access to those privileges when his ‘behaviour change[d]’.2391

Max explained that when he heard this he felt the manager had ‘backed out’ of their deal.2392 He felt that the manager ‘knew that we couldn’t take back what we said, so he just acted as if nothing happened, he acted like the conversation never happened’.2393 Max told us he thought this was ‘bullshit’, so he ‘went off’ at the manager and a ‘code black’ was called.2394 As discussed in Chapter 10, Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff call a code black as a request for immediate assistance.2395

After speaking to the manager, Max said that he phoned Commissioner McLean.2396 He told her that the manager had ‘bribed me but then backed out of the deal’.2397 Max said that Commissioner McLean asked ‘what the deal was’ and Max explained it to her.2398 Max recalled Commissioner McLean telling him that she would call the manager to ‘find out what was going on’.2399

Max explained that after Commissioner McLean told him that the manager had denied his allegation, Max became angry and continued to act out:

[Commissioner McLean] later told me that she had spoken to [the manager] and that he denied it which he was obviously going to do. This really pissed me off so I continued with my behaviour.

At some point later I told [Commissioner McLean] that I probably wanted to talk to the Commission again.2400

When told by Counsel Assisting our Commission of Inquiry that the manager would give evidence that the conversation never happened, Max told us that his own account was ‘100 per cent truth’.2401

We are grateful to Max for speaking with us and recognise people who shared information with us often did so with a fear of perceived consequences or risk.

  1. Commissioner McLean’s recollection

During our public hearings, we asked Commissioner McLean about her recollection of her engagement with Max in relation to his allegation that the manager ‘bribed’ him. Following the hearings, Commissioner McLean gave us a copy of the notes she compiled in advance of her appearance and to which she referred during her appearance.2402 We acknowledge these notes were prepared for purposes other than providing a formal response to our Commission of Inquiry.

Commissioner McLean had advocated on behalf of Max a number of times during his previous detentions at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2403 She told us Max approached her on 29 October 2021 to ask for help to arrange a meeting with the Prime Minister or Premier ‘so that he could tell them the good things about Ashley’.2404 She also told us that at the time Max wanted her help to access MA15+ video games while at the Centre. Commissioner McLean recalled that she suggested Max speak to us and arranged for him to attend a session with a Commissioner.2405

Commissioner McLean said she then began making arrangements for the session with a Commissioner.2406

Commissioner McLean told us that, on 4 November 2021, she also spoke to Max at length about his access to video games.

Commissioner McLean recalled receiving a phone call from Max on 9 November 2021.2407 She said Max disclosed to her that the manager had visited him and, on Commissioner McLean’s recollection, alleged that he was offered an incentive to not speak to our Inquiry.2408

Commissioner McLean told us that Max’s comments concerned her.2409 She told us that she spoke again to Max later the same day.2410 Commissioner McLean also recalled speaking to the Centre’s psychologist on 9 November 2021, with Max’s consent.2411 When they spoke, the psychologist confirmed to Commissioner McLean that she had spoken to Max the previous day (8 November 2021) about his complaint.2412

Commissioner McLean confirmed to us in hearings that she raised Max’s complaint with the Centre’s management after Max’s session with a Commissioner and never raised Max’s allegation directly with the manager.2413

On 10 November 2021, Commissioner McLean attended Max’s session with a Commissioner at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

Commissioner McLean told us that Max contacted her again after his session with a Commissioner, on 12 November 2021.2414 She recalled Max telling her that the manager had visited him after his evidence. During our hearings, Commissioner McLean described her conversation with Max:

Max contacted me to report that after the Commission of Inquiry meeting, [the manager] came to him and asked if he had mentioned the ‘blackmail’—and they were very specific used words—to the Commission of Inquiry. Max reported that [the manager] made statements that, ‘You know you’re old enough to go to Risdon, don’t you?’ Max appeared unsettled during the phone call and reported he was involved in several incidents that day. He expressed a wish to go to Risdon straightaway and that he wanted to give up on his exit plan.2415

On 14 November 2021, Commissioner McLean phoned Pamela Honan, Director, Strategic Youth Services, to disclose Max’s allegation. Commissioner McLean then wrote to Ms Honan the following day summarising Commissioner McLean’s discussions with Max.2416 Commissioner McLean’s email to Ms Honan said that, on 9 November 2021, Max had told Commissioner McLean that the manager had told Max he could get Max the video games ‘if you don’t get involved in any political stuff/speaking with the [Commission of Inquiry or Commissioner McLean] because if you do then it gets taken out of our hands’.2417 Commissioner McLean’s email also referred to her conversation with Max on 12 November 2021.2418

On 22 November 2021, when she returned from leave, Ms Honan forwarded Commissioner McLean’s email summary to the manager in its entirety, noting:

Events as reported by the C4C [Commissioner for Children and Young People].

Can you respond so that this is on the record and adopt the strategies we discussed moving forward re two staff present during conversations and documenting of conversations in shift notes.2419

On 25 November 2021, Ms Honan emailed Commissioner McLean, forwarding the manager’s denial of Max’s allegation and describing a meeting with the manager and Max.2420 We describe this in more detail below. Ms Honan told Commissioner McLean that ‘it was agreed by [Max] that he may have confused what [has] been told to him and taken it out of context’. 2421

After this time, Commissioner McLean said that she continued to advocate for Max about his access to psychological support while at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2422

  1. The manager’s recollection

In his evidence to us, the manager strongly denied Max’s allegation. The manager said: ‘I’m confident that I didn’t bribe or incentivise Max to provide or not provide information to the Commission [of Inquiry]’.2423 The manager also told us that ‘at no time did I ever try to coerce Max into doing anything but provide his own evidence to the Commission [of Inquiry]’.2424 The manager stated that he was ‘actually pleased that [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] residents were speaking to the Commission [of Inquiry] because it’s their voice that needs to be heard and in any child-centred approach that’s what should happen’.2425 The manager later noted that Max’s conversation with Commissioner McLean about wishing to speak to the Prime Minister or Premier to tell them good things about the Centre occurred before Max’s conversation with the manager that was the basis of Max’s allegation.2426 The manager observed that this timing tended to support his evidence that he did not attempt to bribe Max.2427

The manager recalled speaking to Max before Max’s session with a Commissioner, which was held on 10 November 2021. At our public hearings, the manager agreed that before Max’s session with a Commissioner he had discussed moving to a step-down unit, going off-property and access to MA15+ video games with Max and another detainee.2428 The manager told us that access to MA15+ video games was something that Commissioner McLean had raised with him as well during this period.2429 The manager said that he later told Commissioner McLean that he had considered the issue and thought it was reasonable for young people to be able to access age-appropriate video games.2430

The manager told us, however, that his discussion with Max was ‘around [Max’s] pathway forward and what he wanted to achieve’ in the context of some deterioration in his behaviour.2431 The manager said that he approached Max about his progress after an incident involving Max breaking into a prohibited area.2432 He said that during the conversation he and Max discussed Max’s progress, his recent work experience and his plan to enrol in a TAFE course.2433 The manager explained to us that at the time of the conversation, Max had wanted to enter a step-down unit before leaving Ashley Youth Detention Centre and to have access to MA15+ video games.2434

The manager recalled that before the discussion, Max had been involved in a range of incidents. The manager said:

In the time previously before that [Max] had destroyed a $7,000 coffee machine, I think he’d broken two laptop computers, he’d broken into that building area, there had been quite a few incidents as part of his spiral sort of downwards, and we were trying to get him to come up from that.2435

We have had the benefit of reviewing the Department’s registers of incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, as well as the minutes of meetings of the Multi-Disciplinary and Centre Support Teams. The meeting minutes and incident registers provided to us do not appear to record the incidents as recalled by the manager, although they do indicate other incidents involving Max in October and November 2021.2436 There was evidence of Max’s involvement in a stand-off during the weeks leading to Max’s session with a Commissioner. They do not record Max being involved in unauthorised entry to prohibited areas, or damaging property, between 1 October 2021 and 10 November 2021.2437 The meetings of the Centre Support Team also describe Max’s behaviour as ‘polite’, ‘settled’ and ‘positive’ before his session with a Commissioner on 10 November 2021.2438

The registers do, however, record incidents involving Max gaining ‘unauthorised entry to a prohibited area’ on 19 and 20 November 2021, after his session with a Commissioner.2439 Similarly, the documents we have reviewed show that Max damaged a coffee machine and a computer in late November 2021, several weeks after his session with a Commissioner.2440

During our public hearings, the manager was asked whether his conversation with Max before Max’s session with a Commissioner related to the information Max would provide at that session. The manager told us he could not recall such a conversation:

Q [Counsel Assisting]: So, [the manager], I’m sorry to interrupt you but you haven’t answered the specific question which you were asked, which is, do you recall having a specific conversation with Max about the fact that he was going to give evidence to the Commission?

A [The manager]: No, I do not.

Q: And, are you saying that you never had such a conversation?

A: I can’t recall a conversation about that.2441

The manager reiterated his denial that he attempted to bribe Max.2442 The manager also told us that his conversation with Max ‘was absolutely nothing to do with him meeting the Commissioner’ and that ‘young people need to be heard, and the young people should be meeting with the Commissioner’.2443 The manager also observed that Max is ‘very, very well spoken’ and ‘quite articulate’.2444

On 8 November 2021, two days before Max’s session with a Commissioner and in response to a query from Ms Honan about whether the manager needed any support to accommodate Max’s session with a Commissioner, the manager said:

I think that [the other detainee] and [Max] want to voice their opinion of [the Centre] and the support they receive, it could actually be a good opportunity for the centre.2445

In his later email to Ms Honan, the manager said Commissioner McLean had told him that Max and the other detainee had positive things to say about the Centre.2446

The manager told us he did not recall speaking to Max after the session with the Commissioner in relation to Max going off-property and moving to the step-down unit.2447 He also said that after the session with a Commissioner, he spoke to Commissioner McLean and Ms Honan about Max’s allegation.2448

  1. Ms Honan’s recollection

Ms Honan gave evidence in our hearings before Max and the manager gave their evidence. Therefore, during her appearance we did not ask her about the allegation made by Max. After her evidence, we asked Ms Honan to provide us with her account of events, which she did in a statement on 16 November 2022.

Ms Honan told us that Commissioner McLean raised Max’s allegation with her on 14 November 2021. Ms Honan told us she ‘viewed the concerns as serious’.2449 Ms Honan said she spoke to the manager when she returned to work on 22 November 2021 and that this conversation covered ‘strategies’ including the manager having no individual contact with Max and documenting all conversations with him ‘to ensure clarity of conversations’.2450 She said it was also agreed (although it is unclear by whom) that Ms Honan would meet with Max and the manager on 24 November 2021 ‘to discuss the concern’.2451 As described earlier, Ms Honan also emailed the manager and asked him to respond to the allegation ‘so that this is on the record and [to] adopt the strategies we discussed moving forward re two staff present during conversations and documenting of conversations in shift notes’.2452 This forwarded email contained all the details of Max’s complaint as captured and summarised by Commissioner McLean.

On 23 November 2021, the manager emailed Ms Honan in response to Ms Honan’s email about Max’s allegation. In that email the manager said that he had spoken to Max after being contacted by Commissioner McLean in relation to Max and another young person accessing MA15+ video games while they were detained at the Centre.2453 The manager’s email stated that Max was ‘despondent’ because ‘the week before [his session with a Commissioner] he had led a stand off’.2454 As noted above, the documents we reviewed record Max being involved in a stand-off in late October 2021.2455 The manager wrote that he spoke to Max about him being able to go off-property, being able to access MA15+ video games and being moved to the unit being run as a ‘semi-step down unit’ once Max was ‘on green’ (a reference to Max being on the highest colour level for good behaviour on the behaviour management system—refer to Chapter 10).2456

In his email of 23 November 2021, the manager also told Ms Honan that Commissioner McLean had contacted him before the session with a Commissioner, who told him that Max and another detainee wanted to speak to our Commission of Inquiry about ‘their lives at [the Centre] and how they felt it was their home and that they were treated well by the staff’.2457 The manager told Ms Honan that he ‘was surprised at first by this action but felt buoyed as it showed that we were doing our jobs well’.2458

In his email to Ms Honan, the manager denied Max’s account of the conversation as described by Commissioner McLean, stating that he did not attempt to ‘influence, bribe or blackmail’ Max.2459 The manager acknowledged that he ‘did try to influence [Max] to improve his behaviour by suggesting that he may be able to go [f]ishing when Green and that MA15+ video games will be available in the semi step down unit’, but that this was unrelated to Max’s session with a Commissioner.2460

Ms Honan said that on 24 November 2021, following the manager’s email, she met with Max and the manager together to discuss the allegation.2461 Ms Honan told us that she spoke to Max separately before this meeting to discuss its purpose, to confirm Max was comfortable with the manager being present and to discuss the option of the meeting being ended if Max felt uncomfortable or became angry.2462 No independent support person was present for Max at the meeting.

Ms Honan wrote to Commissioner McLean the following day, stating that she and the manager had met with Max and that Max had agreed that he ‘may have confused what was … told to him and taken out of context’.2463 Ms Honan did not explain to Commissioner McLean why or how Max had been confused. Ms Honan later told us that, during the meeting, Max said he may have been confused by the conversation with the manager occurring ‘so close to the time’ of Max’s session with a Commissioner.2464

Ms Honan also said in her email to Commissioner McLean that Max was now ‘in a positive frame of mind’ and was ‘motivated to try and reach green’.2465 Despite Ms Honan’s instruction to the manager on 22 November 2021 that any conversations with Max be documented, Ms Honan did not provide to us any notes recording the
24 November 2021 conversation in response to our request for details of her conversations and correspondence in relation to this matter.2466 Ms Honan told us that she used her 25 November 2021 email to Commissioner McLean as her case note of the meeting with Max and the manager.2467

  1. Findings

We do not make a finding, on the balance of probabilities, of whether or not the manager attempted to bribe Max. We found both Max and the manager’s accounts plausible. We are concerned, however, by the response of Ashley Youth Detention Centre and the Department to that allegation.

Finding—Ashley Youth Detention Centre and the Department did not respond to Max’s allegation appropriately

Max’s allegation against the manager was serious. We are concerned that the response to the allegation, including its investigation, did not reflect its seriousness.

Our concerns with the response to Max’s complaint include the following:

  • If Max’s allegation were true, it would constitute, at least, serious misconduct. We received no evidence to suggest this possibility was considered or was raised with anyone in the Department other than the manager. The complaint might have been reported or referred to more senior management and human resources staff and advice sought about what steps to take, including whether the allegation should be referred to the Secretary to consider a disciplinary investigation.
  • Ms Honan spoke with the manager before making any enquiries with Max and apparently provided the complaint from Commissioner McLean with all the details of Max’s account to the manager. We consider it would be best practice to speak with the young person making the allegation before speaking to the person against whom the allegation is being made and then appropriately formulate and present the issues to which that person should respond.
  • We received no evidence to suggest that Ashley Youth Detention Centre took steps to consider whether other detainees were relevant to the investigation of Max’s allegation. While the Centre may not have been aware that Max alleged another detainee witnessed the bribe, it was known to the Centre that two detainees were seeking access to MA15+ video games and were participating in sessions with a Commissioner.
  • We received no evidence to suggest that Ashley Youth Detention Centre took steps to gather information from any other Centre staff (including the Centre’s psychologist) who may have been aware of the allegation and may have had information relevant to Max’s complaint and what, if any, action they may have taken.
  • Max was called into a meeting with two senior managers—one who he had accused of bribery (the manager) and that person’s superior (Ms Honan). We received no evidence to suggest that Max had an independent support person present in the meeting or any other accommodations to acknowledge the significant power imbalance in the room. We consider that the manager should not have been present at this meeting.
  • There appear to be no records of the meeting between Ms Honan, the manager and Max beyond Ms Honan’s email the next day to Commissioner McLean. Given the seriousness of the allegations, a detailed record of the meeting and indeed the investigation process more generally should have been taken and recorded appropriately.

Overall, we consider there was not an appropriate response to what was a serious complaint from a detainee. We consider the response to Max’s allegation suggests systemic problems in how Ashley Youth Detention Centre and the Department respond to serious allegations, including by children and young people against staff members. We observed similar problems in the Department’s response to allegations of child sexual abuse against staff and in a complaint from Alysha (a pseudonym), a former Clinical Practice Consultant at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, about the safety of children (refer to Case studies 5 and 7).2468

It is important that any investigation appropriately addresses the power imbalance between adults and children, particularly detainees who are highly dependent on staff while in detention. It is important, too, to manage the risk that the accounts of adults are preferred over those of children and young people, even where those children and young people may sometimes display challenging behaviours. Also, information gathering should include the accounts of others who may be able to provide clarifying or corroborating information. Finally, it is imperative that serious allegations be formally responded to in line with policy and procedures, and that this be properly documented. We are concerned that the way in which Ashley Youth Detention Centre responds to serious allegations may affect whether detainees raise allegations about child sexual abuse.

We discuss in Chapter 12 changes we consider can be made to strengthen independent individual advocacy for children and young people in detention through a new Commission for Children and Young People.

Case study 7: Allegations of child sexual abuse against staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

A note on language

In this case study, we use the term ‘Department’ to mean the department responsible for youth detention at the relevant time. From 2000 to 2018, this was the Department for Health and Human Services. From 2018, it became the Department for Communities (also referred to as Communities Tasmania). In October 2022, the department responsible for youth detention changed to the newly formed Department for Education, Children and Young People. Where there is potential ambiguity, we use the full name of the relevant department.

  1. Overview

In this case study, we explore responses to allegations of the sexual abuse of detainees made against some Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff. There is a long history of allegations of abuse at the Centre, but this case study establishes that appropriately responding to allegations of child sexual abuse is an ongoing challenge for the Centre and the Department to manage. It is crucial that the Department has the policies and practices in place to identify and appropriately respond to allegations of staff misconduct related to children and young people at the Centre.

It can be difficult to get timely information about potential abuse perpetrated by staff in detention. As we learned in Case study 1, detainees may be fearful about speaking out against mistreatment, particularly if they are still in detention or likely to return. We heard that reporting or cooperating with authorities is heavily stigmatised among young (and adult) offenders, which can discourage reporting. However, we also observed that where young people did try to report concerns, they often recalled that these reports were not recognised as disclosures or allegations of abuse or were otherwise minimised or downplayed. We saw that many former detainees reported their mistreatment in adulthood, perhaps as they recognised and came to terms with what happened to them, felt safer to do so, or hoped that they would be believed this time.

There has been a steady escalation of allegations against current and former staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre over several years. Establishing redress schemes (Tasmania’s Abuse in State Care Program and the later Abuse in State Care Support Service, as well as the National Redress Scheme) became an important source of information for the Tasmanian Government to understand the nature and scale of potential abuses by current and former staff. The objective of these schemes is to recognise and acknowledge harm that occurs in institutional contexts and to provide some form of compensation for the impacts of abuse and mistreatment, but not to closely examine the conduct of alleged abusers. This can sometimes make it difficult for agencies to respond to information received, particularly where it relates to allegations from a long time ago or where there is limited detail about alleged abusers and their actions. More recently, there has been an increasing number of former detainees who have initiated civil action against the Tasmanian Government (most prominently, in a class action) alleging abuses while they were detainees.

This case study explores how the Tasmanian Government and other State entities have responded to allegations of child sexual abuse by some Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff, particularly in relation to information that it has received through redress schemes and civil action. In addition to the Department, we also discuss the role of the Department of Justice, Tasmania Police, the Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme (‘Registrar’) and the Ombudsman in responding to allegations of abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff. This case study should be considered alongside Case study 1, where we found that for decades some children and young people detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre experienced systematic harm and abuse. However, we expect that some of the challenges (for example, in acting on information in National Redress Scheme applications) would be consistent among other institutions and government departments, in Tasmania and nationally.

  1. The structure of this case study

We begin the case study by describing the key sources of information for allegations of abuse by current and former staff—including the Abuse in State Care Program, the Abuse in State Care Support Service, the National Redress Scheme and civil claims in Section 2. We then provide, in Section 3, some background for this case study, including an outline of the various responsibilities of agencies in responding to allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff. This includes the duty of care owed to detainees and reporting obligations to authorities such as Tasmania Police and the Registrar, and powers to address risks to detainees through disciplinary action.

The rest of the case study is set within a broad chronology, focusing on the response to allegations against staff over several key periods, noting these sometimes overlap. In Section 4, we describe how the Department responded to allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff arising from the Abuse in State Care Program between 2003 and 2013. We note that several claims were also received about out of home carers and about other state care contexts, although we have not examined these in detail. The section includes an explanation of legal advice the Department obtained in 2007 from the then Solicitor-General on whether (and how) the Department could use information received through these claims. The legal advice at that time concluded no disciplinary action or police reporting could occur without the Department seeking a sworn statement from a complainant. While this legal advice (and the practice that emerged because of it) is a significant and recurring theme throughout this case study, we do not consider it was the sole reason for not using this information to protect children from further harm.

Section 5 covers the establishment of the Abuse in State Care Support Service in 2015 to replace the Abuse in State Care Program, noting that the Department continued to receive allegations against staff through this redress program.

We then describe, in Section 6, disciplinary processes undertaken against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff from 2007 to 2018, which show examples of serious complaints sometimes being investigated by the Centre itself. This section reflects some of the challenges we have seen across the Tasmanian Government in applying the State Service disciplinary framework to allegations of inappropriate staff conduct towards children.

In relation to this period—2007 to 2018—we chose a case example to examine responses from agencies around this time. This case example is about a former staff member called Walter (a pseudonym), who was the subject of extensive and serious complaints of alleged abuse from a variety of sources.2469 In that case example, we discuss an arrangement within the then Office of the Ombudsman that incorrectly resulted in some serious complaints made to the Ombudsman (including a complaint about Walter) being referred back to Ashley Youth Detention Centre for response without adequate scrutiny. This arrangement has since ceased but highlights the important role of robust oversight bodies in youth detention. We also saw significant problems in the response to complaints against Walter, which allowed for serious complaints to be managed through counselling, warnings and other minor sanctions for far too long. When a formal disciplinary investigation was initiated, it failed to consider the history of complaints against Walter in their totality and recognise an alarming pattern of behaviour within the allegations.

In Section 7, we note the introduction of the National Redress Scheme in 2018 and outline the processes Tasmania has adopted in responding to claims under this scheme.

We then look to 2019 and onwards in Section 8, which is when the Tasmanian Government began to receive information about current and former Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff through National Redress Scheme applications. We illustrate the key systemic issues we observed during this period with reference to the more recent case examples of Ira, Lester and Stan (all pseudonyms).2470 Each of these staff members had serious and significant complaint histories relating to abuse of detainees that became apparent from 2019 and arising from claims to the Abuse in State Care Program, the Abuse in State Care Support Service, the National Redress Scheme and civil litigation. We identify failings and shortcomings in the Department’s responses to allegations against staff from 2019 to 2020, while noting some challenges it was facing.

In Section 9, we describe a welcome change in the Department’s approach, with a greater focus on the public interest in the safety and wellbeing of children. We also note ongoing shortcomings in the Department’s response to allegations against staff.

In Sections 10 to 12, we make observations about systemic problems from 2019 to 2021 regarding responses from Tasmania Police, the Registrar and the Department of Justice to alleged abuses by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff.

We then, in Section 13, describe continuing departmental initiatives to improve records and responses to child sexual abuse from 2021, before making brief observations about more recent responses to abuse allegations against staff from the similar period in Section 14. In that section, we identify some areas of improvement—particularly in the timeliness of the response—that we want to acknowledge. However, we describe some of our ongoing concerns about the effectiveness of the Department’s response to allegations. We also identify that staff morale re-emerges as a dominant consideration and warn against allowing this focus to come at the expense of the safety of children.

Overall, the problems we identify cannot be reduced to the decisions or actions of individuals—they occur in the context of a fundamentally broken system that struggles to prioritise the safety and wellbeing of young people in detention.

  1. Approach to case examples

As mentioned, in this case study we include several case examples to help us understand the challenges and realities associated with responding to allegations of child sexual abuse. We have chosen these case examples to inform our understanding of the problems and to guide our recommendations. We examine case examples to varying degrees. For instance, we consider only some aspects of the response to allegations of child sexual abuse by Walter in detail to illustrate problems specific to that period (the mid-2010s). In more recent case examples, we were able to include greater detail about those problems and the extensive history of complaints about Walter.

With our case examples of Ira, Lester and Stan, which focus on the period from 2019 to 2020, we adopt a different approach. We examine these three matters in detail, like the approach we adopted for our health case studies in Chapter 14. We chose these examples because they were relatively recent, and we wanted to test the view that allegations of abuse in Ashley Youth Detention Centre were a problem in the past. Through our forensic review of these recent examples, we found that this was not the case. We observed a range of concerning practices that compromised detainee safety and exposed significant weaknesses in the Department’s recent policies, practices and systems to respond to allegations of abuse against staff. These case examples form the basis of our systemic findings in this and other case studies in this volume and have greatly influenced our recommendations in Chapter 12.

Because of how recent the case examples of Ira, Lester and Stan are, we have not been able to lay out our analysis of these matters in detail. This is because there are still legal and other processes underway associated with these matters and we do not want to compromise them. We also needed to respect certain legal obligations to protect the confidentiality of claimants under the National Redress Scheme and other redress processes, which form part of our review.

We had considered publishing but then suppressing our more extensive analysis of these three staff, but ultimately decided against doing so. We thought it in the public interest for the Tasmanian community to receive this information as soon as possible, to the extent possible. This meant we had to present the information differently and in a significantly truncated form. As a result, there may be times where it may appear our findings and recommendations lack some detail compared with other forensic case studies or even our case example of Walter. However, all the information on which we base findings and recommendations has been provided to the State, relevant agencies and witnesses, and has been the subject of considered procedural fairness processes. While we may not always be able to publicly reflect the extent of our knowledge, we consider our findings and recommendations to be well grounded. We spend some time in Section 2 explaining the sources of information we have relied on to show the rigour and breadth of our analysis.

We give a relatively high-level review of departmental responses to several cases involving allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff that came to light in 2021 and 2022. Because responses to these matters were in such early stages during our Inquiry, we did not request extensive information about them and have not individually described them. However, we wanted to see whether lessons had been learned from the responses to allegations against Ira, Lester and Stan and had translated into meaningful and promised change. While we saw some improvements, particularly in the responsiveness and the timeliness of notifications, we continue to have concerns, which are summarised thematically in Section 14.

It is important for us to state that, as far as we are aware at the time of writing, none of the staff who we examine in our case examples have been charged with any child sexual abuse offences. As we make clear throughout our report, it is not our role to investigate and substantiate specific allegations of child sexual abuse, which is ultimately a matter for police and other agencies. Our interest lies in how agencies responded to allegations and managed risks to children in circumstances where staff who were the subject of allegations had access to vulnerable children in an extremely high-risk setting for abuse—namely, a youth detention centre.

  1. Sources of information

We faced enormous challenges gathering the information we needed to thoroughly assess allegations of child sexual abuse by staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, and the responses to them. We often felt we were completing a jigsaw within a jigsaw in our attempts to understand exactly what occurred, particularly in our case examples. Some of the challenges were:

  • We received lengthy and complex witness statements only days before a witness was due to give evidence.
  • Following our public hearings in December 2022, we received a tranche of documents relating to the allegations made against one staff member included as a case example, which limited our ability to test and compare the evidence we received. This included a critical 3 December 2019 Minute to the Secretary regarding Ira.2471 We acknowledge that some witnesses were no longer with the Department or the State Service at the time they prepared responses to our requests or gave evidence at our hearings and, therefore, were not able to access and provide to us all relevant documentation. This was not, however, the case for all witnesses.
  • We did not have access to all Abuse in State Care Program documentation, in part due to the extensive manual review of hard copy files that was required by the State in order to provide some of that information to our Commission.2472 We discuss issues relating to record keeping regarding Ashley Youth Detention Centre in Section 8.5.2 throughout this case study.
  • We could not have access to a multi-agency State Budget submission and related documentation because they were cabinet-in-confidence. We acknowledge that the Department provided us with some summary information about these matters.2473
  • Evidence was sometimes vague, confusing or internally inconsistent. Very generalised evidence often sat alongside highly qualified evidence, which could be difficult to reconcile. At times, we simply did not receive answers to some questions we posed in our requests for statements from some witnesses, without explanation.
  • We saw a lack of alignment between the information held between different agencies. For example, sometimes the Department would tell us a notification was made to Tasmania Police or the Registrar on a particular date—yet evidence from those agencies suggested the notification was made on a different date or not received at all. It was impossible at times to determine why such significant discrepancies existed and whether they arose due to simple human error, a failure in systems of sharing information and recording, or another reason (or indeed, a combination of these factors). The nature of the information or documentation that was provided to agencies in these circumstances was sometimes difficult to determine—for example, was it in the form of a verbal overview, high-level written summary or all the relevant source material? This made it difficult to assess how reasonable responses were—particularly from the Registrar—in the context of the information they held.

Despite these challenges, we drew information from multiple sources to understand, to the best of our ability, how the Department, Ashley Youth Detention Centre and other key agencies responded to allegations of child sexual abuse by staff.

In the following sections, we summarise the key sources of information that we relied on.

  1. Current and former detainees

We observed a general and understandable reluctance by some current and former detainees to engage with our Commission of Inquiry. We recognise the significant stigma attached to reporting, the justified and profound loss of trust in institutions many detainees may hold and the very real scepticism many can encounter when they seek to report offending due to assumptions about their character and reliability. We also acknowledge that some people may have had real and genuine fears about engaging with us (particularly current detainees) because of concerns they may have had about retribution due to their participation.

Notwithstanding these barriers, several current and former detainees (and their families) showed enormous courage in sharing their experiences with us—many of which we describe in Case study 1. Our review of documentation (for example, redress applications) has given us insight into other detainees’ recollections of abuse and the impact their time in Ashley Youth Detention Centre has had on their lives. Where these people have chosen not to engage with us, we have been mindful of how we have presented information to preserve their anonymity, without sanitising the scale and impact of the abuses alleged.

Some witnesses warned us to be wary of detainees’ claims, which reflected a tendency from some to attribute reporting of abuse as being motivated by financial gain or an effort to undermine staff.2474 False allegations of child sexual abuse, while rare (estimated to be 2–5 per cent), do sometimes occur.2475 We accept that there may have been instances where detainees threatened to make unfounded complaints and that such threats may have affected the way management considered allegations. As we reiterate throughout our report, it is not our role to determine whether individual abuses occurred.

While we do not dispute that false claims can be made, we did not see evidence to suggest a concerted and organised attempt to concoct or falsify allegations. Our close engagement with the evidence led us to conclude in Case study 1 that some children and young people experienced systematic abuse and harm at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. We note that descriptions of the culture at the Centre reported by current and former detainees, either directly to us or through documentation, were striking in the patterns of behaviour they described. Aspects of these complaints, including the general attitudes of staff towards detainees and of the practices deployed by staff, were often corroborated or openly admitted by some witnesses including former staff, regulators or authors of past reviews into the Centre.

We are grateful for all the information we reviewed about detainee experiences and consider this information—whether provided to our Inquiry directly or indirectly—will improve awareness of abuses at the Centre and contribute to a safer future.

  1. Current and former staff

We received statements from some current and former staff of Ashley Youth Detention Centre. This evidence greatly assisted us in confronting the very real challenges that staff at the Centre face every day. Many detainees are highly traumatised and can display a range of complex behaviours that are difficult to manage, which can threaten the safety of staff, other detainees or themselves. We learned that staff were sometimes fearful and felt unsafe in their work—an assertion we do not doubt.2476 Some reflected feeling ill-equipped and unsupported in responding to the practical challenges that could arise in a dynamic and unpredictable environment, particularly due to understaffing or lack of adequate training.2477 It was clear that the sharp scrutiny brought to bear on frontline workers at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, who are often working under immense pressure, was a source of considerable and legitimate distress for some staff.2478

Despite these challenges, we found some former detainees spoke positively about some staff who they felt had their best interests at heart and were not complicit in harmful and abusive behaviours.2479 Some detainees observed these staff sometimes did not last long in the Centre or that they eventually became inculcated into poor practices.2480 Our Inquiry also showed there were staff who advocated for and acted in the best interests of children detained at the Centre (refer to Case study 2). In considering and weighing evidence that was critical of staff, we took account of the need to consider their actions within the challenging context of their workplace.

One former staff member, Alysha (a pseudonym), began working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in late 2019 and recalls that, shortly after, she was told by Ira (the subject of one of our case examples) that he had witnessed what he considered to be the aftermath of an incident of sexual abuse of a child by Lester.2481 Alysha reported this in January 2020 and was distressed that her concerns were apparently not acted upon.2482

Alysha went on to raise concerns about how her report was managed (refer to Case study 5), and other issues, providing a detailed statement to us about her experiences working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Alysha’s statement was invaluable to us in drawing our attention to concerns about current staff and informing our lines of enquiry, noting we have verified many of her concerns by reference to documentation or the evidence of others. We know her decision to speak out about the conditions within the Centre, including through our public hearings, came at what she considered to be an enormous personal cost to her and her family. Without Alysha’s evidence, we would not have been able to expose what we have about the treatment of children and young people in the Centre. We were struck by Alysha’s steadfast determination and advocacy on behalf of all children and young people, particularly those in youth detention.

We acknowledge the hardworking and dedicated staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre who performed to the best of their ability in a complex and challenging environment to meet the needs of children detained at the Centre and act in their best interests.

  1. Key witnesses

We sought statements and information from key departmental staff. Their roles and responsibilities, as well as their tenure, are described in the introduction to this chapter and we recommend referring to this to provide necessary context to this case study.

We also sought oral or written evidence from representatives from other agencies, including:

  • Peter Graham, former Registrar within the Department of Justice, who we understand held the role from August 2019 until October 2022.2483 We have referred to Mr Graham as ‘the Registrar’ throughout this case study for clarity and brevity.
  • Jonathan Higgins APM, former Assistant Commissioner of Operations, Tasmania Police, with responsibilities for the Northern, Southern and Western District commands and the Crime and Intelligence Command since 2019 and a career within Tasmania Police since 1999.2484 We understand that Mr Higgins now holds the role of Deputy Commissioner, Tasmania Police. We refer to Mr Higgins as Assistant Commissioner through this case study to reflect the role he held while engaging with our Commission of Inquiry.
  • Richard Connock, Tasmania’s Ombudsman and Custodial Inspector, holding those roles since January 2014 and January 2017 respectively.2485
  1. Documents relating to complaints about staff and disciplinary action

The Department has received allegations of child sexual abuse by staff from multiple sources over a long period. We have been given summaries of many of these complaints, as well as documents outlining disciplinary action taken in response, relating to the period from January 2000 to February 2023. In considering the responses to allegations made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff members, we have drawn information from a range of sources, including:

  • spreadsheets provided by the Department of Justice and the former Department of Communities listing allegations made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff through the Abuse in State Care Program2486
  • various documents related to the National Redress Scheme, including applications relating to alleged abusers at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and related ‘National Redress Scheme – Request for Information’ forms
  • a spreadsheet compiled for senior departmental managers in or around October 2020 of Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff named in the Abuse in State Care Program, National Redress Scheme or civil claims2487
  • departmental Minutes to the Secretary (including briefings about claims made through the Abuse in State Care Program, National Redress Scheme, civil claims and other complaints made by individuals), staff file notes, emails and meeting minutes (including the meetings of the Department’s Strengthening Safeguards Working Group that was convened in or around August or September 2020 to discuss the active employment matters at the Centre)
  • documents provided by the Registrar about alleged abusers, including a table outlining the status of 69 people of interest relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre (the table also included information the Registrar had received from Tasmania Police, Child Safety Services and the Department about some alleged abusers of interest to us)2488
  • a table provided by Tasmania Police setting out the reports made to it about allegations against certain Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff members (the table also includes brief details on ‘[a]ny action or outcome’ resulting from allegations and the dates on which police reported matters to the Registrar and Child Safety Services through its reporting systems)2489
  • several spreadsheets compiled by the Department that set out the disciplinary action it took in response to allegations of child sexual abuse raised against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff.2490

Although we gleaned valuable information from each document, many contained significant deficiencies and much of the information was difficult to reconcile. This made us concerned about the accuracy of some of the information provided to us.

The Department for Education, Children and Young People acknowledged deficiencies in records when it provided us with the most recent ‘Employment Direction No. 5 tracker’ on 6 February 2023 relating to staff from the former Department of Communities (which has since been subsumed into the Department for Education, Children and Young People), telling us:

The information in the tracker has been compiled based on the records that were accessible at the time. We note that the Commission has requested information about historical conduct related matters, many that occurred prior to the creation of the Department of Communities Tasmania. We have reviewed the available records. For some matters the records available are incomplete. Therefore we have not been able to answer all questions … Some of our responses are also based on ‘secondary’ records such as Minutes, but we have not been able to source the primary document.2491

We also reviewed several historical documents provided by Jacqueline Allen, former Acting Executive Director, People and Culture, in response to our requests for information. This includes documents concerning events that occurred before she started her role at the Department and in which she was not involved, and often where we had not been provided those documents in response to other requests. We were grateful for her efforts in this regard, as well as for her detailed statement.

  1. Background
  1. Responsibilities on the State to protect children and young people in youth detention

Before we describe the responses of the Department and other agencies to allegations of child sexual abuse by staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, it is important to understand the responsibilities these agencies have in protecting detainees from harm. Once a young person enters detention, they fall into the care of the State, which has a range of legal obligations to uphold their rights, wellbeing and safety.

We consider that, quite aside from these specific legal obligations, the State also has a moral obligation to do everything in its power to uphold the safety and best interests of children and young people in detention, to take active steps to support them to recover from past trauma and to address the core drivers of their offending. Providing this support for children and young people reduces their vulnerability to child sexual abuse in detention because they are less likely to reoffend and end up back in detention. We also consider that a caring and supportive model of care increases the likelihood young people will disclose child sexual abuse when it occurs, because of an established trust in the adults around them.

  1. Duty of care towards detainees and staff

The Department has a duty of care to children and young people in detention. Or, put another way, a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a detainee’s health, safety and wellbeing. This duty stems from several sources, including the following:

  • Under the Youth Justice Act 1997 (‘Youth Justice Act’), the Secretary (and, in practice, the Department) is designated as ‘guardian’ of all children and young people in detention.2492 As guardian, the Secretary has the same rights, powers, duties, obligations and liabilities over children in detention as a natural parent of the child. Under the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 (‘Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act’) the Secretary is also responsible for decisions concerning the daily care and control of a child or young person in detention.2493 The Youth Justice Act and the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act also impose a wide range of additional duties on the Secretary related to children and young people in detention.2494
  • The Secretary is also responsible for the security and management of detention centres and the safe custody and wellbeing of detainees.2495
  • The State has a common law duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of children and young people in detention.2496
  • From 1 May 2020, the Civil Liability Act 2002 (‘Civil Liability Act’) imposes a statutory duty of care on organisations to take reasonable precautions to prevent child abuse by people associated with the organisation, which can form part of a cause of action in negligence.2497 This duty arises for abuse perpetrated after 1 May 2020 and does not apply retrospectively.
  • From 1 May 2020, the Civil Liability Act also makes organisations vicariously liable for child abuse perpetrated by employees, including those whose relationship with an institution is akin to employment (such as a volunteer or sub-contractor).2498 This duty arises in relation to abuse perpetrated after 1 May 2020 and does not impose a retrospective duty.

The Department also has obligations under the Work Health and Safety Act 2012 to do what is reasonably practicable to provide a safe workplace for staff.2499

  1. Reporting obligations relating to child safety

Across the period of this case study—the early 2000s to 2022—staff in a number of State Service bodies had reporting opportunities and obligations that related to the safety of detainees, some of which were mandatory. We note that even if, on the facts, there was not a mandatory reporting obligation imposed on staff in some of these bodies, best practice would be to make a voluntary report in circumstances where information suggests a potential risk to children.

The reporting obligations relating to the type of conduct we discuss in this case study include:

  • Making a report to police about potential criminal conduct, acknowledging that the offence of failing to report the abuse of a child was only introduced on 2 October 2019.2500 This obligation does not apply where the victim-survivor is over 18 and the person making the report believes on reasonable grounds that the victim-survivor does not want the information to be reported to police.2501
  • Making a mandatory report to Child Safety Services under sections 13 and 14 of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act. Mandatory reporting obligations generally apply when there is a risk of child abuse and neglect. We have observed across the Tasmanian Government that there has been confusion about whether mandatory reporting obligations arise where information suggests a potential risk to children generally, rather than risk to a specifically identified child. We acknowledge that this uncertainty may have contributed to reports not being made. We have chosen not to explore this aspect of reporting in this case study but address reporting to Child Safety Services across other parts of this volume and our report more broadly.
  • Making a report of ‘reportable behaviour’ to the Registrar since 27 November 2015.2502 The Registrar is responsible for determining if a person should be registered to work with children and young people.2503 To determine this, the Registrar undertakes a ‘risk assessment’ to determine if the person should be registered (if they are not already) and an ‘additional risk assessment’ to determine if a registered person needs to be removed from the register if it receives information during the course of a person’s registration.2504 The risk assessments are based on a determination of acceptable or unacceptable risk to vulnerable people.2505 Additional risk assessments are typically driven by reportable behaviour notified by reporting bodies.2506 Where the Registrar determines to undertake an additional risk assessment, the Registrar has grounds for an immediate suspension while the additional risk assessment is undertaken.2507 We discuss this reporting obligation and make an associated recommendation in Chapter 18.

We briefly discuss processes for sharing information with Tasmania Police and the Registrar as context for the case examples, including information from the National Redress Scheme.

Reporting allegations from National Redress Scheme applications

Many of the allegations of child sexual abuse made against staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre after 2019 came to the Department through the National Redress Scheme, which was established under the National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Cth). Although there is a general prohibition on disclosing information gained through the Scheme except for the purposes of the Scheme, it is possible for agencies and their staff to share information they receive under the National Redress Scheme for child protection purposes, including enforcing criminal law or undertaking investigations or disciplinary processes related to child safety.2508 This includes staff working in the Department of Communities (or now the Department for Education, Children and Young People), the Department of Justice and Tasmania Police. We consider this exception enables these agencies to share the information in National Redress Scheme applications with the Registrar and Tasmania Police, as well as between agencies for the purpose of undertaking disciplinary action. We have also relied on this provision to receive, review and use information from National Redress Scheme claims for the purposes of our Inquiry and report.

Reports to the Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme

The Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme sits within the responsibilities of the Department of Justice.

Section 53A of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 (‘Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act’) requires that reportable behaviours by a registered person are notified to the Registrar. ‘Reportable behaviour’ is defined as ‘behaviour that poses a risk of harm to vulnerable persons, whether by reasons of neglect, abuse or other conduct’.2509 The obligations apply to a ‘reporting body’, which includes the Department.2510 Youth justice services have been a ‘regulated activity’ since 1 October 2015, requiring those working in such services to hold registration.2511

It is important to elaborate on the obligation to report to the Registrar because the interpretation of the obligation is important to the discussion in this case study.

A reporting body’s obligation to notify the Registrar of reportable behaviour has existed since 27 November 2015.2512 This includes an obligation to notify the Registrar of reportable behaviour that happened before 2015.2513 However, before 1 February 2021, section 53A of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act stated that the duty to report to the Registrar arose where a reporting body ‘finds that a person has engaged in reportable behaviour’.2514 The Registrar told us that his team always interpreted the term ‘finds’ liberally, imposing an ‘expansive obligation’ on reporting bodies to report risks of harm to vulnerable people.2515 Notwithstanding this interpretation, we were told that the duty was applied by reporting bodies (including government departments) variably, with some interpreting the legislation as requiring a substantive finding of abuse, neglect or other relevant conduct before making a report.2516

The legislation has since been clarified to state that a reporting body must notify the Registrar if it ‘becomes aware by any means, or suspects on reasonable grounds, that a registered person has engaged, or may have engaged, in reportable behaviour’.2517 As discussed later in this case study, the Department told us that, around September 2020 (before the changes to the legislation), it began immediately referring allegations to the Registrar following discussion between People and Culture and the Registrar about best practice and the Registrar’s broad interpretation of the term ‘finds’.2518

We note that there is nothing in the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act preventing a body from notifying reportable behaviour to the Registrar, even if they do not have a legal duty to do so. The Registrar told us that ‘the more reporting that we get, the better, and I would always encourage agencies, if in doubt, to provide [information]’.2519 The Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act contemplates the Registrar receiving information about reportable behaviour other than through the mandatory notification provisions, although there is less clarity about how this information is used.2520

In making such a report outside statutory requirements, the reporting body would need to ensure it does not breach any privacy provisions in the Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (‘Personal Information Protection Act’). We consider, however, that sharing information for the purposes of determining risk assessment for registration purposes would satisfy relevant exemptions relating to individual or public safety that have been in place since the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act came into force.2521 We acknowledge other statutory privacy provisions, such as those in the Youth Justice Act, may also need to be considered and complied with depending on the circumstances and the information being shared. We accept that the specific legal context and practicalities will need to be considered in each case.

As we outline throughout our report, having effective information sharing between agencies is a critical part of keeping children safe. Describing the importance of having a system of information sharing that works, the Registrar observed:

… the systems that we have to keep children safe rely on many actors performing their role, and that’s within an agency, it’s within police, it’s within my office; we all have a role to play. They are distinct roles, quite deliberately, and it’s important, and information sharing is really the core to that.2522

The Registrar told us that when a State Service agency becomes aware of child sexual abuse in a government or government-funded service, the Registrar should receive three notifications: a referral from Tasmania Police, a mandatory notification from Child Safety Services under the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act (which should receive a report from the relevant agency), and a notification provided directly by the agency in accordance with its obligations under the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act.2523 The Registrar receives nightly reports of notifications from Tasmania Police and Child Safety Services that are matched against current registrants and applicants.2524 The notification is typically followed by the notifier providing information one to five days later.2525

The Registrar told us that while there has been some improvement in the process of reporting in recent years, he still does not ‘routinely’ receive three notifications about each allegation.2526 The Registrar also told us that other than one report in 2016, he did not receive any notifications of reportable behaviour relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre until late 2020.2527 We acknowledge that the lateness of this reporting may have stemmed from the narrow interpretation of the obligation to report under the earlier version of section 53A of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable Act, where a ‘finding’ was required. We note, however, there was, and still is, nothing preventing an agency from reporting reportable conduct making a notification of reportable behaviour, even if they do not have a legal duty to do so. We are concerned that the lateness of the Department’s change in practice for reporting shows a lack of prioritisation of the safety of children in detention.

By August 2022, however, the Registrar had received more than 300 notifications involving Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff (including those provided by the Department).2528 From those notifications, the Registrar has identified 69 people ‘of interest’ with sufficient particulars and allegations of relevant conduct.2529 Many of those allegations related to previous staff and spanned many years, including many that stemmed from rediscovering Abuse in State Care Program claims (discussed further in Section 9.2). Of those 69 people, 33 held registration at some point, including 28 who held registration when the notification was made.2530 As a result, the Registrar initiated 28 additional risk assessments and requested further information from reporting bodies.2531 As at 15 August 2022, 10 of those 33 were no longer registered, although only three of these were due to some form of active exclusion by the Registrar (suspension, cancellation or interim bar).2532 Twenty-three remained registered, including:

  • Five people who had been subject to a positive risk assessment, meaning that they could maintain their registration status.
  • Two people who had been subject to a proposed negative notice stating that they posed an unacceptable risk to vulnerable people, and their registration status had been suspended. These were, at the time, proposed decisions because the registered person is afforded the opportunity to request that the Registrar reconsiders a negative risk assessment.2533 We do not know the outcome of this process regarding these two people.
  • Sixteen people who continued to be subject to an additional risk assessment.2534

In addition to the difficulties identified by the Registrar arising from the Department’s information-sharing processes, we understand that the primary source of allegations of abuse relating to current and former staff at the Centre has been the National Redress Scheme, which made it difficult to take action to suspend or cancel registration. The Registrar told us:

The information provided to the National Redress Scheme is collected for a different purpose and is tested against a lower legal standard for a successful outcome. As such, the reports often contain limited particulars, lack clarity with regard to allegations and might not attribute conduct to any individual. For example, it is not uncommon for allegations provided in redress to be limited to a few sentences or a paragraph. Further, due to the lower legal standard, the allegations are often not tested in any way. This is appropriate for the purposes of the National Redress Scheme but can limit its usefulness in a risk assessment. The consequence of this is that there may be allegations which suggest conduct of the most serious kind but for which limited particulars exist.

Claimants to the National Redress Scheme have also typically declined to participate in or provide statements to Tasmania Police investigations relating to the alleged conduct. This, while understandable, further limits the ability for relevant information to be collected or for an appropriate criminal justice response. In the context of the alleged conduct of current and former staff, there are only two cases where Tasmania Police provided information which was in addition to any information provided by [Department of Communities] records.2535

Also, the Registrar described how National Redress Scheme claims ‘often don’t attribute specific conduct to individuals, but they may mention individuals in their statement as a whole’.2536 We were also told that in many cases the Registrar did not receive the full National Redress Scheme application but instead received extracts or quotes, sometimes only one or two sentences in length and without the alleged abuser’s name.2537 The Department of Justice considered that ‘in the majority of cases’, there was unlikely to be ‘sufficient information for the Registrar to “match” the alleged offender with a registration with any degree of confidence’.2538 In our review of National Redress Scheme materials, we also observed such instances where the claimant did not include details, such as an alleged abuser’s name (an application does not require an alleged abuser to be specifically identified to be accepted and redress offered).2539 We note, however, that this was not always the case—many applications we reviewed specifically named the alleged abuser or witnesses to abuse (albeit, sometimes with understandable spelling mistakes).

While we acknowledge that National Redress Scheme claims often contain limited particulars, we are also concerned that inadequacies in the Department of Justice’s processes meant that not all information received from the Scheme Operator (the Australian Government’s Department of Social Services) was shared with the former Department of Communities until 2020, and that this would have affected the information the former Department of Communities gave to the Registrar. We discuss the Department of Justice’s role in National Redress Scheme claims in Sections 7 and 12.

We were told that while the Registrar initiates an additional risk assessment for anyone who is named in a National Redress Scheme claim, it is ‘very rare’ that the claim will include substantial information about the nature of the conduct.2540 However, we consider that the Registrar is required to consider the prospective risk to children when undertaking risk assessments rather than to substantiate information it receives. Based on our case examples, we make a finding in Section 11 that, on occasion, the Registrar appeared to adopt too high an evidentiary threshold in assessing whether staff with allegations against them posed an unacceptable risk to children. In Chapter 18, we make a recommendation to clarify what the Registrar should consider in making risk assessments.

Tasmania Police reporting to other agencies

Tasmania Police is responsible for enforcing the criminal law. Police have several reporting obligations to other agencies concerning child sexual abuse, including to Child Safety Services and the Registrar.2541

We were told that Tasmania Police’s process for reporting to other agencies is an ‘automated process’.2542 Tasmania Police uses the following systems:

  • ‘Atlas’, which is an intelligence system that has an option for police to select ‘Presents a risk to vulnerable people’ via a check box.2543 When this box is ticked, the system generates a notification that is sent to the Department of Justice as a notification to the Registrar.2544 Police can also select ‘Child Safety Occurrences’ in Atlas, in which case the information is automatically shared with Child Safety Services.2545 Our understanding is that the ‘Child Safety Occurrence’ would only be selected if the victim-survivor was still a child, reflecting that Child Safety Services’ focus is generally on the care and protection of a particular child at risk.2546 This means that people whose behaviour may continue to place children at risk may not be recognised as such because the victim-survivor is now an adult.
  • ‘Offence Reporting System’, which is a system for recording crimes and/or
    offences.2547 Specific offences within the Offence Reporting System trigger a notification to the Registrar.2548
  • ‘Online Charging’, which is a system used for recording those taken into custody or to generate court files.2549 Specific offences trigger a notification to the Registrar.2550

Our understanding is that most police notifications to the Registrar in relation to allegations in National Redress Scheme applications would be sent through Atlas. While Assistant Commissioner Higgins described these reporting mechanisms as an ‘automated process’, he also agreed at our hearings that there is a manual and subjective element to the referrals made through Atlas.2551 He explained that there are guidelines as to when a police officer should ‘tick the box’ that a person ‘presents a risk to vulnerable people’, but there is also a ‘human element’ that may result in human error and also introduces subjectivity into the process.2552

Some of the shortcomings of these notification processes became apparent to us through our case examples and were reflected in a lack of alignment in the dates reported by different agencies as to when they received certain information. We explore this further through our case study and discuss Tasmania Police responses to allegations against staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre in Section 10.

National Redress Scheme ‘Child Safe Reports’ made to Tasmania Police

Assistant Commissioner Higgins told us that Tasmania Police receives certain ‘Child Safe Reports’ as referrals directly from the National Redress Scheme through an Australian Government Department of Social Services secure email inbox.2553 Reports can be either identifying (meaning the complainant provided consent for their personal details to be disclosed to police) or deidentified. All applicants are asked at the time of making an application if they consent to police contacting them.2554 The Australian Government’s Department of Social Services (as the Scheme Operator) appears to have had this reporting procedure in place since August 2018 at the latest, the month after the National Redress Scheme began.2555 We discuss this in Section 7.

The ‘Child Safe Reports’ are only referred to Tasmania Police where they meet a certain criterion, such as the abuse occurred in the past 10 years, children are at current risk of abuse, the alleged abuser is still working with children or where the alleged abuser may have children of their own.2556 We understand the strict criteria for referrals were set by the Scheme Operator.2557 We are concerned, however, that those criteria mean that relevant evidence relating to certain alleged abusers is not provided to Tasmania Police, particularly because we consider it would be difficult for the Scheme Operator to know (for example) whether a person works directly with children because this information is held by Tasmanian agencies such as the Registrar. It is for this reason we consider it important for the Department of Justice (and other departments) to apply active judgment to what should be reported to Tasmania Police rather than relying solely on an assumption that the Scheme Operator would have reported everything necessary. This active judgment may also be required to meet other reporting obligations. We discuss this in Section 12.

  1. Disciplinary action

Where a complaint is made about the conduct of a staff member, the Department may take action to assess whether there has been a breach of the staff member’s employment obligations, particularly those reflected in the State Service Act 2000 and related State Service Code of Conduct. This can empower the Department to take a range of actions, including suspending an employee, investigating a potential breach and, in circumstances where a breach is substantiated, imposing sanctions (which may include termination).2558

We have summarised the key aspects of the disciplinary framework here to provide context for the case examples in this case study. For more detailed information on the disciplinary framework, refer to Chapter 20.

If an allegation of child sexual abuse is made against a member of staff, a preliminary assessment is conducted to collect and organise information to determine whether the matter should be referred to the Secretary, who would then decide if there should be an investigation for a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct. The Integrity Commission’s Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (‘Integrity Commission’s guide’), which is discussed in Chapter 20, states that preliminary assessments should be used to quickly (within three working days) gather relevant information to determine whether there is a reasonable suspicion of misconduct and the most appropriate way to deal with the matter.2559 The Integrity Commission’s guide is clear that a preliminary assessment should not turn into an investigation and does not require the allegations to be defined.2560 We were told, however, that the Integrity Commission’s guide was contrary to the advice that had been previously provided by the State Service Management Office, although the nature of those differences was not explained to us.2561 We discuss the role of the State Service Management Office in providing advice and guidance in Chapter 20.

The Secretary is empowered to take disciplinary action in line with Employment Directions, which most relevantly include:

  • Employment Direction No. 4—Procedure for the suspension of State Service employees with or without pay (‘Employment Direction No. 4—Suspension’ or ‘Employment Direction No. 4’)
  • Employment Direction No. 5—Procedure for the investigation and determination of whether an employee has breached the Code of Conduct (‘Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct’ or ‘Employment Direction No. 5’)
  • Employment Direction No. 6—Procedure for the investigation and determination of whether an employee is able to efficiently and effectively perform their duties (‘Employment Direction No. 6—Inability’). This direction may apply when a person no longer has capacity to perform their role or does not have the minimum requirements for employment, such as holding registration to work with vulnerable people.

An allegation of child sexual abuse reflects potential misconduct and requires steps to be taken to address any risks of harm. The Integrity Commission’s guide sets out potential immediate actions that an organisation can take when an allegation of misconduct is raised. This includes reporting allegations to police and external bodies, imposing a suspension, short-term changes to the duties or the physical location of involved parties, blocking or restricting access to data or information, and securing appropriate evidence.2562 The Integrity Commission’s guide also notes support may need to be offered to affected parties and the safety of others be considered.2563

These Employment Directions can be used to remove or restrict an employee and, where serious breaches are substantiated, result in termination of employment.

With respect to suspensions, the Integrity Commission’s guide states, among other things, that an employee can be suspended before or during an investigation and may be required when people are at risk or the alleged conduct is very serious.2564 It also provides that consideration should be given to reassignment before suspension.2565 We understand reassignment in the context of a complaint raising child safety concerns may mean moving someone into a role in which they have no possibility of contact with children and young people. We saw some examples where such reassignment was not considered possible based on the nature of the role of some staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

We also received evidence in the context of Ashley Youth Detention Centre that although an employee could not be suspended under Employment Direction No. 4—Suspension if an Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation had not begun, other action might be taken such as ‘directing’ the employee away from the workplace before beginning an investigation.2566 We were told that any line manager could make such a direction.2567 We understood this evidence to concern an employer’s entitlement to issue a ‘lawful and reasonable direction’ to an employee, which can include, in some circumstances, a direction not to attend the workplace or perform any work while receiving full pay. Whether a direction not to attend work while receiving full pay will amount to a ‘lawful and reasonable direction’ or is in effect a de facto ‘suspension’ (such that it must comply with the terms of Employment Direction No. 4), will depend on all the circumstances of the particular case.

We prefer the view that the employer retains the capacity to immediately remove State Service employees from the workplace in circumstances of suspected misconduct (including by issuing lawful and reasonable directions that they not attend work) considering the State’s duty of care to children and occupational health and safety obligations. However, the evidence presented to us suggests that this is a matter of some uncertainty and debate among those responsible for such decisions.

In Chapter 20, we describe some of the uncertainty within agencies around whether Employment Direction No. 4 enables immediate suspensions. We heard evidence that it would be useful if the scope of Employment Direction No. 4 was expanded so that suspension could occur on the grounds of child safety.2568 We make a recommendation to achieve this in Chapter 20 (refer to Recommendation 20.6).

  1. Department processes for responding to abuse allegations against staff

We observe in our case examples that up until late 2020, the Department did not have any documented or approved policies specific to conducting investigations and notifying other agencies of allegations of child sexual abuse by staff.2569 This was surprising to us, given the nature of the Department’s responsibilities for child safety and youth justice. Ms Allen told us that despite this, there were many informal policies and procedures that People and Culture followed.2570 She referred, for example, to flowcharts relating to Employment Directions No. 4 and No. 5 that specifically outline the suspension and investigation process.2571 The Department has since developed flowcharts to guide responses to allegations of child sexual abuse against staff, which we discuss in Sections 9.4 and 13.3.

Below, we outline what we understand to be the responsibilities for responding to allegations against staff based on the evidence we received from various departmental officials in our Inquiry.

On receiving a notification of an allegation of child sexual abuse by an Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member, People and Culture makes an assessment on a case-by-case basis, which is ultimately determined by many factors. However, witnesses told us that the process since mid-2020 typically includes:

  • conducting an initial assessment of the information to confirm whether the alleged abuser is a current Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member and confirming relevant biographical information
  • contacting the relevant manager/director to determine whether the employee is at work and their work schedule, having regard to the risk to detainees
  • notifying authorities such as Tasmania Police and the Registrar, including a copy of the allegations and employment information, and staying in contact with those agencies ‘to ensure a coordinated approach’
  • informing the Deputy Secretary Corporate Services, Deputy Secretary Children, Youth and Families and the Director Strategic Youth Services ‘to case conference and coordinate necessary immediate actions, so that Ashley Youth Detention Centre management can ensure the safety of residents’
  • compiling and organising available and relevant departmental information and records including rosters, timesheets, closed-circuit television footage, detainee records, policies and procedures
  • determining the availability of investigators and confirming that the proposed investigator has no conflicts of interest with the staff member being investigated
  • preparing a Minute for the Head of Agency (in this case, the Secretary) to consider whether they have reason to believe a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct may have occurred (per Employment Direction No. 5) and whether it is in the public interest to suspend the employee (per Employment Direction No. 4), together with a draft letter to the employee, investigator appointment documentation and a briefing note to the Head of the State Service
  • providing the employee with relevant paperwork, in conjunction with Ashley Youth Detention Centre management
  • engaging with the appointed investigator, including providing any identified records
  • providing the investigation report to the Head of Agency, Tasmania Police and/or
    the Registrar and liaising with the relevant staff member on their response to allegations
  • undertaking activities to provide advice to the Head of Agency for their consideration and decision
  • communicating decisions and outcomes to the employee, Tasmania Police and/or the Registrar.2572

We received conflicting evidence about the extent to which the Secretary would be briefed (including verbally) on details of allegations once senior departmental officials became aware of those allegations and before any formal documentation was prepared for initiating an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation.2573

It is the Secretary’s role to make decisions about disciplinary action under Employment Directions, including investigating or suspending an employee, guided by the advice of the Department. We understand that there is no specific timeframe within which People and Culture must undertake a preliminary assessment, particularly given that the actions that may be required as part of that assessment are determined on a case-by-case basis.2574 However, as discussed earlier, the Integrity Commission’s guide states that preliminary assessments should be undertaken within three working days of receiving an allegation of child sexual abuse against a staff member.

Ms Allen told us that the factors taken into account when deciding whether to recommend a matter should be investigated include, but are not limited to, the risk of harm to children or young people; the severity of the matter; the potential severity of the outcome for the employee; whether the allegations are easily proven or disproven; the complexity of the matter; when the alleged conduct took place; whether the matter has already been dealt with or investigated; whether there is likely to be any evidence relating to the allegation; whether there is a pattern of similar complaints; the past conduct of the employee; and matters relating to public confidence.2575

  1. 2003–2013—Abuse in State Care Program claims

In this section, we outline the extent of allegations received through the Abuse in State Care Program from 2003 to 2013 and how the Department responded to these allegations, including any measures taken to protect children from the potential risks posed by staff. From at least 2007, the Department was on notice that current staff (of Ashley Youth Detention Centre, other parts of the Department and foster carers) were the subject of allegations of child sexual abuse when it sought legal advice on how it could use information arising from claims. As we discuss throughout this case study, based on this legal advice (and a practice that seemingly emerged because of it), the Department did not use information from Abuse in State Care Program claims to manage potential risks to children and young people from serving staff.

  1. Allegations of abuse through the Abuse in State Care Program

People who were abused while under state care (whether in youth detention or out of home care) could make applications for compensation through Tasmania’s Abuse in State Care Program between 2003 and 2013. Claims could relate to any kind of abuse (physical, emotional or sexual abuse, or neglect) by staff or carers. Claims could also be made by victim-survivors in relation to harmful sexual behaviour they experienced while in state care.

As we outlined in Case study 1, the Abuse in State Care Program received hundreds of claims related to abuse in Ashley Youth Detention Centre (or its predecessor, Ashley Home for Boys), including claims of sexual abuse.

The Department is the information custodian for Abuse in State Care Program records and had access to the claimant files.2576 With the change in departmental structures, we assume the Department for Education, Children and Young People would now be the custodian. Despite this, as we explore in our case examples below, departmental knowledge of the existence of the Abuse in State Care Program was piecemeal and, as recently as 2020, senior members of the Department did not know that allegations had been raised through it against staff still working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

  1. Departmental response to Abuse in State Care Program claims

We received limited evidence to suggest the Department took any action prior to 2020 in response to allegations made against current or former staff arising from Abuse in State Care Program claims, despite some describing serious sexual abuses. A 4 November 2021 briefing to the Minister for Children and Youth said the Department had ‘not been able to source any records that indicates any action was taken against any employees as a result of the information provided through the State Based Redress Scheme’.2577

We did not receive evidence of the Department taking any steps in response to information from Abuse in State Care Program claims, such as reallocating the duties of staff, making notifications to other agencies or initiating disciplinary action.2578 While the application form for the Abuse in State Care Program included a question to the claimant about whether they would like to make a complaint to the police, there was not a similar question about a claimant’s willingness to take part in any disciplinary processes if the person they alleged abuse against was still a State Service employee or a carer for children in the care system.2579

This inaction meant that Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff, who were the subject of allegations of child sexual abuse, continued working directly with children at the Centre over a long period.2580 Quite apart from the potential for children to be harmed, it exposed the State to the financial risks of having to meet more compensation claims in the future.

We understand that part of the reason why the Department did not proactively act on information it received through claims was because of the purpose of the Abuse in State Care Program itself. The program was intended to be a healing and restorative act of recognition of past harm, rather than a way to test the veracity of claims or take further action. A December 2020 departmental review into the Abuse in State Care Program considered the notifications process associated with the Abuse in State Care Program as well as its scope and aims. The review noted:

… the aim of the [Abuse in State Care Program] process was not one established to ascertain blame or fault but rather to be part of a supportive, healing reconciliation process for those who suffered abuse in the care of the State. It was only when claimants specifically requested it, that matters were referred to police.2581

The 2020 review described steps the Department intended to take during the life of the Abuse in State Care Program to safeguard children if it was revealed that the alleged abuser continued to provide care to children in state care, which would include those working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. The review quoted a discussion paper from 14 November 2003 (around the time of the first round of Abuse in State Care Program) that described the respective roles of the Ombudsman, the Department and the Independent Assessor, and said:

The Department was responsible for checking departmental records to find out if any named perpetrators were still in the State care system and if so, providing that the perpetrator had not already been referred to the Police by the Ombudsman, the claimant should be advised that the matter may be referred to Police for investigation …2582

However, this review also quoted a 2004 Minute to the then Minister for Health and Human Services confirming the intention of the Abuse in State Care Program was never to test the veracity of claims or otherwise engage with alleged abusers:

Except in those cases where a matter has been referred to the Police at the request of a claimant, unless [the Independent Assessor] determines otherwise, no attempt is being made to put allegations to alleged perpetrators. Thus, while initially the Ombudsman and subsequently [the Independent Assessor] must be satisfied that the abuse occurred, it is not intended that there be specific findings made against alleged perpetrators, and ordinarily natural justice would require allegations to be put to alleged perpetrators so that they were in a position to deny, admit or otherwise comment on.2583

As the custodian of these records and due to its involvement in the operation of the program, the Department knew of serious allegations made about current and former staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

In September 2014, former Secretary of the Department, Michael Pervan, (then in his first week as Acting Secretary) signed off on the Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report.2584 This report stated that during the period from 2011 to 2013, 172 claims were made against staff from Ashley Youth Detention Centre or Ashley Home for Boys, as well as hundreds of claims involving out of home care.2585

During our hearings in August 2022, Secretary Pervan acknowledged he was aware in 2014 that claims had been made alleging abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre at a high level and he did not ‘recall’ turning his mind to the question of whether alleged abusers named in the Abuse in State Care Program might still be working at the Centre.2586 However, he did recall asking:

… regardless of whether they were employees or not, what happens with this information on the grounds that it was pretty clear that we were talking about horrible criminal offences, and I just asked the general question, ‘What happens with these?’, and I was referred to particular advice and a general practice which was current across government until late 2020 where matters raised in redress were not to be used for investigation, prosecution, and the assumption of course that would have been made by people in the People & Culture or Human Resources area was that, if we were told that they couldn’t be used for [Employment Direction No. 5 processes], then those matters weren’t open anymore, that they weren’t tracked across time. Of course, regardless now, in retrospect, regardless of that advice that we couldn’t pursue those matters, we should have come up with some way of keeping track of that information, I can see that.2587

The ‘particular advice’ Secretary Pervan is referring to is legal advice the Department sought in 2007 about whether (and how) it could use information received through Abuse in State Care Program claims (‘2007 Solicitor-General’s advice’).2588 We discuss this in Section 4.2.1.

We understand that the limitations described by Secretary Pervan also applied to the out of home care context. We were not aware of all the detail about the Abuse in State Care Program, the Department becoming aware of it again, and the Solicitor-General’s 2007 legal advice (or the practice that developed from it) when requesting information and conducting our public hearings into the safety of children in the out of home care system. Given we have not examined this issue closely, our findings are confined to failures to use this information regarding staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

As will become apparent, the Department’s awareness of the information arising from the Abuse in State Care Program seemed to diminish over time and be lost from much of the corporate memory until 2020.

  1. 2007—Solicitor-General’s advice on using information received through the Abuse in State Care Program

Despite the intended purpose of the Abuse in State Care Program, the Department showed some concern about allegations against serving Centre staff in the early years of the program. As mentioned, in 2007 the Department requested legal advice from the then Solicitor-General on whether (and how) the Department could use information received through Abuse in State Care Program claims.2589 Specifically, the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice was sought because the Department’s review of the Abuse in State Care Program claims around 2007 had ‘disclosed that a number of allegations of abuse were made against persons who are still either [out of home care] carers or are employed by the Department in some capacity’.2590 Our Commission of Inquiry did not receive the request for advice which resulted in the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice. As such, we cannot assess whether the scope of the request affected the advice which was ultimately provided. On the face of the advice, the Department asked three questions of the Solicitor-General at that time:

  1. Should prosecution be considered?
  2. Should disciplinary action be considered?
  3. Is some other action required to ensure proper protection for children in care either now or in future?2591

The then Solicitor-General advised, among other things, that to pursue any disciplinary action against current departmental employees on the basis of allegations made through the Abuse in State Care Program, the Department needed complainants to make statements under oath.2592 The then Solicitor-General advised that the ‘appropriate first step’ was for the Department to contact complainants to see whether they would be willing to make a statutory declaration.2593 The then Solicitor-General also suggested that the Department refer complaints that related to criminal conduct to police, if the complainant agreed and was willing to swear the allegations under oath.2594

The advice did not address the third question: ‘Is some other action required to ensure proper protection for children in care either now or in future?’ beyond a recommendation that the Department engage with complainants to determine their willingness to make statements under oath to facilitate disciplinary and other processes, as described above.

Importantly, the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice extended beyond allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre to all departmental employees (including carers). Curiously, the advice did not address the need for any differences in approach between departmental employees and carers in the out of home care system (who are not employees and are not subject to the same procedural fairness requirements for disciplinary action).

  1. The effect of the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice on the Department’s response to allegations of abuse

We received varying evidence about the extent to which the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice influenced the Department’s response to allegations from 2007 to December 2020.

Some senior leaders in the Department told us that the Department was required to follow the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice and accordingly, the Department could not begin disciplinary action without the participation of the complainant.2595 Secretary Pervan clarified that this was due to Department of Treasury and Finance rules.2596 We were told that departmental leadership found this position ‘frustrating’.2597

During our public hearings, Secretary Pervan reflected on the prevailing view at the time, telling us that ‘it wasn’t just the practice’, adding that the inability to take disciplinary action on allegations raised through claims under the Abuse in State Care Program was a ‘very uncomfortable message that none of us were happy with’.2598

Secretary Pervan also responded to questioning by Counsel Assisting at hearings as follows:

Q [Counsel Assisting]: … at around the time you were publishing the report in 2014 it appears that, because of practices that had come to exist, no one invited you to and you didn’t yourself reflect on the possibility of reaching out to some of those 172 claimants from Ashley Boys Home to see if any of them wanted to be part of a disciplinary process?

A [Secretary Pervan]: No, the assumption was that we could not.2599

While the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice was specific to the Abuse in State Care Program, its principles appear to have extended into other types of claims. For example, it was cited as a barrier to responding to allegations of abuse arising from the Abuse in State Care Support Service (established in 2015), the National Redress Scheme, allegations reported by other staff and even civil claims.2600

We saw limited awareness of the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice from some other witnesses. For example, Ginna Webster, Secretary, Department of Justice (who held Deputy Secretary and Secretary roles in the Department of Communities and its predecessor from July 2018 to September 2019) told us in January 2023 that she only ‘recently’ became aware of the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice.2601 Other departmental managers also told us they were unaware of the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice until our Inquiry brought it to their attention.2602

The 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice was not referred to (including as a potential limitation in taking action against staff) in any of the Department’s extensive documentation about responses to allegations made in the redress schemes, civil claims or other complaints (and related documentation) that we reviewed.

Despite this, it appears that from at least 2007 a practice emerged within the Department that was based on, or related to, the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice.2603 That practice had the following features:

  • Disciplinary processes were not pursued in response to allegations made through the Abuse in State Care Program based on an understanding that the Department could not do so without a sworn statement or the involvement of the complainant.2604
  • The Department had no formal process for contacting complainants to get their statement or participation in a disciplinary process and did not do so as a matter of course (despite the Solicitor-General’s advice suggesting this was the appropriate first step in any attempt to act on allegations against staff).2605 On this issue, Secretary Pervan conceded that there was nothing preventing those with responsibility for Ashley Youth Detention Centre at various points from contacting the complainants to check whether they would participate.2606
  • The principle of not taking disciplinary action extended to complaints or allegations ‘where indirect evidence of abuse was raised’, including for allegations made through the Abuse in State Care Support Service, the National Redress Scheme, civil claims and complaints from employees. 2607

This practice appeared to exist until late 2020. Secretary Pervan said the Department had its ‘hands tied’ until it received further legal advice on 15 December 2020, telling us:2608

… the advice from the Solicitor-General that effectively prevented us from using information provided in applications for financial compensation for disciplinary purposes, applied from 2007 until 15 December 2020. Our management of these matters changed with the change of position from the Solicitor-General.2609

We discuss this change in legal advice in Section 9.8.

We acknowledge that the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice constrained some actions available to the Department around the time it was provided. We are concerned, however, that the practice that emerged from the advice appears to have been in place for more than a decade without apparently being revisited and reconsidered. We are particularly concerned that the establishment of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme in 2014, and the associated reporting obligations in 2015, did not appear to trigger a reconsideration of how the Department handled and responded to allegations of abuse—noting that much of the information received through these claims would constitute ‘reportable behaviour’ under that Act. The National Royal Commission, which ran between 2013 and 2017 and highlighted failures to protect children within institutions, also did not prompt the Department to revisit this advice.

As we discuss in our case example relating to Lester, providing all the Department’s information holdings at the time the scheme was established would have revealed an extensive history of complaints made in Abuse in State Care Program claims that the Registrar could have considered in determining Lester’s suitability for registration. We consider the failure to take more active steps to use information from Abuse in State Care Program claims to have been a significant missed opportunity to protect detainees from potential risks to their safety.

Finding—From at least 2007 the Department should have taken more active steps to use information gained through state redress programs to protect children from the risk of harm

From at least 2007 and possibly from 2003 when the Abuse in State Care Program began, the Department was on notice that some current staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre were the subject of allegations of child sexual abuse and other abuses. From this point, it had an obligation to take active steps to protect children from harm.

It is not apparent what steps the Department took to investigate claims against staff before seeking advice from the Solicitor-General in 2007 on how it could act on the information it received. We are pleased it sought this advice.

It is regrettable that the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice and associated departmental practices did not prioritise the safety and best interests of children. While we recognise the intention behind the Abuse in State Care Program was to be restorative for claimants (rather than a basis for action in relation to alleged abusers) we do not consider it in the public interest to have a situation where the

Department holds potentially credible information alleging serious abuses against current staff and carers (whether in the out of home care system or Ashley Youth Detention Centre) and does not act on that information.

We accept that the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice constrained some actions available to the Department around the time it was provided, including for taking disciplinary action against staff. However, we consider more could have been done to use the information received from 2007 to 2020 (when new legal advice was sought), including:

  • contacting complainants to gauge their willingness to make a statement under oath and/or take part in other processes (including disciplinary and/or criminal justice processes)
  • where there was no possibility of initiating formal procedures, taking all non-disciplinary measures available to protect children, including advising managers and supervisors of these claims against current staff to allow for greater vigilance and care in allocating staff duties and ensuring alleged abusers remained closely supervised
  • ensuring relevant information was held on a staff members’ personnel file to ensure any future complaints or concerns be considered in light of prior claims through the Abuse in State Care Program
  • refining the design of the Abuse in State Care Program (noting there were four rounds) to maximise the ability of the Department to act on information it received; for example, this could occur by including a question directed at gauging an applicant’s interest in supporting disciplinary action against their alleged abuser—and outlining the support an individual would receive should they choose to do so, to make such a process feel safe (claimants should also have been advised they could revisit this decision at any point)
  • revisiting the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice sooner than December 2020, particularly given the significant changes to the legal and policy landscape as it related to child safety; for example, the establishment of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme in 2014 should have triggered greater reflection on information that needed to be provided to the Registrar and the National Royal Commission should have invited consideration of the appropriateness of existing processes
  • if fresh advice maintained the legal position of the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice, seeking ministerial approval for amendments to the legal constraints, recognising its practical effect was not sufficiently prioritising child safety and the public interest.

It appears that it was not until the Department sought further advice in December 2020 that it took any active steps to address the unsatisfactory outcome the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice (and associated practice) had created.

The Department’s approach to Abuse in State Care Program claims prior to December 2020 enabled knowledge of the claims to become lost to a large portion of the Department’s corporate memory. They were only rediscovered in 2020. This placed the safety of children in Ashley Youth Detention Centre at risk for years.

  1. 2015—Introduction of the Abuse in State Care Support Service

The Abuse in State Care Program was wound up in 2013 and replaced by the Abuse in State Care Support Service in 2015. The Abuse in State Care Support Service still operates today.2610 Like its predecessor, the Abuse in State Care Support Service was established to support people who experienced abuse (including sexual abuse) in state care when they were children, including former Ashley Youth Detention Centre detainees.2611

As we discuss in Case study 1, departmental documents indicate that as at 20 July 2021, 26 claims had been made through the Abuse in State Care Support Service about allegations of sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (or its predecessor, the Ashley Home for Boys).2612 Most of these allegations related to staff conduct at the Centre.2613 The period of abuse from these claims spans 1995 to 2012.2614

We did not receive evidence that the Department took any steps prior to 2020 to identify if claims through the Abuse in State Care Support Service related to current staff.

  1. 2007–2018—Disciplinary action taken against Centre staff

In this section, we consider the way the Department approached (or as is the case in many instances, failed to initiate) disciplinary action against employees at Ashley Youth Detention Centre who were the subject of allegations of child sexual abuse between 2007 and 2018.

Again, during this period, we continued to see missed opportunities to use information gained from the Abuse in State Care Program and the Abuse in State Care Support Service to inform disciplinary action and ensure staff who posed a risk to detainees were not working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

As is the case across all areas of the State Service we have examined, we saw a conservative approach to initiating disciplinary proceedings, with disproportionate focus on procedural fairness at the expense of protecting the safety of children. This is discussed in Chapter 20.

We observed some key issues in the Department’s approach to taking disciplinary action against employees accused of child sexual abuse, which includes:

  • a lack of clarity and consistency in processes for managing complaints and allegations
  • poor record keeping and failures to ensure all complaints and allegations about staff members were appropriately stored and accessible for future review
  • failures to consider the cumulative effect of complaints and concerns about a staff member, including to identify patterns of behaviour
  • using internal and more informal investigations to respond to serious allegations that should have been viewed as a potential breach of the State Service Code of Conduct and escalated to the Head of Agency.

The practical effect of these problems is that complaints made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff were not properly investigated, if at all, enabling them to continue to work with detainees. The failures of the disciplinary process are particularly apparent in the case example of Walter, which we describe in Section 6.2.

  1. Summary of disciplinary and internal investigations between 2007 and 2018

In this section, we summarise information we received from the Department regarding disciplinary action it took between 2007 and 2018, with an overview of the nature of complaints received about staff and the response to those complaints. We have not limited this section to child sexual abuse and related conduct, including complaints about other forms of mistreatment of children and young people.

  1. Disciplinary action between 2007 and 2018

From 2007 to 2018, the Department undertook several disciplinary investigations, including the following:

  • In the late 2000s, the Department investigated an Ashley Youth Detention Centre employee over allegations of inappropriate physical force and inappropriate use of language.2615 It appears from the information provided to us that two different detainees made allegations against the employee, resulting in a disciplinary investigation, with the outcome being ongoing training, supervision and a demotion.2616
  • In the late 2000s, the Department suspended an Ashley Youth Detention Centre employee while a disciplinary investigation began over allegations including procuring and providing sexually explicit material to a child.2617 The Department stood the employee down about seven days after it was notified of the allegations.2618
  • In the early 2010s, the Department began a disciplinary investigation into two Ashley Youth Detention Centre employees over allegations that they brought pornographic material into the Centre.2619 It is unclear whether these employees were suspended while the investigation was undertaken. The employees were sanctioned with reductions in salary and reassignment of duties.2620
  • In the early 2010s, the Department initiated disciplinary investigations over allegations of physical and verbal abuse by one staff member and allegations of physical abuse by another. It appears that one of these employees was suspended four days after the Department received the complaint.2621
  • In the mid-2010s, the Department began a disciplinary investigation into an employee involving allegations of physical assault that were also the subject of two police charges.2622 The Magistrates Court dismissed these charges.2623
  • In the mid-2010s, the Department began an Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation into Walter including because of allegations that he touched a detainee’s genital area.2624 Walter had previously been the subject of five other investigations.2625 The Department’s handling of the allegations regarding Walter is considered in Section 6.2.
  1. Internal investigations between 2007 and 2014

From 2007 to 2014, Ashley Youth Detention Centre undertook several internal or informal investigations into the conduct of staff, including the following:

  • A number of internal investigations were conducted in relation to Walter during this period. We discuss responses to allegations regarding Walter in Section 6.2.
  • In the late 2000s, Centre management conducted a review into a staff member who had been the subject of a complaint to the Secretary about excessive use of force. The Secretary referred the complaint back to Centre management for review. The Department provided us with a spreadsheet that said the complaint was not substantiated and was referred to the Ombudsman ‘for further review if required’.2626 In reflecting on the referral, the Ombudsman has told us that there is no mechanism under the Ombudsman Act 1978 (‘Ombudsman Act’) for the Department to make such a referral.2627 Another allegation against the employee was ‘referred’ to the Ombudsman in the early 2010s for alleged excessive use of force and that access to medical care was withheld.2628 The Department told us that the Ombudsman did not make an adverse finding.2629
  • In the late 2000s, the Department terminated a staff member’s employment over allegations including that he supplied a child at Ashley Youth Detention Centre with contraband in exchange for ‘sex[ual] favours’.2630
  • Centre management conducted two reviews in the late 2000s into one staff member who had been the subject of a complaint to the Ombudsman in relation to alleged abuse and inappropriate comments, and another allegation about the use of excessive force.2631 An Employment Direction No. 5 investigation ultimately began in the late 2010s over the allegations of excessive force.2632
  • In the mid-2010s, Centre management conducted a review into a staff member who had been the subject of a complaint to the Ombudsman about alleged physical abuse.2633 The Department told us that it did not have information about the final finding.2634
  • In the mid-2010s, Centre management conducted a review into allegations that a staff member had made comments of a sexual nature and perpetrated sexual abuse during a search.2635 The review included seeking clarification from the complainant, putting the allegations to the employee for comment and reviewing closed-circuit television footage.2636 Management found that the allegations were not substantiated.2637
  • On an unknown date, the Department conducted a review into allegations of verbal and physical abuse by a staff member.2638 When more allegations of verbal abuse were later raised against the staff member, these were referred to the Area Manager with a recommendation for suspension (on an unknown date).2639 The suspension was not actioned because the staff member was on workers compensation.2640 The Department issued a direction that the staff member was not to interact inappropriately with children and contrary to the Child Protection Practice Framework.2641
  1. Case example: Walter

In this case example, we consider responses to complaints made about a former Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member, Walter (a pseudonym).2642 Walter began working at Ashley Home for Boys and was an employee at Ashley Youth Detention Centre until the late 2010s.2643 He held various roles at the Centre that involved working directly with children.2644

While we found many aspects of the Department’s response to Walter concerning, we have not examined all elements of it exhaustively. We have chosen three elements of this matter to illustrate problems and issues. This includes consideration of:

  • the failure of the Department to recognise and act on, allegations received about Walter over several years that indicated a pattern of abusive behaviours, including allegations made through Abuse in State Care Program claims
  • how the Office of the Ombudsman responded to a complaint from a detainee, Erin (a pseudonym), which led to her serious complaints being referred by the Office of the Ombudsman back to Ashley Youth Detention Centre for response without adequate independent oversight and scrutiny2645
  • the Department’s approach to considering and initiating formal disciplinary action against Walter.
  1. Complaints about Walter’s behaviour towards detainees

We examined a variety of sources about Walter’s conduct at Ashley Youth Detention Centre to understand his complaints history. This information was difficult to piece together due to the nature and complexity of the spreadsheets and documents we received from various State agencies and witnesses. In some instances, we have relied on information compiled by departmental witnesses who were not with the Department at the time of the alleged incidents and who were not involved in, or responsible for, the Department’s response.

What we did observe in the information available to us, however, was a significant pattern of serious allegations of abuse by Walter spanning two decades. Walter was the subject of at least 31 allegations of abuse, including child sexual abuse, made from the late 1990s to as recently as 2022—including through complaints made directly to the Department, the Ombudsman, the Commissioner for Children and Young People, through Abuse in State Care Program claims, civil claims, and reports to Tasmania Police.

The Department was aware of at least 19 of these allegations before Walter’s resignation in the late 2010s, with these 19 allegations raised with the Department from the late 1990s to the mid-2010s. The allegations of Walter’s abuse the Department received were extremely serious. They included inappropriate touching of female detainees, sexual abuse while strip searching a detainee, forced oral sex and rape. We also received evidence of allegations of physical abuse or excessive use of force.

We set out below, at a high level, some of the allegations made against Walter before his resignation, and the associated responses by the Department, Tasmania Police and other agencies.

In the late 1990s, two female detainees lodged complaints with Ashley Youth Detention Centre alleging that Walter touched them inappropriately.2646 A third detainee also complained to the Centre, alleging that Walter failed to apply proportionate restraint.2647 The Centre carried out an internal investigation into these three complaints during which Walter was suspended on full pay.2648 As a result, Walter was required to undergo training related to at least one of these complaints and a ‘first and final warning’ was issued regarding the second complaint.2649 In relation to the third complaint, Walter was issued with a notice, which we understood to confirm a finding that Walter had conducted himself ‘in an improper manner’ in the performance of his duties.2650 No further action was otherwise recommended.2651 We understand Tasmania Police was notified about Walter’s conduct at the time, but we are unclear of the specific allegations reported at this time.2652

Between the late 2000s and early 2010s, six people made Abuse in State Care Program claims in relation to Walter’s conduct.2653 The claims, which related to Walter’s alleged conduct in the late 1990s and early 2000s, included allegations of sexual abuse while strip searching a detainee, forced oral sex and rape.2654 We received no evidence to suggest any contact was made with the complainants who had lodged Abuse in State Care Program claims naming Walter to determine whether they would be willing to make a sworn statement—either to support a disciplinary investigation or investigation by police—which aligns with what we were told was necessary to act based on the practice at the time (refer to Section 4.2). We were also told the Department could not find evidence to suggest that the information from the Abuse in State Care Program was ever made available to those who supervised Walter or who were subsequently involved in the disciplinary investigations of him.2655

In the early 2000s, a male detainee disclosed that Walter had touched his genital area during strip searches.2656 The matter was reported to the Centre and Walter was stood down for 48 hours in response to this complaint.2657

In the late 2000s, a female detainee alleged that Walter sexually abused her and that a staff member witnessed the incident but did not intervene.2658 Tasmania Police found there was no evidence to support the allegations and closed the matter.2659

In the late 2000s, a complaint was made to the Ombudsman about Walter’s restraint of a detainee, which allegedly caused their genitals to be exposed.2660 We did not consider this matter in detail.

In the early 2010s, Walter was alleged to have physically abused a female detainee and entered her room after viewing her through the door viewing panel.2661 The Department became aware of this complaint via a referral from the Ombudsman.2662 Mr Connock, who was not the Ombudsman at the time, told us that the Office of the Ombudsman carried out preliminary inquiries into the matter and found that the use of force involving Walter was unjustified and ‘showed a weakness in his conflict resolution skills’.2663 Mr Connock also told us that Centre management advised that Walter had been formally counselled and received remedial training.2664

In the early 2010s, a former detainee, ‘Erin’, made a complaint about Walter’s alleged sexualised behaviour towards her.2665 We describe the Ombudsman and Department’s response to Erin’s complaint in Section 6.2.2.

In the mid-2010s, a detainee complained that Walter was physically threatening and intimidating towards him.2666 We understand this complaint was raised through an internal complaints process. Walter was given a ‘lawful and reasonable direction’ in response.2667

In the mid-2010s, it was alleged that Walter touched a detainee’s genital area, as well as having engaged in inappropriate use of force and failing to report the incident in line with Ashley Youth Detention Centre procedures.2668 The Commissioner for Children and Young People, Child Safety Services and Tasmania Police were made aware of this complaint.2669 We understand the Department notified Tasmania Police about this allegation.2670

In addition to the allegations the Department was aware of, in the mid-2010s, the then Commissioner for Children and Young People made a notification to Child Safety Services about an allegation that Walter had tried to touch a detainee’s genitals.2671 The notification stated that the future risk was low because the young person was no longer in custody, Walter was being investigated and the Centre had taken necessary steps to ensure other children were not at risk.2672 This complaint was not included in the Department’s information to us about Walter’s complaints history.2673

Below, we explore two specific responses to allegations raised against Walter. We note generally, however, that the information we received about allegations against Walter from the Department, the Registrar and Tasmania Police was confusing and inconsistent. Based on the information the Department provided, we could not always tell which allegations were reported to Tasmania Police or the Registrar, and the dates and allegations in each of their respective responses to us did not align.

We note with some concern that the Registrar told us that the first notification he received was about the mid-2010s allegation that Walter had touched a detainee on his genital area, which was reported approximately four weeks after the allegation was made.2674 Based on our chronology, the Department was aware of at least 12, and potentially as many as 21, previous complaints about Walter at this time. We acknowledge the obligation to report only arose in 2015 and that there was some confusion around reporting obligations to the Registrar until the Department’s practice changed in 2020. However, we consider Walter’s extensive complaints history to be vital information for the Registrar. This is particularly the case because decisions about granting registration to work with vulnerable people can protect children in a broader range of settings (for example, volunteer and other activities).

We note that Walter’s registration to work with vulnerable people was only cancelled in the early 2020s after the Registrar received new information about the serious history of complaints against Walter around that time.2675

  1. Erin complains about Walter to the Ombudsman in the mid-2010s

Erin told us about her experience as a detainee at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, where she was sexually and physically abused by staff (particularly during strip searches) as well as abused by other young people in detention, which we outline in Case study 1.2676

Erin told us that about a month after arriving at the Centre in the mid-2010s, she was feeling unwell and was worried she had appendicitis.2677 She recalled she told Walter and asked to see the nurse.2678 She said Walter told her to lift her top up, felt around her lower abdomen and drew a shape near her hip, telling Erin it was a ‘happy appendix’.2679 Feeling violated and that his actions were ‘creepy’, Erin told us she reported the incident to a female staff member, who advised Erin to report it to the Ombudsman.2680 Erin also described an incident where Walter entered her room to collect sheets while she was showering, despite Erin’s request that Walter send a female staff member to collect the sheets, or waited until she finished showering.2681

The Ombudsman told us the office received a complaint that ‘the staff member had touched the resident’s stomach and drawn a line with his finger near her hipbone’.2682 By the time Erin made a complaint, the Ombudsman had already received at least two other complaints against Walter, which are described earlier.2683

Two weeks after Erin submitted her complaint, she received a letter from the Office of the Ombudsman that stated that the Ombudsman had an ‘arrangement’ with the Department in which ‘complaints such as yours are initially referred back to Ashley management to attempt to resolve the complaint quickly and efficiently’.2684 The letter went on to state:

The sort of complaints that are referred are ones that appear to relate to matters such as the application of Ashley’s Behaviour Development program or where it seems likely that Ashley management can resolve the matter through discussion with staff and the young person.

I expect that a senior staff member will speak to you about your complaint in the near future. I am confident that your complaint will be resolved through this process and I will not contact you about it again. I will be notified of the outcome of any discussions with you by the Manager at Ashley.2685

In response to the referral from the Ombudsman, Centre management initiated an internal investigation into Erin’s complaint, which included a review of closed-circuit television footage and obtaining a statement from Walter and witnesses.2686 In relation to the allegation that Walter drew on Erin’s body, Walter described this as an attempt to calm Erin’s nerves and emphasised that other staff and detainees were present.2687 Regarding the allegation he entered Erin’s room while she was showering, Walter said another staff member was present just outside the room and that he [Walter] could not see Erin from where he stood in the room.2688

Ultimately, Centre management accepted Walter’s version of events.2689 Centre management concluded that Walter did not have any inappropriate intent, but he should have realised that his conduct was likely to make Erin feel uncomfortable and potentially feel unsafe.2690 Referring to the similarities between Erin’s complaint and the other detainee complaint to the Ombudsman made around this time, Centre management reflected that there was ‘insufficient sensitivity on [Walter’s] part to gender considerations’.2691 It said Walter’s actions in both instances were ‘ill-advised’ and made him ‘susceptible to a complaint such as this’.2692 Walter was not sanctioned but was formally counselled and asked to conduct himself with greater sensitivity and focus on gender awareness.2693

We have not sought evidence of the processes adopted as part of this investigation and accordingly, do not make conclusions regarding whether the Department took appropriate action in this investigation. However, we note that it is our understanding Erin was not interviewed as part of this internal investigation, which appears to have been conducted outside the State Service disciplinary framework.

Erin had been released from the Centre by the time the Office of the Ombudsman received the Department’s decision about her complaint.2694 Mr Connock, who was not the Ombudsman at the time but worked in the Office of the Ombudsman, told us ‘no action was taken by the Ombudsman’s office other than to note the outcome’, which he considered a ‘questionable decision’.2695 Erin told us that she was never notified of any outcome, and she had to continue seeing Walter in her two subsequent admissions to Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2696 Speaking of the consequences she faced when she returned to the Centre after her complaint, Erin said staff called her a ‘dog’ and a ‘drama queen’.2697 She felt it was ‘pointless’ speaking up and she learned that it was easier to not say anything at all.2698

We were surprised by the letter from the Ombudsman’s office to Erin, which made mention of an ‘arrangement’ by which complaints were referred back to the Centre, particularly given the Ombudsman’s involvement in administering two rounds of the Abuse in State Care Program. This involvement should have made the Office of the Ombudsman aware of the number of complaints of abuse and mistreatment made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff and raised questions about the appropriateness of referring complaints back to the Centre.

We acknowledge that under the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman’s powers are to investigate a public authority’s administrative action, not individual officer conduct.2699 In practical terms, this means the Ombudsman is responsible for reviewing the Department’s (and Centre’s) systems, practices and decisions made, rather than any specific misconduct by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff. When complaints were made about particular staff members, we were told that the Ombudsman would investigate the manner in which the Department had responded to the complaint and what legal framework, policies and procedures were in place to mitigate against the circumstances of the complaint arising again.2700 However, Mr Connock also acknowledged that the Ombudsman should have more closely considered and monitored the Centre’s responses to Erin’s complaint and other serious allegations.2701 In Chapter 12, we discuss the Ombudsman’s role and associated powers when responding to complaints about the treatment of children and young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

Mr Connock told us he considered the referral of Erin’s complaint back to the Centre to be a ‘mistake’ by a less experienced staff member and said that the type of allegations that were intended to go back to Centre management under the arrangement were ‘low level things’ such as ‘not enough jam’.2702 Mr Connock said that the arrangement should never have been used to refer any complaint that included an element of sexual abuse or harassment.2703 He considered that a more experienced staff member would not have reached the same conclusion as the one reached in Erin’s case.2704 In any event, Mr Connock confirmed that the ‘practice has long been discontinued’.2705

We accept Mr Connock’s view that Erin’s complaint was referred back in error and that this practice would not occur today. We are concerned, however, by other evidence we received about this ‘arrangement’. In addition to Erin’s complaint, we have reviewed four letters dated between 2009 and 2013 from the Office of the Ombudsman in response to complaints made against various Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff members. Those letters, prepared by two different staff members of the Ombudsman’s office, used similar language to the letter relating to Erin referring to this ‘arrangement’ where complaints were referred back to Ashley Youth Detention Centre management. These complaints did not include allegations of child sexual abuse or related conduct but related to issues such as ‘the application of AYDC’s Behaviour Development program’ and ‘staff attitude and behaviour towards residents’.2706 They also included a complaint by a child at the Centre who had been locked in his room and a complaint that a staff member told other detainees that he would give them contraband if they ‘bash[ed]’ the complainant.2707

We do not consider complaints of this kind to be minor because they relate directly to the human rights and safety of detainees. On this basis, we do not consider the referral of Erin’s complaint back to the Centre was a one-off human error. We are also concerned about the integrity of the processes that were in place in the Office of the Ombudsman at that time to ensure inappropriate referrals were not made.

We are pleased Mr Connock shared our concerns about Erin’s complaint and that the arrangement where ‘minor’ complaints are referred back to Ashley Youth Detention Centre has since ceased. We make recommendations about oversight of Ashley Youth Detention Centre in Chapters 12 and 18.

  1. Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation into Walter’s conduct in the mid-2010s

Walter was investigated (internally or by the Ombudsman) on at least five occasions before the Department started an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation in the mid-2010s.2708

As mentioned earlier, in the mid-2010s Ashley Youth Detention Centre management became aware that a detainee had made a complaint against Walter, alleging that Walter had touched him in the genital area. A preliminary investigation into the matter indicated that Walter may have touched the detainee but did not necessarily make contact with his genital area.2709 There were concerns that the contact may have constituted an inappropriate use of force.2710 A meeting was held with Walter in which the allegations were put to him and he was invited to provide a written response to the claims.2711 Walter was also informed that due to the nature of the allegations, he would be assigned alternative duties with no contact with detainees while the matter was investigated.2712 This direction appears to be a result of ‘preliminary investigations’.2713

In a written response, Walter acknowledged that he touched the detainee but rejected the allegation that he touched the detainee in the genital area.2714 He explained that no force was involved and provided a justification for touching the detainee.2715

Soon after, the detainee reported his complaint to the Commissioner for Children and Young People.2716 The matter was also referred to the police at the detainee’s request and was reported to Child Safety Services.2717

We understand that Walter went on leave immediately after Centre management put the allegation to him and did not return to the Centre before his resignation.2718

Later, but before Walter’s resignation, the then Acting Deputy Secretary – Children, approved a Minute recommending an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation into Walter.2719 The three grounds on which the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation was based (and ultimately proceeded) were in relation to allegations that Walter had touched the detainee in the genital area, failed to use non-violent crisis intervention techniques, and failed to report the alleged incident relating to inappropriate contact in line with the Department’s Standard Operating Procedure.2720

The Minute also included a heading ‘Related Prior Incidents’, which referred to previous concerns and allegations that had been raised against Walter. These were included to show that on several occasions Walter may have potentially shown a lack of care and diligence in his interactions with some detainees.2721

The Minute provided details of ‘the most recent incidents’ involving Walter. This included the two complaints made to the Ombudsman in the early 2010s as well as another allegation made by a female detainee in the late 2000s, which the police found to be ‘unsubstantiated’.2722 The advice to the Acting Deputy Secretary stated: ‘While past incidents cannot be used in making a determination or severity, they can be used to establish a pattern of behaviour of which to determine risk’.2723

Consistent with the practice of not using information received through Abuse in State Care Program claims, the Minute did not mention any of the six claims made under that scheme. Surprisingly, the Minute also did not mention a late-2000s complaint to the Ombudsman or the seven other complaints that were known to the Department about

Walter at this time. As a result, 14 separate allegations about Walter, some of which were very serious allegations of child sexual abuse, were omitted from the Minute.

An independent investigator appointed to investigate the allegations provided their final investigation report. The report concluded that there was no case to answer over the substance of the allegations under investigation because the investigator did not believe inappropriate contact had occurred.2724 Consistent with instructions from the Department, the investigator did not have regard to any previous allegations (noting they did not receive the complete complaints history in any event).2725

The Acting Deputy Secretary approved a Minute about the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation report after receiving that report.2726 The Minute recommended that there be no further action on the matter.2727 It did not refer to any previous allegations or propose any disciplinary action.

While the first Minute to the Acting Deputy Secretary included the advice that past incidents could be used to establish a pattern of behaviour on which to determine risk, Walter’s conduct was ultimately assessed based on the investigation of a single incident, without reference to a potential pattern of behaviour. We were told that other than brief periods where Walter was stood down from work, there does not appear to have been any other action taken in respect of repeated complaints about his behaviour.2728

Following this disciplinary process, Walter made a number of WorkCover claims.2729 Walter ultimately left the Department in the late 2010s by mutual agreement and received a lump sum payout.2730

Secretary Pervan agreed that an opportunity was lost to protect children entering Ashley Youth Detention Centre from the potential harm posed by Walter over this period.2731 Reflecting on the opportunities lost during the period in which the Abuse in State Care Program information was coming in, he said:

I agree that there was a lost opportunity to identify [Walter] as an individual against whom multiple allegations had been made. However there was no guidance on the use of this kind of information in employment decisions provided by the [State Service Act] or [Employment Directions] insofar as matters had already been tested and resolved (it is my understanding that double jeopardy applies in disciplinary proceedings). If the full history had been presented to me we would have sought urgent advice from the Solicitor-General on how to proceed given our intent to take action. I assume the advice of the Solicitor-General on our options would be different today … than they were prior to the revision of the 2007 advice.2732

We agree this was a lost opportunity.

Finding—The State Service disciplinary framework, including its application and interpretation by the Department, did not facilitate an appropriate response to allegations and complaints about Walter (a pseudonym) from the late 1990s to the mid-2010s

We identified several areas of concern with the disciplinary response to Walter. These reflect systemic problems across the State Service, including the following:

  • To protect the procedural fairness rights and privacy of Walter, previous complaints (including Abuse in State Care Program claims) alleging sexual abuse by him were not considered (and therefore, not considered cumulatively) in investigations, despite these suggesting increased risks to child safety.
  • The accounts of adults appeared to be favoured over the accounts of children and young people.
  • Fragmented and poor record keeping made it difficult to gain a complete picture of Walter’s past conduct and complaints history.
  • Complaints that were made directly and exclusively to Ashley Youth Detention Centre management or the Department were managed ‘in-house’ and relatively informally (if at all).
  • While some of the internal reviews had greater formality, such as the early 2010s referral from the Ombudsman’s office about Erin’s complaint, they did not appear to have been conducted in line with formal disciplinary processes (despite potentially constituting a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct).

We were particularly concerned that reviews and investigations into Walter’s conduct were episodic and fragmented. This significantly undermined consideration of the seriousness of Walter’s cumulative conduct, which meant there was no meaningful consideration given to assessing and managing risks he may have posed to detainees.

We have seen multiple examples where past complaints or concerns about a person’s conduct have not been acted on due to real or perceived limitations in the industrial framework relating to previous unsubstantiated allegations. We consider the case of Walter to be an extreme manifestation of this problem.

We consider that previous allegations and complaints, not just those that are formally substantiated, could and should be considered in disciplinary processes against a staff member. They should be given appropriate weight and consideration that recognises the extent to which they were investigated and the basis for them

not being substantiated. A previously unsubstantiated matter does not mean it did not occur but that it could not be proven on the balance of probabilities. We note the significant evolution and understanding of the dynamics of sexual misconduct and abuse of children has contributed to a much more sophisticated appreciation of complaints of this nature now compared with the past. Even the criminal justice system, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the alleged offence, now allows consideration of evidence that suggests a tendency towards a ‘sexual interest’ in children.2733

The lack of record-keeping systems to ensure all information was taken together (including information from Abuse in State Care Program claims) also contributed to these shortcomings.

Secretary Pervan conceded that there was a system failure in how the Department responded to information it held about Walter.2734

  1. Observations

Because responses to this matter occurred a number of years ago, we have been able to include more detail about some elements of the Department’s response compared with much more recent examples relating to Ira, Lester and Stan in Section 8 (which concern alleged offending of similar seriousness).

While we are pleased some of the problems we saw in this case example have since been addressed, we did see a striking number of similar themes continue to arise in more recent responses. This includes failures to:

  • recognise certain allegations as constituting child sexual abuse and treating them with the seriousness and urgency they deserved
  • consider and give adequate weight to the cumulative effect of multiple complaints over time, which suggest a significant pattern of alarming behaviour
  • act on information received in Abuse in State Care Program claims due to actual or perceived barriers
  • apply the State Service disciplinary framework for conduct that may constitute a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct in favour of internal investigations that did not have the level of rigour and independence that would be expected
  • make appropriate notifications to other agencies, including Tasmania Police and the Registrar, in a consistent and timely manner
  • keep clear and consistent records internally, but also across agencies, relating to information received about an alleged abuser and complaints about them.

We revisit some of these themes in Section 8.5 based on our examination of responses to allegations about Ira, Lester and Stan.

  1. 2018—Introduction of the National Redress Scheme

The National Redress Scheme began in 2018. It is available to people who experienced sexual abuse in institutional settings before 1 July 2018.2735 While the purpose and design of the National Redress Scheme is focused on recognising and alleviating the impact of child sexual abuse, information provided through it is valuable to assessing and understanding current risks to children. The Department started receiving National Redress Scheme claims regarding Ashley Youth Detention Centre employees from 2019.

The National Redress Scheme is administered by the Australian Government through its Department of Social Services, which is the Scheme Operator (‘Scheme Operator’). Tasmania’s Department of Justice (through the Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit) coordinates the Tasmanian Government’s participation in the National Redress Scheme.2736 Ginna Webster, Secretary, Department of Justice, told us:

Where the National Redress Scheme identifies the Tasmanian Government as potentially responsible for the abuse alleged in an application, the Scheme Operator notifies the Tasmanian Government. The notification provides the Tasmanian Government with a copy of the relevant parts of the application. This includes details of the claims as it relates to the Tasmanian Government institution but not details of any other claims made by the applicant.

The relevant Tasmanian Government institution is then required to retrieve any relevant records and prepare a summary of the retrieved records and provide those documents to the Scheme Operator.2737

The Department of Justice described the ‘relevant parts of the application’ it receives from the Scheme Operator as ‘redacted and curated’ parts of the full National Redress Scheme application as lodged by the claimant.2738 We understand that this is not unique to Tasmania as the Scheme Operator does not provide a copy of the full National Redress Scheme application to any institution.2739

  1. Department of Justice process for responding to the Scheme Operator

We were told that Tasmania is the only jurisdiction that has centralised the processing of National Redress Scheme applications.2740 We understand that the purpose of this centralisation is to ‘ensure that the State of Tasmania provides [the Scheme Operator] with a consistent and timely response to its requests’.2741

The Department of Justice will often liaise with other Tasmanian Government agencies to gather information that is relevant to assessing claims.2742

We were told that the process the Department of Justice adopted before October 2020 involved the following steps:

  • The Department of Justice’s Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit summarised the claim based on the redacted and curated aspects of the claimant’s application it received from the Scheme Operator and identified the relevant agency (or agencies) the claims related to (such as the Department).2743
  • The Department of Justice included its summary of the claim in a ‘National Redress Scheme – Request for Information’ form. The ‘National Redress Scheme – Request for Information’ form included questions as to whether the agency holds records that document the abuse, whether there are any records of a prior payment to the complainant (for example, ex gratia payments) and whether there are records that show the alleged abuser is still an employee of the Tasmanian Government and/or working in a child-related activity.2744 That form was sent to relevant agencies to complete based on any records searches or other material they may have held. We understand the Department of Justice sent this form to agencies within 24 hours of the claim details being provided by the Scheme Operator.2745 If the agency needed more information, it would need to ask the Department of Justice for the complete information it received from the Scheme Operator.2746
  • The relevant agency then reviewed its records to answer queries and supplement any information and returned the ‘National Redress Scheme – Request for Information’ form to the Department of Justice.2747 The agency was expected to include information on relevant claims received through the Abuse in State Care Program or Abuse in State Care Support Service in its response.2748

From around October 2020, the Department of Justice changed its practice and began to pass on all information it held to agencies, rather than summarising the already redacted and curated material from the Scheme Operator. This is discussed in Section 9.4.

If allegations in National Redress Scheme claims relate to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, it is the Department’s role to determine whether the alleged abuser is a current staff member or otherwise represents a continuing risk for children and to address that risk through its own processes.2749 This includes making relevant notifications to agencies such as the Registrar.2750

The Tasmanian Government does not have contact details for claimants and is not permitted to contact them directly. If the Department needs more information about a claim or claimant (including to contact them) it notifies the Department of Justice, which then approaches the Scheme Operator to organise this.2751

  1. 2019–2020—Department management of increasing abuse allegations against staff

By the end of 2018, the Department had been notified of various allegations of child sexual abuse occurring at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, including through the Abuse in State Care Program and the Abuse in State Care Support Service, through other agencies (such as the Ombudsman or Commissioner for Children and Young People) and directly from detainees.

From 2019, however, the Department saw an increasing number of allegations made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre employees. This was partly due to the start of the National Redress Scheme in 2018, with allegations first being made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff through this scheme from 2019. Gathering information in response to National Redress Scheme claims also contributed to the rediscovery of several Abuse in State Care Program claims relating to serving staff.

The Department received at least eight National Redress Scheme claims relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff members or contractors (or those of its predecessor, the Ashley Home for Boys) in 2019.2752 Some of these claims contained multiple allegations against several staff members, and the conduct was alleged to have occurred between 1994 and 2008.2753 Some of those claims were made by former detainees who had also already reported their abuse in other ways, including through state redress processes.

We received evidence that the Department was not equipped to deal with the allegations that were coming in during this period, with Kathy Baker, former Deputy Secretary, Corporate Services attributing this to the Department being in:

… unfamiliar territory regarding how to handle these matters which were historical in nature, with poor record keeping practices, new personnel within the Department and the distributed nature on which the matters came into the Department.2754

The challenge of responding to National Redress Scheme claims would not be limited to Tasmania, as institutions across Australia also began to receive allegations of abuse against current and former staff and volunteers.

From 2019, the Department began to grapple with how to respond to this information. It was only from October 2020, however, that we saw the Department take active steps to improve its processes and responsiveness to information received through National Redress Scheme claims. This arose in the context of a steady escalation in the number of allegations from this period, as well as increased media reporting on institutional responses to child sexual abuse in late 2020. We outline the Department’s responses to these increasing allegations in the following sections, with reference to the specific case examples of Ira, Lester and Stan.

  1. Context for our review of responses to Ira, Lester and Stan

We have examined more recent responses to allegations against three Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff members—Ira, Lester and Stan (all pseudonyms). This included making multiple requests to the State, Tasmania Police, the Registrar and departmental witnesses for details of the allegations against Ira, Lester and Stan, and the responses to those allegations.2755

For a range of legal and procedural reasons, we cannot outline our analysis to its full extent in this report. However, these case examples have significantly informed our recommendations. Even based on the information that we have published, we consider these relatively recent examples of responses to allegations of abuse by staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre are significant cause for concern. Particularly, as noted in Section 6.2.4, many of the problems we identified in the case example of Walter continued to feature in these more recent examples.

By around 2020, it became clear that the Department was facing an unprecedented crisis, with several staff being the subject of allegations. There were multiple competing demands relevant to the protection of children in such circumstances, including protecting children from people who may pose a risk to child safety, ensuring enough staff presence to allow children and young people to undertake their normal routines safely, as well as avoiding reinforcement of negative attitudes about detainees.

In considering responses from the Department to allegations against Ira, Lester and Stan, we kept several factors front of mind. We took seriously what we understand to be the very real challenges of running a youth detention centre, particularly during this period. Evidence from current and former staff, our site visits, private meetings and submissions all helped inform our understanding of these challenges. This includes:

  • The impact of the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in 2020, would have been a significant and consuming issue for the Department. Much of the work of the Department involved delivering essential frontline services that needed to continue, in some form, through the pandemic. This includes consideration of how to manage a child protection system that required active monitoring of at-risk children and young people and how to ensure risks of COVID-19 infections could be mitigated and managed in closed facilities such as Ashley Youth Detention Centre. The Department also assumed responsibility for Tasmania’s hotel quarantine program. Several staff were seconded and diverted during this time.
  • There has been a longstanding struggle to maintain adequate staffing at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Youth justice is a difficult environment, and this can make recruitment and retention of suitably skilled and qualified staff challenging. We recognise that understaffing creates significant operational challenges and that the scale of allegations against staff (and media attention around aspects of this) would have had a significant impact on other staff at the Centre.
  • It is often difficult to take disciplinary action against conduct that is alleged to have occurred many years ago, as is often the case for claims made under the Abuse in State Care Program and the National Redress Scheme. There may be little prospect of establishing corroborative evidence due to the passage of time or complainants not wishing to participate in disciplinary processes.

The Department was notified of serious allegations of abuse about Ira, Lester and Stan. While we do not itemise these specifically and do not always link them to particular staff members, this information included allegations of rape, forced oral sex, exposure of their genitals to detainees and watching detainees in the shower or while they masturbated. Claims sometimes also included allegations of physical violence or threats that occurred in connection to the alleged sexual abuse. Many allegations referred to multiple instances of abuse, as opposed to one-off occasions. One allegation was made about child sexual abuse occurring in the community by one of these staff members.

We provide summaries of responses to these allegations below.

  1. Case example: Ira

Ira is one of many Centre staff who began working at what was then known as Ashley Home for Boys and held multiple operational roles, including as a youth worker, until his suspension in November 2020.2756

  1. Allegations against Ira and the Department’s response

In 2019, the Department received information outlining allegations from two former detainees of Ashley Youth Detention Centre that involved Ira. This included allegations Ira witnessed or was involved in abusive strip searches, inappropriately watched detainees in the shower and that he coerced detainees to perform sexual acts upon each other for his own sexual gratification.

  • In April 2019, the Department was notified of allegations from a former detainee, Parker (a pseudonym).2757 Parker alleged that he was subjected to abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2758 Parker did not link Ira to any specific incident of abuse or mistreatment but listed him among other staff as being somehow involved. As we describe throughout this case example, at some time point, Parker’s allegations about Ira essentially fell by the wayside and were only ‘rediscovered’ by the Department almost a year later in October 2020.
  • In September 2019, the Department was notified of allegations against Ira by another former detainee, Baxter (a pseudonym).2759 Baxter alleged that Ira sexually abused him on multiple occasions and engaged in other forms of mistreatment (along with other allegations not involving Ira).2760

Almost a decade earlier, Parker and Baxter lodged Abuse in State Care Program claims alleging abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff and had each received ex gratia payments as a result.2761 Those Abuse in State Care Program claims made similar allegations about the kind of abuse each endured at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, but neither named Ira. Both claims described the incidents as causing psychological damage and otherwise having a negative impact on their lives.2762

In September 2019, Ira was placed on restricted duties for reasons unrelated to abuse claims or disciplinary matters. Senior members of the Department told us that this meant Ira did not work directly with detainees from September 2019, although he remained on site at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2763 We received assurances that these restricted duties suitably mitigated the risk relating to the allegations against Ira. However, Stuart Watson (who was Assistant Manager from January 2020 and Acting Centre Manager from March 2020) told us he did not become aware of the allegations against Ira until March 2020 and only did so incidentally.2764 In that context, we find it difficult to understand how Centre management could appropriately monitor Ira’s engagement with detainees if it did not know the secondary purpose for which his restricted duties were being relied on. We received some evidence that suggested Ira was able to undertake activities with detainees (including on a one-on-one basis) even while he was on restricted duties.2765 Ultimately, we do not know if Ira did in fact engage with detainees while on restricted duties, but we are concerned there was no clear restriction or safeguards to prevent him from doing so.

On 7 October 2019, an ‘ad hoc’ meeting between a range of senior departmental staff was convened to consider allegations raised against current employees, including through the National Redress Scheme, and to determine any required actions.2766 The meeting also considered the information received in 2019 relating to Parker and Baxter naming Ira, but it is unclear whether their earlier Abuse in State Care Program claims were acknowledged or discussed in this meeting.2767 The minutes of the meeting recorded a number of action items, including a review of Ira’s files and otherwise trying to gather more information with a view to providing advice to Mandy Clarke, then Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families.2768 It was agreed that the next meeting would be held ‘when the information associated with the actions of the meeting is available’.2769 We did not receive information about this further meeting, including whether it occurred.

Two months later, on 3 December 2019, information about the allegations against Ira were included in a Minute to Secretary Pervan, which was described as a ‘preliminary review’ of the information arising from both claims.2770 We note that the Minute focused almost exclusively on Baxter’s allegations (which specifically named Ira as an alleged abuser) and recommended that Baxter’s allegations be referred to Tasmania Police.2771 The Minute also advised that the Department was empowered to act on the allegations it had received for disciplinary and risk management purposes, including by referring matters to Tasmania Police and the Registrar.2772 The Minute did not refer to or otherwise acknowledge limitations imposed by the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice for acting on the information and, in fact, identified options for the Department that were inconsistent with the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice and the practice that emerged from it. The Minute recommended that Secretary Pervan defer a decision on whether to conduct an Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation until advice was received from Tasmania Police.2773

Due to human error, the Department did not refer Baxter’s allegations to Tasmania Police until February 2020.2774 Tasmania Police advised, in February or March 2020, that it would not be investigating Baxter’s complaints.2775

We received no evidence to suggest that the Department took any steps to pursue disciplinary action against Ira until August 2020 at the earliest, despite there being no impediment in doing so from the perspective of Tasmania Police.2776

In September 2020 (a year after Baxter’s allegations were received), Ms Clarke approved a Minute to Secretary Pervan recommending that the Department put Baxter’s allegations to Ira (outside of the Employment Direction No. 5 process) to gather more information given that Ira was ‘at the stage of transitioning back to resident contact’ because his restricted duties were ending.2777 It was envisaged that the information gathered from this process would be used to consider whether an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation was required, although the Minute acknowledged that Ira would likely deny the allegations.2778 The Minute was silent on Parker’s allegations, which had seemingly fallen from the Department’s consideration since they were last considered in December 2019. We note that we were only provided with a version of this Minute that had not been signed by Secretary Pervan; however, minutes of the 25 September 2020 Strengthening Safeguards Working Group meeting and a later 8 November 2020 Minute (discussed below) indicate that Secretary Pervan approved this September 2020 Minute and accepted the recommendation.2779

On or around 25 September 2020, the Department decided to delay putting Baxter’s allegations to Ira. This decision was made in the context of the Department wanting information from Ira about allegations that he had raised about Lester (we discuss these allegations as they relate to Lester in Section 8.3).2780 A draft statement was taken based on a meeting between People and Culture staff and Ira in late September 2020 but was not finalised until November 2020.

On the evidence made available to us, it appears that in or around October 2020, the Department rediscovered Parker’s allegations.2781 These were referred by the Department to Tasmania Police on 21 October 2020.2782 The Department told us that, on 26 October 2020, five days after the Department’s referral, Tasmania Police notified the Department that it had ‘closed’ the matter.2783

On 2 November 2020, Secretary Pervan was reminded of Parker’s allegation against Ira in a Minute prepared by the Department and endorsed a recommendation that the Department wait to put the allegations against Ira to him until it had a statement from Ira about the allegations against Lester, noting at this point the draft statement had not been finalised.2784 The Department ultimately finalised this statement on 5 November 2020.2785 We are unclear why it took more than two months to finalise Ira’s statement.

A few days later, on 8 November 2020, Secretary Pervan decided, through a Minute he approved, to suspend Ira and commence an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation into Parker and Baxter’s allegations against Ira, although the Minute lacked some detail about serious allegations of abuse. The Minute recommending this course of action:

  • noted that Ira’s restricted duties were ceasing, which would ‘see him exposed to young people’, although it also noted that, given additional controls at the Centre (such as closed-circuit television footage), it was considered lower risk that the abuse outlined in the allegations could occur today2786
  • referred to media attention and scrutiny involving child sexual abuse matters, including The Nurse podcast, which had foreshadowed on 3 November 2020 that the Centre would be featured in its upcoming episode (due to be aired on 10 November 2020)2787
  • noted the seriousness of the allegations and that the public would expect that the allegations would be fully investigated and that Ira would be removed from working with children and young people2788
  • acknowledged the change in position from advice reflected in the September 2020 Minute (to put the allegations to Ira informally and seek his response) but referred to the fact that there were now multiple allegations that ‘may suggest a pattern of inappropriate behaviour’, stating ‘what previously wasn’t considered was the public expectation and pattern of behaviour’.2789

We were told that the decision to suspend Ira was made because there was, at that time, ‘sufficient particulars’ or information relating to the allegations against Ira that could be responded to.2790 We note that the decision in November 2020 to suspend Ira and begin an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation was based on the same information that was known to the Department in September 2019. We discuss this briefing, alongside Lester and Stan’s, in Section 9.6.

Ira was ultimately suspended from his employment at the Centre in November 2020, some 15 months after the Department became aware of Baxter’s allegations. It was 18 months after Parker’s allegations, although we accept that these alone may not have triggered an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation.

In February or March 2021, the Department appointed an external investigator to examine the allegations against Ira.2791 Further allegations were made against Ira in 2021 and 2022 following his suspension and the start of the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation, raising concerns that are relevant to a pattern of physical and sexual abuse of children.2792 We understand the investigation is ongoing.2793

  1. Responses of Tasmania Police and the Registrar

We received conflicting evidence about when the Department reported Parker and Baxter’s allegations to the Registrar. While the Department told us that it notified the Registrar about Baxter’s allegations in August 2020 and Parker’s allegations in October 2020, the Registrar gave evidence that it was only on 9 November 2020 that he received enough information about Parker and Baxter’s claims to consider them notifications.2794 Again, we note that the Department had been aware of these allegations since September 2019.

On 10 November 2020, the Registrar notified Ira that he intended to conduct an additional risk assessment to determine whether he should maintain his registration to work with vulnerable people.2795 The Registrar did not suspend Ira’s registration while this risk assessment occurred. We were told this was because there was not enough detail in the allegations.2796

Although the Registrar has received more information since this time (and at its request), as of 15 August 2022, the Registrar told us that he was awaiting ‘further information as to investigations by the Department of Communities including receipt of all relevant information’.2797 As of 11 August 2023, we understand that Ira still holds his registration to work with vulnerable people.

We reflect above the Department’s evidence as to when it reported to Tasmania Police. This is inconsistent with some of the information received from Tasmania Police. For example:

  • The Department told us that it reported Baxter’s allegations to Tasmania Police in February 2020.2798 However, Tasmania Police did not list this report in response to our request for all reports made against Ira.2799
  • The Department told us that it reported Parker’s allegation to Tasmania Police in October 2020.2800 However, Tasmania Police’s evidence suggests that it did not receive a report from the Department directly but rather from a third party, some eight months later, in June 2021.2801

There was also evidence of substantial delays in Tasmania Police reporting allegations to the Registrar. Parker’s allegations were referred almost two years after the Department says it reported the allegations to police.2802 We received no evidence that Tasmania Police reported Baxter’s allegations to the Registrar at all.2803

Ultimately, Tasmania Police told us that it received three allegations against Ira and did not investigate any of these allegations given that the complainants were either deidentified in the source of the information or did not consent to being contacted by Tasmania Police.2804

  1. Case example: Lester

Lester was one of many Centre staff members who began working at Ashley Home for Boys as a youth worker and continued his employment with the Centre until he resigned in the early 2020s.2805

  1. Allegations against Lester

Multiple allegations of child sexual abuse were made against Lester from the early 2000s:

  • In the early 2000s, there was an investigation into a complaint that Lester had exposed himself to detainees, although we note that the Department never told us directly about this allegation or investigation.2806
  • From the late 2000s to early 2010s, four claims were made against Lester through the Abuse in State Care Program. The allegations included that Lester tried to rape a complainant, forced a complainant to perform oral sex, touched a complainant’s penis and bottom during a strip search, watched a complainant while the complainant was masturbating, bribed a complainant with privileges to allow instances of child sexual abuse to occur, and watched a complainant in the shower and made sexual gestures towards him.2807 We note that in two of these cases the sexual abuse allegations included associated allegations of physical abuse.2808
  • In the early 2010s, a community member reported child sexual abuse by Lester outside the Centre to Tasmania Police, noting their concern that Lester worked with children at the Centre.2809 Tasmania Police took a statement from the complainant who was described as ‘unsure if [they] wanted to proceed to court proceedings’.2810 Tasmania Police did not share this allegation with the Department.2811
  • In the mid-2010s, the Department received information about a claim relating to Lester alleging child sexual abuse.2812 The Department reported this allegation to Tasmania Police about two weeks later.2813 Neither Tasmania Police nor the Department investigated this matter further, with Tasmania Police stating that the victim-survivor did not want to speak with police.2814
  • In January 2020, as recalled by former Clinical Practice Consultant at the Centre, Alysha (a pseudonym), Ira told her that in the 1990s or early 2000s he had witnessed an incident in which Lester was standing with a naked child, who was on all fours in what was known as the Ashley Youth Detention Centre secure unit.2815 Alysha reported the allegation directly to her line manager in the Department.2816 We were not satisfied that this report was recognised as a report of potential child sexual abuse at the time of its receipt. We discuss Departmental views of this report in Case study 5. Departmental documentation from March 2022 suggested that Alysha’s report ‘does not provide information that would lead the reader to conclude without doubt a serious sexual assault and/rape was perpetrated’, although the allegations were acknowledged as ‘concerning information’ that required further review.2817
  • In September 2020, Tasmania Police also received an anonymous report that Lester sexually abused detainees over a 15-year period.2818 The police disclosure report noted under the heading ‘Previous offences’ that ‘many children’ had alleged physical and sexual abuse by Lester.2819
  1. Department’s response to the January 2020 report

Despite Alysha’s report in January 2020, the Department appeared to take no meaningful action in early 2020 in response to the allegation. We were told ‘extensive file searches’ were taken to determine whether information relating to the allegations was held on Lester’s file, which did not uncover any information about the allegation reported by Alysha (or prior Abuse in State Care claims against Lester).2820 Although we were told these extensive file reviews occurred shortly after Alysha’s report, an email sent much later by Ms Clarke in September 2020 said it did ‘not appear that any investigation has been undertaken’ into Alysha’s report about Lester and that an ‘HR file review needs to occur’.2821 In addition, an extensive file review is not a sufficient investigation. The Department did not meet with Ira to verify the information received from Alysha until September 2020.

In early 2020, after Alysha’s report, Lester acted in an operational role at the Centre, until he was redirected back to his substantive non-operational role based on site at the Centre in May 2020.2822 The Department told us that, during the period from May 2020 until Lester’s resignation, Lester was in a non-operational role that did not have direct contact with detainees, although he remained on site at the Centre but separate from the main building.2823 We heard allegations that Lester conducted a strip search of a detainee after Alysha made her report in January 2020, but no records documenting that strip search were identified by the Department.2824 Some witnesses agreed that controls on Lester’s contact with detainees could have been stronger. Mr Watson told us it was his view that Lester should not have been on site in any capacity.2825 Pamela Honan, Director, Strategic Youth Services, and Ms Baker conceded that the risk to children was not fully mitigated while Lester remained at the Centre. Ms Honan said: ‘Well, I wouldn’t say they [detainees] weren’t protected, but there was definitely a risk with this person still in the workplace’.2826

Ms Baker said:

I do note that there are other controls that would have existed, however [Lester] did remain in the workplace, albeit in a non-operational role … and therefore the risk to young people at AYDC was not fully mitigated between January 2020 and when he was suspended from duty in November 2020. This is regrettable.2827

In September 2020, the Department finally met with Ira, despite Alysha reporting the allegation to the Department in January 2020. We remain unclear about the reasons for this delay, given a statement from Ira seemed the most obvious way to gather more information as Ira was reportedly a direct witness to the incident. We were told that there were many ‘attempts’ to obtain his statement between January and May 2020.2828 We received some evidence that suggested the delay was a result of Ira being on restricted duties and that he did not return to Ashley Youth Detention Centre until around the time that his statement was taken.2829 This is contrary, however, to other evidence we received that Ira was still present at the Centre while he undertook restricted duties from September 2019, as discussed earlier. In any event, we are unclear why Ira’s absence from the Centre would have prevented him from making a statement to the Department about the allegations against Lester.

We were also told that, at the end of August 2020, Ms Clarke became aware of the allegations Alysha reported against Lester after a discussion with a private lawyer, who had been engaging with the Commissioner for Children and Young People about a ‘high number’ of allegations of sexual and physical abuse of detainees by staff.2830 After this meeting, Ms Clarke spoke to staff and became aware of Alysha’s report. Ms Clarke made enquiries in the Department about Alysha’s report and requested a closer review of all information held by the Department about allegations of abuse by Centre staff (discussed in Section 9). It is not clear what information Ms Clarke obtained relating to Alysha’s report at the time.

It was only when Ms Clarke became aware of Alysha’s report that the Department seemingly reconsidered the report. An email from Ms Clarke (mentioned earlier) suggests that there was no investigation undertaken of Alysha’s report before this time, and we accept that evidence.2831

  1. Rediscovering the Abuse in State Care Program claims

As noted, Ms Clarke’s meeting with a private lawyer prompted her to check historical records relating to allegations against staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2832 In September 2020, the Department conducted a review of the Abuse in State Care Program claims to identify whether any serving Centre staff had been the subject of allegations (we discuss this review in Section 9.2). The four Abuse in State Care Program claims containing allegations against Lester were rediscovered through this review in September and October 2020.2833 Ms Baker told us:

The information gathered from the Abuse in State Care Scheme would suggest prior matters which when put together with the matters that [Alysha] reported forms a more holistic picture of [Lester] and his alleged offending ...2834

  1. Suspension and investigation

Ira’s statement was finalised on 5 November 2020.2835 This allegation was then reported to Tasmania Police and the Registrar on 6 November 2020, some 10 months after the Department first received it.2836 The Department also reported the Abuse in State Care Program allegations to Tasmania Police and the Registrar on 9 November 2020.2837

On 8 November 2020, Secretary Pervan decided to suspend Lester and commence an Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation into the allegation reported by Alysha and supported by Ira in his statement. While the Minute to the Secretary recommending this course of action also referred to three of the Abuse in State Care Program claims, the Secretary’s decision did not appear to be predicated on these allegations, with the Minute stating that the Department was trying to get more information about these claims.2838 We are unclear why the Minute did not refer to the fourth Abuse in State Care Program claim. In any event, the decision taken at this time was based on the information provided to the Department some 10 months earlier.

We note the Minute stated that given additional controls at the Centre (including the use of cameras) there was a lower risk that the abuse could occur in the environment at the Centre today.2839 However, the Minute also acknowledged that it may not have been possible to eliminate the risk, especially if Lester was in direct contact with detainees.2840

Correspondence to Lester notifying him of the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation and suspension also indicated that the Secretary could not identify alternative duties that would sufficiently mitigate the risk.2841 This was even though some witnesses identified Lester’s non-operational role acting as a means by which the potential risks he posed to detainees were managed.2842

At some point after March 2021, an external investigator was appointed to conduct the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation into Lester.2843 We understand that the Abuse in State Care Program allegations were added to the investigation. It appears that at least one of the allegations against Lester listed above was never added to the investigation.2844

A further five allegations relating to child sexual abuses were raised against Lester after his suspension, which came from a variety of sources.2845

Lester resigned from his employment in mid-2021.2846 Shortly after, Secretary Pervan ceased the investigation into Lester’s conduct with no further employment action to be taken unless Lester began working with the State Service again.2847

  1. Responses of Tasmania Police and the Registrar

While the Department reported all four Abuse in State Care Program claims to Tasmania Police in November 2020, Tasmania Police referred these allegations to the Registrar some 21 months later in August 2022.2848 Assistant Commissioner Higgins conceded at hearings that this was an oversight by Tasmania Police.2849

As set out above, the Registrar received information from the Department about Lester on 6 and 9 November 2020. On 10 November 2020, the Registrar notified Lester that he intended to conduct an additional risk assessment.2850 The Registrar immediately suspended Lester’s registration at this time ‘due to the volume and gravity of the alleged conduct and the existence of some corroborating evidence’.2851

On 4 August 2021, Lester’s registration to work with vulnerable people lapsed before his additional risk assessment was finalised. Lester no longer holds registration under the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act.2852

  1. Case example: Stan

Stan is a long-time Centre staff member who started working at what was then Ashley Home for Boys and held roles that involved engaging with detainees, until his suspension in November 2020.2853

  1. Allegations against Stan

From the early 2010s, several former detainees alleged that Stan had abused them:

  • In the early 2010s, a former detainee made a claim through the Abuse in State Care Program alleging that Stan physically abused him.2854 It is unclear when the Department rediscovered this claim, but we infer that it did so through the review of the Abuse in State Care Program claims conducted in 2020, which we explain in Section 9.2.
  • In 2017, a former detainee, Ben (a pseudonym), made a submission to the National Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse that alleged Stan had raped him and another detainee on three occasions.2855 This submission was provided to Tasmania Police in 2017.2856 It is unclear whether the Department was informed of the allegations in Ben’s submission in 2017. However, later exchanges between the Department and Tasmania Police indicate that Tasmania Police had thought that the Department had been aware of these allegations since around the time they were made.2857
  • In or around early 2019, the Department was notified of allegations of sexual abuse made by a former detainee that named Stan. Due to human error (outside the Department) this allegation was only linked to Stan in October 2020.2858 The Department referred these allegations to Tasmania Police on 21 October 2020.2859 On 26 October 2020, five days after the Department’s referral, Tasmania Police notified the Department that it had ‘closed’ the matter.2860 The Department told us that it referred those allegations against Stan to the Registrar on 21 October 2020, although the Registrar told us he first received this allegation about Stan on 26 May 2021.2861
  • In mid-2020, the Department received a Letter of Demand from Ben which, in line with his 2017 submission to the National Royal Commission, included allegations that Stan raped him on three occasions.2862 Despite receiving those allegations in mid-2020, the Department did not report the allegations to Tasmania Police or the Registrar until about three months later.2863 We also saw little action taken by the Department from the time of receiving this allegation in mid-2020 until Stan’s suspension in November 2020, although we received some evidence that in September 2020 the Department cross-checked Stan’s records in an attempt to corroborate the allegations.2864 Much of the Department’s evidence was that it was waiting on police advice before taking action in relation to Stan.2865 We discuss this evidence, and our views on the extent to which the interaction with police processes influenced delays, later in this section.
  • In September 2020, the Department received allegations raised by another complainant.2866 The information alleged that Stan and several other staff members engaged in child sexual abuse but did not link any specific instance of abuse to Stan.2867 That complainant had also raised allegations of sexual abuse while at the Centre through the Abuse in State Care Support Service in 2017, although they did not name any alleged abusers at the time.2868 The Department reported these new allegations to Tasmania Police and the Registrar three weeks later, in October 2020.2869

On 3 November 2020, Tasmania Police advised the Department that certain complainants did not wish to make a statement.2870

  1. Department’s response

Stan was suspended pending an Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation in November 2020.

The Minute to the Secretary recommending this course of action did not include all the allegations against Stan that are outlined above; it only noted Ben’s allegation (contained in his Letter of Demand) and the allegation notified to the Department in September 2020.2871

We note the Minute stated that Stan had direct contact with detainees through his role.2872 The letter to Stan notifying him of his suspension and intended Employment Direction No. 5 investigation also stated that Secretary Pervan could not find alternative duties for Stan that sufficiently mitigated the risk that was present in the allegations.2873 We note that the Department told us that the risk posed by Stan remaining in the workplace was mitigated because he was in a building not accessed by detainees, and that the Centre Manager was made aware of the allegations so he could remain vigilant.2874 We also saw evidence that the Centre Manager was raising concerns about Stan continuing to work on site with children.2875 The Minute leading to Stan’s suspension is discussed in Section 9.6.

On 12 February 2021, Secretary Pervan appointed an external investigator to examine the allegations against Stan.2876 The other allegations made against Stan, including the earlier Abuse in State Care Program claim, were added to the investigation at this time.2877

A further three claims (two of which involved allegations of child sexual abuse) were raised against Stan following his suspension and the start of the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation.2878 We understand the investigation is ongoing.2879

  1. Response of Tasmania Police and the Registrar

As was the case with Ira and Lester, we received evidence that there were substantial delays in Tasmania Police reporting allegations to the Registrar. For example, while allegations against Stan raised directly with the Department in 2021 were reported to Tasmania Police in 2021, the police did not report this to the Registrar for some nine months.2880 Also, we received evidence that despite receiving Ben’s National Royal Commission submission in 2017, Tasmania Police did not report the allegations to the Registrar through its automated referral process.2881 Assistant Commissioner Higgins agreed that this is an example of how the process is subject to ‘human error’.2882

Ultimately, Tasmania Police told us that it received four allegations against Stan.2883 The evidence indicates that Tasmania Police had also been notified by the Department of at least one further allegation against Stan.2884

The Registrar began an additional risk assessment into Stan on 18 September 2020, having received Ben’s allegations against Stan on that day.2885 The Registrar did not suspend Stan’s registration pending the outcome of the additional risk assessment.2886

After receiving more allegations from the Department, the Registrar sent Stan a letter in April 2021 with notice of his intention to suspend Stan’s registration to work with vulnerable people.2887 More allegations and updates were provided to the Registrar, after which the Registrar proposed to cancel Stan’s registration in February 2022.2888 The Registrar’s written reasons stated that Stan had been named as a ‘responsible person for abuse by five separate alleged child victims’, and that the allegations ‘are those of the most serious kind and are directly relevant to [Stan’s] eligibility to maintain registration’.2889 Also, the written reasons stated that given the number of allegations raised over a lengthy period, it was reasonable to conclude that a pattern of behaviour was present.2890

However, after further engagement with the Department and Stan, the Registrar ultimately decided to continue Stan’s registration in July 2022.2891 There was a stark difference between some of the reasoning provided in the Registrar’s proposed and final decisions, with the Registrar concluding in the final decision that it was not possible to identify a pattern of grooming or offensive behaviours.2892 The Registrar also considered the claimants’ histories of criminal offending, calling their credibility into question.2893 As we have noted throughout this chapter, we received no evidence to support a conclusion that detainees had made false allegations for malicious or financial gain, nor did we find evidence that former detainees had colluded in making allegations. Indeed, collusion between former detainees was unlikely given the allegations spanned more than a decade. We did receive evidence from former detainees that they believed their criminal histories meant they were less likely to be believed. We make a recommendation on factors to be considered in the Registrar’s risk assessment in Chapter 18.

As of 11 August 2023, Stan continues to hold registration to work with vulnerable people.

  1. Enduring themes we saw in our case examples

We identified a range of problems in responses to our case examples of Ira, Lester and Stan that meant allegations of serious abuses were not acted on quickly and effectively. This had the practical effect of placing detainees at risk of harm because staff who were the subject of serious allegations remained at the Centre. We were disappointed to see that many of these problems were also apparent in our case example of Walter, discussed in Section 6.2.

  1. Delays in notifications

Across the three case examples we explored, we saw significant delays by the Department in reporting allegations to Tasmania Police and the Registrar. Examples include the following:

  • The Department’s notifications to Tasmania Police of Baxter and Parker’s allegations against Ira were made around five and 18 months, respectively, after the Department became aware of the allegations.2894
  • The Department first raised Baxter’s allegations against Ira with the Registrar on 11 August 2020.2895 However, it was not until 9 November 2020 that the Department could provide enough information to the Registrar about Baxter’s allegations for the Registrar to consider it a notification of reportable behaviour.2896
  • In relation to Lester, the Department only passed on Alysha’s report to Tasmania Police and the Registrar in November 2020, despite being received around 10 months earlier in January 2020.2897
  • In relation to Stan, the Department only reported Ben’s allegations to Tasmania Police and the Registrar in September 2020, despite being received in mid-2020.2898

We consider there are a range of reasons that contributed to delays in making those notifications, including:

  • confusion and a lack of clarity around whether and when certain matters should be reported to the Registrar (we discuss the legislative ambiguity around this in Section 3.1.2), which the Department resolved in September 2020 (described in Section 9.3)
  • failures to identify certain conduct as amounting to potential child sexual abuse—we consider this to be a contributing factor for the delay in responding to Alysha’s report about Lester
  • poor record keeping, which made it difficult to locate and share relevant information quickly
  • perceived barriers to information sharing about child safety—seeking legal advice, adopting a narrow interpretation of reporting obligations and often only reporting where required by law.

We acknowledge that we do not discuss mandatory reporting to Child Safety Services in detail in this case study. We note, however, that Child Safety Services were not notified about any of the allegations we examined in our case examples. While we note the confusion when complainants were adults and risks related to a group rather than an individual child, we consider it would have been best practice to report, as we have made clear throughout this case study.

The safety of children in institutions depends on all parties sharing what they know with other relevant agencies quickly and accurately and applying good judgment about what should be shared, even if such sharing is not mandated. It is information that is ultimately the basis upon which decisions are made and, in the context of child safety, should be treated and shared with the care and safety of children and young people at the forefront. It is critical that agencies such as Tasmania Police, the Registrar and Child Safety Services receive information relevant to their functions at the earliest opportunity to enable swift action.

We are pleased that in much more recent cases we examined in 2022 (the themes of which are discussed in Section 14.1) the timeliness of notifications has significantly improved.

  1. Deficient record keeping

Across our case examples, we observed the challenges that the Department’s deficient record-keeping practices presented. We were told poor record keeping made it difficult for the Department to access relevant records and contributed to delays in responding to allegations of child sexual abuse.2899

These problems also affected former detainees seeking information. For example, Ben told us of the difficulties he has faced in accessing information about his time in detention:

I have applied to get a copy of my Ashley file three times, including twice while I was still in prison. All I’ve ever received in response to my requests are a few pieces of paper. There should be so much more. There would be hundreds of incident reports on my file, with many of them detailing violent incidents with workers … 2900

Departmental officials were frank about the poor record-keeping practices at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. We were told that Centre records were paper based, stored in various locations, poorly catalogued or indexed, and not easily accessible.2901 We heard about ‘an entire room the size of a garage full of paper files that went back for years and years and years’ and that records were sometimes only discovered ‘incidentally’.2902

We were told that due to these record-keeping practices, it was difficult for the Department to establish facts, timeframes and key events relating to the allegations.2903 Records had not been catalogued or indexed, so accessing relevant information for preliminary assessments and during the investigation was time-consuming and labour-intensive.2904 We understand this extended to even relatively basic matters, such as confirming that a complainant was at Ashley Youth Detention Centre at a particular time, or that an employee worked at the Centre at the time of an allegation.2905 The lack of access to reliable, well-indexed catalogued records was described as a ‘limiting factor’ in undertaking preliminary assessments more quickly.2906 It also had a major impact on the Department being able to thoroughly investigate, and act on, allegations it received and meant that senior managers and the Secretary did not have a complete picture of all the allegations that may have been made about a particular staff member.

Ms Baker said that it became clear to her in late 2020 or early 2021 that the Department was ‘severely hampered’ in its ability to respond and produce information for the Registrar and in the context of Employment Direction No. 5 investigations.2907

We discuss the Department’s records remediation project in Section 13.2 and make more observations and recommendations about records in Chapter 12.

  1. Lack of awareness and responsiveness to Abuse in State Care claims

Abuse in State Care Program claims contained critical information that was directly relevant to potential risks posed by staff and yet there was no meaningful process to enable the Tasmanian Government and other agencies to act on it. The practical result of this was that the program itself faded from the Department’s corporate memory and the valuable information contained in claims was essentially lost. When reporting obligations to the Registrar arose in 2015, with retrospective effect, this information was not revisited for reporting purposes, even though the Abuse in State Care Support Service (the successor to the Abuse in State Care Program) continued—and continues—to operate.

Earlier in this case study, we made a finding that from 2007 onwards, the Department should have taken more active steps to protect children from potential risks posed by staff who had allegations of abuse made against them through state redress schemes. In that finding, we highlight the introduction of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme as a particular opportunity to address a key gap in managing risks posed by staff and volunteers in institutions. If the Department and Tasmania Police had done this on the establishment of the scheme in 2015 for Lester, for example, there would have been four Abuse in State Care Program claims, one Abuse in State Care Support Service claim (which had a related police report) and one standalone police complaint referred to the Registrar. The allegations included those of forced oral sex, attempted rape, masturbating in front of detainees, bribery for sexual acts and watching detainees while they showered or masturbated. The Registrar could have used this to assess Lester’s suitability to retain registration to work with vulnerable people many years ago. Had there been stronger record keeping for complaints arising from Lester at Ashley Youth Detention Centre before 2008, there may have been even more information available.

As acknowledged above, the Department received several allegations of abuse relating to serving Centre staff through the Abuse in State Care Program and the Abuse in State Care Support Service. Seven Abuse in State Program claims named Lester or Stan, but there were many more relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre. Taken together, they reflect an alarming pattern of alleged behaviour among some long-serving staff members.

As we describe in Section 9.2, these complaints histories only began to be pieced together in mid-2020 when newer departmental staff became aware of the program and recognised the significance of the information in these claims. While this was an important and welcome development, it came many years too late.

We acknowledge the evidence we received about the barriers the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice (and related practice) created in acting on information received through the Abuse in State Care Program. As we describe in our earlier finding, however, we consider this practice should have been revisited and revised (as it eventually was in December 2020, described in Section 9.8) in the interests of promoting children’s safety and the public interest.

  1. Inadequate risk management in response to information about Centre staff

Across all case examples, including that of Walter, we found a failure to recognise allegations for what they were or had the potential to be: allegations of child sexual abuse. Unlawful strip searches (such as those that involve touching or gratuitous nudity, or are not based on reasonable grounds), the touching of children’s genitals outside legitimate medical treatment by a health practitioner, invasions of privacy that constitute voyeurism (such as observing detainees masturbating)—are allegations of child sexual abuse.

We saw what appeared to be reluctance from the Department to characterise Alysha’s report about Lester as potential child sexual abuse, with a tendency to downplay the allegation as inappropriate or concerning conduct. This was similar to the way Erin’s complaint about Walter’s invasion of her privacy while she was showering was seen— as a gender insensitivity issue rather than a potential sexual violation. We discuss the Department’s reluctance to characterise Alysha’s report as a report of child sexual abuse in Case study 5.

Staff need to understand what may constitute child sexual abuse and related conduct, particularly in the early stages of receiving an allegation. While sometimes allegations can seem relatively benign on the surface, more information and context can point to something far more troubling. Failure to understand the nature of allegations compromises the quality of risk assessments.

We saw other weaknesses in how potential risks to detainees were managed, with staff the subject of serious allegations remaining on site and with the potential to interact with detainees. We consider:

  • Relying on Ira’s restricted duties (arising from circumstances unrelated to the allegations against him) was inadequate because it was not specifically directed at preventing his contact with detainees.
  • Relying on Lester moving into a role that did not involve direct contact with detainees as a safeguard was inadequate given he remained on site, was at least occasionally called on to assist in operational matters, and held different roles in an acting capacity, during which he was alleged to have conducted a strip search.
  • Not modifying Stan’s role or removing him from the Centre was inappropriate given his role involved significant contact with detainees.

The 8 November 2020 Minutes recommending the suspension of Ira, Lester and Stan (described in Section 9.6) make it clear that, despite the cited safeguards, Lester and Stan continued to have contact with children.

We heard of other inadequate risk mitigations. For example:

  • The Department told us its risk mitigation strategy for dealing with certain allegations against Stan was that Mr Watson was ‘made aware of allegations received [in late 2020] so he could remain vigilant, whilst police [undertook] their enquiries’.2908 This was some three months after the Department received Ben’s allegations against Stan.2909
  • In the case of Ira, Mr Watson (then Acting Centre Manager) told us he only became aware of the allegations against Ira incidentally in March 2020, four months after the Secretary was first briefed on the allegations.2910
  • In relation to Lester, Patrick Ryan, who was the Centre Manager in January 2020 when Alysha made the report, told us at our hearings that he learned of the allegations against Lester through our Commission of Inquiry.2911 Reflecting on his lack of knowledge of previous allegations against Lester, Mr Ryan said ‘it is something I should have known, something I should have been advised of’.2912
  • Mr Ryan told us that he was also not told of any restrictions that should be placed on Lester’s access to young people and, in fact (not knowing about the allegations) encouraged Lester and others to ‘get out of their offices and walk around the centre, support each other, support the young people, build relationships’.2913 He told us:

    … if I was aware of [the allegations] at the time I would have— I wouldn’t have encouraged Lester’s contact with young people, there would have needed to have been some intervention.2914

We consider that Centre managers were not able to put in place and enforce appropriate risk mitigations given they were not advised of allegations against staff at the earliest opportunity.

We also saw the Department adopt a position that deferred to police action and justified this as a reason not to take immediate protective action. This was particularly noticeable in the context of the response to Stan but was also seen in other case examples. The evidence we received about acting on allegations of abuse by Stan was that the Department was waiting on police advice before taking disciplinary action.2915 Yet, the Department became aware of the allegations in mid-2020, but did not report them to Tasmania Police until approximately three months later and did not suspend Stan until 8 November 2020.2916

Assistant Commissioner Higgins gave evidence that the way Tasmania Police and the Department work together has improved, saying:

I honestly think this [collaboration] is done far better now with everything that the government agencies have done to improve in reporting and working together, particularly in relation to criminal matters and [Employment Direction No. 5 investigations]; I think that hasn’t always been the case … but I think it’s fair to say that over the last couple of years in particular that has certainly changed, for the better for all.2917

We accept that consultation and cooperation with Tasmania Police is important, but this should not come at the expense of child safety and can be achieved concurrently. Appropriate risk mitigations may need to be designed to address specific risks posed by alleged abusers to remove their access to children while an investigation progresses. We discuss this in Section 10.5.

At times, relying on Tasmania Police’s actions suggested confusion over the test required to progress a criminal matter with that required to progress a disciplinary matter.

  1. Conservative application of the State Service disciplinary framework

Throughout our Inquiry, we identified several challenges associated with applying the State Service disciplinary framework to child sexual abuse and related conduct. These reflect systemic problems across the State Service, which we discuss in Chapter 20.

We were told about the difficulties the Department faced in responding to allegations of child sexual abuse against staff, attributing this to the employee-focused requirements of the disciplinary process. We heard evidence to suggest some within the Department feared that employees might challenge decisions to initiate investigations in the Tasmanian Industrial Commission. Such concerns were reflected in some of the meeting minutes and advice to the Secretary that we reviewed.2918 Ms Baker said:

The Employment Framework in the State Service facilitates employees reviewing decisions. Section 50 of the State Service Act 2000 provides for employees to be able to review decisions related to their employment (with the exception of termination). In my view, this has naturally led to a very considered approach for decision making being adopted and is a contributing factor for some ED5s [Employment Directions No. 5] taking some time to commence, following the receipt of initial information. In undertaking an initial assessment, you seek to gather the relevant pieces of information for two key reasons. Firstly, to enable the decision maker (the Secretary of Communities Tasmania) to form a reasonable belief (as is required by ED5) that a breach may have occurred. Secondly, to frame up the allegations that you intend to put to the employee. If the allegations aren’t descriptive enough, it is not providing the employee the opportunity to be able to consider and respond. If this eventuates you may end up with a review of decision, which could compromise the continuation of ED5.2919

Ms Clarke told us that while the Department’s paramount consideration was the safety of young people in detention, she also:

… recognised the importance of balancing the paramount consideration with the need for an initial assessment to be undertaken that would support a plausible allegation when/if subjected to industrial scrutiny.2920

Secretary Pervan told us that the industrial and employment lens meant that issues of natural justice to the employee were given primacy over the issue of child safety.2921

We saw some issues arising in the context of responses to Ira, Lester and Stan including the following:

  • Oral briefings were relied on to brief to the Secretary about allegations against staff, with written material provided in a formal briefing many months later as part of the preliminary assessment process. This informality and lack of consistency also meant oral briefings were not documented.
  • There also did not appear to be a clear escalation process, with identification of which role-holders were responsible for which actions, and within a set timeframe.
  • Responses did not comply with best practice guidance for preliminary assessments. The timeframes for the Department’s preliminary assessments of allegations were lengthy—well beyond the three working days recommended by the Integrity Commission.2922 In relation to Ira, Lester and Stan, we saw what would best be described as preliminary investigations drag out for months (and in Ira’s case, for more than a year). It was unclear at times what exactly was occurring in those months—sometimes, on the evidence we received, very little. But what activity was described to us (extensive attempts at validation and corroboration of specific details, the interviewing and statement preparation of witnesses) went far beyond what we consider necessary for a preliminary investigation and unnecessarily delayed appropriate action. We consider the interviewing of witnesses and the taking of statements (as occurred in relation to Lester) to be more appropriately undertaken by an independent investigator.
  • The protracted and involved nature of the preliminary assessment process applied by the Department suggested a very high threshold for launching a disciplinary investigation, by essentially becoming an investigation within itself. There appeared to be significant concern about the need to bring concrete and substantial evidence to the Secretary, despite the test imposed by Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct that a Head of Agency need only have reasonable grounds to believe a breach of the Code may have occurred. It is then a matter for an investigation to determine whether the matters can be substantiated.
  • The Department adopted informal practices of ‘putting allegations’ to alleged abusers for a response. Secretary Pervan told us that this practice occurs primarily where there is a lack of information and that he considers the approach appropriate in those circumstances.2923 We are concerned that this option was considered in each of the cases we reviewed given the nature and number of serious allegations.
  • The Department was reluctant to consider the cumulative impact of allegations. As we describe in more detail in Section 9.6, we consider there was not enough weight placed on a potential pattern of behaviour that the fuller complaints histories revealed, particularly in relation to Lester. This was partly due to delays in piecing together all relevant information (such as Abuse in State Care Program claims) but, even when this occurred, we found the fact there were multiple complaints was not emphasised or consistently taken into account for disciplinary investigations.
  • Industrial pressures created challenges in responding to allegations. We heard that, while detainee safety was the most important consideration, concern about the possibility of industrial scrutiny also weighed on the Department.

We make a range of recommendations to improve disciplinary responses in child sexual abuse matters in Chapter 20, and recommend that, in future, such matters be referred to a Child-Related Serious Incident Management Directorate for specialised response (refer to Recommendation 6.6 in Chapter 6).

Finding—The Department did not take appropriate steps to manage risk, make appropriate notifications and progress investigations against Ira, Lester and Stan (all pseudonyms), which left children and young people at Ashley Youth Detention Centre at potential risk of harm

At various points between 2019 and 2020, it became clear to the Department that there were serious allegations of child sexual abuse made against Ira, Lester and Stan. We consider these allegations were not treated with the seriousness, urgency and care that was warranted. This had the effect of delayed reporting to relevant bodies and delayed disciplinary action, including the removal of staff from the Centre while a proper disciplinary process was conducted. These delays placed detainees at potential risk of harm in one of the highest risk environments for sexual abuse.

We consider these delays were a result of:

  • limited understanding of the range of behaviours that constitute child sexual abuse
  • concerns about privacy and sharing information with appropriate authorities
  • deficient record keeping
  • a corporate loss of knowledge of the Abuse in State Care Program
  • a failure to consider the cumulative effect of allegations
  • inadequate risk management strategies, including retaining staff on site, inappropriately relying on staff being in non-operational roles, not informing managers about potential risks and deferring action awaiting police direction
  • conservative and narrow disciplinary processes, which ultimately gave preference to employee rights at the expense of child safety considerations.

Ideally, we would like to see the following:

  • Allegations made against staff must be treated with seriousness and urgency, with relevant senior managers and the Secretary notified (ideally in writing). This requires an understanding of what constitutes child sexual abuse and sexual misconduct (particularly around issues such as strip searches or observing showers).
  • Immediate notifications must be made to relevant key agencies, including Tasmania Police, the Registrar and Child Safety Services. Clear information-sharing channels should be established with these bodies so any more information and developments can be shared quickly with the right people in those agencies who are empowered to act.
  • There needs to be immediate risk mitigation planning, including with managers at the Centre, to address potential risks to detainees. These mitigations should be tailored and proportionate to the potential risks and clear to all relevant managers and senior managers to ensure they can be monitored and enforced.
  • Prompt preliminary assessments should draw on clear, accurate and accessible records that are available to the Department. Advice to the Secretary should place significant weight on the safety of detainees and reflect the relatively preliminary nature of the process (that is, not require extensive evidence or corroboration, which is more appropriately gathered through an independent investigation). The availability of potential witnesses could be canvassed and confirmed (for example, Ira in the matter of Lester) quickly as part of this preliminary assessment, but statements should be taken by the investigator at the next stage, during the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation.
  • Sensitive and timely contact and engagement should take place with potential victim-survivors (where appropriate) to gauge their willingness to participate in investigations and to ensure they have appropriate support.
  • All steps taken should be thoroughly documented.
  1. Mid-2020 onwards—A change in the Department’s approach

By 2020, the number of National Redress Scheme claims relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre was beginning to mount. By mid-2020, the Department had received allegations against Ira, Lester and Stan at various times (and through various means). During 2020, the Department was notified of nine National Redress Scheme claims containing allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff.2924 Some of these claims contained several allegations against multiple staff members and the conduct was alleged to have occurred between 1995 and 2012.2925 Also, two civil claims were issued against the Department in 2020 relating to allegations of abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff between 1998 and 2006.2926 This escalation in allegations received against staff was a significant challenge for the Department, with many of the allegations relating to serving staff members.

On 30 January 2020, the World Health Organization declared the coronavirus (COVID-19) a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.2927 On 17 March 2020, the then Premier of Tasmania announced that the State would take several public health emergency response measures.2928 As we have noted earlier, we recognise that responding to the pandemic was a significant challenge for the Department and Tasmanian Government more broadly in the months before and after March 2020.

During this period, we also saw a significant growth in the knowledge and understanding of the Abuse in State Care Program among senior departmental officials and the fact that many of these past claims related to current Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff, who were also being identified through National Redress Scheme claims. This was alluded to in some of our summaries in Section 8 because it occurred while the Department was responding to allegations against Ira, Lester and Stan.

We saw a range of efforts and measures within the Department in mid to late 2020 to improve its responses to allegations of abuse. These included the Department:

  • establishing the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group in September 2020 to facilitate coordinated responses to allegations against staff
  • undertaking a cross-check of Abuse in State Care Program files against a list of current employees from September 2020
  • compiling a spreadsheet of Centre staff named in the Abuse in State Care Program, National Redress Scheme and common law claims in October 2020
  • setting up a process and guidance for responding to ‘National Redress Scheme – Request for Information’ forms that contained allegations against serving employees, including involving the Deputy Secretary of Children and Youth Services in approving these forms from around September 2020
  • clarifying and improving processes for reporting matters to Tasmania Police and the Registrar between August and September 2020
  • obtaining updated legal advice from the Solicitor-General on how it could use information in redress and other claims to support disciplinary investigations in December 2020.

This section takes us to the time the Department was in the midst of responding to increasing allegations against staff, including Ira, Lester and Stan, under increasing pressure as awareness of the nature and scale of potential abuses began to grow. We have arranged this timeframe in a broad chronology.

  1. September 2020—Strengthening Safeguards Working Group established and meets regularly

In September 2020, the Department convened a Strengthening Safeguarding Executive Working Group to discuss active employment matters at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.2929 Witnesses referred to ‘case conferencing’, the ‘AYDC Working Group’ and the ‘Strengthening Safeguards Working Group’ interchangeably.2930 For simplicity, we have adopted the term ‘Strengthening Safeguards Working Group’ throughout this report.

Members of the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group included Ms Clarke, Ms Baker, Ms Allen, Ms Honan, the Director of People and Culture and a legal adviser to the Department.2931 Other people, such as the Centre Manager, attended particular meetings. Mr Watson was a regular attendee from late October 2020.2932

The Strengthening Safeguards Working Group met for the first time on 18 September 2020.2933 Meetings were scheduled fortnightly, but we understand the frequency varied depending on the number of allegations or claims of abuse and their progress.2934

We were told that the purpose of the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group was to ensure coordination between departmental officers involved in civil and redress matters, including operational staff such as Ms Honan, so the People and Culture team could provide progress updates and share information on relevant departmental personnel matters and investigations.2935 We received evidence that the meetings were used as an opportunity to:

  • discuss the Department’s response to allegations of child sexual abuse against employees2936
  • assist the Secretary to make decisions about suspending employees and commencing Employment Direction No. 5 investigations2937
  • discuss options to direct staff to not have contact with children or putting staff on alternative duties2938
  • raise other concerns, including about the delays in progressing action to suspend employees.2939

Secretary Pervan did not attend Strengthening Safeguards Working Group meetings. Ms Clarke recalled that she ‘would keep the Secretary abreast of … new practices being implemented to mitigate risks’, which included action items identified by the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group.2940 We understood her evidence to be that these updates would form part of fortnightly meetings with the Secretary and other more ad hoc engagement.2941 Secretary Pervan told us he had ‘no hands-on involvement in the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group’ and could not recall any briefings relating to the group or any detail about actions it took.2942

We understand that the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group met between four and six times to the end of 2020 (noting its role continued into 2021).2943 We have reviewed meeting minutes for the first four meetings and some associated file notes and correspondence, noting the following common themes or concerns across those meetings:

  • There was a lack of clarity about the nature and number of allegations concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff and the need for further information to understand the extent of allegations.2944 Despite this lack of clarity, at least some staff were expressing concerns about the safety of children at the Centre, an apparent pattern of behaviour across allegations, and risk that potential child sexual abuse offenders were on site.2945
  • There was no ‘clear co-ordinated process’ to respond to those claims made through redress or civil processes, including confusion about reporting responsibilities, such as to Tasmania Police.2946
  • There was concern about the Department being subject to parliamentary or public scrutiny over the handling of the allegations against current staff members, should it become known that Centre staff had outstanding serious allegations against them.2947
  • There was concern about a looming class action brought by several former Ashley Youth Detention Centre detainees alleging a range of harms and abuses.2948
  • There were concerns about the potential ‘HR issues’ if staff were to be dismissed, including the need to ensure procedural fairness for employees, the risk that relevant staff may go to the Tasmanian Industrial Commission and concerns for staff morale at the Centre.2949
  • Members deferred to police advice before engaging in disciplinary action (although there seemed to be some confusion about the extent to which suspension could begin without police clearance).2950

These issues mirror many of the themes we describe in Section 8.5.

From the establishment of the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group in September 2020, we began to see Department and Centre managers raise concerns about alleged abusers remaining on site at the Centre. Those concerns included comments about risks to the Department. We also began to see increasing concern from Department staff about the legal and moral implications of the Department not acting.2951 In particular, one staff member with legal training raised questions with People and Culture about the Department’s apparent inability to start disciplinary investigations in the absence of a participating complainant or sworn statement, despite that imposing a higher threshold than that which applied to a civil claim.2952

  1. August and October 2020—Awareness of the Abuse in State Care Program within the Department grows and information starts to be pieced together

We observed that knowledge among senior departmental officials about the Abuse in State Care Program was piecemeal and often came about by chance, even though:

  • many allegations had been raised against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff through the Abuse in State Care Program
  • Secretary Pervan personally signed off on the Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report in September 2014, which identified 172 claims made between 2011 and 2013 against Ashley Youth Detention Centre or its predecessor, Ashley Home for Boys2953
  • the Department was the custodian of the Abuse in State Care Program records and used these materials to respond to National Redress Scheme requests for information.2954

We were told that only in August or September 2020 did some senior departmental officials and their advisers become aware—or more fully aware—of the Abuse in State Care Program and that allegations had been raised through this program against staff who were still employed at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

Ms Clarke, then Deputy Secretary for Children, Youth and Families, acknowledged she was ‘aware of the concept’ of the Abuse in State Care Program (and had approved some ‘National Redress Scheme – Request for Information’ forms referring to the program in 2019).2955 However, as mentioned, she told us she was prompted to consider the program in more detail following a meeting with a private lawyer in August 2020 about abuse allegations against staff.2956 We note that it would have been clear from the forms that Ms Clarke approved in 2019 that allegations had been raised against employees, including through the Abuse in State Care Program.2957

In mid to late-2020, a legal adviser to the Department assumed responsibility for a period for overseeing responses to the National Redress Scheme information requests.2958 As part of this process, they realised there was a possibility that some current employees may have been the subject of past Abuse in State Care Program claims.2959 This awareness led to others learning of the Abuse in State Care Program incidentally. For example, Ms Allen learned about this through a passing comment from the legal adviser; Ms Baker found out because her office was located close to the legal adviser’s.2960

Ms Allen had begun working at the Department six to eight weeks before becoming aware of the Abuse in State Care Program. She told us that, up until that point, she had no knowledge of the program and had only been told of two unrelated Employment Direction No. 5 investigations that were nearing completion.2961 We were concerned by the lack of a formal briefing to Ms Allen on these matters when she first took up her role.

Ms Allen said ‘it was one of those, “Wait, wait, wait, hold up, what are you talking about? We have got all of this information that has never been put together and no action’s been taken”’.2962 She went on to say:

It’s my understanding at that point in time that the four rounds of the abuse in state care applications were never put together to paint a picture of who may have been perpetrators of child sexual abuse, and … it remains a very big disappointment of mine that that work hadn’t occurred prior, because I do believe that, putting to one side issues with advice that had been provided, there was definitely valuable intelligence a long time ago in relation to potential perpetrators of child sexual abuse; and it wasn’t until, again, the support of the executive that those files were got out and put together and to create a bit of that picture, a true picture, I believe, as to what may have occurred at Ashley was able to be painted.2963

We agree that the failure of the Department to use the information on those records reflected a critical missed opportunity to identify and address the potential risks posed by staff.

The growing awareness of abuse allegations connected to Ashley Youth Detention Centre was followed by a series of steps to consolidate the Department’s knowledge of the extent of abuse allegations and to coordinate a response. We were pleased to see these steps begin in August/September 2020, as this reflects an appropriate shift in approach by the Department. We summarise those steps below.

  1. September 2020—A cross-check of Abuse in State Care Program records against current staff lists begins

In or around September 2020, at Ms Clarke’s request, the Department began a ‘cross check’ of the names of alleged abusers in Abuse in State Care Program records against a list of current Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff who had been working at the Centre before 2010.2964 We are unclear why this date threshold was imposed, which we note below. The review was also to identify what actions may have been taken where an employee had been named in an Abuse in State Care Program claim.2965

This cross-check did not cover all sources of potential information held by the Department. Specifically:

  • It was limited to Abuse in State Care Program records and did not extend to allegations raised through the Abuse in State Care Support Service (the program’s successor from 2015).2966
  • It was limited to serving employees who had been working at Ashley Youth Detention Centre prior to 2010. However, the Abuse in State Care Program ran until 2013, and we are aware that the period of abuse that was raised in Abuse in State Care Program records spanned 1995 to 2013 (although, as set out in Case study 1, the period of abuse may have spanned a much longer period).2967 This suggests the cross-check may not have captured employees who had been employed after 2010 and who were the subject of allegations regarding conduct that was alleged to have occurred between 2010 and 2013. We accept that many staff at the Centre had been employed before 2010.
  • The process only considered claims relating to current Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff and not other people who were the subject of allegations (including other State Service employees, foster carers or people who were registered to work with vulnerable people) who may have also posed a potential risk to children. We discuss our concerns about the scope of the Department’s reviews of claims in Chapter 12.

We understand the cross-check work was completed around December 2020.2968

  1. September 2020—Spreadsheet of Abuse in State Care Program claims circulated to Strengthening Safeguards Working Group members

On 21 September 2020, a spreadsheet we understand was prepared by the Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit was circulated to members of the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group.2969

The spreadsheet collated information of claims made through the Abuse in State Care Program and identified that 127 claims had been made against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff members (some of whom were named on multiple occasions).2970 The email circulating the spreadsheet highlighted that two then current employees had been named as alleged abusers.2971 This included Lester, who was named in four Abuse in State Care Program claims.2972 However, the spreadsheet was incomplete because it was missing some Abuse in State Care Program allegations of which we are aware.

  1. October 2020—The Department compiles a spreadsheet of all claims against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff

To address an action item of the 9 October 2020 Strengthening Safeguards Working Group meeting, the Department compiled a spreadsheet of all Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff who were mentioned in the Abuse in State Care Program, National Redress Scheme and/or civil claims.2973 We were told that this new spreadsheet was prepared in response to concerns that the Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit spreadsheet (circulated on 21 September 2020) did not present a complete picture of all allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff (for example, those arising from civil claims) and that some information may have been omitted from the original spreadsheet.2974 We understand that the online Government Directory Service was used to verify whether named alleged abusers were current State Service employees but that concerns were expressed that this did not constitute a ‘robust’ checking mechanism.2975

Despite attempting to reflect a fuller picture of allegations against current Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff, it appears that the review did not consider allegations raised through the Abuse in State Care Support Service, which included a claim against Lester.2976

We understand that this spreadsheet was later expanded and maintained.2977 However, for reasons we discuss in Chapter 12, we are not confident that a comprehensive audit has been undertaken and we are unaware of any similar reviews relating to others named in claims who may still be working with children and young people (as carers or otherwise). In that chapter, we recommend that the Tasmanian Government conducts an audit of all relevant records it holds to identify all allegations of child sexual abuse.

  1. August–September 2020—Processes for reporting to Tasmania Police and the Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme are clarified and strengthened

We understand that in August or September 2020, concerns were raised internally that National Redress Scheme applications and civil litigation claims may not have been notified to Tasmania Police or the Registrar.2978 Referring to these concerns, Ms Allen (who as we noted was relatively new to the Department) told us:

I considered that it was not Communities Tasmania’s role to decide if conduct amount[ed] to criminal misconduct, or an unacceptable risk to children (insofar as Registration to Work with Vulnerable People) and therefore we should be openly sharing information immediately once received with Tasmania Police and Registration to Work with Vulnerable People.2979

We agree with this observation. We observed that, in August and September 2020, the processes for reporting abuse allegations to Tasmania Police and the Registrar began to be considered and improved.

  1. Reporting to the Registrar

In 2018, the Office of the Solicitor-General prepared advice for the Department of Justice on the meaning of the word ‘finds’ in the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act, taking a view that there was only an obligation to report conduct that presented a risk of harm to a child if there had been a formal finding about that conduct. We discuss that advice in Section 12.2.

We were told that several senior officials in the former Department of Communities were unaware of that legal advice to the Department of Justice.2980 However, it appears there was some confusion within the Department of Communities about what the actual reporting threshold to the Registrar was, noting the wording of the legislation at that time. In August 2020, People and Culture contacted the Registrar to clarify reporting obligations, seeking confirmation of exactly when a reporting obligation arises.2981 In that correspondence, People and Culture acknowledged that while the legislation appeared to require a ‘finding’ of reportable conduct to enliven the obligation, this could take some time to obtain and there was a desire to reflect best practice in reporting at the earliest opportunity.2982

A staff member from the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Unit replied to People and Culture’s email stating:

The timely provision of information goes a long way [to protect vulnerable people from the risk of harm]. As such, we take and encourage a broad interpretation of the word ‘find’ so as to mean become aware of. We believe this is in keeping with the intent and purpose of the Act.2983

We were told that in around September 2020 (before changes to the legislation on 1 February 2021 clarifying the requirement to report described in Section 3.1.2), the Department changed its processes so information it received that constituted ‘reportable behaviour’ was immediately referred to the Registrar.2984

  1. Reporting to Tasmania Police

We understand that prior to December 2020, the reporting of allegations of sexual abuse by government agencies generally occurred through informal relationships developed between Tasmania Police and government agencies within their local area.2985 Notifications would be made in person, or via phone or email.2986

On 18 September 2020, the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group discussed the idea of establishing a central liaison contact in Tasmania Police for all redress and civil claims.2987 We were told that shortly after the 18 September 2020 Strengthening Safeguards Working Group meeting, the Department changed its processes so matters were immediately referred to an appointed contact at Tasmania Police.2988 Tasmania Police would then send the referrals to local police stations, with whom the Department (via People and Culture) would remain in contact.2989 We understand this notification process took immediate effect.2990

Evidence we received from the Department and Tasmania Police was that Tasmania Police then changed its reporting processes for receiving child sexual abuse complaints from government agencies in December 2020, so all notifications of sexual abuse were made through the Assistant Commissioner of Operations’ office as a single point of contact through a specific inbox.2991 Since February 2021, all agencies use a standard police template to report allegations of child sexual abuse committed by government employees.2992

In relation to the reporting of civil claims to Tasmania Police, we were told that the Office of the Solicitor-General advises the Department whether the matter has been referred to police.2993 Where a referral is not made, the Department may nevertheless decide to refer the matter to police (having regard to the Office of the Solicitor-General’s reasons for not referring already).2994

It appears that this process was not in place at the time the Department first started making referrals to Tasmania Police, and we note that the first referral from the Office of the Solicitor-General that Tasmania Police told us about was in November 2021.2995 We consider that best practice requires that the Office of the Solicitor-General, as first receiver of the allegations in civil claims, refers all potentially criminal allegations derived from civil claims to Tasmania Police. If a referral has not been made, the Department should consider the Office of the Solicitor-General’s reasons as to why, and the Department may decide to refer.

We note that while it appears the practice of reporting to the Registrar and Tasmania Police did improve around this time (including in relation to some allegations raised against Ira and Stan), we still saw some delays and inconsistent reporting practices until as recently as 2022 (discussed in Section 14).

  1. October 2020—New departmental guidance developed for responding to National Redress Scheme claims

Minutes of a Strengthening Safeguards Working Group meeting on 18 September 2020 indicated there was no clear process in place for responding to information arising from National Redress Scheme claims, which began coming to the attention of the Department from 2019. The minutes record the need for a procedure ‘to provide a clear process and detailed steps when current staff are identified’ as a required action item.2996

As we have described earlier, the purpose of National Redress Scheme claims is primarily to offer acknowledgment and some form of compensation to victim-survivors of child sexual abuse in institutional settings, rather than to pursue alleged abusers. However, the National Redress Scheme does contemplate some claim information being reported, shared and acted on to the extent possible to protect the safety of children. Some of the information coming to the Department’s attention through such claims related to serving Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff.

By early October 2020, a new ‘process flowchart’ and associated procedure was prepared to guide the Department’s response to information it received in National Redress Scheme claims.2997 It is unclear when exactly these documents came into operation (noting that the procedure we were provided with has a draft watermark and

unexplained highlighting, and has no effective date), but the minutes of the 9 October 2020 Strengthening Safeguards Working Group meeting suggest that it was around this time.2998

The flowchart provides for the following process:

  • The Department of Justice emails the National Redress Scheme – Request for Information form (‘Request for Information form’) to the Department of Communities with a response due date, accompanied by information held by the Department of Justice relating to a National Redress Scheme claim.2999 As we explained in Section 7, we saw that the Department of Justice did not always send the Department of Communities all the information it held about National Redress Scheme claims.
  • A Department of Communities officer identifies relevant client records (including Abuse in State Care Program and Abuse in State Care Support Service records) and adds any necessary information to the Request for Information form.3000
  • The Department of Communities officer emails the completed Request for Information form and a copy of the claim details provided by the Department of Justice to the Deputy Secretary Children and Youth Services (also known as the Deputy Secretary, Children, Youth and Families) and flags any alleged abusers who appear to be current government employees or departmental foster carers.3001
  • The Deputy Secretary Children and Youth Services is to be alerted as soon as possible when an alleged abuser is identified as a current government employee or foster carer.3002
  • The Deputy Secretary Children and Youth Services reviews the draft response and forwards this to legal services to ‘verify any civil matters’.3003
  • The Deputy Secretary Children and Youth Services refers any concerns about current government employees to People and Culture for forwarding to the relevant Director (and any concerns about a current foster carer to the Director Children, Youth and Families for further review and investigation as appropriate).3004
  • The Deputy Secretary Children and Youth Services approves the release of the completed Request for Information form to the Department of Justice.3005

We understand the requirement that the Deputy Secretary Children and Youth Services approves or ‘clears’ all Request for Information forms dates to at least late September 2020.3006 Ms Clarke told us this requirement was embedded so she would, on a daily basis, be fully apprised of allegations being raised against departmental employees and because she ‘was starting to form the view that more [National Redress Scheme] forms alleging abuse of current [Ashley Youth Detention Centre] officials may occur’.3007 She also said the requirement sought ‘to strengthen the linkage between the relevant operational portfolios and the People and Culture Division’ because both divisions needed to work together when an allegation against a current staff member was received.3008

Although the flowchart requires that the Deputy Secretary Children and Youth Services is alerted as soon as possible when an alleged abuser is identified as a current government employee or foster carer, it otherwise does not include any specific timeframes for notifying People and Culture or the relevant Director about current employees.3009 We were told that, in practice, the time between receiving a National Redress Scheme claim alleging abuse by a current staff member and the Department starting an initial assessment was ‘very prompt’.3010

The flowchart is limited to the Department’s response to a Request for Information form relating to claims under the National Redress Scheme and does not refer to any reporting obligations to Tasmania Police, the Registrar or Child Safety Services. We discuss the Department of Justice’s understanding of, and approach to, reporting obligations in Section 12.

  1. November 2020—Media and parliamentary interest grows in alleged abuses at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

The Nurse podcast, created by freelance journalist Camille Bianchi, focused initially on abuses that occurred at Launceston General Hospital by paediatric nurse James Griffin and others (described in Case study 3 in Chapter 14).

On 3 November 2020, the fourth episode of The Nurse podcast aired. At the end of the episode, a preview was played for the forthcoming episode. The voiceover stated:

Next time on The Nurse, we go outside the hospital to another institution where Jim worked, in northern Tasmania. We go to the youth prison: you’re going to want to brace yourselves—it’s a horror show.3011

It then plays audio from a person who describes an allegation that we consider to be a reference to Lester:

There is one guard there who was witnessed engaged in the aftermath of raping a child. He was naked and the child was naked, and another guard saw it. For whatever reason a report was made that never went anywhere.3012

The Nurse podcast is mentioned in some of the briefing materials to Secretary Pervan, discussed in Section 9.6.

That same month, on 20 November 2020, journalist David Killick published an article in The Mercury newspaper referring to claims of sexual abuse and cover ups, commenting that Tasmania had an appalling record on handling Right to Information requests. The article said that abuse claims in education, Launceston General Hospital and Ashley Youth Detention Centre ‘have been known in government circles but kept under wraps for months or years’ and asked: ‘How many child sex abuse scandals and cover-ups will it take for someone in this government to spot the pattern?’3013 Three days later, on 23 November 2020, then Premier Peter Gutwein announced that a Commission of Inquiry into the Tasmanian Government’s responses to child sexual abuse in institutional settings would be established in early 2021.3014

On 25 November 2020 (a few weeks after Ira, Lester and Stan had been suspended, which we discuss in the next section), a question was raised in Parliament as to whether any of the Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff who had been publicly reported as having been ‘stood down’ were involved in strip searches in the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020.3015

On 26 November 2020, information was tabled in the Tasmanian Parliament that suggested that ‘of the three staff stood down or under investigation, none have [strip] searched young people’.3016 The Department sought to correct this information by notifying Secretary Pervan in a Minute prepared on 9 December 2020 because Lester had in fact undertaken a strip search of a detainee in 2019.3017

  1. November 2020—A change in approach to initiating disciplinary action

On Sunday 8 November 2020, a few days after the preview of The Nurse episode referencing what we consider to be the allegations against Lester, a meeting was held to discuss each of Ira, Lester and Stan.3018 Secretary Pervan recalled that he had ‘various conversations’ with departmental staff about the matter in the week leading up to this meeting.3019

On the same day, Secretary Pervan considered and approved three Minutes (one each for Ira, Lester and Stan) concerning allegations raised against each and the possible disciplinary action to take place. At least two of those Minutes had been drafted on 6 or 7 November 2020.3020 It appears it was at this point that the Department felt it necessary (and felt able) to recommend disciplinary action be taken against these three staff members.

The Minutes set out details of the relevant allegations against each of Ira, Lester and Stan. They did not include all allegations made about each employee that came to be known to our Commission of Inquiry. Only some (but not all) allegations known to the relevant departmental officials at the time the Minutes were prepared were included in the Minute. We describe some of the omissions from the Minute in Section 8.

The Minutes invited Secretary Pervan to consider four options in relation to the three staff members, being to:

  • advise the staff member of the allegations against them and provide them with an opportunity to respond (essentially put the allegations to them for response)
  • initiate an Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation
  • reassign the staff member’s duties to prevent direct contact with detainees
  • take no further action but maintain a record of the basis of that decision.3021

These same options were previously put to Secretary Pervan regarding Ira on 18 September 2020, which, as described above, resulted in a decision to put the allegations to Ira and provide him with an opportunity to respond (which was delayed to obtain his statement against Lester).3022

Across all briefings, Secretary Pervan was invited to consider a number of factors in making his decision, including the safety of detainees at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, the nature and severity of the conduct, the staff member’s potential exposure to young people, the level of information available and potential to progress an investigation (including whether the complainant wanted to take part), the public interest and the staff member’s wellbeing.3023

These considerations appear to extend beyond those articulated in the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice, which primarily focused on the complainant’s participation. We acknowledge that the Minute relating to Ira advised that:

Previously it was considered there was insufficient information to provide reasonable grounds to believe that a breach of the Code may have occurred given [one] complainant [would not at that time] participate in an investigation.3024

The Minute, however, pointed to a ‘pattern of inappropriate behaviour’ that was now before the Department to justify overcoming the lack of a complainant’s participation.3025 While the Minutes note the challenges of success without the participation of complainants, they nonetheless recommend disciplinary action—contrary to the practice we are told emerged from the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice. No Minute expressly mentioned the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice directly, or indirectly by describing its requirements.

Like the earlier 18 September 2020 Minute about Ira, Secretary Pervan was also given the following assurance across the different 8 November 2020 Minutes:

The allegations relate to alleged events over 20 years ago. It is considered that the environment at [the Centre] has changed significantly over the past 20 years, with additional controls now in place. There is greater staff to resident ratios, less of an opportunity for Youth Justice Workers and residents to be in 1:1 situation, more cameras and monitoring, and a greater opportunity for residents to raise complaints. Given these additional controls it is considered a lower risk that abuse such as that outlined in the allegations against [the relevant employee] could occur in the environment at [the Centre] today. However, whilst it is considered that risk is minimal it may not be possible to eliminate risk, especially if [an employee] is in direct contact with residents.3026

Only one Minute made any reference to media attention and scrutiny over child sexual abuse matters. It noted the significant media attention that was occurring about child sexual abuse, particularly involving James Griffin.3027 The Minute also referenced the upcoming release of The Nurse podcast episode on Ashley Youth Detention Centre.3028

Ultimately, Secretary Pervan decided to suspend all three Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff and initiate Employment Direction No. 5 investigations because he had formed a reasonable belief that each may have breached the State Service Code of Conduct.

In an email approving all three Minutes, Secretary Pervan suggested that steps had not been taken over the allegations until that point because the Department did not want to interfere with police processes.3029 The email noted that as police had advised they did not intend to pursue criminal investigations, ‘the way is therefore clear for us to pursue our process’.3030 The email did not acknowledge that police had notified the Department in February 2020 that they would not be pursuing Baxter’s allegations against Ira, clearing the way for much earlier action.

We are pleased to see more decisive action occurred on 8 November 2020. However, we consider it took too long to give serious consideration of the public interest and a possible pattern of behaviour revealed through multiple complaints.

Finding—The Department failed to adequately consider the safety of detainees and place appropriate weight on public interest considerations in relation to Ira, Lester and Stan until 8 November 2020

Despite the Department becoming increasingly aware of the extent of allegations being made against current staff by August and September 2020, we were disappointed that it took until 8 November 2020 for disciplinary action to be commenced in relation to the allegations made against certain Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff.

For example:

  • The Department had the same information about Ira in September 2019 that it had on 8 November 2020. It had provided the Secretary with three previous briefings from December 2019, none of which recommended that Ira be suspended or an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation be commenced.
  • The Department received Alysha’s report about Lester on 9 January 2020, which was the only allegation initially included in the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation into Lester’s conduct on 8 November 2020. Also, the Department had reidentified that there were four Abuse in State Care Program claims against Lester in September 2020, yet only recommended disciplinary action to Secretary Pervan on 8 November 2020 (referring to only three of these claims).
  • The Department had received Ben’s allegations of rape by Stan by mid-2020. This was the only allegation initially included in the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation against Stan on 8 November 2020, noting that the Minute also referred to other allegations it had received in September 2020.

While we accept responding to allegations of this nature is complex, the Department owes a duty of care to detainees that must be at the forefront of decision making. We note that the Department became aware of the relevant allegations a number of months—and in one instance, more than a year—before making the decision to suspend those staff members.

We acknowledge there was growing concern within the Department from September 2020 onwards but were surprised by the markedly different change in approach on 8 November 2020, which showed welcome emphasis on the safety of detainees and the public interest in having staff the subject of allegations removed from the workplace and investigated.

We are unclear why this outcome could not have been achieved earlier, given, at this point, there had been no apparent change to the legal advice that we were told precluded any disciplinary action without the participation of, or a sworn statement from a complainant, or to the practice that appears to have developed from that advice.

While increasing awareness of the number and nature of complaints against past detainees from September onwards can partly be attributed to this change, we also consider it likely that the growing appreciation of risks to the Department, arising from the looming class action and increased media scrutiny, was a significant contributor to the relatively sudden recommendation to take decisive action.

  1. December 2020—Secretary Pervan receives the Department’s Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care

In or around December 2020, the Department prepared a review of the reporting processes under each of the four Abuse in State Care Program rounds, which considered the notifications process and the scope and aims of the program.3031 We discuss this review, and what it revealed about the purpose of the program in Section 4.2.

On 14 December 2020, the Department sent Secretary Pervan this review. The associated cover email included an extract from the review, which stated that the program was about compensation and acknowledgment and was not established to determine blame or fault or to make specific findings against alleged abusers. Rather, the Abuse in State Care Program was intended to be part of a supportive, healing reconciliation process.3032

Secretary Pervan responded on 14 December 2020 to the email as follows:

I acknowledge the intent of the Review … in terms of compensation and healing and of the advice you have compiled for Mandy [Clarke]. In the context of claims and harm done that is entirely understandable.

I do think however, that if we consider these matters in the current context of our duty of care to children in our care and include in that consideration the statutory provisions relating to reporting and responding to abuse and the associated penalties where it is proven, then a different perspective on the information and our compulsion to act emerges.3033

This statement would appear to reflect the position taken on 8 November 2020, when Employment Direction No. 5 investigations were commenced against Ira, Stan and Lester.

  1. December 2020—The Department seeks and receives new legal advice from the Office of the Solicitor-General on using information alleging abuses by Centre staff

We saw some evidence that the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice, or any practice associated with it, was not viewed as an immovable barrier to disciplinary action. But this was clear by November 2020, when Ira, Lester and Stan were suspended. In each of those three matters, the Department did not have the active participation of, or a sworn statement from, the relevant complainant at the time of the suspension.

Despite our efforts to enquire into the rationale for taking that disciplinary action at that specific time, we remain unclear about any change in policy or legal position that produced this different approach, until new legal advice was received on 15 December 2020.

We were told that the ‘number and detail of the allegations’ relating to Ira, Lester and Stan ‘distinguished them from earlier matters’ such that a disciplinary response was appropriate in November 2020 despite the continued application of the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice.3034 We found this difficult to reconcile with the lengthy period over which these allegations were known to the Department (noting in particular the allegations against Ira, which had been briefed to the Secretary as early as December 2019).

In July 2023, Secretary Pervan told us that since his previous evidence to us he had recalled being informed by People and Culture earlier than 15 December 2020 that the Office of the Solicitor-General had confirmed the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice would be superseded.3035 Secretary Pervan could not recall whether this occurred before or after the decision to approve Employment Direction No. 5 investigations into the allegations against Ira, Lester and Stan on 8 November 2020.3036 We did not receive evidence from other departmental witnesses suggesting this advice had been given at this time, although we did not have an opportunity to test this recollection with relevant people before publishing our report.

We received evidence that the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice was reinforced in a meeting in November or December 2020 between representatives of the Office of the Solicitor-General and the Department.3037 As we note above, we consider that heightened media attention and scrutiny likely played some role in the Department’s changes in processes and practice during this period.

We outline here the evidence that we received about the lead-up to providing the 15 December 2020 legal advice, noting it suggests that:

  • there continued to be real or perceived legal barriers to taking disciplinary action, even after the initiation of Employment Direction No. 5 investigations on 8 November 2020
  • concerns about taking disciplinary action based on information from redress schemes was a matter exercising many Secretaries
  • the extent to which the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice affected the Department’s practice in managing allegations against staff (particularly by 2020) remains unclear.

At some point, the Department must have become concerned about potential barriers to using information from redress schemes in disciplinary processes.

On 23 November 2020, departmental staff met with the then Assistant Solicitor-General (and current Solicitor-General) Sarah Kay SC to discuss the Department using information about historical allegations of abuse.3038 We were told that Ms Kay confirmed at the meeting that the Department could not progress investigations where there was no complainant.3039 Some departmental officials expressed feeling upset with the advice.3040 They felt ‘very frustrated with a seeming inability to do anything when there were serious allegations against current employees’.3041

The Office of the Solicitor-General told us, and provided documentary evidence to support, that no legal advice was provided at that 23 November 2020 meeting, including advice that investigations could not be progressed.3042 The Office of the Solicitor-General considers that the contents of that discussion may have been misinterpreted by the staff of the Department.3043

On 24 November 2020, Secretary Pervan emailed the then Solicitor-General stating that he had been briefed by staff about the meeting with Ms Kay on the previous day. The email stated:

I understand that the material provided to us from civil claims and redress statements cannot be used for disciplinary purposes but remains live and usable by the Crown for the purpose of settling claims. As you know, the victims in 2 of the matters have made it abundantly clear that they do not wish to participate in any investigation by the Police or the Crown generally. Given that one of the employees in particular is accused of a significant number of potentially criminal acts this places us in a poor position.3044

Secretary Pervan also requested advice on the Department’s mandatory reporting obligations, in addition to the advice that was being drafted about using historical information.

We asked Secretary Pervan about this email and what the basis was for his statement that material provided from civil claims and redress statements cannot be used for disciplinary purposes.3045 He responded:

The verbal preliminary advice from Sarah Kay was that in the absence of a sworn statement from the victim-survivor, the claims could not be used in ED5 investigations. This maintained the position that we had understood we were bound by, set out in the 2007 written advice.3046

On 6 December 2020, the Department requested new advice from the
Solicitor-General, asking:

  • whether investigations could be initiated without the complainant’s consent
  • whether the Department could provide information received through the state and national redress schemes and civil claims to external investigators
  • whether the Department could use that information as part of a misconduct investigation in circumstances where the complainant had not made a formal complaint to the police or a statement to the Department.

On the one hand, this request for legal advice suggests the Department was actively seeking legal advice to enable it to share and act on information about child sexual abuse by staff gleaned from redress and civil claims. On the other hand, it illustrates there continued to be real or perceived barriers to taking this action, despite the Department initiating disciplinary processes a month before.

Ms Baker explained her concerns this way, in the context of managing the disciplinary process against Lester:

Noting that [Lester] was out of the workplace and the risk to children mitigated from 8 November 2020, there was a delay in progressing the Abuse in State Care matters to [Lester]. This was initially attributable to seeking advice from the Office of the Solicitor General to ascertain whether the information (including the complainant[’s] name) from the Abuse in State Care Scheme could be put to [Lester]. This was the first case where we were relying on information from the Abuse in State Care Scheme to put matters to an employee. I recall the discussion at the time on how this was unprecedented and legal advice needed to be sought. This advice was sought at a meeting between Department staff and the Office of the Solicitor General and was held on 23 November 2020, written advice was sought on the 8 December and the written advice was received from the [Office of the Solicitor-General] on the 15 December 2020.3047

On or around 7 December 2020, there was a multi-agency meeting at which there was a discussion about:

… the use and retention of information concerning claims of child sexual abuse made in the course of seeking financial compensation under the National Redress Scheme and the need to take action in respect of alleged perpetrators who were still in contact with children in their roles.3048

We understand the meeting attendees included Secretary Pervan, Ms Clarke, Assistant Commissioner Higgins, the then Director of the Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit, Secretary Webster, Secretary of the Department of Health, Kathrine Morgan-Wicks PSM, and the then Deputy Secretary of the Department of Education, Rob Williams.3049 Secretary Pervan told us:

Although I do not recall specific statements, my general recollection is that attendees were forthright about their dissatisfaction with [the 2007 legal] advice and its practical repercussions. I recall that this meeting was the catalyst to request that the Solicitor General provide updated advice on these matters, including with respect to how the Department could engage with employment directions using information arising from the [National Redress Scheme] claims that it had received from the Department of Justice.3050

As mentioned above, Secretary Webster told us that she only ‘recently’ became aware of the Solicitor-General’s 2007 legal advice and that she understands:

… this advice may have resulted in these [Abuse in State Care Program] allegations not being pursued, however, this understanding is based on the evidence that has come to light during the Commission’s hearings.3051

The decision to request the 15 December 2020 legal advice was made on 23 November 2020 and there was no reference to the Solicitor-General’s 2007 legal advice in that request.3052

On 8 December 2020, there was a meeting between Secretary Jenny Gale, Secretary Webster, Secretary Pervan, Secretary Morgan-Wicks, Secretary Timothy Bullard and former Commissioner of Police, Darren Hine AO APM.3053 The purpose of the meeting was to determine responsibility for a paper to Cabinet about internal processes for identifying whether and where employees who may have had historical allegations against them are still employed by the State and the need to ensure there was information sharing across agencies to identify whether an employee had moved from one agency to another.3054 We understand this meeting, or discussions that followed it, included discussion about the reliance on a statement from redress claims for the purpose of disciplinary processes and the complexity this entailed.3055

On 15 December 2020, the Office of the Solicitor-General advised the Department that:

  • The Department could commence a misconduct investigation in the absence of a complaint to Tasmania Police or a statement to the Department.3056
  • The Department did not need to notify a complainant it was acting on the information provided unless the Department’s actions might adversely affect the complainant.3057
  • The use or disclosure of information derived from National Redress Scheme claims is permitted in certain circumstances by the Scheme’s legislation. This includes disclosure or use in relation to the safety or wellbeing of children or related disciplinary or employment processes (including an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation).3058
  • In certain circumstances, exceptions in the Personal Information Protection Act may enable the use of information for the purposes of Employment Direction No. 5 investigations without the complainant’s consent.3059 Those exceptions have been in place since 2004.3060

This new legal advice did not reference the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice and did not explain the reason for the change in view. We understand that the legal advice of 15 December 2020 is still current.

We were told that these measures worked to improve reporting to other agencies, reduce delays and allow for more effective disciplinary responses.3061 We welcome information that expressed a shift towards prioritising detainee safety, including by working to remove staff from site where required.3062 Departmental officials placed particular emphasis on the difference in approach since receiving the Solicitor-General’s legal advice on 15 December 2020.3063

We also heard of efforts to overcome reliance on police investigations as a reason to wait to start disciplinary action. We were told that since 2020, ‘generally speaking’ there were not the same concerns about delaying Employment Direction No. 5 investigations pending police processes but in some cases, a person will be suspended and the Department will wait for police to confirm that the Employment Direction No. 5 investigation can begin.3064

Many departmental officials told us that the Department’s responses to the allegations against Lester, Ira and Stan would be different if the allegations were made today.3065

  1. Reflections on the Department’s responses to Ira, Lester and Stan

We have outlined responses to allegations against Ira, Lester and Stan in this case study because they illustrate some significant failings in the responses of the Department and other agencies. They also highlight the complexities of responding to such matters. We recognise that the task of investigating allegations of child sexual abuse by staff is a difficult exercise that requires careful consideration, risk assessment and clear processes and supports for all parties. It requires consideration of risk to children and young people, as well as care towards complainants and fairness towards the staff subject to the allegations. It also requires close cooperation and collaboration across multiple agencies—particularly Tasmania Police and the Registrar. This requires broader systems to be designed and applied in a way that promotes the safety and best interests of children and young people.

Overall, our examination of these case examples revealed that neither occurred; systems were poorly designed or not developed at all and this greatly affected the availability and sharing of information that could enable action to be taken to protect children from potential risks over decades.

The culture we observed within the Department was indicative of an attitude we saw across the State Service—one that focused on adherence to bureaucratic processes and procedures and was conservative about the prospects of substantiating allegations of misconduct. We do not consider such reservations to be entirely unfounded, based on what we learned about the State Service disciplinary framework.

We are also conscious that the Department was beginning to face an unprecedented crisis, with numerous allegations against a substantial number of staff. We have sympathy for the challenge the Department was, and is, facing.

Through the period 2019 to 2020, we would have liked to have seen allegations made against staff treated with urgency, with proactive effort to overcome barriers that produced outcomes that directly placed detainees at risk. We would have also liked to have seen the setting of expectations within the Department that allegations would be addressed and referred without delay. We consider that the circumstances the Department described (of not being able to take action on critical information that suggested staff may be a risk to detainees) should have been intolerable for the Department, yet it was allowed to stand for years and years. We were not advised of any proposals for legislative change made by the Department to overcome the problems. We were pleased to see more decisive action on 8 November 2020, where there was finally serious consideration of the public interest and a possible pattern of behaviour revealed through multiple complaints. We also welcome the legal advice received in December 2020, which gives the Department greater power to act on abuse allegations it receives about staff.

  1. Responses by Tasmania Police

Tasmania Police plays a critical role in keeping children and young people safe from sexual abuse and misconduct and for holding abusers accountable. In this context, we identified several areas regarding Tasmania Police’s response to allegations of child sexual abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff that could be improved, including information-sharing processes, police attitudes, recognising allegations of abuse, overcoming barriers to investigations, and coordinating its response with other agencies.

  1. Quality and clarity of information held about abuse allegations and deficiencies in reporting processes

We are concerned about the quality and clarity of information we received from Tasmania Police regarding our case examples. In response to our request for information about the reports it received and made, and the actions it took in response to allegations relating to certain Centre staff members, we received multiple iterations of a table of allegations that contained different pieces of information.3066 While we appreciated efforts to correct information through the course of our Inquiry, we are concerned about the reliability of police mechanisms to track and record this important information.

Also, information provided by Tasmania Police often did not align to the reporting dates or allegations provided by the Department or did not exist at all. For example, while we are aware the Department sent a letter to Tasmania Police on 18 February 2020 about Baxter’s allegations against Ira, the police did not provide us with any information about this notification.3067 It was difficult for us to tell why this was the case.

We also note there have been some significant delays by Tasmania Police in making notifications to the Registrar, as well as instances where it appears no notifications were made—suggesting the automatic notification process adopted was not working as intended. Examples from the case examples we considered include:

  • On 9 November 2020, the Department reported allegations raised against Lester through the Abuse in State Care Program to Tasmania Police.3068 However, the police did not enter these notifications into their intelligence system until 18 August 2022.3069 As a result, Tasmania Police did not notify the Registrar of these allegations until that time.3070 We were told this was an oversight by Tasmania Police and the allegations should have been entered into its intelligence system and reported to the Registrar in November 2020.3071
  • Tasmania Police told us that it notified the Registrar of Parker’s allegations against Ira on 11 August 2022.3072 This was more than a year after Tasmania Police was notified of the allegations by a third party (and almost two years after the Department says it reported the allegation to the police).3073
  • Ben’s allegations against Stan were reported by the Office of the Solicitor-General to Tasmania Police in November 2021, but were not listed as ‘presents a risk to vulnerable people’ on Atlas until 19 August 2022.3074
  • Despite receiving a submission to the National Royal Commission containing allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff in May 2017, Tasmania Police did not report this to the Registrar through its automated referral process.3075 Assistant Commissioner Higgins agreed that this is an example of how the process is subject to ‘human error’.3076

Prompt notifications to the Registrar are particularly important where conduct may not satisfy a criminal threshold but nonetheless may point to a person being a risk to children.

We are also not confident that the information that has been provided to us by police is complete. We have received evidence that the ability to search for an individual is based on the accuracy of information provided and the ability of the police to link that person to a report.3077 In the past, the manual entry of names meant that people were not identified or linked to a report due to incorrect spelling.3078 We were told that while this still occurs and the system is ‘not always perfect’, the process has been improved by requiring the person inputting the data to find the offender’s name and date of birth on the system.3079

We are concerned about problems with the accuracy and clarity of information held by police because any single piece of information can be vital to a criminal investigation. It is important that police databases enable all relevant information about an individual to be linked, accessible and accurate to give police a complete picture of its holdings. What may seem relatively insignificant in isolation can become crucial as further information emerges and is vital to establishing and understanding patterns of behaviour.

In relation to deficiencies in information provided to our Inquiry by Tasmania Police, we were told that this was due to unintentional oversights in the compilation of the information.3080 Assistant Commissioner Higgins told us:

I do accept that our notifications to external agencies relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff have been deficient at times. This has been a result of incomplete, minimal data, or a failure on our behalf to validate information with the Department of Communities on entities identified within reports. To expand on this, incomplete and minimal data relates primarily to Redress and civil claims, where information at times can be limited for example to a surname only … Without prior knowledge of the individual, these individuals may not be correctly linked with the occurrence within ATLAS which results in no automatic notification being made to either Communities or Working with Vulnerable People.3081

He noted that Tasmania Police had begun a review of matters relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre to ensure the correct people are linked and accurate information can be provided to other agencies.3082

We received evidence that December 2020 was a ‘pivotal time’ and during this period changes in protocols, guidelines and training led to 94 per cent of sworn police staff members receiving online training, including about requirements for making intelligence submissions and ticking the appropriate boxes for referrals.3083 Assistant Commissioner Higgins had observed ‘a measurable change’ and ‘more correct reporting’ as a result of this training.3084 He also described systemic safety nets, such as further supervision and audits.3085 He acknowledged that while there will be human errors on occasion, he generally has confidence in the system, which is now far more robust.3086

  1. Police attitudes towards detainees

We observed concerning attitudes among some police members regarding detainees. We saw detainees being openly described as ‘the worst of the worst’.3087 Some police members also suggested to us that detainees only make complaints to receive compensation and that those processes make it ‘too easy’ for complaints to be made without being substantiated.3088

People with criminal histories can be reluctant to report abuse because of the stigma associated with reporting but also due to distrust of police, an issue we discuss in Chapter 16. Some former detainees told us that staff who inflicted abuse on them told them that no one would believe them because they were just criminals, or that they felt they would not be believed if they made a report due to their criminal history.3089

One senior departmental official told us about a conversation they had with a police officer they called to discuss an allegation against an Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member:

I distinctly recall the officer I was talking to laughing when I relayed the claims against [the staff member] and the disbelief of this officer that we were taking the steps to suspend the employee as this complainant was apparently from a well-known criminal family, had a long criminal past, and that [their] word should not be trusted, especially when there was money involved.3090

At the hearings, Counsel Assisting asked Assistant Commissioner Higgins whether he had any concerns that members of the police may be less open to believing allegations that are made by detainees as distinct from other members of the community.3091 He told us:

It’s possible. Would it be common practice? No. I think, watching a witness this morning, I think you’d only have to watch a victim in that case to realise how raw it is and how compelling their experience is to be able to put your personal view on the veracity of something. So, it’s difficult to say. The only thing I’d say to qualify that is that, the sad reality of the detainees at Ashley over lengthy periods is that they have had very long histories with police, so there perhaps is on occasion scepticism.3092

Assistant Commissioner Higgins conceded that Tasmania Police needed ‘to work on [its] unconscious bias’ against detainees.3093 He also acknowledged the need to educate police officers about abusers using the fact that the children are ‘criminals’ as a tool to stop them from disclosing because of the perception that no one will believe them.3094

We discuss this issue—including the relevant recommendations of the National Royal Commission that directed police to consider the credibility of complaints rather than the credibility of the complainant alone—in Chapter 16.

  1. Failures to recognise allegations as potential child sexual abuse

As with the Department, we observed a failure by police to recognise some of the alleged conduct as potentially criminal in nature. Our consultation with Launceston Police indicated that police officers had received reports relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff rubbing cream on detainees’ genitals, watching detainees in the shower and watching them masturbate.3095 Some members of Launceston Police told us this occurred in the context of staff doing their job and that it does not constitute child sexual abuse.3096 This is consistent with the view police have taken in response to similar allegations—for example, allegations of unlawful strip searches.3097

We are troubled by this assessment because we consider that, accounting for the relevant context and particulars, including departmental policies that may dictate how strip searches or other procedures in detention should be undertaken, such behaviours may indeed constitute child sexual abuse and should be treated as such. There is now a wider range of offences available to police regarding child sexual abuse following Tasmania’s implementation of the National Royal Commission recommendations. This includes broader offences relating to perpetrators but also offences relating to failures by institutions (such as failures to report or act on information). Tasmania Police should always consider the full suite of offences and powers it has when considering allegations, and not make assumptions about the nature of alleged conduct (for example, that it was lawfully undertaken in the course of duties) without further investigation.

  1. Overcoming barriers to investigations

We acknowledge challenges arise for police when complainants do not want to provide statements or otherwise participate in criminal justice processes—particularly where the alleged conduct may have occurred some time ago and other evidence (such as records or witnesses) may be difficult to secure. Complainant reluctance would be more pronounced among current and former detainees, and police receive information through National Redress Scheme claims and sometimes do not have the name and details of a complainant, often having to go through third parties (such as lawyers or victim support groups) to make contact. Often, too, the complainant has indicated they do not wish to be contacted by police, which should be respected.

We consider that, rather than passively accepting these barriers (particularly in the context of multiple, serious allegations against people working with children) police should adopt proactive policing strategies, including building trust with current and former detainees. Public calls for information or dedicated reporting channels may also demonstrate police commitment to receiving and responding to such complaints. We also note that complainants can believe they are the only victim and, if later advised of other complaints, may change their minds and be more willing to proceed.

  1. Reducing delay and ensuring institutions do not unduly defer to police

In relation to our case examples of Ira, Lester and Stan, we identified a tendency of the Department to defer to police as a justification for inaction in responding to certain allegations. We recognise that it is appropriate for the Department to consult with Tasmania Police about its intentions to ensure it does not in any way interfere with a police investigation, although note that this should not compromise child safety. As a general observation, once Tasmania Police was notified of allegations, it was often relatively prompt in confirming its intentions (for example, to not investigate an allegation further) to clear the way for the Department to pursue disciplinary action. We consider this important.

However, we also consider it important that Tasmania Police is aware of the need to manage the active risks posed by those who are the subject of allegations and its role in reminding institutions of their responsibilities to keep children safe while investigations occur. Risk management may need to be designed on a case-by-case basis and in a collaborative way between Tasmania Police and the relevant institution. We consider the introduction of Tasmania’s Reportable Conduct Scheme (discussed in Chapter 18) so that responses to allegations of abuse within organisations are overseen by an Independent Regulator, will ensure this occurs.

We note that, following acknowledged failings in police responses to information received around now deceased abuser James Griffin (discussed in Chapter 14), Tasmania Police has initiated a range of reforms to improve and clarify its responses to reports of child sexual abuse. These are described in Chapter 16. It is important that these reforms are applied equally to consideration of safety for children in the community and those in the care of the State, including in youth detention.

Finding—Tasmania Police should improve its responses to allegations of child sexual abuse made by current and former detainees at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

While we recognise several recent improvements, Tasmania Police must continue to improve its responses to allegations of child sexual abuse made by current and former detainees at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. This includes responding to allegations made against former Centre staff. The fact a child or young person has previously engaged in criminal behaviour does not, and should not, deny them the right to live free from abuse and harm and to have any allegations they make taken seriously and investigated thoroughly.

In Chapter 16, we make several suggestions and observations about how Tasmania Police can improve its responses to child sexual abuse, but note in the context of this case study that Tasmania Police should improve its responses to this cohort in the following ways:

  • Adopt proactive strategies to build trust with current and former detainees.
  • Implement and further embed the recommendations of the National Royal Commission as they relate to complainants who may have criminal histories—by avoiding judgments of character or assessments of credibility based solely on views about the character of the complainant rather than the nature of the complaint.
  • Improve its information-sharing and referral practices to ensure other agencies (including Child Safety Services and the Registrar) receive information, where appropriate, to enable those agencies to take steps to protect the safety of detainees.
  • Improve record keeping to ensure all allegations and information received is accurate, accessible and appropriately linked to relevant individuals. It is important that any piece of information relating to child sexual abuse is treated as potentially important so that police can identify patterns of behaviour over time.
  • Investigate all allegations thoroughly using all available tools, powers and potential offences available. While we accept police will not always be able to pursue an investigation without the participation of a complainant, we consider there may be instances (for example, where there are several past complaints) where police may be able to form a basis for actions, such as obtaining a search warrant to try to elicit further information. Police may also be able to interview other potential witnesses to gather information (for example, other staff) or re-engage with past complainants to see whether they may wish to proceed with a formal complaint at a later time (particularly if other complaints have been made since).
  • Specifically regarding allegations made by current or former detainees in youth detention, police need readily accessible guidance on Tasmanian law on personal searches, isolation and use of force so they can quickly identify when the alleged conduct falls outside of the parameters of acceptable professional conduct and may indicate a crime has occurred.
  1. Responses by the Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme

The Registrar plays one of the most important roles in the context of responding to allegations against staff in institutions.

The Registrar has a primary focus on the safety of vulnerable people, including children, in its decision making and is often not bound by the limitations of other agencies (such as the Department, which must act within a rigid industrial framework, or Tasmania Police, which requires allegations to suggest there has been a defined criminal offence and to meet higher standards of proof). A loss of registration can also protect children in a wider range of settings beyond the institution where the allegations arise. For example, state servants who are the subject of allegations may also rely on registration to volunteer with children or to be foster carers. However, we recognise that the loss of registration—particularly for those in child-facing roles—has serious impacts. It can end their career and preclude them from undertaking a wide range of activities in the community. Therefore, it is proper and appropriate that the Registrar acts carefully in making adverse decisions and has the best possible information to do so.

The Registrar told us that, as of 15 August 2022, there were 16 current or former Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff who continued to be subject to an additional risk assessment.3098 We received evidence that, at that date, no negative Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct outcomes had been provided to the Registrar relating to Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff.3099 Describing the impact of these delays on the Registrar’s functions, the Registrar told us:

… we don’t have outcomes from investigations that started in November 2020, nor do we have any real appreciable information that’s come from those investigations that would enable us to make decisions to remove people from settings where they may cause harm.3100

The Registrar has significant powers to suspend registration and has issued some suspension notices on the basis of the volume or similarity of allegations against a registered person before police or employee conduct investigations begin, charges are laid or findings made.3101 However, given the challenges associated with allegations that lack specificity, are isolated in nature and in respect of which there are not timely investigatory outcomes, there are some cases where the Registrar considers it is not appropriate to suspend registration while another risk assessment is undertaken.3102 We discuss this in Chapter 18.

We received evidence that the Registrar experienced several challenges and frustrations in executing his functions in relation to information he received regarding allegations about staff in Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

In December 2020, the Registrar was provided with a spreadsheet with more than 300 allegations of child sexual abuse and physical abuse relating to current and former Centre staff. We were told that the Registrar assumed this was a starting point for receiving further, more comprehensive information. However, it became clear in February 2021 that there was:

… an apparent reluctance within parts of [the Department] to share records from the redress scheme under reportable behaviour obligations in the [Registration to Work with Vulnerable People] Act.3103

We understand that, in mid-2021, many Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff were due to renew their registration and that the Registrar felt that he could not decide that the members of staff posed an unacceptable risk (thereby removing their registration) without more information.3104

In light of the difficulties the Registrar faced, in March and April 2021, the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Unit began a full review of the spreadsheet provided to it by the Department in December 2020 to log reportable behaviour and start additional risk assessments.3105 However, this resulted in only eight registered people being identified.3106 In an attempt to verify the identities of the remaining records included in the spreadsheet, requests for information were sent to the Department. This included clarifying names or dates of birth of persons named in the spreadsheet.3107

We understand that in response to one of these requests from the Registrar, the Department confirmed it was seeking advice on releasing information about redress claims and confirmed on 16 March 2021 that it could provide all relevant information about redress claims to the Registrar.3108 We understand this approach was adopted after the Department sought legal advice about the Registrar’s powers to request information.

The Department received advice from the Office of the Solicitor-General dated 12 March 2021, that indicated the Registrar could request such information and there was no barrier to sharing this information with the Registrar under the Personal Information Protection Act or the National Redress Scheme legislation.3109 We note the 15 December 2020 legal advice (discussed in Section 9.8) had previously indicated that the legislation permitted the use and disclosure of such information in certain circumstances.3110

We were told that, over the period from May 2021 to August 2022, the Department provided information about reportable behaviour relating to a further 14 current and former staff concerning conduct that occurred at the Centre.3111 However, we received evidence that the Department did not respond to requests for information in a timely way. The Registrar told us that his office had made more than 80 requests for information and that it took the Department up to a year to respond to some of these requests.3112 Sometimes the records ultimately provided by the Department did not contain much more information than the Registrar already had.3113 We have noted the problems the Department had with record keeping and accessing records throughout this case study.

The Registrar reported difficulties his office faced around limited particulars on allegations raised through the National Redress Scheme—sometimes due to limited information within the claim itself but also because the Department had not always provided all relevant information.3114 We note that until at least October 2020, the Department had less information about these claims than the Department of Justice. We return to this issue in Section 12.

The Registrar told us that, even though requests were made to the Secretary in November 2020 for continuous disclosure from Employment Direction No. 5 investigations, the Department had not provided records about such investigations, which form a vital source of information for the Registrar.3115

The Registrar highlighted delays in appointing investigators to undertake Employment Direction No. 5 investigations, giving the example that one of the staff members who was suspended in November 2020 was yet to have allegations put to him as of July 2021.3116 The Department told us that typically the Minute recommending the commencement of an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation includes the relevant appointment documentation for the investigator, but acknowledged there were sometimes delays associated with securing suitably skilled and trained investigators and gathering all the necessary records.3117 Also, the Registrar noted that there were no investigations into allegations where the alleged abuser was a former staff member.3118

The Registrar also reported that often responsibility for managing such matters in the Department would shift multiple times between People and Culture, Legal Services and the Records and Program areas ‘with a sense that no area particularly saw themselves as accountable’.3119 Secretary Pervan acknowledged that there were some restructures within the Department, but that at the time of our hearings there was greater resourcing of the records and legal areas to support such processes.3120

Describing his decision to send the Department 80 requests for information in 2021, the Registrar accepted that even though his role is not investigative, his unit was forced to adopt a quasi-investigative role to progress matters:

… these were allegations of particularly grave conduct, albeit with no real particulars, so it was very hard: you’re sort of sitting with something that you need to make a decision on, potentially a suspension decision on, but you don’t really have information about it, so trying to understand more about the people who were alleged to have taken it was a vital kind of step.3121

The Registrar told us that, in July 2021, his frustrations with the lack of information being provided led him to consider whether enforcement action was necessary to compel the Department to produce records.3122 However, he ultimately decided to instead insist on regular meetings with senior departmental representatives who acted as a clearinghouse for the information requests and status updates.3123 The Registrar observed it was not until the second half of 2021 that information flow improved.3124 We discuss this in Section 14.1.

Some senior departmental officials disagree there was ‘reluctance’ within parts of the Department to share records, at least on their own part.3125 Ms Clarke and Ms Baker told us that it was not until August 2021 that the Registrar raised his concerns about the timeliness of the Department’s response, which was followed by a series of regular meetings initiated by the Department providing ‘a regular forum to address any concerns’, which they considered to be effective.3126

During our hearings, senior departmental officials told us that the delays in reporting to the Registrar were a function of the Department’s record-keeping practices and that its records remediation project, discussed in Section 13.2, resulted in the Department being able to respond to requests for information more efficiently.3127 Ms Baker acknowledged that the Department needed to respond to the Registrar’s requests for information in a more timely manner, although noted that once this was brought to her attention, she met the Registrar within two days to address this issue.3128 We were told, however, that the Department often experienced the same limitations with information as experienced by the Registrar, noting that it often had ‘non-specific allegations of concern, but without concrete information on which to make a decision’.3129

We identified multiple discrepancies between when agencies told us they had reported information to the Registrar and the information held by the Registrar. We have not been able to determine whether the differences were caused by errors in reporting, the receiving of information or the recording of this information. Nevertheless, we are concerned that the Registrar may not be aware of all relevant information and is not always receiving information as quickly as possible.

While we acknowledge the difficulties the Registrar faced in obtaining prompt and clear information to inform his decision making, based on our case examples, we consider the Registrar occasionally adopted too high an evidentiary threshold in assessing risk, rather than undertaking prospective risk assessment. We consider the Registrar is uniquely placed to put children’s safety at the forefront of decision making and should consistently do so.

Finding—On occasion, the Registrar of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme appeared to adopt too high an evidentiary threshold in assessing whether staff with allegations against them posed an unacceptable risk to children

As we have emphasised throughout this case study, the Registrar plays a central role in responding to risks to children in institutional settings. Their primary focus is on protecting vulnerable people, including children, from risks of harm. While the Registrar is required to extend procedural fairness to parties subject to its decisions and should recognise the weight of decisions on the lives and livelihoods of registered individuals, the Registrar is not required to ‘prove’ or ‘substantiate’ allegations in the same way that an employer may need to so as to apply disciplinary sanctions (on the balance of probabilities) or police must so as to secure a criminal conviction (beyond reasonable doubt). Rather, the Registrar is required to undertake an assessment of future risk to vulnerable people, including children. We consider this gives the Registrar greater scope to act on concerning information that suggests risk, including considering patterns and coincidence in assessing a body of allegations, and a broad array of corroborative evidence. The Registrar must be enabled and willing to adopt this approach.

In our case examples, we observed that the Registrar sometimes imposed too high a threshold when assessing risks to children. We accept the evidence of the Registrar that his decision making was sometimes hampered by belated or incomplete information from the Department. However, we consider it important that the Registrar maintains a focus on future risk, unimpeded by industrial or union concerns.

We make a detailed recommendation regarding the statutory guidance which the Tasmanian Government should provide to the Registrar in respect of risk assessments in Chapter 18.

  1. Department of Justice responses to National Redress Scheme claims

In Section 3.1.2, we described the processes the Department of Justice used to get information from agencies to respond to queries from the Scheme Operator of the National Redress Scheme. In Section 9.4, we also outlined how some Department of Communities processes for responding to sharing information requests from the Department of Justice improved from October 2020.

In this section, we discuss previous concerns raised about the Department of Justice’s sharing of information received under the National Redress Scheme. We also explain that the Department of Justice does not have a process for making notifications to relevant agencies based on information it receives from the Scheme Operator related to National Redress Scheme claims.

  1. Concerns with information sharing between the Department of Justice and the former Department of Communities

Before at least October 2020, the Department of Justice’s practice was to only share a summary of the information it received from the Scheme Operator, unless and until an agency specifically requested more information.3130 We were told that this was to reduce vicarious trauma on staff who may be responsible for reviewing the information.3131

In 2019, concerns were raised within the Department of Communities that the information provided to agencies by the Department of Justice in respect of at least some National Redress Scheme claims was not enough to facilitate a ‘thorough investigation’.3132 We also identified at least one example where the name of an alleged abuser was not included in the ‘National Redress Scheme – Request for Information’ form (despite being known to the Department of Justice), which limited the Department of Communities’ ability to act on that information.3133

The State told us the Department of Justice changed its practice in October 2020 and now provides everything it holds in respect of each National Redress Scheme application to the relevant agency.3134 Secretary Pervan also recalled discussions at a multi-agency meeting between the Department of Justice, the former Department of Communities and others on 7 December 2020 that he considered ultimately led to changes to the amount of detail the Department of Justice would provide to agencies in respect of National Redress Scheme claims and how quickly the information was provided.3135 Secretary Pervan also said that this meeting led to a new process for contacting redress applicants to gauge their willingness to participate in investigations (such as police investigations or disciplinary investigations initiated by a department).3136 Secretary Pervan did not elaborate on the specifics of these changes.

We also received evidence about a cross-agency meeting on 8 December 2020 at which attendees discussed the need to ensure there was information sharing between agencies, including to identify whether an employee may have moved from one agency to another.3137

Given this evidence, we are unclear as to the timing of the change in the Department of Justice’s practice but accept it occurred at some point in late 2020. We welcome this change.

We are concerned, however, that prior to at least October 2020 there was not a robust process for sharing information about National Redress Scheme claims that ensured all relevant information was provided to agencies completing a ‘National Redress Scheme – Request for Information’ form. As noted by Secretary Webster, the relevant agency is required to deal with allegations against current employees through its own internal policies.3138 By not consistently providing complete information to the agency, this already challenging task became more difficult because of the fragmentation and omission of information. We would be concerned if a focus on protecting staff from trauma had a negative impact on the Department’s ability to make an appropriate assessment about risks to children, noting staff trauma must and can be addressed in other ways. Adding an extra step of summarising material also created greater risks of delays.

  1. Making reports and notifications

The Department of Justice is often the first Tasmanian agency to receive allegations through the National Redress Scheme, but we were told it does not take any steps to report these allegations to authorities, including Tasmania Police, Child Safety Services and the Registrar.3139

We asked Secretary Webster what action the Tasmanian Government takes regarding information acquired during the National Redress Scheme process, beyond responding to information requests from the Scheme Operator about individual applications, including whether reports are made to Child Safety Services or Tasmania Police.3140 Secretary Webster told us in response on 20 June 2022:

The Department [of Justice] does not use the information obtained through redress applications for any purpose outside responding to the Scheme Operator save for reporting on de-identified figures in annual reports.

I am unable to comment on what other Tasmanian Government agencies do in respect of information acquired during the National Redress Scheme process with the exception of current employees who are alleged abusers are dealt with by internal Agency policies.3141

  1. Reporting to Tasmania Police

We were told the Department of Justice does not report matters to Tasmania Police.3142 The National Redress Scheme’s Operational Manual for Participating Institutions states that the Scheme Operator will report certain information directly to law enforcement, so Tasmania Police would be notified directly of some matters ahead of the Department of Justice and could then activate its processes to share information with the Registrar and Child Safety Services, where relevant. Tasmania Police also told us that if it received a report from the Department of Justice this may result in some duplication. It also told us that if it received a report regarding a matter from the Department of Justice, without identifying particulars, it might need to contact the responsible agencies to seek similar additional identifying particulars as the Department of Justice might also request from those agencies.3143

Tasmania Police also told us that if it received a report from the Department of Justice this may result in some duplication. It also told us that if it received a report regarding a matter from the Department of Justice, without identifying particulars, it might need to contact the responsible agencies to seek similar additional identifying particulars as the Department of Justice might also request from those agencies.3144

While we accept that the Department of Justice is relying on the National Redress Scheme’s Operational Manual for Participating Institutions as reason to not make notifications to Tasmania Police, we are not sufficiently confident in that process (and in Tasmania Police’s systems to make appropriate notifications). For example:

  • The Department of Communities told us it reported certain National Redress Scheme allegations to Tasmania Police in October 2020, but Tasmania Police told us it received this from the Scheme Operator in June 2021.3145 There were delays in Tasmania Police referring these allegations to the Registrar. The Department of Justice will have had this information before the Department of Communities.
  • The Abuse in State Care Program claims relating to Lester were provided to Tasmania Police in November 2020, but it took Tasmania Police 21 months (in August 2022) to forward these to the Registrar.3146 While this information was not about a National Redress Scheme claim, it illustrates the risk of relying on police reporting to the Registrar.

In Chapter 12, we discuss this issue in more detail and recommend that the Tasmanian Government advocates for changes to the National Redress Scheme operating procedures.

  1. Department of Justice reporting to the Registrar

We are also concerned about the fact that the Department of Justice does not report the information it receives from the Scheme Operator to the Registrar and consider this would, in some circumstances, be a breach of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act.

We consider that the Department of Justice did not, at the introduction of the National Redress Scheme, have appropriate processes in place to maximise the information it received from the Scheme Operator to inform decision making by the Registrar. This compromised responses to allegations received about Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff, particularly in contributing to delays. While we welcome changes made in October 2020 to ensure agencies are provided with complete information received from the Scheme Operator, we consider the issue of the Department of Justice not making reports to be a continuing problem.

We were given the following reasons why the Department of Justice does not report information it receives to the Registrar:

  • The Department of Justice would often not have enough information to make a meaningful report and agencies would be in a better position to make notifications, noting that National Redress Scheme claims do not consistently have clear information about the identity of an abuser.3147
  • The Registrar may become aware via a notification from Tasmania Police before the Department of Justice receives it through the process described in Section 12.1, which makes the need for the Department of Justice to report redundant.3148
  • Too many notifications, particularly if based on incomplete information, may overwhelm agencies (such as the Registrar) when they are not necessarily able to act on that information.3149

We were also told there was ambiguity around the Department of Justice’s obligation to report to the Registrar prior to the legislative clarification from 1 February 2021. Noting that the Department has not changed its practice since that time, we do not consider this legal advice to be determinative but consider it does reflect an attitude within the Department of Justice that was overly cautious and conservative in its approach to making notifications. This is curious given the Registrar sits within the Department of Justice and, based on our case examples, the Registrar seemed to have adopted a broad interpretation around what could, and should, be reported.

As we describe in Sections 3.1.2 and 9.3, there was some confusion around when a reporting obligation arose before 1 February 2021, given the uncertainty about whether a ‘finding’ of reportable conduct had been made such that the obligation arose. We note that the Department of Justice received legal advice from the Office of the Solicitor-General in September 2018 that the making of a ‘finding’ following an investigation under the State Service Act 2000 was a prerequisite for the Department of Justice to make a report under section 53A of the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act (which imposes a duty to report concerns about a risk of harm to a child to the Registrar).3150

This obligation was clarified in the legislation in February 2021 to impose an obligation on a reporting body to notify the Registrar where it ‘becomes aware by any means, or suspects on reasonable grounds that a registered person has engaged, or may have engaged, in reportable behaviour’ (that being, in this instance, behaviour that poses a risk of harm to a child).3151 As noted above, Secretary Webster’s evidence on 20 June 2022 was that the Department of Justice still did not report these National Redress Scheme allegations to the Registrar.

We also note that the Department of Justice was aware of the expansive interpretation given by the Registrar to the meaning of the word ‘finds’ before the legislative amendments in 2021, with the Department of Justice’s request for legal advice to the Office of the Solicitor-General of 15 August 2018 stating:

The word ‘finds’ is not defined in the Act. However, based on the object of the Act, the functions and powers of the Registrar under the Act, the purpose behind the amendment of the Act to insert section 53A, and the successful application to date of section 53A by other reporting bodies; it is the Registrar’s position that the word should be given its ordinary meaning such as: ‘to come upon by chance’, ‘to learn, attain or obtain by search or effort’, ‘to discover’.3152

This broad interpretation is consistent with advice given by the Registrar to the Department in mid-2020, as we discuss in Section 9.3.

The Department of Justice’s request for legal advice also indicates an appreciation of the ‘flexible approach’ provided for in the Second Reading Speech to the legislation, as well as the difficulties in requiring a finding to be made before reporting to the Registrar, stating:3153

If section 53A was interpreted with the narrow interpretation (ie ‘a finding’ as opposed to ‘finds’) and the Registrar were to wait until the reporting body made their own ‘finding’ on a matter prior to the information being reported then … it could be a matter of months, if not years until the matter is reported to the Registrar …

The duty of reportable bodies to report behaviour is relevant to whether a person remains acceptable to work with vulnerable people. It is crucial for the purposes of monitoring and compliance that the Registrar is informed in real time of any behaviours that by definition, pose a risk of harm to vulnerable persons … 3154 [Emphasis in source.]

Irrespective of whether there was a duty to report a risk of harm to a child before the legislative changes in February 2021, it would have been best practice to report information obtained through the redress scheme to the Registrar.3155

While we accept that the Department of Justice will not always have enough information to make a notification to the Registrar, where it does, we consider it should. This is because:

  • This ensures the Registrar receives the information at the earliest opportunity and is ‘on notice’ to contact relevant agencies for further information, where needed.
  • The Registrar has identified (described in Section 11) that there is a lack of consistency in the way different agencies and departments approach their reporting obligations; the Department of Justice reporting would go some way in standardising this. Our case examples revealed delays in the former Department of Communities making notifications to the Registrar that could have been avoided if the matter was already reported by the Department of Justice.
  • The Scheme Operator’s reports to Tasmania Police would not necessarily capture all the information that constitutes ‘reportable behaviour’, which is broader than the type of matters that constitute a criminal offence. We consider that the Scheme Operator, as an Australian Government agency, is not best placed to determine some of the criteria for reporting (for example, we consider it less likely to be aware of whether an alleged abuser is working with children compared with Tasmanian agencies).

We discuss this in greater detail, and make a recommendation in this regard, in Chapter 12.

Finding—The Department of Justice does not have an appropriate process to ensure information in National Redress Scheme applications is shared in a timely manner to protect children

We are concerned that the Department of Justice does not appear to have a process for reporting allegations provided to it through the National Redress Scheme to the Registrar. As a reporting body under the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act, the Department of Justice is obliged to notify the Registrar of ‘reportable behaviour’.3156 We were surprised that the Department of Justice, which administers the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme, does not refer allegations received through the National Redress Scheme as a matter of course. Although it does not receive all information associated with each National Redress Scheme application from the Scheme Operator, it is well placed to make an initial notification to the Registrar if it has enough information to do so, to reduce any delay.

We consider the Department of Justice should have set up a process to immediately refer these matters to the Registrar where it has enough information to do so and made it clear to relevant agencies from which it was seeking further information that any other information or reportable conduct held or obtained by those departments should be reported separately to the Registrar. Delaying giving information to the Registrar delays the Registrar’s ability to take appropriate steps for assessing a person’s suitability to be working with children. It also relies on all other departments making notifications appropriately.

The Department of Justice also has reporting obligations to Tasmania Police and Child Safety Services. It should put in place a process for making all relevant reports.

  1. 2021—Departmental initiatives to improve records and processes

Below we outline some other initiatives progressed by the Department from 2021 to improve its responses to allegations of child sexual abuse by Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff. It will be recalled that our Commission of Inquiry was formally established by Order of the Governor of Tasmania on 15 March 2021.3157

  1. January 2021—Multi-agency budget bid to improve records relating to child sexual abuse

During our public hearings, we were informed of a State Budget bid that was made to Cabinet in 2020 to seek funding for the State’s response to our Commission of Inquiry, including a proposal to improve the quality and accuracy of records held that may relate to child sexual abuse.3158 Following our hearings, we sought copies of relevant budget documentation supporting that proposal.3159

In January 2023, the State advised us that a 2020 multi-agency State Budget bid was prepared by the agencies that anticipated being most affected by our Inquiry’s work.3160 Those agencies were the former Department of Communities, Department of Education, Department of Health, Department of Justice and Department of Police, Fire and Emergency Management.3161 We were told that, as part of this budget bid, the Department of Communities made a bid to Cabinet for a large-scale records remediation and centralisation of historical records.3162 The budget bid to Cabinet was unsuccessful.3163

We have not reviewed the 2020 budget bid documentation, noting that these are subject to privilege on the basis that they are cabinet-in-confidence documents.3164

We discuss the Department’s records remediation project below, which eventually began in May 2021 following the approval of an internal budget bid.

  1. May 2021—Departmental records remediation project

Throughout this case study, we have described significant problems with the quality and accessibility of the Department’s records. We know records are extremely important in child sexual abuse matters because they often provide an evidentiary basis for initiating legal, criminal or disciplinary actions. They also help victim-survivors understand important information about their past experiences, including the circumstances surrounding their abuse. As set out in the National Royal Commission report, inadequate records and record keeping have contributed to failures in identifying and responding to risks and incidents of child sexual abuse and have exacerbated distress and trauma for many victim-survivors.3165

We understand there have been significant delays in releasing files and documents to people who request them, such as former detainees. We were told there were more than 300 applications for personal files outstanding in March 2021 and, at that time, nearly a two-year wait time for these to be assessed and released.3166

After the broader budget bid discussed in Section 13.1 was unsuccessful, in or around May 2021, internal funding was approved to enable records remediation work to progress in the Department.3167 The Department initiated the Records Digitisation and Remediation Project to centralise historical records from 2000 onwards (partly to support its responses to our Commission of Inquiry, noting our focus begins on this date).3168 A team of eight people in the records area began the digitisation work and the Department’s legal services area was given resources to enable it to dedicate the time to process personal information and requests through the Right to Information Scheme.3169

Ms Baker said this was a ‘significant piece of work’ where the Department needed to ‘identify what record holdings that we had’, ‘catalogue those record holdings’ and ‘remediate and digitise those records’.3170 She told us that this resulted in the Department having a ‘fuller set of information’ that it could then make available to Employment Direction No. 5 investigators and to the Registrar.3171

In relation to the release of client files, we understand that during the period from March 2021 to April 2022, there had been 312 applications for information processed and released. Another 86 applications remained outstanding as of April 2022, and the Department for Education, Children and Young People agreed that the team dealing with information requests would continue until November 2022 to allow the work to progress further.3172

We welcome the Department’s investment and improvements to record keeping and make further recommendations to strengthen the integrity of files and the thoroughness (and completeness) of attempts to locate and triangulate multiple sources of information containing allegations relating to staff in Chapter 12.

  1. Mid-late 2021—More flowcharts are developed clarifying process for responding to allegations against staff

From 2021 onwards, some additional flowcharts were developed to guide the Department’s responses to allegations received about staff more broadly, including notifications processes. We describe these flowcharts, and our reflections on them, below.

  1. Department of Communities flowchart: ‘Common Law Claim,
    State-based Redress (historical), National Redress Application or other information received by People and Culture’

In Section 9.4, we describe a flowchart the Department developed in October 2020 for responding to information received through National Redress Scheme claims. In late 2021, the Department developed a new flowchart that aims to clarify the processes the Department follows on receiving allegations against current employees (whether under a civil claim, through a redress scheme or some other source).3173 We understand this exists and applies in addition to the flowchart prepared in October 2020.

The 2021 flowchart provides that once information about allegations against staff is received through any means, People and Culture conducts a factual check of the alleged abuser’s employment details and undertakes a risk assessment. If there is an immediate risk of harm to children, the following steps are taken:

  • Immediate action is taken to manage the risk (such as removal from the workplace or variation of duties).
  • A verbal report is provided to the Secretary.
  • The Head of the State Service is notified if the abuser is removed from the workplace and an Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigation is likely.
  • A preliminary assessment is conducted.3174

Where it is determined that there is no immediate risk to children and young people, People and Culture proceeds to conduct a preliminary assessment without taking the above steps.

In all cases, the Department notifies ‘relevant external bodies’, such as the Registrar and Tasmania Police, if required.3175

The flowchart indicates that the preliminary assessment includes considering the role of the employee, the nature (sexual or physical) and severity of the allegation, other prior matters, available records (such as incident reports and health records) and questioning other employees. Relevantly, the flowchart states:

  • If there is information that the Secretary could use to form a reason to believe a breach of the State Service Code of Conduct may have occurred, a Minute is provided to the Secretary with a recommendation for investigation and suspension.3176
  • If there is not enough information for the Secretary to form a reason to believe a breach of the Code of Conduct may have occurred, a Minute is provided to the Secretary with other recommended actions, including putting the allegations to the alleged abuser for response, varying their duties or taking no action.3177
  • Where putting the allegations to the alleged abuser results in more information that the Secretary could use to form a reason to believe a breach of the Code of Conduct may have occurred, a Minute to the Secretary is provided with this recommendation. Where the alleged abuser provides no such further information, the Department keeps the allegations on file and closes the matter (which is reopened if more information is received).3178
  1. State Service Management Office flowchart: ‘State Servant Suspensions due to Allegations of Child Sex Abuse – Notification Process’

We were also provided with a flowchart titled ‘State Servant Suspensions due to Allegations of Child Sex Abuse – Notification Process’, which we were told was prepared by the State Service Management Office for agencies to implement.3179 It is unclear when this flowchart was created, although the document we have been provided is dated 22 April 2021. We are unclear whether and how this relates to the flowchart discussed in Section 13.3.1.

This flowchart indicates the following:

  • Where an agency is aware of an allegation, it conducts a preliminary assessment including an assessment of the ‘risk of an employee remaining in the workplace including duty of care and public perception’.3180 The employee is directed to not attend the workplace.
  • The agency informs the police via the approved template.3181
  • The Head of Agency immediately notifies the Head of the State Service verbally of the allegation and preliminary assessment.3182
  • The ‘ED5 investigation remains pending, awaiting Police advice (i.e. not commenced; or on hold if commenced)’.3183 Once the police advise the agency that there is no further police action or charges laid, the agency proceeds with the formal Employment Direction No. 5 investigation, suspends the employee (where appropriate) and updates the ‘ED5 register’ (including to indicate that the police assessment is now complete).3184
  • Where a formal investigation has begun, the Head of the State Service also notifies the Premier, and the Head of the State Service or Premier informs the Minister.3185
  1. Our observations

While we commend efforts to clarify processes for responding to allegations of abuse, we still have some reservations about this guidance. We consider aspects of these guidance materials could be clarified and further strengthened. For example:

  • It is unclear how various flowcharts (including those described in Section 13.3 and the October 2020 guidance on responding to National Redress Scheme claims) are intended to operate together, noting that they have slightly different wording, emphases and requirements. For example, the ‘State Servant Suspensions due to Allegations of Child Sex Abuse – Notification Process’ provides for both the Premier and the Minister to be advised, which is different from other guidance. A single source of guidance would be preferable.
  • The guidance often lacks specific timeframes in respect of key activities—including the conduct of a preliminary assessment or investigation, or notifications to external agencies. Given the significant delays we observed, we consider this a significant omission.
  • Enabling reliance on verbal reporting (to the Secretary, for example) risks incomplete records. Where a verbal report is made to the Secretary, we consider it should require a written report to follow as soon as possible in the interests of timely and accurate record keeping and to create greater accountability.
  • It is not clear from the flowcharts exactly who is responsible for which tasks (for example, who is responsible for providing the verbal report to the Secretary). Given the confusion we observed about respective responsibilities on these matters, we consider it necessary for guidance to be explicit around the roles.
  • The ‘State Servant Suspensions due to Allegations of Child Sex Abuse – Notification Process’ appears to give unqualified deference to Tasmania Police advice without any guidance on how to mitigate risk in the interim and to continue to actively engage with Tasmania Police to minimise delays.
  • The ‘Common Law Claim, State-based Redress (historical), National Redress Application or other information received by People and Culture’ flowchart does not offer enough clarity on when informal practices (such as putting allegations to staff) are appropriate other than there being ‘insufficient information’. We acknowledge that there may be times when an informal approach is appropriate (such as when there is a first-time minor boundary breach by a staff member). We consider that the nature and number of allegations should be a key consideration as to whether such an informal process is appropriate. We also consider that all efforts should be taken to quickly gather information (including, for example, by seeking to engage with a complainant) before this course of action is taken. In all circumstances, the allegation and outcome of the process should be recorded on the employee’s personnel file.
  1. 2021–2022—The Department continues to respond to allegations against staff

We heard that the case examples of Ira, Lester and Stan reflected a significant learning curve for the Department and were assured things had since changed. For example, Ms Clarke told us:

… those three matters that you’re talking about from my perspective of the Deputy Secretary, the Department started to enter into really unchartered territory. I think it matured in its capacity very, very quickly, I think it was a team effort; of course, learning occurs in those circumstances, and those particular matters, I think, from that, what we actually did see is the Department mobilised. In response to, when a comparison between those and today, I actually think it’s vastly different.3186

We note some welcome improvements and investments in responding to allegations of child sexual abuse from late 2020 onwards. However, we observed continuing difficulties in the Department’s response to allegations made against other Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff in 2021 and 2022, when the Department continued to receive more allegations against staff.

We did not investigate more recent responses as closely because they arose after our Commission of Inquiry was established. Accordingly, we set out below only our high-level observations of these matters.

The Department told us that, as of 20 July 2021, it had received the following allegations in 2021:

  • Sixteen National Redress Scheme claims contained allegations against Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff (or those of its predecessor, the Ashley Home for Boys), some of which contained multiple allegations against multiple staff, during the period from 1998 to 2009.3187
  • One civil claim regarding Ashley Youth Detention Centre contained allegations against multiple staff members during the period from 2002 to 2008.3188
  • There was an allegation made through the Department that a staff member had forcibly stripped a detainee during the period from 2015 to 2016.3189

At the time, the Department was aware of allegations included rape, sexual abuse while strip searching (including digital penetration of a detainee’s anus), being watched in the shower, being forced to watch staff members masturbate and the placement of lotion on detainees’ genitals.

We also received a spreadsheet from the Department that, based on our analysis of its content, states that in the period from 20 July 2021 to 25 May 2022, the Department received another 54 claims about child sexual abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (six civil claims and 48 National Redress Scheme claims).3190 Of the 54 claims received during this period, 51 claims named Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff members (or those of its predecessor, the Ashley Home for Boys) as alleged abusers and the allegations relate to conduct over the period from 1997 to as recently as 2019.3191

Further, we received evidence that suggests many more civil claims have been issued in relation to physical abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, with a briefing for the Minister for Children and Youth dated 4 November 2021 stating that, as of 18 October 2021, there were 42 civil claims related to allegations of physical and/or child sexual abuse that involved the Department (or its predecessor).3192

Also, on 11 August 2022 a class action was commenced in the Supreme Court of Tasmania on behalf of more than 100 former Ashley Youth Detention Centre detainees, with more claimants being added at the time of writing.3193 We discuss the allegations raised in this class action in Case study 1, but note briefly here that the lawyers acting for the plaintiffs in the class action, Angela Sdrinis Legal, told us that they act for more than 150 clients who allege abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre and its predecessor, and that complaints include allegations of child sexual abuse spanning 40 years.3194 As discussed in Section 9, the Department was aware that this class action was looming in 2020 and the impending class action was discussed at the Strengthening Safeguards Working Group meetings in late 2020.3195

Our analysis of the information provided to us indicates that in each of 2021 and 2022, the Department began Employment Direction No. 5—Breach of Code of Conduct investigations against and suspended four Ashley Youth Detention Centre employees (a total of eight suspensions over those two years).3196

In April 2022, the Department had also prepared a Minute recommending suspending and initiating an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation into another Ashley Youth Detention Centre employee, although this was ceased when the employee resigned.3197 We understand that the Department began preliminary assessments for three more Ashley Youth Detention Centre employees but that these did not proceed to an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation or suspension and no further action was taken.3198

In August 2022, we heard that the Department had lowered the threshold required for triggering an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation where there was an allegation of child sexual abuse, and that a child raising an allegation would be much more likely to be regarded as ‘reasonable grounds’ for an investigation even before other extensive evidence was sought.3199

As of January 2023, there were 10 investigations under Employment Direction No. 5 that were outstanding, despite those investigations beginning between November 2020 and May 2022.3200 Two other investigations had not been progressed because the employee resigned.3201 Secretary Pervan told us that investigations have been prioritised but that they have ‘all taken an inordinate amount of time because for the most part the accused Officers have not readily participated in the process because they are on sick leave’.3202 He said he did not have powers of compulsion and he believes that he is not able to make findings where there is not enough evidence, even if the accused does not participate.3203

  1. Our observations of responses from 2021 onwards

As described above, we did not conduct a forensic analysis of departmental responses to allegations of abuse from 2021 onwards, but we did receive and consider some evidence about these responses regarding four Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff. Collectively, those cases involved three Abuse in State Care Program claims, seven National Redress Scheme claims, one civil claim, one complaint to Tasmania Police and one complaint raised by former Leader of the Tasmanian Greens, Cassy O’Connor. Allegations against these four staff members included that one or more of them had rubbed heat gel on children’s genitals as punishment, enabled and encouraged harmful sexual behaviours between detainees, raped one or more detainees and inappropriately strip searched or touched one or more detainees. There were also allegations of physical abuse and excessive uses of force.

Across that evidence, we observed the following themes that mirrored some of our concerns with the responses we saw in the Ira, Lester and Stan case examples. These included the following (across one or more cases):

  • We noted delays and failures to reassign employees to other areas of work that did not involve any contact with detainees while a preliminary assessment or investigation was underway. In one matter, we saw a willingness to delay decision-making on disciplinary action on the basis that detainees were sufficiently protected if the alleged abuser was in a non-operational role (but remained on site). In that case, People and Culture became aware (some months later) that the staff member was regularly entering accommodation units for certain purposes associated with their non-operational role, which was considered ‘a risk to the Agency’.3204 The staff member was then suspended.3205
  • The Department relied on informal processes for putting allegations to alleged abusers, instead of proceeding to an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation following a preliminary assessment. Such information processes fall outside the State Service disciplinary framework. This happened even in instances where there were numerous allegations that could have been treated as a potential pattern of behaviour that had cumulative weight and warranted further investigation and suspension while that investigation was undertaken.3206 In one Minute to the Secretary, approved in mid-2021, we saw the process of putting allegations to the staff member described as an ‘opportunity to reinforce the correct standards of behaviour, operating procedures and policies’.3207
  • Where allegations were put to alleged abusers, we observed an unwillingness to put all allegations known to the Department to alleged abusers. In one instance, we understand that the Department only put allegations of physical abuse to an alleged abuser but did not raise allegations of sexual abuse (which were numerous and severe in nature).3208 We do not know why this approach was taken.
  • There were often lengthy periods between receiving allegations, removing alleged abusers from the Centre and starting an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation—in one instance, more than a year and in another, just under a year.3209
  • There was a failure on one occasion to act promptly on the rediscovery of an Abuse in State Care Program claim. In that instance, the claim was rediscovered in September 2020, but an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation did not begin until early 2022.3210
  • We saw continued delays in making notifications to Tasmania Police and the Registrar (including of up to 11 months in one case and six months in another).
  • In one instance, reference to the 2007 Solicitor-General’s advice was used to justify failing to pursue misconduct investigations, despite allegations having been received after December 2020 (being the month in which revised legal advice was received by the Department that permitted it to act).3211

We also observed, in one instance, an emphasis on concerns for employee morale and wellbeing, such that it was considered important for employees to continue to attend work even where serious allegations had been made against them.3212 In that example, we saw references to the need to perform a ‘balancing act’ between detainee and staff safety.3213 We were told that at this time there were very real risks to staff welfare, but that detainee safety was ‘always considered a paramount priority’.3214

We acknowledge that there have been several suspensions and staffing pressures over recent years and months at Ashley Youth Detention Centre. By this point, the Department was operating in uncharted and exceptional circumstances. There were several staff with allegations against them, and there were staff shortages and lockdowns (which adversely impact children and young people).

The Department was also facing the challenge that, with some allegations, there may have been little prospect of substantiation for a variety of reasons. When this occurs, it can lead to an (incorrect) assumption that the allegation was proven to be false. A non-finding can ‘vindicate’ the staff member in the eyes of their colleagues, reinforce negative attitudes towards current and former detainees and contribute to fears in current detention centre staff that they may be subject to false allegations. We accept that these are all difficult dynamics for the Department to manage and that care and judgment are required in responding to each matter.

While considerations of staff wellbeing should never come at the expense of the safety of children, often staff wellbeing and child safety go hand in hand. The safety and wellbeing of staff can have a direct (and indirect) impact on the collective safety and wellbeing of children and young people in their care.

In one case in late 2021 and early 2022, the Department received an allegation through a civil claim.3215 The Department responded as follows:

  • One week after receiving the civil claim, the claim was sent to Tasmania Police.3216
  • Six weeks after receiving the civil claim, information arising from the claim was provided to People and Culture.3217
  • Six weeks after information was provided to People and Culture, a preliminary assessment began.3218
  • The staff member was suspended and an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation began within two days of starting the preliminary assessment.3219
  • The Registrar was notified of the claims approximately four months after the Department received the allegations.3220

In another case in around mid-2022, the Department received allegations through the National Redress Scheme against a current staff member. Following this:

  • The claim was provided to People and Culture approximately three weeks later.3221
  • The preliminary assessment began on the day the claim was provided to People and Culture.3222
  • The claim was sent to Tasmania Police and the Registrar the day after the claim was provided to People and Culture.3223
  • The staff member was suspended and an Employment Direction No. 5 investigation launched two days after the claim was provided to People and Culture.3224

The above examples show some improvements in how allegations are managed, although also continuing delays in some areas. While we are concerned by some of the initial delays in referring matters to People and Culture, we can see some improvements in timeliness compared with the cases of Ira, Lester and Stan. However, these examples also show that delays in referrals to People and Culture led to delays in referring to Tasmania Police and the Registrar. We were also concerned to see that there were additional delays in reporting to the Registrar even after the referral had been made to People and Culture, with one claim being referred to the Registrar more than two months after it was provided to People and Culture. Ms Allen acknowledged that this was a concern and told us that systems and processes have now been implemented so that the legal team reports civil claims to the Registrar.3225

We consider this period continued to reveal a tension or ‘push–pull’ between prioritising risks to child safety and risks to staff morale and wellbeing. While in late 2020, concerns about child safety appeared to be dominant, by 2021 to 2022 concerns about staff morale re-emerged.3226 This reflected a theme we identified in previous reviews and reports into Ashley Youth Detention Centre.3227

While we have highlighted continuing problems across responses to individual staff, ultimately, we consider this period confirms the emerging concerns of departmental officials from the 2019 to 2020 period—that there is a pattern of behaviour across multiple staff.

We consider that there may be times where the sheer number and nature of historical allegations (as is the case with Ashley Youth Detention Centre) may overwhelm the effectiveness of an individualised disciplinary approach and reach the level of what is, essentially, a catastrophic critical incident. We heard evidence to suggest that the number of staff being suspended due to allegations was compromising the safe operations of the Centre and highly damaging for the wellbeing of staff—not only because of increased workload pressure but also the broader instability, distress and fearfulness it created. Once such a catastrophic threshold is reached—as arguably it has at the Centre—we consider it in the interests of staff and detainees to initiate a change management process that includes identifying the aptitudes, attitudes and capabilities expected of youth workers and any other relevant staff, and that requires them to reapply for their positions. This will allow reappointed current and new staff to be confident that the community will see them as part of the solution. We make such a recommendation in Chapter 12.

  1. Conclusion

Across this case study we identified numerous problems with how the Department has responded to allegations of child sexual abuse perpetrated by staff, noting some different problems during varying periods.

From 2003 to 2013, the Department received multiple allegations of abuse through the Abuse in State Care Program, identified that several current staff were the subject of allegations, and received legal advice but did not take the steps outlined in that advice that may have enabled it to act on allegations received through that (and later) iterations of redress schemes and civil claims. We were told the practical effect of this advice constrained the Department up until 2020 from acting on information it received alleging abuses by staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre.

In the years from 2007 to 2018, we saw a reluctance to consistently take formal disciplinary action against staff, with internal reviews and investigations that were not always appropriate given the severity or number of allegations against staff. The case example of Walter also highlighted problems in the Department’s failure to consider the cumulative impact of allegations, including those through the Abuse in State Care Program. It also showed a concerning historical arrangement between the Office of the Ombudsman and Ashley Youth Detention Centre of referring matters back to the Centre, which appeared to capture more than minor matters and, at least on occasion, resulted in serious matters being erroneously referred back to the Centre. We were glad to hear this referral arrangement has since ceased.3228

From 2019, the Department started to receive a growing number of allegations through the National Redress Scheme and civil claims, as well as reidentifying previous Abuse in State Care Program allegations that had been lost to the Department’s corporate memory over time. We examined the Department’s response to this growth in allegations in detail because it is so recent and presents challenges the Department is still facing. In fact, we see the systemic issues uncovered in responding to National Redress Scheme claims as having potential national relevance in informing how this information can be employed to better protect children from abuse in institutions.

We identified multiple problems primarily centred around the delays in responding to allegations about three staff members—Ira, Lester and Stan. We discovered problems in not recognising the full range of conduct that may constitute child sexual abuse, poor record keeping, a lack of awareness and responsiveness to prior Abuse in State Care Program claims and inappropriate risk management strategies to protect children, including leaving staff who were the subject of allegations on site. We also identified a conservative application of the disciplinary process, including not giving enough weight to child safety, not undertaking proper processes in response to serious allegations, and setting too high a threshold for taking disciplinary action even where there was a pattern of alleged misconduct against a staff member. There was an apparent lack of appetite for questioning these problems, taking decisive action or seeking legal advice to question perceived barriers until late 2020.

We also found there were problems with interagency responses during this time, particularly with the coordination and information sharing between the Department of Justice, the Department of Communities, Tasmania Police and the Registrar. We received no information demonstrating significant engagement or information sharing with Child Safety Services at all.

From late 2020 to 2021, we saw several system improvements to address many of these problems, including improved records management and information sharing. Despite these improvements, we remain concerned that there continue to be several challenges for responding to allegations made through redress schemes. In particular, the disciplinary process and the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Scheme, or their application, do not appear well equipped to respond to these types of allegations.

We see the Registrar as best placed to overcome the challenge of managing allegations arising out of the National Redress Scheme—with its ability to prioritise child safety. However, this solution relies on the Registrar being enabled and willing to consider pattern and coincidence in assessing a body of allegations, considering a broad array of corroborative evidence.

In Chapter 12, we make a range of recommendations for reform that we trust will improve the way the Department and other agencies respond to allegations of abuse in youth detention more broadly. The most significant of these is our recommendation for initiating a considered change management process. Such a process will give children and young people, staff and the community confidence in Ashley Youth Detention Centre in the future.

Notes

Introduction to case studies

1 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Abuse (Final Report, December 2017) vol 2, 166.

2 The names ‘Alysha’ and ‘Max’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

3 Michael Ferguson and Jacquie Petrusma, ‘Rebuilding Tasmania’s Health and Human Services System’ (Media Release, 28 October 2015) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/releases/rebuilding_tasmanias_health_system2>; Roger Jaensch and Jacquie Petrusma, ‘Department of Communities Tasmania’ (Media Release, 9 May 2018) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/releases/department_of_communities_tasmania>; Will Hodgman, ‘Changes to Senior Public Service Management’ (Media Release, 21 August 2019) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/releases/changes_to_senior_public_service_management>; ‘About Us’, Department of Communities (Web Page, undated) <https://www.communities.tas.gov.au/about-us>; Peter Gutwein, ‘Department Structures to Strengthen Tasmanian Outcomes’ (Media Release, 22 February 2022) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/site_resources_2015/additional_releases/department_structures_to_strengthen_tasmanian_outcomes>.

4 Peter Gutwein, ‘Department Structures to Strengthen Tasmanian Outcomes’ (Media Release, 24 February 2022) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/site_resources_2015/additional_releases/department_structures_to_strengthen_tasmanian_outcomes>.

5 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 16–17 [58].

6 Statement of Ginna Webster, 29 April 2022, 1 [7], 2 [8].

7 Statement of Ginna Webster, 29 April 2022, 1 [6–7].

8 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 1.

9 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 1.

10 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 1.

11 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 1–2.

12 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 1.

13 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 1.

14 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 1 [3–4].

15 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 2 [17]–3 [18].

16 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Annexure C (‘People and Culture Organisational Structure’, May 2020); Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Annexure F (‘People and Culture structure’, undated).

17 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 1 [3–4].

18 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 1 [1.1].

19 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2935 [9–21].

20 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3397 [41–45].

21 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 10 [6.1]; Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 2 [5].

22 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3568 [36–40]; Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 1 [1–2], [10].

23 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 1 [10].

24 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 10 [4.1].

Case study 1: The nature and extent of abuse in Ashley Youth Detention Centre

25 Refer to, for example, Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [18]; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [7–11]; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3202 [22–33]; Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [6].

26 Notice to produce served on the State of Tasmania, 20 July 2021.

27 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, 1 produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

28 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 3. The Claims of Abuse in State Care Program is also sometimes referred to as the Tasmanian Abuse in State Care Ex Gratia Scheme.

29 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 4.

30 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 3.

31 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 3.

32 Department of Justice, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-0004, Item 13’, 5 April 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

33 Ombudsman Tasmania, Listen to the Children: Review of Claims of Abuse from Adults in State Care as Children (Report, November 2004) 15.

34 Ombudsman Tasmania, Listen to the Children: Review of Claims of Abuse from Adults in State Care as Children (Report, November 2004) 16.

35 Ombudsman Tasmania, Review of Claims of Abuse from Adults in State Care as Children (Final Report – Phase 2, June 2006) 5.

36 Ombudsman Tasmania, Review of Claims of Abuse from Adults in State Care as Children (Final Report – Phase 2, June 2006) 3, 6.

37 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 3.

38 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 10.

39 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 14.

40 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

41 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

42 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 8.

43 Statement of the Department for Education, Children and Young People, 20 January 2023, Annexure 40(B) (‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’, Spreadsheet, 19 September 2020), produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

44 Department of Justice, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-0004, Item 13’, 5 April 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

45 Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

46 Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

47 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

48 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

49 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 19 [118].

50 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 19 [121].

51 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 19 [119].

52 Statement of Michael Pervan, 14 June 2022, 98 [537].

53 Statement of Michael Pervan, 14 June 2022, 97 [535].

54 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

55 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-04 – Item 19 Response’, 4 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

56 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

57 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

58 ‘About the National Redress Scheme’, National Redress Scheme (Web Page) <https://www.nationalredress.gov.au/about/about-scheme>.

59 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 18 [112].

60 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 18 [114]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 21 (‘Responding to Requests for Information Relating to Claims under the National Redress Scheme’, Procedure, Children and Youth Services) 1.

61 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

62 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

63 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

64 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

65 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 86 [343].

66 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 27 (‘Description of Allegations or Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or in relation to its Officials Received by the Department from 20 July 2021’, Spreadsheet, undated). In Chapter 17, we note that, as at 8 April 2022, 689 National Redress Scheme claims had been made in relation to Tasmanian Government institutions.

67 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 77 (‘Description of Allegations or Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or in relation to its Officials Received by the Department from 20 July 2021’, Spreadsheet, undated); Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

68 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

69 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 86 [343]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 77 (‘Description of Allegations or Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or in relation to its Officials Received by the Department from 20 July 2021’, Spreadsheet, undated).

70 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

71 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

72 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

73 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 77 (‘Description of Allegations or Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or in relation to its Officials Received by the Department from 20 July 2021’, Spreadsheet, undated).

74 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

75 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 77 (‘Description of Allegations or Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or in relation to its Officials Received by the Department from 20 July 2021’, Spreadsheet, undated).

76 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

77 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 77 (‘Description of Allegations or Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or in relation to its Officials Received by the Department from 20 July 2021’, Spreadsheet, undated); Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

78 Department of Communities, ‘Briefing to Minister for Children and Youth: Employment Matters at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC)’, 4 November 2021, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

79 ‘AYDC Class Action’, Angela Sdrinis Legal (Web Page) <https://www.angelasdrinislegal.com.au/aydc-class-action.html>; Amber Wilson, ‘Ashley Abuse Action: Dozens More Join Lawsuit’, The Mercury (online, 25 February 2023) 8 <gandmmonitoring.com.au/reports/story.php?storyProfileID=732722>.

80 ‘AYDC Class Action’, Angela Sdrinis Legal (Web Page) <https://www.angelasdrinislegal.com.au/aydc-class-action.html>.

81 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 48.

82 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 59.

83 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 60.

84 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 60.

85 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 60.

86 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 60.

87 Department of Communities, ‘Summary of Complaints Received by the Department in relation to Ashley Youth Detention Centre’ (Spreadsheet), 9 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

88 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

89 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

90 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

91 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

92 The name ‘Alysha’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

93 The name ‘Ben’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

94 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 1–2 [5].

95 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 2 [6–7].

96 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 2 [8].

97 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 2 [9].

98 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 2 [9].

99 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 2 [9].

100 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 1.

101 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 3 [10].

102 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 3 [10].

103 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 3 [11].

104 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 3 [11].

105 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [18].

106 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6 [27]; Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 1.

107 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 1.

108 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 1.

109 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6 [27].

110 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6 [27].

111 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2.

112 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2, 4.

113 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [18].

114 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [18].

115 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2.

116 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3.

117 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3.

118 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 4.

119 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3.

120 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3.

121 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3.

122 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3.

123 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3.

124 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3.

125 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 4.

126 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 4. The name ‘Stan’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

127 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 4.

128 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 4.

129 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 4.

130 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5 [22]; Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 5.

131 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5 [22].

132 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 5.

133 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 6.

134 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 6.

135 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 6.

136 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 6.

137 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 6.

138 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 7.

139 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 7.

140 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 7–8.

141 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 7–8.

142 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2.

143 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2.

144 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2.

145 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2.

146 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6–7 [28]; Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2.

147 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2.

148 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2–3.

149 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 5.

150 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 5.

151 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 5.

152 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 5.

153 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 5.

154 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5–6 [25].

155 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 7 [32].

156 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 7 [32].

157 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6 [26].

158 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6 [26].

159 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [18–19].

160 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [19].

161 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5 [20].

162 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5 [20].

163 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 8 [33].

164 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 8 [33].

165 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 8 [34].

166 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 8 [35–36].

167 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 8 [37].

168 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 8 [38].

169 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 9 [39].

170 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 9 [39].

171 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 9 [41].

172 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 10 [44–45].

173 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 10 [47].

174 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 10 [47].

175 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 10 [48].

176 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 10 [48].

177 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 10 [49].

178 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 11 [50].

179 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 11 [51].

180 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 11 [51].

181 The names ‘Eve’ and ‘Norman’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 1 [4–5]; Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2868 [40–42], 2869 [32–41].

182 Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2869 [4–8].

183 Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2869 [22–26].

184 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 1 [3].

185 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 2 [6]; Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2870 [38–45].

186 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 2 [6]; Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2870 [38–45].

187 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 2 [7].

188 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 2 [8]; Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2871 [45].

189 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 2 [9].

190 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 2 [9]; Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2871 [4–9].

191 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 2 [9]; Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2871 [4–9].

192 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 5 [27].

193 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 2 [9].

194 Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2873 [27–41]; Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 3 [14].

195 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 3 [17].

196 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 3 [17]–4 [19].

197 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 5 [28].

198 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 3 [16]; Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2872 [35]–2873 [6].

199 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [20–21].

200 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [22].

201 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [22–23].

202 Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2876 [2–12].

203 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [25].

204 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [25].

205 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 5 [26].

206 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 5 [26].

207 Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2876 [35].

208 Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2876 [35–37].

209 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 7 [38].

210 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 7 [37].

211 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [24].

212 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 5 [29]–6 [34]; Transcript of ‘Eve’, 19 August 2022, 2873 [47]–2874 [29].

213 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 7 [39].

214 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 7 [40].

215 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 7 [41].

216 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 7 [42].

217 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 7 [43].

218 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 8 [44].

219 The name ‘Max’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [3].

220 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3109 [43]–3110 [2].

221 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [3].

222 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [3].

223 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [4].

224 The name ‘Floyd’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [6].

225 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [6].

226 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [6].

227 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [7].

228 The name ‘Alan’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [7–9].

229 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [9].

230 Restricted publication order (‘Ned’), 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [10–11].

231 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [11].

232 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [11].

233 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [13].

234 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [13].

235 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [15].

236 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16].

237 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16].

238 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16].

239 The name ‘Arlo’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [17].

240 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [17].

241 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [18].

242 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [20]; Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3115 [27].

243 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [20].

244 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [20].

245 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [21].

246 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [21].

247 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [22].

248 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3115 [29–34].

249 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3117 [1–12]; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [28].

250 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 12 [52].

251 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [28].

252 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3121 [2–15].

253 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3120 [12–16].

254 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [36–37].

255 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [36].

256 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [37].

257 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3120 [9–25].

258 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3120 [12–17].

259 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [43]; Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3122 [45]–3123 [15].

260 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [43]; Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3122 [45]–3123 [15].

261 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [27], 10 [42].

262 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3116 [8–14], 3122 [4–8].

263 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [42].

264 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [26].

265 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [26].

266 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [42].

267 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [42].

268 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [29]–7 [31].

269 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 7 [31].

270 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3123 [33–43].

271 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3123 [24–43].

272 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [23].

273 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [23].

274 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3119 [6–26].

275 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [23].

276 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [27].

277 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 7 [32].

278 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [33].

279 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [34].

280 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [33].

281 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [35].

282 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [24].

283 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 12 [54].

284 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 12 [53].

285 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 12 [53].

286 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 12 [52].

287 The name ‘Warren’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 1.

288 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 1.

289 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 1.

290 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [7].

291 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [7].

292 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [12].

293 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [12].

294 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [12].

295 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [8].

296 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [8].

297 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [11].

298 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [9].

299 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [10].

300 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [10].

301 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [15].

302 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [15].

303 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 1.

304 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 1.

305 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [15].

306 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

307 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

308 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

309 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

310 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

311 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

312 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

313 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 1–2.

314 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

315 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [15].

316 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16].

317 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16].

318 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16].

319 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [17].

320 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3–4 [17].

321 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

322 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

323 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

324 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 4 [18–19].

325 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 4 [20].

326 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 4 [21].

327 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 4 [21].

328 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 4 [22].

329 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 4 [22].

330 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 5 [23].

331 The name ‘Charlotte’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

332 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

333 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3199 [44–45].

334 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3199 [45–46].

335 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

336 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

337 The name ‘Edwin’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

338 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

339 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3200 [17–23].

340 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

341 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3200 [13–46].

342 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

343 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3201 [7–8].

344 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

345 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3201 [10–11].

346 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3201 [13–21].

347 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3201 [23–26].

348 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

349 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

350 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3201 [29–32].

351 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3201 [32–37].

352 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3201 [35–41], 3202 [11–13].

353 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3201 [44–46].

354 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

355 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

356 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

357 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

358 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3202 [22–33].

359 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

360 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3202 [22–30].

361 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

362 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3202 [35–45].

363 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

364 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3202 [47]–3203 [3].

365 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3203 [5–6].

366 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3203 [25–34].

367 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

368 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

369 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

370 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3203 [35–39].

371 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3.

372 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3204 [32–35].

373 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2–3.

374 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3204 [35]–3205 [1], 3205 [23–35].

375 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3204 [37–44].

376 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3205 [5–14].

377 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3.

378 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3.

379 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3.

380 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3203 [13].

381 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3206 [18–21].

382 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3206 [18–27].

383 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3–4.

384 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3206 [29–37].

385 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 4.

386 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3206 [40]–3207 [2].

387 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3207 [5–9].

388 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3204 [2–11], 3206 [40]–3207 [2].

389 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3207 [12–16].

390 The name ‘Fred’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 1 [3].

391 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 1 [4–6].

392 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 1 [5].

393 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 1 [6].

394 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [7–8]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3341 [27–29].

395 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [9].

396 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [9].

397 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [11].

398 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [11].

399 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 4 [21–24].

400 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 4 [23]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3342 [8–14].

401 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 4 [24].

402 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 4 [24].

403 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3342 [17–21].

404 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [12]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3342 [28–29].

405 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [12]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3342 [28–40].

406 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3343 [21–26].

407 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [13]–3 [14]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3343 [45–46].

408 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [18].

409 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [19]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3345 [24–31].

410 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [16]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3345 [10–15].

411 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [18].

412 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 5 [25].

413 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3344 [25–30].

414 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 5 [28].

415 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [15].

416 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 5 [29–30]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3346 [17–24].

417 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 5 [29].

418 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 6 [32].

419 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 6 [32].

420 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3346 [47]–3347 [5].

421 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3346 [39–44].

422 The name ‘Oscar’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023. In relation to this individual, the Commission of Inquiry received the information on the basis that the individual would remain anonymous. Consequently, the State has not been provided with identifying information in relation to this individual and has not had the opportunity to fully consider or respond to the details of the incidents alleged. Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 1 [3].

423 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 1 [4].

424 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 1 [5].

425 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 1 [5].

426 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [6].

427 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [6].

428 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [6].

429 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [6].

430 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [8].

431 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [8].

432 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [9].

433 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [9].

434 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [7].

435 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [9].

436 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [9].

437 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [9].

438 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [10].

439 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [11].

440 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [11].

441 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2–3 [11].

442 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [12].

443 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [12].

444 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [13].

445 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [13].

446 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [13].

447 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [13].

448 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [13].

449 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [14].

450 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [14].

451 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [15].

452 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [16].

453 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 4 [17].

454 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 4 [17].

455 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 4 [17].

456 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 4 [18].

457 The name ‘Simon’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 1 [4]–2 [7].

458 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 1 [4].

459 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 2 [7].

460 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 2 [8].

461 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2757 [19–20].

462 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2757 [32–37].

463 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 2 [9]; Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2757 [33].

464 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 2 [9].

465 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 2 [9].

466 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [11].

467 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2758 [38–43].

468 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [11].

469 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [12].

470 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [11–12].

471 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2758 [7–22].

472 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2758 [17–19].

473 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [13].

474 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [13].

475 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2759 [23–27], [45–46].

476 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [13].

477 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [13].

478 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [14].

479 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2758 [27–31], 2759 [12–18].

480 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 2 [7].

481 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2760 [18–29].

482 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 2 [7].

483 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 4 [18].

484 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2761 [27–39].

485 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 4 [19].

486 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2762 [34]–2763 [8].

487 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 5 [20].

488 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 5 [20].

489 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 4 [16].

490 The name ‘Erin’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3018 [40]–3019 [5].

491 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3019 [9–44].

492 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [1–10].

493 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3019 [43]–3020 [10].

494 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [12–16].

495 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [18–35].

496 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [29–32].

497 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [34–39].

498 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 6 [31]; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [5–7].

499 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [41–46].

500 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [41–47].

501 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3028 [21–39].

502 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3028 [22–28].

503 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3028 [22–28].

504 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3028 [32–45].

505 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3028 [41].

506 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3028 [47]–3029 [1].

507 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3029 [1–5].

508 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [3–4].

509 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [22–25]; File note of telephone conversation from the Commission of Inquiry to ‘Erin’, 18 July 2023.

510 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [27–28].

511 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [4–35].

512 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 6 [33]; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [32–33].

513 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 6 [34]–7 [35]; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [40–41], [10–18].

514 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 7 [35].

515 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [3–6].

516 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [6–10].

517 Manager Custodial Youth Justice, ‘Memo: Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date redacted], 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [10–16].

518 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [18–24].

519 Manager Custodial Youth Justice, ‘Memo: Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date redacted], 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3029 [10–26].

520 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, Annexure [Erin]–001; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [18–31].

521 Manager Custodial Youth Justice, ‘Memo: Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date redacted], 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

522 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [35–39].

523 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [39–44].

524 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [46]–3022 [1].

525 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3022 [3–6].

526 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3022 [6–16].

527 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3022 [21–25].

528 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3022 [25–31].

529 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 4 [20].

530 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3022 [33–38].

531 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3023 [13–20].

532 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3023 [20–24].

533 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3023 [28–30].

534 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3023 [32–41].

535 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3023 [32]–3024 [6].

536 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [8–15].

537 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [16–18].

538 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [18–24].

539 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [31–34].

540 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [31–45].

541 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [47]–3025 [3].

542 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3026 [29–41].

543 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3025 [4–6].

544 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3026 [41]–3027 [1].

545 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3030 [10–16].

546 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3030 [18–22].

547 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3030 [21–30].

548 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3030 [32–41].

549 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3030 [45]–3031 [12].

550 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3031 [14–26].

551 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3031 [28–33].

552 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3030 [33–35].

553 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3031 [28–31].

554 The names ‘Jane’ and ‘Ada’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2858 [6–13].

555 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 1 [4]–2 [6].

556 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 1 [4]; Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2858 [38–45].

557 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 1 [5]; Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2859 [6–16].

558 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2859 [28–31].

559 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 2 [7].

560 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 1 [5].

561 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 1–2 [5].

562 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 2 [7].

563 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2860 [4–12]; Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 2 [7–8].

564 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 2 [8].

565 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 2 [9].

566 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 2 [10].

567 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 2 [10]; Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2861 [10–19].

568 Department for Education, Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 1 June 2023, 10.

569 Department for Education, Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 1 June 2023, 9.

570 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 3 [11].

571 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 3 [11], [15].

572 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 3 [11].

573 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2861 [36].

574 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 3 [12]; Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2861 [36–45].

575 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2862 [27–37].

576 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 3 [13].

577 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2863 [21–27].

578 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 3 [14].

579 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2864 [14–19].

580 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2864 [25–38].

581 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 4 [16–17]; Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2866 [15–17].

582 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 4 [16].

583 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 5 [26].

584 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 5 [26]; Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2865 [32–35], [39–44].

585 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2865 [31–39].

586 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 5 [26]; Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2865 [42–45].

587 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2866 [7–25].

588 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 4 [20]; Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2866 [15–25].

589 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2866 [11–13].

590 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 4 [20].

591 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2866 [7–8], [30–38].

592 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 4 [21].

593 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2864 [44–47].

594 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 5 [23].

595 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2865 [3–10].

596 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2865 [10–15].

597 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2867 [18–31].

598 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2862 [19–23].

599 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 3 [15].

600 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 5 [26].

601 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 7 [33].

602 Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 7 [33].

603 Transcript of ‘Jane’, 19 August 2022, 2866 [40–47].

604 The name ‘Otis’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023. Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 1 [4].

605 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 1 [4].

606 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 1 [5], 2 [7].

607 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 1 [6].

608 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 1 [5].

609 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 1 [6]–2 [7].

610 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [7].

611 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [8].

612 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [10].

613 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [10].

614 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [10].

615 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [10].

616 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [11].

617 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [11].

618 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [11].

619 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [11].

620 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [12].

621 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [15]–4 [22].

622 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [15].

623 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [12].

624 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [16].

625 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [16].

626 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [17]–4 [19].

627 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [18–19].

628 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [17].

629 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [21].

630 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [19].

631 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [19].

632 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [17].

633 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [17], 4 [19], 4 [21].

634 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [17].

635 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [18].

636 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4–5 [24].

637 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [13].

638 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [15].

639 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [13].

640 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 6 [32].

641 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 6 [32].

642 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4–5 [24].

643 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [23].

644 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [23].

645 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [23].

646 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [25].

647 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [26].

648 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [26].

649 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [26].

650 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [27].

651 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [27].

652 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [27].

653 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [27].

654 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 6 [31].

655 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [28].

656 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [28].

657 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 6 [33].

658 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 6 [33].

659 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [29].

660 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [29]–6 [30].

661 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 6 [30].

662 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1536 [8–37].

663 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 1 [6]–2 [7], 3 [14].

664 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1541 [18–33].

665 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1543 [8–14]; Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 3 [17].

666 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1541 [44]–1542 [25].

667 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 4 [19–20]; Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1542 [34]–1543 [1].

668 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 3 [18].

669 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1543 [18–21].

670 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1543 [23]–1544 [8].

671 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1544 [25–39].

672 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 6 [31–34].

673 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 6 [36].

674 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 7 [37].

675 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 7 [37].

676 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1545 [24–5].

677 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 7 [38–39].

678 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 7 [40].

679 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 1 [4].

680 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 1 [6]; Statement of ‘Jane’, 2 June 2022, 2 [7]; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3019 [1–5]; Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 1 [4].

681 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2; Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 1 [5]; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [43–46].

682 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 1; Anonymous session, 16 February 2022.

683 Submission of Sebastian Buscemi, 28 August 2021, 5; Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to the Minister: Update on AYDC Matters Referred by Cassy O’Connor’s Office’, December 2020, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

684 Tasmania Police, Unsigned ‘Statement of Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member’, November 2020, 3 [28–33].

685 Anonymous session, 16 February 2022.

686 Anonymous session, 16 February 2022.

687 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3342 [17–21].

688 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [22]–[23].

689 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 70.

690 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3028 [21–45], 3028 [47]–3029 [1].

691 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 1.

692 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 6 [33–34].

693 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 3; Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [15].

694 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [17], 4 [19], [21].

695 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [26]; Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 4 [20].

696 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2758 [7–10]; Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 7 [37].

697 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2758 [7–22]; Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 7 [37–38].

698 Statement of Angela Sdrinis, 5 May 2022, 57.

699 Department for Education, Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 1 June 2023, 13.

700 Department for Education, Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 1 June 2023, 13.

701 The name ‘Alysha’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 55 [278].

702 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 16 [74].

703 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 26 [124].

704 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 132(d)–(f).

705 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990), art 37(c).

706 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 4.

707 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 10; Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3501 [40–44].

708 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3518 [6–13].

709 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3378 [19–37], 3379 [19–33].

710 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3378 [19–37]; 3380 [46]–3381 [5].

711 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3379 [28]–3380 [42].

712 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 9 [29].

713 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 5 [6].

714 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2945 [29–42].

715 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2945 [44–47].

716 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3533 [5–10].

717 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3533 [5–15].

718 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3159 [6–14].

719 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3159 [16]–3160 [6].

720 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 3 [18].

721 The names ‘Ira’, ‘Lester’ and ‘Stan’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

722 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

723 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 3 [2].

724 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3400 [31–37].

725 Refer to, for example, Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 3 [18]; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [33].

726 Anonymous session, 15 February 2022.

727 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5 [20–21].

728 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5 [21].

729 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

730 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3026 [29–41].

731 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 2 [12].

732 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [12]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3343 [28–37].

733 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [26], 10 [42].

734 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 5 [26].

735 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001 (Additional statement, ‘Warren’, 24 November 2021) 2.

736 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 60.

737 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 60.

738 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 86 [436].

739 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3123 [24–43].

740 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 7 [30].

741 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [19].

742 Transcript of Michael Guerzoni, 4 May 2022, 203 [26–30].

743 Transcript of Michael Guerzoni, 4 May 2022, 203 [21–25].

744 Statement of Michael Guerzoni, 29 April 2022, 24–25 [83].

745 Statement of Michael Guerzoni, 29 April 2022, 20–21 [68].

746 Transcript of Donald Palmer, 4 May 2022, 202 [45]–203 [3].

747 Statement of Samantha Crompvoets, 10 September 2022, 10 [38].

748 Transcript of Sarah Spencer, 18 August 2022, 2820 [28–37], [42–46].

749 Sarah Spencer, Procedural Fairness Response, 14 July 2023.

750 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 15 [48].

751 Transcript of Fiona Atkins, 24 August 2022, 3286 [36–45].

752 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3157 [7–13].

753 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3157 [16–19].

754 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3161 [5–9].

755 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [27]; Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16].

756 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [23].

757 Transcript of Leanne McLean and Richard Connock, 24 August 2022, 3310 [16–34].

758 Statement of Mark Morrissey, 9 August 2022, 4 [23].

759 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [18]; Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 4 [23].

760 Statement of Peter Graham, 16 August 2022, Attachment D (‘Continuation of Positive Registration: Reasons for Decision – [Stan]’, 7 July 2022) 5.

761 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 21 [26.1].

762 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2941 [12–17].

763 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2941 [31–33].

764 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 21 [26.2–26.3].

765 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3400 [39]–3401 [4].

766 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 25 August 2022, 3456 [44]–3457 [10].

767 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 25 August 2022, 3457 [17–22].

768 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3489 [21–31], 3489 [37]–3490 [8].

Case study 2: Harmful sexual behaviours

769 The names ‘Max’, ‘Henry’ and ‘Ray’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

770 The name ‘Ben’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6 [27]–7 [28].

771 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6 [27]–7 [28].

772 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 7 [30]; Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Annexure [Ben]-001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 3–4.

773 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Annexure [Ben]-001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 2.

774 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 6.

775 The name ‘Charlotte’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

776 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3202 [22–30].

777 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3206 [18–27].

778 The name ‘Fred’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [14], [16].

779 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 5 [28].

780 The name ‘Oscar’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023. Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 1 [3]. In relation to this individual, the Commission of Inquiry received the information on the basis that the individual would remain anonymous. Consequently, the State has not been provided with identifying information in relation to this individual and has not had the opportunity to fully consider or respond to the details of the incidents alleged.

781 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [6].

782 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [7], [11].

783 The name ‘Erin’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3019 [34–36].

784 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3022 [25–29].

785 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3023 [13–30].

786 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3023 [45]–3024 [18].

787 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [4]–3025 [6].

788 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [3], 3 [16]; Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3109 [43–45].

789 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [3], 3 [16], 4 [17]; Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3111 [15]–3112 [8], 3113 [39–40].

790 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [20].

791 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022.

792 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Annexure [Ben]-001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 2–3; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16]; Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

793 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3022 [25–31]; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 5 June 2019, 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3202 [22–30]; Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 2.

794 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Annexure [Ben]-001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 2; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3023 [20–24], 3025 [4–6], 3026 [29–41].

795 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]-001 (Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, ‘Ben’, undated) 2; Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3202 [35–45], 3203 [35–39].

796 The names ‘Albert’ and ‘Finn’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

797 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 132.

798 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 129(1)(a).

799 Refer to, for example, Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 3 [1.3.3], 40 [8.6], 44 [8.10].

800 After 31 May 2022, the placement and transfer of children and young people in units at Ashley Youth Detention Centre was to be conducted in accordance with the Unit Commissioning, De-Commissioning and Allocation to a Young Person Procedure (31 May 2022). The decision-making process and considerations are substantively similar to those previously in place and listed above, with unit allocations and transfer requests now considered by the Risk Assessment Process Team and Weekly Review Meeting respectively, with both reviewed by the Centre Manager.

801 Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 5 [29]; Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 11 [39(a)]; Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 13 [128]; Statement of ‘Piers’, 16 August 2022, 15 [45(b)]; the name ‘Piers’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023; Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 16 [56(b)]; the name ‘Digby’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023; Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 5 [31].

802 Statement of Ginna Webster, 13 January 2023, Annexure 1 (Letter from Secretary Webster to the Ombudsman including appendices, 14 November 2018); Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 13 [129]; Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 5 [30], [32]; Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 5 [29]; Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 16 [56(a)]; Statement of former Case Management Coordinator, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 4 [59]; Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 11 [39(c)]; Statement of ‘Piers’, 15 August 2022, 16 [45(c)].

803 Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 16 [56].

804 Statement of Ginna Webster, 13 January 2023, Annexure 1 (Letter from Secretary Webster to the Ombudsman including appendices, 14 November 2018) 157–160.

805 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 27 [130]; the name ‘Alysha’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

806 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 8 [49a]; Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3179 [16–21].

807 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 8 [49a].

808 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 8 [49a].

809 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 32 [55].

810 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 32 [55].

811 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 51 [262].

812 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 47 [241].

813 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 27 [130].

814 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 27 [130].

815 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

816 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

817 Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, 3-4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

818 Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 5 [30], [31]; Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 17 [57]; Statement of ‘Piers’, 15 August 2022, 17 [47]; Statement of former Case Management Coordinator, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 4 [60].

819 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 16, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from ‘Piers’ to ‘Alysha’, 22 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

820 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 16, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

821 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Standard Operating Procedure #8: Supervision and Movement of Young People’, 2015, 5–6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

822 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Standard Operating Procedure #8: Supervision and Movement of Young People’, 2015, 5–6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

823 Refer to, for example, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map’, 19 February 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

824 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 24, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

825 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 24–25, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

826 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 24–25, 32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

827 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: AYDC Incident Reporting’, 1 July 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

828 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: AYDC Incident Reporting’, 1 July 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

829 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: AYDC Incident Reporting’, 1 July 2018, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

830 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 59 [161].

831 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 34 [56].

832 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: AYDC Incident Reporting’, 1 July 2018, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

833 Children and Youth Services, ‘Form: AYDC Incident Reporting’, undated, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

834 Children and Youth Services, ‘Form: AYDC Incident Reporting’, undated, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

835 Children and Youth Services, ‘Form: AYDC Incident Reporting’, undated, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

836 Children and Youth Services, ‘Form: AYDC Incident Reporting’, undated, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

837 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 140(3).

838 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 2 (‘Instrument of Delegation’, Department of Communities, 9 March 2022).

839 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 140(3).

840 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Standard Operating Procedure #24: Conferencing’, November 2014, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

841 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Standard Operating Procedure #24: Conferencing’, November 2014, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

842 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 140(2)(b)(i); Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Standard Operating Procedure #24: Conferencing’, November 2014, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

843 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Standard Operating Procedure #24: Conferencing’, November 2014, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

844 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor (SQPA)’, 6 November 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

845 Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 June 2022, 52 [232]; Transcript of Michael Pervan, 17 June 2022, 1624 [43]–1625 [13]; Transcript of Claire Lovell, 4 July 2022, 2296 [17–20].

846 Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 21 July 2023, 2 [7]–3 [9]; Department for Education, Children and Young People, Child Safety Services Careers (Web Page) <https://www.decyp.tas.gov.au/about-us/employment/child-safety-services-careers/>.

847 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor (SQPA)’, 6 November 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

848 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor (SQPA)’, 6 November 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

849 Children and Youth Services, ‘Information Sheet: Serious Event Reviews’, 29 August 2019, 1, produced by the Department for Education, Children and Young People in response to a Commission notice to produce.

850 Statement of Ginna Webster, 13 January 2023, 48 [80.1].

851 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 13 [59].

852 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3527 [15–21].

853 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 16 [76]. Refer also to Children and Youth Services, ‘Information Sheet: Serious Event Reviews’, 29 August 2019, which states that referrals to the Serious Event Review Team were made by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary.

854 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 4 [17], 16 [77].

855 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 16 [78–82].

856 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 16 [83].

857 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 16 [83].

858 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 16 [83].

859 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 4 [17], 15 [72], 16 [84].

860 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, Annexure 10 (Flow chart: ’Serious Events Review – Governance’, undated).

861 Statement of former Manager, Serious Events Review Team, 11 November 2022, 10 [45].

862 Children and Youth Services, ‘Information Sheet: Serious Event Review’, 29 August 2019, 2, produced by the Department for Education, Children and Young People in response to a Commission notice to produce.

863 Refer to, for example, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Advice in relation to [Albert], 17 February 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Advice in relation to [Albert]’, 25 February 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Advice in relation to [Albert]’, 31 January 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert]’, 10 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Finn]’, 11 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Finn]’, 23 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

864 The only incident that was not recorded as a detention offence may be found at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Finn]’, 24 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

865 Patrick Ryan, ‘Schedule 1: Application to transfer person from Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 15 April 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

866 Patrick Ryan, ‘Schedule 1: Application to transfer person from Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 15 April 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

867 Patrick Ryan, ‘Schedule 1: Application to transfer person from Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 15 April 2019, 4–5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

868 Patrick Ryan, ‘Schedule 1: Application to transfer person from Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 15 April 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

869 Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Violence Risk Assessment’, 5 April 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

870 Patrick Ryan, ‘Schedule 1: Application to transfer person from Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 15 April 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

871 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Finn]’, 10 June 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

872 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [3].

873 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 25 [121]; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [14], 11 [48].

874 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 32 [55].

875 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 25 [121].

876 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [14].

877 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

878 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Henry]’, 14 February 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Henry]’, 12 September 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

879 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Henry]’, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

880 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Henry]’, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

881 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3093 [30–33].

882 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Client Request in relation to [Henry]’, 8 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

883 The name ‘Ray’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 25 October 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Custodial Youth Justice, ‘File Cover Sheet’, September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

884 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 25 October 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Transcript of ‘Alysha’, 22 August 2022, 3057 [21–25].

885 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Ashley Operations Management et al, 24 September 2019, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

886 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Ashley Operations Management et al, 24 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

887 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Ashley Operations Management et al, 24 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

888 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 25 October 2019, 1, 3–5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

889 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 25 October 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

890 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Ashley Operations Management et al, 24 September 2019, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

891 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Ray]’, 18 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

892 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 23 [108]; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 6 January 2020, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 8 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

893 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

894 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 21 [208].

895 The names ‘Floyd’ and ‘Ned’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [5–6].

896 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [5–6].

897 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [7].

898 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2 [10]; Transcript of Max, 23 August 2022, 3111 [32]–3112 [8].

899 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2–3 [10–11]; Transcript of Max, 23 August 2022, 3111 [32]–3112 [8].

900 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2–3 [10–11]; Transcript of Max, 23 August 2022, 3111 [32]–3112 [8].

901 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 2–3 [10–11]; Transcript of Max, 23 August 2022, 3112 [10–25].

902 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16].

903 The name ‘Arlo’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

904 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9–12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

905 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [17].

906 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

907 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [17–18].

908 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9–10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

909 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9–10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

910 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [20].

911 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [21]–5 [22].

912 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [22].

913 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan and Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes [Max]’, 23 August 2018, 2–3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan and Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes [Max]’, 20 September 2018, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

914 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 3, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

915 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

916 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

917 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

918 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

919 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

920 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

921 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

922 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

923 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

924 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 10–11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

925 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [17].

926 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 10–11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

927 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

928 Serious Events Review Team, Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

929 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

930 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

931 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

932 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

933 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

934 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

935 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 16, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

936 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

937 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Henry]’, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

938 Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team Review in Relation to AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

939 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 38 [60.1].

940 Department of Communities, ‘CCTV Recording of 7 August 2019’, 7 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

941 The name ‘Jonathan’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

942 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Henry]’, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

943 The name ‘Frank’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

944 The name ‘Maude’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

945 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Client Request’, 8 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

946 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Client Request’, 8 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

947 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert] and [Finn]’, 9 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

948 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

949 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

950 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

951 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report Form in relation to [Albert] and [Finn]’, 9 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

952 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert] and [Finn]’, 9 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Note that the incident report records the date of the incident as 7 September 2019, which we presume to be a typographical error on the basis that the report indicates the CCTV footage was viewed and the report was signed on 9 August 2019, and on the basis that the incident date of 7 August 2019 is confirmed in other documentary and witness evidence.

953 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert] and [Finn]’, 9 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

954 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert] and [Finn]’, 9 August 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

955 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

956 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

957 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

958 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

959 The name ‘Clive’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

960 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

961 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

962 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

963 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

964 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

965 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

966 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

967 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

968 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

969 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

970 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

971 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

972 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 August 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

973 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 August 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

974 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert], [Finn] and [Frank]’, 10 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

975 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3010 [20–24].

976 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 27–28 [50].

977 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3010 [7–10].

978 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3009 [42]–3010 [5], [26–29].

979 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

980 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

981 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 August 2019, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3009 [42]–3010 [5].

982 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 August 2019, 3–4 produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3009 [42]–3010 [5].

983 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 August 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

984 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 August 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

985 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 27–28 [50]; Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 22 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

986 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

987 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

988 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

989 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

990 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

991 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

992 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 33–34 [144], 35 [150]; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Patient Consultation Summary List: [Henry]’, 25 March 2021, 14, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

993 Letter from Mandy Clarke to Leanne McLean, 19 May 2020.

994 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 36 [152], 37–38 [162]; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Patient Consultation Summary List: [Henry]’, 25 March 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

995 Letter from Mandy Clarke to Leanne McLean, 19 May 2020.

996 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

997 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 5–6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

998 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 5–6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

999 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1000 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1001 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1002 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1003 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1004 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Patient Consultation Summary List: [Henry]’, 25 March 2021, 15, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1005 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Patient Consultation Summary List: [Henry]’, 25 March 2021, 15, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1006 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Patient Consultation Summary List: [Henry]’, 25 March 2021, 15, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1007 Patrick Ryan, Procedural Fairness Response, 12 July 2023, 2 [6].

1008 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1009 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 3–6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, Annexure PR-56 (Email from ‘Piers’ to ‘Maude’ et al, 21 November 2019); Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3101 [17–22]; Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 21–22 [96(e)]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2952 [30–42], 2953 [26–37]; Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 37 [161].

1010 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 38–40 [198].

1011 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1012 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 August 2019, 1.

1013 Refer also to email from Operations Manager to Madeleine Gardiner, 21 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1014 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan and Operations Manager, 21 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1015 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 29 [53(a)].

1016 Email from Operations Manager to Madeleine Gardiner, 21 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1017 Email from Operations Manager to Madeleine Gardiner, 21 August 2019.

1018 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 29 [53(a)].

1019 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 29 [53(a)].

1020 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, Annexure PR-51 (File Note, Patrick Ryan, 22 August 2019).

1021 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, Annexure PR-51 (File Note, Patrick Ryan, 22 August 2019).

1022 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, Annexure PR-51 (File Note, Patrick Ryan, 22 August 2019).

1023 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 21 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1024 Email from Patrick Ryan to Madeleine Gardiner, 21 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1025 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1026 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 23 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1027 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1028 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1029 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 2, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1030 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 23 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1031 Patrick Ryan, Procedural Fairness Response, 15 May 2023, 4 [27].

1032 Greg Brown, Procedural Fairness Response, 17 July 2023, 10 [49]; Greg Brown, Procedural Fairness Response, 17 July 2023, Annexure 1 (Statement of Greg Brown, 17 July 2023) 1 [6].

1033 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 1–2, 8–9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 23 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1034 Email from former Operations Coordinator to former Director, Strategic Youth Services, Department of Communities, 1 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1035 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1036 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1037 Tasmania Police, ‘Table of Allegations and Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse’, 20 July 2021, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1038 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Log’, 21 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1039 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Log’, 21 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1040 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1041 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1042 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1043 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1044 Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1045 Email from Patrick Ryan to Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1046 Email from Patrick Ryan to Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1047 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 49 [92(c)].

1048 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 28 [50], 49 [92(b)]; Email from Madeleine Gardiner to former Director, Strategic Youth Services, Department of Communities, 5 September 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1049 Patrick Ryan, Procedural Fairness Response, 15 May 2023, 2 [14]; Patrick Ryan, Procedural Fairness Response, 15 May 2023, Annexure 1 (‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Program Summary Table 2018–19’, undated).

1050 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 3 [22]–4 [32].

1051 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 4 [32].

1052 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 20 [195–199].

1053 Greg Brown, Procedural Fairness Response, 17 July 2023, 10 [50]; Greg Brown, Procedural Fairness Response, 17 July 2023, Annexure 1 (Statement of Greg Brown, 17 July 2023) 1 [7].

1054 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 13 [12.5–12.6].

1055 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1056 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 46 [89(a)]; Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, Annexure MG-26 (Email from Ashley Professional Services to Madeleine Gardiner and Patrick Ryan, 23 August 2019).

1057 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 46 [89(a)]; Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, Annexure MG-26 (Email from Ashley Professional Services to Madeleine Gardiner and Patrick Ryan, 23 August 2019).

1058 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1059 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 36 [152].

1060 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1061 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 August 2019, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1062 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 19 [183].

1063 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 19 [181].

1064 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 1 [1].

1065 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 1 [2].

1066 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 32 [93].

1067 Greg Brown, Procedural Fairness Response, 17 July 2023, 12 [63]; Greg Brown, Procedural Fairness Response, 17 July 2023, Annexure 1 (Statement of Greg Brown, 17 July 2023) 2 [10].

1068 Greg Brown, Procedural Fairness Response, 17 July 2023, Annexure 1 (Statement of Greg Brown, 17 July 2023) 2 [11].

1069 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1070 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1071 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2 produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1072 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1073 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1074 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1075 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1076 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1077 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1078 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1079 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1080 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1081 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1082 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1083 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1084 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1085 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1086 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1087 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 9 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1088 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3636 [46–47], 3637 [15–19].

1089 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3634 [43–46].

1090 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3635 [34–35].

1091 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, Annexure PR-50 (‘Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, Draft Issues Briefing to Secretary, Strategic Youth Services, 30 August 2019).

1092 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, Annexure PR-50 (‘Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, Draft Issues Briefing to Secretary, Strategic Youth Services, 30 August 2019) 1–2.

1093 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, Annexure PR-50 (‘Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, Draft Issues Briefing to Secretary, Strategic Youth Services, 30 August 2019) 3.

1094 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, Annexure PR-50 (‘Sexualised Incident between Residents at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, Draft Issues Briefing to Secretary, Strategic Youth Services, 30 August 2019) 2.

1095 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 32 [93–94].

1096 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 35 [59.1].

1097 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 35 [59.1].

1098 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 35 [59.1].

1099 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 35 [59.1].

1100 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 24 [31.2].

1101 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 17 [69.1]–18 [69.2].

1102 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 56 [229(i)].

1103 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 56 [229(i)].

1104 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3525 [22–36].

1105 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 23 [30.2]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2949 [9–13].

1106 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan et al, 18 September 2019, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1107 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan et al, 20 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1108 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan et al, 20 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1109 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Refer also to Transcript of Chris Gunson SC, Counsel for the State of Tasmania, 19 August 2022, 2983 [28]–2984 [42].

1110 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3628 [14–17].

1111 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Ray]’, 19 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1112 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 26 September 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Authorisation for Use of Isolation in relation to [Ray]’, 26 September 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1113 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 28 September 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 1 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 3 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 5 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 8 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 24 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 27 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1114 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 28 September 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 1 October 2019, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 October 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 October 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 3 October 2019, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 5 November 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 8 November 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 24 November 2019, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 27 November 2019, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1115 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 17 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 13 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 4 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 4 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 4 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1116 Refer to, for example, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 October 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 4 December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 4 December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1117 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 4 December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Conference Convenor Report in relation to [Ray]’, 4 December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1118 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 25 October 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1119 Email from Ashley Professional Services to ‘Chester’, 8 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. ‘Chester’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

1120 Email from ‘Chester’ to Ashley Professional Services, 8 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1121 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Leanne McLean, 8 October 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1122 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1123 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 21 [208].

1124 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 21 [206].

1125 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 21 [207–210]; Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, Annexure PR-56 (Compiled emails and other documents relating to planning and meetings in relation to ‘Albert’ and ‘Finn’).

1126 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Albert] and [Finn]’, 14 November 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1127 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1128 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1129 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1130 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1131 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1132 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1133 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1134 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1135 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1136 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1137 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1138 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1139 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1140 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 22 [215]; Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, Annexure PR-56 (Email from Patrick Ryan to ‘Digby’, 6 December 2019).

1141 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, Annexure PR-56 (Email from Patrick Ryan to ‘Piers’, 22 November 2019).

1142 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 35–36 [151].

1143 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 35–36 [151].

1144 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 35–36 [151].

1145 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 33 [144].

1146 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 33 [144].

1147 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 39 [169].

1148 Statement of Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 3 November 2022, 18 [99].

1149 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 32 [93–94], 33 [95–96]; Greg Brown, Procedural Fairness Response, 17 July 2023, 13 [66].

1150 Statement of former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 6 September 2022, 16 [76].

1151 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, Annexure PR-56 (Email from Patrick Ryan to ‘Piers’, 22 November 2019).

1152 Transcript of Barry Nicholson, 19 August 2022, 2929 [26–34].

1153 Transcript of Barry Nicholson, 19 August 2022, 2930 [2–12].

1154 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 27 [132].

1155 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 27 [134].

1156 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 33 [167].

1157 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1158 Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1159 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 28 [135].

1160 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 28 [136].

1161 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 28 [137], 29 [142–143].

1162 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 29–30 [144].

1163 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 31 [154–155].

1164 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 30 [147].

1165 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 30 [147].

1166 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 30 [148].

1167 Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 24.

1168 Statement of ‘Piers’, 15 August 2022, 30 [103(d)].

1169 Statement of ‘Piers’, 15 August 2022, 30 [103(d)].

1170 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 24 [225–226], [228].

1171 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 24 [228].

1172 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 24 [227].

1173 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 24 [228].

1174 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 30 [149].

1175 Department of Communities, ‘CARDI Conversation Summary Report in relation to [Henry]’, 25 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1176 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 6 December 2019, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1177 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 1 [1.1].

1178 Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1179 Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1180 Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1181 Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 12 [121].

1182 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 30 [150–151], [154–156].

1183 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 30 [151]; Email from Executive Officer to ‘Alysha’, 6 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 23 [30.1].

1184 Email from Executive Officer to ‘Alysha’, 6 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1185 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Executive Officer, 6 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to Produce.

1186 Email from Executive Officer to ‘Alysha’, 6 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1187 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Leanne McLean, 6 December 2019; Letter from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 10 December 2019, 1; Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note’, 6 December 2019.

1188 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Leanne McLean, 6 December 2019; Letter from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 10 December 2019, 1.

1189 Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note’, 6 December 2019.

1190 Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note 8/12/19 re Ashley Disclosures re Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour/Assault and AYDC Response’, 8 December 2019, 1.

1191 Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note 8/12/19 re Ashley Disclosures re Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour/Assault and AYDC Response’, 8 December 2019, 1.

1192 Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note 8/12/19 re Ashley Disclosures re Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour/Assault and AYDC Response’, 8 December 2019, 2.

1193 Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note 8/12/19 re Ashley Disclosures re Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour/Assault and AYDC Response’, 8 December 2019, 2.

1194 Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note 8/12/19 re Ashley Disclosures re Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour/Assault and AYDC Response’, 8 December 2019, 2; Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3316 [34–43].

1195 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 31 [157].

1196 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 31–32 [157].

1197 Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note 8/12/19 re Ashley Disclosures re Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour/Assault and AYDC Response’, 8 December 2019, 2.

1198 Commissioner for Children and Young People, ‘File Note 8/12/19 re Ashley Disclosures re Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour/Assault and AYDC Response’, 8 December 2019, 2.

1199 Letter from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 10 December 2019.

1200 Letter from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 10 December 2019, 2.

1201 Letter from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 10 December 2019, 2.

1202 Transcript of Richard Connock, 24 August 2022, 3318 [10–32].

1203 James Cumming Investigation Services, ‘Review into the Immediate and Post Management of a 13 December 2019 Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 26 March 2021, 112, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1204 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 23 [30.2]; Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1205 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1206 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1207 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1208 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1209 Patrick Ryan, Procedural Fairness Response, 12 July 2023, 3 [13–14]

1210 Transcript of ‘Alysha’, 22 August 2022, 3050 [26]–3051 [2]; Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3095 [43]–3096 [30]; Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 35 [178–179].

1211 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3096 [32]–3097 [1].

1212 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 4 [17].

1213 Statement of ‘Piers’, 15 August 2022, 30 [104(a)].

1214 Statement of ‘Piers’, 15 August 2022, 30 [104(a)].

1215 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 5 [22].

1216 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 5 [22].

1217 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3097 [44]–3098 [2]; Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 5 [22].

1218 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3098 [4–10]; Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 5 [22].

1219 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 5 [22].

1220 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3098 [25–33].

1221 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3098 [21–33].

1222 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3098 [39–42].

1223 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 5 [22].

1224 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 2 [9].

1225 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3085 [37–40].

1226 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 2 [10]; Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3090 [5–9].

1227 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3086 [40]–3087 [7].

1228 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 3 [13]; Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3086 [32]–3087 [14].

1229 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3085 [14–16].

1230 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3085 [8–18].

1231 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3089 [35–47].

1232 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3085 [43]–3086 [5].

1233 Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Resident Daily Roll’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 40 [203].

1234 Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Resident Daily Roll’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1235 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1236 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Ashley Operations Management et al, 24 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1237 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, December 2019, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1238 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Ray]’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1239 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Ray]’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1240 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Resident Daily Roll’, December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1241 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, December 2019.

1242 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, December 2019.

1243 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, 27 [249–250].

1244 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, 27 [252].

1245 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, 27 [253].

1246 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, 27 [253].

1247 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, 27 [255].

1248 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to the Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1249 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Standard Operating Procedure #8: Supervision and Movement of Young People’, August 2012, 5–6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1250 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, December 2019, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1251 Department of Communities, ‘CCTV recording of Franklin 2-1-2020’, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 January 2020, 1–8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1252 Department of Communities, ‘CCTV recording of Franklin 2-1-2020’, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 January 2020, 1–8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1253 Department of Communities, ‘CCTV recording of Franklin 2-1-2020’, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 January 2020, 1–8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1254 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 8 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1255 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 January 2020, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1256 Department of Communities, ‘CCTV recording of Franklin 2-1-2020’, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1257 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Ashley Operations Management et al, 24 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1258 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1259 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 43 [218].

1260 Transcript of ‘Alysha’, 22 August 2022, 3058 [15–22].

1261 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, Annexure M (Email from Nurse Unit Manager to Pamela Honan, 27 July 2022).

1262 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 January 2020, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert]’, 2 January 2020, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Finn]’, 2 January 2020, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1263 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 42 [65.4].

1264 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2963 [2–4].

1265 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2963 [10–11].

1266 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 3 January 2020; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Case Notes’, 2 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1267 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1268 Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Resident Daily Roll’, 2 January 2020; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Resident Daily Roll’, 3 January 2020; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Resident Daily Roll’, 4 January 2020.

1269 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 3 January 2020.

1270 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 2 January 2020, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert]’, 2 January 2020, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Finn]’, 2 January 2020, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1271 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 43–44 [220].

1272 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 43–44 [220]; Email from Alysha to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Alysha to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1273 Email from ‘Chester’ to Ashley Operations Management, 5 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1274 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Resident Daily Roll’, 6 January 2020.

1275 Email from ‘Chester’ to Ashley Operations Management, 5 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1276 Email from ‘Chester’ to Ashley Operations Management, 5 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1277 Email from ‘Chester’ to Ashley Operations Management, 5 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1278 Email from ‘Chester’ to Ashley Operations Management, 5 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1279 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Reports in relation to [Ray] – 01 01 2020 – 31 12 2020’, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1280 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Ray]’, 5 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1281 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 23 [109].

1282 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 23 [110].

1283 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 23 [110].

1284 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1285 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1286 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1287 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1288 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1289 Email from Case Management Coordinator to Operations Manager, 9 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1290 Email from Case Management Coordinator to Operations Manager, 9 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1291 Email from Case Management Coordinator to Operations Manager, 9 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1292 Email from Case Management Coordinator to Operations Manager, 9 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1293 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 14 [65].

1294 Request for Statement served on ‘Maude’, 1 August 2022, 18 [102].

1295 Email from Case Management Coordinator to Senior Quality and Practice Advisor, 6 January 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1296 Email from Pamela Honan to ‘Alysha’, 6 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Patrick Ryan to Case Management Coordinator, 6 January 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1297 Emails from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 1–3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1298 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1299 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1300 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1301 Email from Pamela Honan to ‘Alysha’, 6 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1302 Email from Pamela Honan to ‘Alysha’, 6 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1303 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 45 [231].

1304 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1305 Emails between ‘Alysha’ and Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1306 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1307 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 6 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1308 Child Safety Service, ‘Notification Report Incident Id: [redacted]’, 3 February 2020, 4, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1309 Child Safety Service, ‘Notification Report Incident Id: [redacted]’, 3 February 2020, 4, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1310 Child Safety Service, ‘Notification Report Incident Id: [redacted]’, 3 February 2020, 4, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1311 Child Safety Service, ‘Notification Report Incident Id: [redacted]’, 3 February 2020, 4, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1312 Email from Pamela Honan to ‘Alysha’, 7 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1313 Email from Pamela Honan to ‘Alysha’, 7 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1314 Email from Patrick Ryan to ‘Alysha’, 7 January 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1315 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Management Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 7 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1316 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Management Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 7 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1317 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Management Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 7 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1318 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Management Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 7 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1319 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Care Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 25 October 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1320 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Management Plan in relation to [Ray]’, 7 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1321 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Ray]’, 4 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1322 Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 26 [94].

1323 Email meeting invite from ‘Maude’ to Patrick Ryan et al, 8 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1324 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 8 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1325 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 8 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1326 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 8 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1327 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 8 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1328 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 8 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1329 Email from AYDC staff member to Pamela Honan, 8 January 2020, 1–4.

1330 Email from AYDC staff member to Pamela Honan, 8 January 2020, 1.

1331 Email from AYDC staff member to Pamela Honan, 8 January 2020, 2.

1332 Email from AYDC staff member to Pamela Honan, 8 January 2020, 2.

1333 Email from AYDC staff member to Pamela Honan, 8 January 2020, 2.

1334 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services and Senior Psychologist, Community Forensic Mental Health Service, 8 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, 6 January 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services to Employee of the Department of Health et al, 13 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Manager, Human Resources, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 15 January 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 3 November 2022, 17 [86–89]; Statement of Senior Psychologist, Community Forensic Mental Health Service, Department of Health, 22 August 2022, 2 [8]–3 [13]; Statement of former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 6 September 2022, 14 [64], 21 [110].

1335 Email from Patrick Ryan to former Operations Coordinator, 22 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Letter from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 15 November 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services and Senior Psychologist, Community Forensic Mental Health Service, 8 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services to Employee of the Department of Health et al, 13 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services to Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services et al, 13 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Manager, Human Resources, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 15 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1336 Email from Patrick Ryan to former Operations Coordinator, 22 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services to Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, 8 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services to Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 4 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email exchange between Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services and former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services et al, 15 January 2020 to 4 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 3 November 2022, 18 [97–98]; Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 35–36 [151]; Statement of former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 6 September 2022, 16 [80].

1337 Email from former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services to Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services et al, 13 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1338 Email from former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services to Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, 13 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1339 Email from Patrick Ryan to former Operations Coordinator, 22 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1340 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 40 [175].

1341 Statement of former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 6 September 2022, 17 [85].

1342 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 4 [13]; Statement of Barry Nicholson, 18 August 2022, 6 [48].

1343 Statement of Director of Nursing, Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 3 November 2022, 4 [18].

1344 Statement of former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 6 September 2022, 23 [120]–24 [124].

1345 Statement of former Head of Department, Forensic Mental Health Services, Department of Health, 6 September 2022, 19 [94–96].

1346 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 47 [88].

1347 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 27 (‘A Memorandum of Understanding between the Correctional Primary Health Services and Children, Youth and Families - Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, Department of Communities, May 2021). While this memorandum is dated May 2021, we understand there has been a memorandum in place since 2011 (Statement of Barry Nicholson, 18 August 2022, 6 [46]).

1348 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1349 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1350 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1351 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1352 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1353 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1354 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1355 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1356 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1357 Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023.

1358 Kathy Baker, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023.

1359 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Secretary: Concern for Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) Resident [Ray] Due to Recent Incidents’, 20 January 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1360 Email from former Executive Officer, Strategic Youth Services to Quality Improvement and Workforce Development, 28 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1361 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 23 [30.6].

1362 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 35 [59.2].

1363 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1364 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1365 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1366 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1367 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1368 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1369 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1370 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31–32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1371 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31–32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1372 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31–32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1373 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31–32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1374 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31–32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1375 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 31–32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1376 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1377 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 32, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1378 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 33, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1379 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 33, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1380 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 33, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1381 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 33, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1382 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 33, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1383 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1384 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1385 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1386 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1387 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1388 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1389 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1390 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1391 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1392 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 35, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1393 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 35, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1394 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Henry]’, 19 March 2020, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1395 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3083 [16–18]; Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 9 [35].

1396 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 9 [35].

1397 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3083 [16–18], 3084 [22–25].

1398 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3439 [18]–3450 [7].

1399 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3439 [19]–3450 [7].

1400 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2982 [31–34]; Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3437 [10–28].

1401 Transcript of Veronica Burton, 22 August 2022, 3079 [4–13]; Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 1 [4]; Statement of former Manager, Serious Event Review Team, 11 November 2022, 3 [10], 13 [60–63].

1402 Statement of Ginna Webster, 13 January 2023, 48 [80.1], 53 [89.1].

1403 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3525 [47]–3526 [21].

1404 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3526 [8–21].

1405 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3526 [8–11].

1406 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3526 [18–21].

1407 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3527 [15–21].

1408 Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 21 July 2023, 3–4 [11].

1409 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 7 [27]; Statement of former Manager, Serious Event Review Team, 11 November 2022, Annexure 1 (‘Comments Regarding AYDC Incident Review‘, Memorandum to Pam Honan, 21 February 2020); Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum to Director, Strategic Youth Services: Concerns Identified During Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) SERT review’, 27 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of former Manager, Serious Event Review Team, 11 November 2022, 5 [19].

1410 Statement of former Manager, Serious Event Review Team, 11 November 2022, Annexure 1 (Memo from Veronica Burton and Serious Events Review Team staff member to Pamela Honan, 21 February 2020); Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum to Director, Strategic Youth Services: Concerns Identified During Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) SERT review’, 27 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1411 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 7 [27]; Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum to Director, Strategic Youth Services: Concerns Identified During Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) SERT review’, 27 February 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1412 Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum to Director, Strategic Youth Services: Concerns Identified During Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) SERT review’, 27 February 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1413 Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum to Director, Strategic Youth Services: Concerns Identified During Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) SERT review’, 27 February 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1414 Statement of former Manager, Serious Event Review Team, 11 November 2022, Annexure 1 (Memo from Veronica Burton and Serious Events Review Team staff member to Pamela Honan, 21 February 2020); Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum to Director, Strategic Youth Services: Concerns Identified During Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) SERT review’, 27 February 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. The name ‘Lester’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

1415 Statement of former Manager, Serious Event Review Team, 11 November 2022, Annexure 1 (Memo from Veronica Burton and Serious Events Review Team staff member to Pamela Honan, 21 February 2020); Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum to Director, Strategic Youth Services: Concerns Identified During Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) SERT review’, 27 February 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1416 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 7 [27].

1417 Notice to produce served on Department for Education, Children and Young People, 25 November 2022, 6–7.

1418 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 7 [27].

1419 Email from Veronica Burton to Pamela Honan, 27 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum to Director, Strategic Youth Services: Concerns Identified During Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC) SERT review’, 27 February 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1420 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 35 [59.3–59.4].

1421 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 36 [59.6].

1422 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 36 [59.7].

1423 Letter from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 10 December 2019; Letter from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean, 18 February 2020.

1424 Email from Mandy Clarke to Leanne McLean, 20 May 2020; Department of Communities, ‘Report of the Matter of [Henry]’, 23 March 2020.

1425 Emails between Mandy Clarke, Pamela Honan and Leanne McLean, May 2020 to September 2020; Letter from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 4 December 2020; Letter from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean, 24 December 2020; Letter from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 18 January 2021.

1426 Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3317 [21–24].

1427 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 22 [97].

1428 Email from Stuart Watson to Pamela Honan, 16 June 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1429 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 15 [104].

1430 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.22], 38 [59.24]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2951 [5–9].

1431 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.22–59.23]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 6 [13(a)].

1432 Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1433 Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1434 Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1435 Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1436 Stuart Watson, ‘Response to the Findings of a Serious Event Review Team (SERT) Review in Relation to Former AYDC Resident [Henry]’, 31 May 2021, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1437 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 36 [59.14]. Refer also to Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 7 [13(b)].

1438 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 18 [69.5].

1439 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 18 [69.5].

1440 Mandy Clarke, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023, Annexure 2 (Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Executive Working Group – Strengthening Safeguards: SERT Recommendation 16 – Concluded and Appropriate Safeguards in Place’, August 2021).

1441 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 57 [233].

1442 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 57 [232–233].

1443 Children and Youth Services, ‘Information Sheet: Serious Event Review’, 29 August 2019, 2, produced by the Department for Education, Children and Young People in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1444 Statement of former Manager, Serious Event Review Team, 11 November 2022, 18 [94].

1445 Statement of former Manager, Serious Event Review Team, 11 November 2022, Annexure 11 (Children and Youth Services, ‘Serious Events Review Committee Terms of Reference’) 3.

1446 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 36 [59.14].

1447 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 36 [59.14].

1448 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 36 [59.14].

1449 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.15]; Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 8 [49].

1450 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.17]; Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 14–15 [102].

1451 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.18]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 7 [13(b)]; Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 7 [44(b)].

1452 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.19].

1453 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.20].

1454 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.21]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 7 [13(b)].

1455 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 37 [59.21].

1456 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 8 [49(a)].

1457 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 7 [13(b)].

1458 Department of Justice, ‘Internal Memorandum Regarding Request to Transfer a Young Person from Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Tasmania Prison Service’, 8 July 2021, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1459 Refer, for example, to Children and Youth Services, ‘Brief Review of Complaint: [Max]’, 10 March 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1460 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [43].

1461 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3123 [8–21].

1462 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Max] – Proposed application to the Transfer Assessment Panel’, 22 December 2021, 1–2.

1463 Email from Pamela Honan to Michael Pervan, 8 February 2022.

1464 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 11 July 2023, 2.

1465 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [43].

1466 Department of Communities, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Health and Human Services, Children and Youth Services and Department of Justice, Tasmania Prison Service’, December 2014, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1467 Email correspondence between Leanne McLean and Michael Pervan, 17–22 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1468 Email from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 17 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1469 Email from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 17 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1470 Email from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 17 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1471 Email from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 17 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1472 Email from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 17 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1473 Email from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean, 20 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1474 Email from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 22 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1475 Email from Leanne McLean to Michael Pervan, 22 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1476 Statement of Michael Pervan, 26 April 2022, Annexure MP.90.001 (Email from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean, 26 April 2022).

1477 Statement of Michael Pervan, 25 August 2022, 73 [299].

1478 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert] and [Finn]’, 30 January 2018, 37–41, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Finn]’, 11 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1479 Refer, for example, to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Advice in relation to [Albert], 17 February 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Advice in relation to [Albert]’, 25 February 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Advice in relation to [Albert]’, 31 January 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Albert]’, 10 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Finn]’, 11 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report in relation to [Finn]’, 23 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1480 Statement of Case Management Coordinator, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 6–7 [107].

1481 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 50 [93(b)].

1482 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2954 [6–8].

1483 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 November 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1484 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 7 [27].

1485 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 27 [36.1].

1486 Email from Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan et al, 13 November 2019.

1487 Request for statement served on Patrick Ryan, 8 July 2022, 11 [54(c)].

1488 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 21 [204].

1489 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3179 [3–8].

1490 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3179 [28–35].

1491 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 18 [52].

1492 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 23 [103].

1493 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 23 [103].

1494 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 59 [246].

1495 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 59 [243].

1496 Statement of Veronica Burton, 4 August 2022, 7 [27].

1497 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 27 [36.1].

1498 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 23 [30.6]; Children and Youth Services, ‘Referral to a Senior Quality and Practice Advisor (SQPA) - [Ray]’, 9 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1499 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 50 [107]; Custodial Youth Justice Services, ‘Procedure: Unit Commissioning, De-Commissioning and Allocation to a Young Person’, 31 May 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1500 Custodial Youth Justice Services, ‘Procedure: Unit Commissioning, De-Commissioning and Allocation to a Young Person’, 31 May 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1501 Custodial Youth Justice Services, ‘Procedure: Unit Commissioning, De-Commissioning and Allocation to a Young Person’, 31 May 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1502 Statement of Case Management Coordinator, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 6 [104].

1503 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 38 [60.1]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2952 [45]–2953 [8].

1504 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2954 [43–44]. Refer also to Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 21 [96(d)].

1505 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2954 [36–38].

1506 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 17 [64]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2954 [37].

1507 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2953 [30–32]. Refer also to Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 21 [96(d)].

1508 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 38 [60.3].

1509 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 38 [60.4]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2953 [14–24].

1510 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 38 [60.4].

1511 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 38 [60.4].

1512 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 21 [96(d)].

1513 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 24 [31.3], 25 [34.2], 56 [90.4]; Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 21 [96(d)].

1514 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2954 [38–42].

1515 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 43 [66.2].

1516 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 93 [386], 94 [389].

1517 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 11 July 2023, 4.

1518 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 94 [391].

1519 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 45 [199].

1520 Statement of Nurse Unit Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 11 November 2022, 45 [200].

1521 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2944 [27–43].

1522 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2944 [36–43].

1523 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 24 [105].

1524 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 11 July 2023, 4.

1525 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 11 July 2023, 4.

1526 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 11 July 2023, 5.

1527 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 11 July 2023, 6.

1528 Bretton Smith, Submission No. 41 to Legislative Council Sessional Committee Government Administration B, Parliament of Tasmania, Inquiry into Tasmanian Adult Imprisonment and Youth Detention Matters (31 March 2023); Ivan Dean, Submission No. 23 to Legislative Council Sessional Committee Government Administration B, Parliament of Tasmania, Inquiry into Tasmanian Adult Imprisonment and Youth Detention Matters (March 2023).

1529 Ivan Dean, Submission No. 23 to Legislative Council Sessional Committee Government Administration B, Parliament of Tasmania, Inquiry into Tasmanian Adult Imprisonment and Youth Detention Matters (March 2023) 4–5.

1530 Serious Events Review Team, ‘Serious Event Review Report – Review of the Matter of [Max]’, 19 June 2018, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

Case study 3: Isolation in Ashley Youth Detention Centre

1531 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final Report, 2017) vol 15, 43, 90–91.

1532 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 24 (2019) on Children’s Rights in the Child Justice System, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/24 (18 September 2019) 16 [95](g).

1533 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1534 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 133(1).

1535 Youth Justice Act 1997 ss 124(2), 133(2); Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1536 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1537 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 146B; Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1538 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1539 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1540 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1541 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1542 References to the detention Centre Manager regarding the use of isolation procedure should be taken as a reference to the ‘detention centre manager or their delegate’. Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1543 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1544 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1545 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1546 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1547 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1548 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1549 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1550 The Isolation Procedure refers to this role as ‘Director, Services to Young People’. As discussed in Chapter 10, this role has been known by different names and we have elected to refer to it as ‘Director, Strategic Youth Services’.

1551 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4–6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1552 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 133(5); Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1553 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1554 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1555 Department of Communities, ‘Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, July 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1556 Department of Communities, ‘Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, July 2019, 3, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1557 Department of Communities, ‘Youth Justice Act 1997: Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, 16 December 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 2.

1558 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1559 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1560 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1561 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1562 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1563 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1564 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1565 The names ‘Ben’ and ‘Erin’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 2; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [41–42].

1566 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 5 [28]; Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 7.

1567 The names ‘Charlotte’, ‘Fred’ and ‘Eve’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 7; Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [13]; Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [20].

1568 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [12–15]. The name ‘Max’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [3].

1569 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 2. The name ‘Simon’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 1 [5]; Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 5 [30]; Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3.

1570 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3345 [27–31]; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 9 [40].

1571 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [41]–3021 [1]; Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3; Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 3 [13].

1572 The name ‘Ben’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 2.

1573 The name ‘Simon’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 1 [5].

1574 The name ‘Erin’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [43–46].

1575 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3020 [46]–3021 [1].

1576 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2760 [1–10]; Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [13].

1577 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2760 [1–10].

1578 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2758 [24–31].

1579 The name ‘Fred’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3343 [42–46].

1580 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3343 [42–46]; Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [14].

1581 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3024 [12–15].

1582 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 5 [30].

1583 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 6 [31].

1584 The name ‘Oscar’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023. In relation to Oscar, the Commission of Inquiry received the information on the basis that the individual would remain anonymous. Consequently, the State has not been provided with identifying information in relation to this individual and has not had the opportunity to fully consider or respond to the details of the incidents alleged. Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 3 [14]; Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 5 [28].

1585 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [10].

1586 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [13].

1587 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 9 [40].

1588 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 6 [31–32].

1589 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 6.

1590 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 6.

1591 The name ‘Charlotte’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

1592 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3.

1593 Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3.

1594 The names ‘Eve’ and ‘Norman’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 3 [13].

1595 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 3 [13].

1596 Statement of ‘Eve’, 18 August 2022, 4 [20].

1597 Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 3 [18(b)].

1598 The name ‘Digby’ is a pseudonym. Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023. Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 5 [18(c)]; Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 11 [39(d)].

1599 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 12 [18(b)].

1600 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 11 [39(d)].

1601 Statement of former Case Management Coordinator, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 4 [59]; Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 5 [32]; Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 17 [56(d)].

1602 Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 6 [32].

1603 Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 17 [56(d)].

1604 Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 17 [56(d)]; Statement of former Case Management Coordinator, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 4 [59]; Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 12 [18(b)].

1605 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 12 [18(b)].

1606 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 11 [39(d)].

1607 Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 5 [32]; Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 5 [33]. The name ‘Alysha’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 19 [90]; Anonymous Statement, 16 August 2022, 9 [41].

1608 Statement of Samuel Baker, 8 August 2022, 6 [48–49]; Transcript of Samuel Baker, 19 August 2022, 2908 [35]–2909 [10]; Anonymous Statement, 16 August 2022, 9 [41–42].

1609 Transcript of Samuel Baker, 19 August 2022, 2907 [24–44].

1610 Transcript of Colleen (Sue) Ray and Sarah Spencer, 18 August 2022, 2816 [27–34].

1611 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2959 [7–9].

1612 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2959 [11–19].

1613 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3006 [17–28].

1614 Email from former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 7 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1615 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Behaviour Development System, Version 2.2’, May 2013, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1616 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Behaviour Development System, Version 2.2’, May 2013, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1617 Transcript of Sarah Spencer, 18 August 2022, 2815 [1–3].

1618 Statement of former Operations Coordinator, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 15 June 2022, 14.

1619 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 30 [53(d)].

1620 The name ‘Alysha’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

1621 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 18 [86].

1622 Transcript of Sarah Spencer, 18 August 2022, 2815 [35]–2816 [7].

1623 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38.

1624 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 5 [12–13].

1625 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 5 [11].

1626 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 7 [15]–9 [20].

1627 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 5 [12].

1628 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 5–6 [14].

1629 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 5–6 [14].

1630 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 7 [15].

1631 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 8 [16], 9 [18].

1632 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 10 [22].

1633 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Michael Pervan, 6 April 2016.

1634 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Michael Pervan, 6 April 2016, 2–3.

1635 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Michael Pervan, 6 April 2016, 3.

1636 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1637 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1638 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1639 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1640 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1641 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1642 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1643 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1644 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1645 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1646 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1647 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1648 Children and Youth Services, ‘Minute to Secretary: AYDC – Commissioner for Children Letter and Emerging Concerns’, 6 May 2016, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1649 Letter from Michael Pervan to Mark Morrissey, undated.

1650 Email from Mark Morrissey to Acting Deputy Secretary for Children and Youth Services, 9 November 2016, 2–3.

1651 Email from Mark Morrissey to Acting Deputy Secretary for Children and Youth Services, 9 November 2016, 2–3.

1652 Email from Acting Deputy Secretary for Children and Youth Services to Mark Morrissey, 10 November 2016, 1.

1653 Email from Acting Deputy Secretary for Children and Youth Services to Mark Morrissey, 10 November 2016, 1.

1654 Email from Acting Deputy Secretary for Children and Youth Services to Mark Morrissey, 10 November 2016, 1.

1655 Email from Acting Deputy Secretary for Children and Youth Services to Mark Morrissey, 10 November 2016, 1.

1656 Email from Acting Deputy Secretary for Children and Youth Services to Mark Morrissey, 10 November 2016, 1–2.

1657 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Minister for Human Services, 11 November 2016, 2.

1658 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Minister for Human Services, 11 November 2016, 2.

1659 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Minister for Human Services, 11 November 2016, 2.

1660 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Minister for Human Services, 11 November 2016, 2.

1661 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Minister for Human Services, 11 November 2016, 2.

1662 Letter from Michael Pervan to Mark Morrissey, 18 November 2016, 2.

1663 Letter from Michael Pervan to Mark Morrissey, 18 November 2016, 2.

1664 Letter from Michael Pervan to Mark Morrissey, 18 November 2016, 2.

1665 Letter from Michael Pervan to Mark Morrissey, 18 November 2016, 2.

1666 Email from Mark Morrissey to Acting Deputy Secretary for Children, 4 January 2017, 2.

1667 Email from Mark Morrissey to Acting Deputy Secretary for Children, 4 January 2017, 2.

1668 Email from Acting Deputy Secretary for Children to Mark Morrissey, 4 January 2017.

1669 Email from Acting Deputy Secretary for Children to Mark Morrissey, 4 January 2017, 1–2.

1670 Email from Acting Deputy Secretary for Children to Mark Morrissey, 4 January 2017, 1.

1671 Email from Mark Morrissey to Acting Deputy Secretary for Children, 11 January 2017, 1.

1672 Email from Mark Morrissey to Acting Deputy Secretary for Children, 19 January 2017, 1.

1673 Email from Mark Morrissey to Acting Deputy Secretary for Children, 19 January 2017, 1.

1674 Email from Mark Morrissey to Acting Deputy Secretary for Children, 19 January 2017, 1.

1675 Email from Mark Morrissey to Richard Connock, 9 February 2017.

1676 Email from Mark Morrissey to Richard Connock, 9 February 2017.

1677 Email from Mark Morrissey to Ginna Webster, 2 June 2017, 1.

1678 Email from Mark Morrissey to Ginna Webster, 2 June 2017, 1.

1679 Statement of Mark Morrissey, 9 August 2022, 1 [3]; Transcript of Mark Morrissey, 18 August 2022, 2781 [40]–2783 [5].

1680 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 1.

1681 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Youth Justice Act 1997 s 124(2).

1682 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Custody Inspection Report: Inspection of Youth Custodial Services in Tasmania, 2018 (Report, August 2019).

1683 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Custody Inspection Report: Inspection of Youth Custodial Services in Tasmania, 2018 (Report, August 2019) 1.

1684 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Custody Inspection Report: Inspection of Youth Custodial Services in Tasmania, 2018 (Report, August 2019) 53–55.

1685 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Custody Inspection Report: Inspection of Youth Custodial Services in Tasmania, 2018 (Report, August 2019) 54.

1686 Email from Patrick Ryan to Ashley Youth Detention Centre Operations Management, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘All Young People Communication’, 7 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1687 Email from Patrick Ryan to Ashley Professional Services staff copied to Greg Brown, 7 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘All Young People Communication’, 7 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1688 Email from Patrick Ryan to Ashley Youth Detention Centre Operations Management, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1689 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Purpose and Practices’, undated, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (emphasis in original).

1690 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Purpose and Practices’, undated, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Details’, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1691 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Purpose and Practices’, undated, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (emphasis in original).

1692 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Purpose and Practices’, undated, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (emphasis in original).

1693 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Purpose and Practices’, undated, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1694 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Details’, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Purpose and Practices’, undated, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1695 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Blue Colour Category Details’, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1696 Patrick Ryan, ‘Blue All Young People Communication’, 7 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Patrick Ryan, ‘Blue Colour All Staff Communication’, 7 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1697 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3607 [35–40].

1698 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3607 [26]–3608 [46].

1699 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3607 [26]–3608 [46].

1700 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 10 [99]; Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, Annexure to question 23, 128–130.

1701 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 10 [99].

1702 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 10 [102].

1703 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 12 March 2019, 2–3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1704 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 18 March 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 25 March 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1705 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 18 March 2019, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 25 March 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 1 April 2019, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1706 Email from Patrick Ryan to Greg Brown, 15 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Patrick Ryan to Greg Brown, 18 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Patrick Ryan to Greg Brown, 2 April 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1707 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 19 [56].

1708 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 18 [54].

1709 Statement of Greg Brown, 28 November 2022, 21 [61].

1710 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 16 July 2023, 3; Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 21 July 2023, 4.

1711 Email from Leanne McLean to Patrick Ryan, 4 March 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1712 Email from Patrick Ryan to Leanne McLean, 4 March 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1713 Email from Patrick Ryan to Ashley Youth Detention Centre Operations Management, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1714 Email from Patrick Ryan to Leanne McLean, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. For completeness, Mr Ryan refers to the incident occurring on 25–26 ‘March’ but given the date of his correspondence, this is likely an error.

1715 The name ‘Piers’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023. Email from Patrick Ryan to ‘Piers’, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1716 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3624 [31–35].

1717 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3624 [26–29].

1718 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3623 [45–47].

1719 Email from Patrick Ryan to Leanne McLean, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1720 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 10 [101]; Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3609 [1–3].

1721 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 23 [38], 30 [53(d)].

1722 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 22 [37], 23 [38], 30 [53(d)].

1723 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3008 [46]–3009 [2]; Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 30 [53(d)].

1724 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Draft BDS Review Committee Minutes’, 16 November 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Draft BDS Review Committee Minutes’, 22 January 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Draft BDS Review Committee Minutes’, 19 February 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1725 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Draft BDS Review Committee Minutes’, 19 February 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1726 The name ‘Digby’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023. Statement of ‘Digby’, 8 August 2022, 13 [41]; Email from ‘Digby’ to Patrick Ryan, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1727 Email from ‘Digby’ to Patrick Ryan, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1728 Email from Patrick Ryan to Greg Brown, 12 April 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1729 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing for the Minister’, 12 April 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1730 Patrick Ryan, Procedural Fairness Response, 12 July 2023, 2.

1731 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, Attachment 8, 1.

1732 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 31 [53(i)].

1733 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 23 [38].

1734 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 23 [38]; Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, Attachment 9 (Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 16 March 2019) 1.

1735 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, Attachment 9 (Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 16 March 2019) 2.

1736 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3006 [39].

1737 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, Attachment 9 (Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 16 March 2019) 1.

1738 Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, Attachment 9 (Email from Madeleine Gardiner to Patrick Ryan, 16 March 2019) 1.

1739 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3007 [1–6]; Statement of Madeleine Gardiner, 15 August 2022, 23 [38].

1740 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3007 [1–2].

1741 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3007 [6–19].

1742 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3008 [2–8]

1743 Transcript of Madeleine Gardiner, 22 August 2022, 3008 [10–44].

1744 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3609 [31–37].

1745 Email from Greg Brown to Madeleine Gardiner, 21 May 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Ginna Webster, 29 April 2022, 1 [7]. We discuss the Department’s Quality Improvement and Workforce Development team in Chapter 9.

1746 Email from Greg Brown to Madeleine Gardiner, 21 May 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1747 Statement of Ginna Webster, 13 January 2023, 44 [72].

1748 Letter from Leanne McLean to Ginna Webster, 22 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1749 Letter from Leanne McLean to Ginna Webster, 22 August 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1750 Letter from Leanne McLean to Ginna Webster, 22 August 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1751 Letter from Leanne McLean to Ginna Webster, 22 August 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1752 Letter from Leanne McLean to Ginna Webster, 22 August 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1753 Email from Administrative Support Officer, Commissioner for Children and Young People to CTECC, Department of Communities, 23 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Email from Executive Officer, Strategic Youth Services to Patrick Ryan and Madeleine Gardiner, 29 August 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1754 Email Patrick Ryan to former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 4 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1755 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary: Ashley Youth Detention Centre – Unit Bound Policy’, 4 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1756 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary: Ashley Youth Detention Centre – Unit Bound Policy’, 4 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1757 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary: Ashley Youth Detention Centre – Unit Bound Policy’, 4 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1758 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary: Ashley Youth Detention Centre – Unit Bound Policy’, 4 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1759 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary: Ashley Youth Detention Centre – Unit Bound Policy’, 4 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1760 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary: Ashley Youth Detention Centre – Unit Bound Policy’, 4 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1761 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing to the Secretary: Ashley Youth Detention Centre – Unit Bound Policy’, 4 September 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1762 Email from Patrick Ryan to former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 4 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a notice to produce.

1763 Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Issues Briefing for the Minister’, 4 September 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Patrick Ryan, ‘Draft Letter from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean’, 4 September 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1764 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, Annexure MP.77.001 (‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre – Unit Bound Policy’, Issues Briefing to Secretary, Department of Communities, 11 September 2019).

1765 Letter from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean, 11 September 2019.

1766 Letter from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean, 11 September 2019, 1.

1767 Letter from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean, 11 September 2019, 1.

1768 Letter from Michael Pervan to Leanne McLean, 11 September 2019, 1.

1769 Email from Leanne McLean to Patrick Ryan, 23 October 2019.

1770 The description of this incident is derived from the chronology prepared by James Cumming Investigation Services as part of its report to the Secretary. The Commission of Inquiry has relied on the factual findings made in that investigation except where otherwise stated: James Cumming Investigation Services, ‘Review into the Immediate and Post Management of a 13 December 2019 Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 26 March 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (referred to below as ‘James Cumming Investigation Report’).

1771 James Cumming Investigation Report, 26, 88.

1772 James Cumming Investigation Report, 94.

1773 The names ‘Arlo’, ‘Elijah’ and ‘Joseph’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. James Cumming Investigation Report, 1.

1774 James Cumming Investigation Report, 1, 12–13.

1775 James Cumming Investigation Report, 6–11, and 21–23.

1776 James Cumming Investigation Report, 12–13.

1777 James Cumming Investigation Report, 13.

1778 James Cumming Investigation Report, 12–13, 25, 67.

1779 James Cumming Investigation Report, 12.

1780 James Cumming Investigation Report, 10–11.

1781 James Cumming Investigation Report, 18.

1782 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing for the Minister: AYDC Incident – 13 December 2019’, 7 January 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; James Cumming Investigation Report, 18.

1783 James Cumming Investigation Report, 18.

1784 James Cumming Investigation Report, 14.

1785 The name ‘Chester’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. James Cumming Investigation Report, 14.

1786 The name ‘Maude’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. James Cumming Investigation Report, 15.

1787 James Cumming Investigation Report, 15.

1788 Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 13 December 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1789 Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 13 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1790 Email from Patrick Ryan to YJS Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 13 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1791 Email from Patrick Ryan to YJS Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 13 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1792 James Cumming Investigation Report, 15.

1793 James Cumming Investigation Report, 15.

1794 James Cumming Investigation Report, 15.

1795 James Cumming Investigation Report, 15.

1796 James Cumming Investigation Report, 16.

1797 James Cumming Investigation Report, 47–49.

1798 James Cumming Investigation Report, 47–49.

1799 James Cumming Investigation Report, 47–49.

1800 James Cumming Investigation Report, 37–38.

1801 James Cumming Investigation Report, 78–79.

1802 James Cumming Investigation Report, 47–49.

1803 James Cumming Investigation Report, 106.

1804 James Cumming Investigation Report, 37 [69].

1805 James Cumming Investigation Report, 16.

1806 James Cumming Investigation Report, 74.

1807 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 16 December 2019, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1808 Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 14 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 15 December 2019; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 16 December 2019, 1; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 17 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 18 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 19 December 2019, 1; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 20 December 2019, 1; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 21 December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 22 December 2019, 1; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 23 December 2019, 1; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 24 December 2019, 1.

1809 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 December 2019.

1810 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 19 December 2019.

1811 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing for the Minister: AYDC Incident – 13 December 2019’, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1812 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing for the Minister: AYDC Incident – 13 December 2019’, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1813 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing for the Minister: AYDC Incident – 13 December 2019’, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1814 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 64 [267].

1815 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 65 [268–269].

1816 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 65 [269].

1817 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 19 [82].

1818 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 19 [82].

1819 Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023.

1820 Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023.

1821 Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023.

1822 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Request for Approval to Appoint an Investigator to Investigate the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; and Associated Post Incident Management’, 20 February 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1823 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 23 [30.3]; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Attachment 2 – Background Information for the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1824 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 39 [61.3]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, Annexure 18 (Emails between Maude and Operations Manager, January 2020); Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Attachment 2 – Background Information for the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1825 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Attachment 2 – Background Information for the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Emails between Pamela Honan and former Conferencing Coordinator, 8 January 2020.

1826 James Cumming Investigation Report, 111.

1827 James Cumming Investigation Report, 112.

1828 James Cumming Investigation Report, 112.

1829 James Cumming Investigation Report, 112.

1830 James Cumming Investigation Report, 112.

1831 James Cumming Investigation Report, 113.

1832 James Cumming Investigation Report, 113.

1833 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 39 [61.3]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, Attachment 18 (Email from Patrick Ryan to Maude and Piers, 16 January 2020) 1.

1834 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 39 [61.5].

1835 Email from former Clinical Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, to former Head of Department for Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1836 Email from former Clinical Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Head of Department for Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1837 Email from former Clinical Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Head of Department for Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1838 Email from former Clinical Psychologist, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to former Head of Department for Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, 6 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1839 Statement of former Head of Department for Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, 22 August 2022, 17 [88].

1840 Statement of former Head of Department for Statewide Forensic Mental Health Services, 22 August 2022, 18 [89].

1841 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Request for Approval to Appoint an Investigator to Investigate the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; and Associated Post Incident Management’, 20 February 2020, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1842 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Request for Approval to Appoint an Investigator to Investigate the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; and Associated Post Incident Management’, 20 February 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1843 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Request for Approval to Appoint an Investigator to Investigate the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; and Associated Post Incident Management’, 20 February 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1844 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Request for Approval to Appoint an Investigator to Investigate the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; and Associated Post Incident Management’, 20 February 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1845 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Request for Approval to Appoint an Investigator to Investigate the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; and Associated Post Incident Management’, 20 February 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1846 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Request for Approval to Appoint an Investigator to Investigate the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; and Associated Post Incident Management’, 20 February 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1847 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Request for Approval to Appoint an Investigator to Investigate the Incident of 13 December 2019 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre; and Associated Post Incident Management’, 20 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1848 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to Secretary: Attachment 1 – Proposed Scope of Investigation’, 20 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; James Cumming Investigation Report, 1–2.

1849 James Cumming Investigation Report, 3; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2960 [46]–2961 [5].

1850 James Cumming Investigation Report, 2–3.

1851 Notice to produce served on the Department for Education, Children and Young People, 25 November 2022, 7.

1852 James Cumming Investigation Report, cover page.

1853 James Cumming Investigation Report, 14, 101.

1854 James Cumming Investigation Report, 14, 101.

1855 James Cumming Investigation Report, 15, 101.

1856 James Cumming Investigation Report, 94–95, 97.

1857 James Cumming Investigation Report, 96.

1858 James Cumming Investigation Report, 96–97.

1859 James Cumming Investigation Report, 36 [56], 43 [25].

1860 James Cumming Investigation Report, 114.

1861 James Cumming Investigation Report, 78–79.

1862 James Cumming Investigation Report, 21.

1863 James Cumming Investigation Report, 44, 55, 101–102.

1864 James Cumming Investigation Report, 96, 106–107.

1865 James Cumming Investigation Report, 46.

1866 James Cumming Investigation Report, 44.

1867 James Cumming Investigation Report, 40, 55.

1868 James Cumming Investigation Report, 79, 97.

1869 James Cumming Investigation Report, 97.

1870 James Cumming Investigation Report, 27.

1871 James Cumming Investigation Report, 78–79.

1872 James Cumming Investigation Report, 97.

1873 James Cumming Investigation Report, 79.

1874 James Cumming Investigation Report, 97–98.

1875 James Cumming Investigation Report, 111–112.

1876 James Cumming Investigation Report, 112.

1877 James Cumming Investigation Report, 117.

1878 James Cumming Investigation Report, 79.

1879 James Cumming Investigation Report, 117.

1880 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 19 August 2022, 29 [267].

1881 Statement of ‘Chester’, Annexure B (CV, 1 August 2022) 1.

1882 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Minister for Children and Youth: Update on AYDC Matters Referred by Cassy O’Connor’s Office’, undated (cleared 22 December 2021), produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a notice to produce.

1883 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Minister for Children and Youth: Update on AYDC Matters Referred by Cassy O’Connor’s Office’, undated (cleared 22 December 2021), 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a notice to produce.

1884 Department of Communities, ‘Issues Briefing to Minister for Children and Youth: Update on AYDC Matters Referred by Cassy O’Connor’s Office’, undated (cleared 22 December 2021), 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a notice to produce.

1885 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 33–34 [188].

1886 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment B Q23–25 (‘Meeting to Discuss the Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on 13 December 2019, and the Associated Post Incident Management’, Minute to Secretary, Department of Communities, 11 February 2022) 1.

1887 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment D Q23–25 (‘Finalising Matter – Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on 13 December 2019, and the Associated Post Incident Management’, Minute to Secretary, Department of Communities, 4 April 2022) 2.

1888 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment D Q23–25 (‘Finalising Matter – Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on 13 December 2019, and the Associated Post Incident Management’, Minute to Secretary, Department of Communities, 4 April 2022) 2.

1889 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment D Q23–25 (‘Finalising Matter – Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on 13 December 2019, and the Associated Post Incident Management’, Minute to Secretary, Department of Communities, 4 April 2022) 2.

1890 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment D Q23–25 (‘Finalising Matter – Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on 13 December 2019, and the Associated Post Incident Management’, Minute to Secretary, Department of Communities, 4 April 2022) 2.

1891 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment D Q23–25 (‘Finalising Matter – Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on 13 December 2019, and the Associated Post Incident Management’, Minute to Secretary, Department of Communities, 4 April 2022) 1.

1892 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment D Q23–25 (‘Finalising Matter – Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre on 13 December 2019, and the Associated Post Incident Management’, Minute to Secretary, Department of Communities, 4 April 2022) 6.

1893 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment E Q23–25 (Letter from Michael Pervan to Patrick Ryan, 4 April 2022) 2–3.

1894 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment G Q23–25 (Letter from Michael Pervan to Chester, 28 September 2021) 1.

1895 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment G Q23–25 (Letter from Michael Pervan to Chester, 28 September 2021) 1.

1896 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 34 [190].

1897 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 34 [188].

1898 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 34 [191].

1899 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 40 [63.4].

1900 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 40 [63.4].

1901 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 40 [63.4(c)].

1902 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 41 [64.2].

1903 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 41 [64.3].

1904 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 41 [64.4].

1905 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2959 [24–25].

1906 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2959 [31–44].

1907 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 25 August 2022, 3455 [33–37].

1908 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 67 [276].

1909 Department of Communities, ‘Youth Justice Act 1997: Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, 16 December 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 2.

1910 Department of Communities, ‘Youth Justice Act 1997: Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, 16 December 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 2.

1911 Department of Communities, ‘Youth Justice Act 1997: Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, 16 December 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 2.

1912 Department of Communities, ‘Youth Justice Act 1997: Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, 16 December 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 3.

1913 Department of Communities, ‘Youth Justice Act 1997: Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, 16 December 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 6.

1914 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 16 December 2019, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1915 James Cumming Investigation Report, 44, 55, 101–102.

1916 James Cumming Investigation Report, 96, 106–107.

1917 James Cumming Investigation Report, 46.

1918 James Cumming Investigation Report, 46.

1919 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 9 [53(d)].

1920 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 6 [20(a)], 13 [43(d)].

1921 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1922 Children and Youth Services, ‘Form: Authorisation for Extension of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1923 Department of Communities, ‘Youth Justice Act 1997: Instrument of Revocation and Delegation – Detention Centre Manager’, 16 December 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 2.

1924 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 49 [75.2].

1925 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Isolation’, 1 July 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1926 The summary of this event is derived from an internal incident report prepared in relation to this event, except where otherwise stated: Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1927 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1928 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1929 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1930 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1931 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1932 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1933 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1934 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1935 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1936 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1937 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1938 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1939 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1940 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1941 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1942 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1943 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1944 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1945 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1946 Email from Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member to Ashley Youth Detention Centre Operations Management, 7 March 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1947 Former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Family Contact Information’, 6 March 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1948 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1949 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1950 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1951 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1952 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1953 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Incident Report’, 7 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (‘7 March 2020 Incident Report’).

1954 Statement of former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 February 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1955 World Health Organization, ‘WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19’ (Media Release, 11 March 2020) <https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020>.

1956 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 29 [267].

1957 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 1 [10].

1958 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 1 [10].

1959 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 29 [270].

1960 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 29 [270]; Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 March 2020.

1961 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 29 [270].

1962 Statement of Patrick Ryan, 18 August 2022, 29 [270].

1963 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 48 [73.3].

1964 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, Annexure 23 (Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 March 2020), Annexure 24 (Emails from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 March 2020).

1965 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 48 [73.3]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2965 [1–3].

1966 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, Annexure 23 (Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 March 2020).

1967 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 24 [31.7], 26 [34.4], 48 [73.3–73.4] and [73.6].

1968 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2965 [8–9], [17–24].

1969 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2965 [8–9], [17–33].

1970 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, Annexure 24 (Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 March 2020).

1971 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, Annexure 24 (Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 March 2020). Refer also to Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 48 [73.4].

1972 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 48 [73.4]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, Annexure 24 (Email from Patrick Ryan to Pamela Honan, 6 March 2020).

1973 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 48 [73.4].

1974 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 48 [73.4].

1975 Meeting minutes, 17 December 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1976 Meeting minutes, 17 December 2020, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1977 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3183 [45]–3184 [22].

1978 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3184 [30–36].

1979 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3184 [30–36].

1980 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3184 [30–36].

1981 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2966 [4–8].

1982 Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 7 March 2020; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 8 March 2020; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 9 March 2020; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 10 March 2020; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 11 March 2020; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 12 March 2020; Children and Youth Services, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Daily Roll’, 13 March 2020.

1983 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2966 [4–11].

1984 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 48 [73.7]–49 [73.8].

1985 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022, 16 [107(e)].

1986 Email from Fiona Atkins to Pamela Honan, 7 March 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1987 Email from Fiona Atkins to Pamela Honan, 7 March 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1988 Email from Fiona Atkins to Pamela Honan, 7 March 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1989 Email from Fiona Atkins to Pamela Honan, 7 March 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1990 Former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Statement’, 8 February 2021, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1991 Ashley Youth Detention Centre ’Incident Report’, 8 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1992 ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Incident Report’, 8 March 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Note that the original wording here refers to ‘Saturday morning 8th of March’; this is considered an error.

1993 ‘Minutes of Debrief from Incident Friday 6/3/2020’, undated, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1994 ‘Minutes of Debrief from Incident Friday 6/3/2020’, undated, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1995 ‘Minutes of Debrief from Incident Friday 6/3/2020’, undated, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1996 ‘Minutes of Debrief from Incident Friday 6/3/2020’, undated, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1997 ‘Minutes of Debrief from Incident Friday 6/3/2020’, undated, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1998 ‘Minutes of Debrief from Incident Friday 6/3/2020’, undated, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

1999 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 68 [280].

2000 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2967 [29]–2969 [6].

2001 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2966 [42–46].

2002 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2967 [24–27].

2003 Janise Mitchell, Through the Fence and into Their Lives: Ashley Youth Detention Centre Trauma Informed Practice Framework, Discovery Phase’, April 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2004 Janise Mitchell, ‘Through the Fence and into Their Lives: Ashley Youth Detention Centre Trauma Informed Practice Framework, Discovery Phase, April 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2005 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 50 [77.1]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2967 [2–9].

2006 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2967 [35]–2968 [2].

2007 ‘Minutes of Debrief from Incident Friday 6/3/2020’, undated, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2008 Department of Communities, ‘Employment Histories – AYDC’, 29 March 2022, 4, 10, 22, 31, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre staff member, ‘Curriculum Vitae’, undated, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Ashley Youth Detention Centre Organisation Chart’, 25 July 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2009 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38.

2010 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 72 [247].

2011 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 72 [248].

2012 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 73 [249].

2013 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 62 [256].

2014 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 62 [257].

2015 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 62 [257].

2016 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 63 [258].

2017 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 63 [259].

2018 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 64 [263].

2019 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, 64 [264–265].

2020 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3531 [21–29].

2021 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2960 [6–9].

2022 Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, Annexure L (‘Standard Operating Procedure #15 Isolation’, 12 March 2015) 2.

2023 United Nations Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Australia, UN Doc C/AUS/CO/6 (5 December 2022) 11 [37].

2024 United Nations Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Australia, UN Doc C/AUS/CO/6 (5 December 2022) 11 [37].

2025 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 12 July 2023, 3.

2026 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 12 July 2023, 5.

2027 Letter from Timothy Bullard to Commission of Inquiry, 3 August 2023, 1–2.

2028 Letter from Timothy Bullard to Commission of Inquiry, 3 August 2023, 2.

2029 Email from former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Patrick Ryan, 7 March 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2030 Letter from Mark Morrissey to Michael Pervan, 6 April 2016, 2–3.

2031 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 10 [22].

2032 James Cumming Investigation Report, 97.

2033 Commissioner for Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 12 July 2023.

2034 Department for Education, Children and Young People, Procedural Fairness Response, 3 August 2023.

2035 Lusted v ZS [2013] TASMC 38, 8 [16], 9 [18].

Case study 4: Use of force in Ashley Youth Detention Centre

2036 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final Report, December 2017) vol 2, 157.

2037 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final Report, December 2017) vol 15, 43.

2038 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final Report, December 2017) vol 15, 29.

2039 Donald Palmer, Valerie Feldman and Gemma McKibbin, The Role of Organisational Culture in Child Sexual Abuse in Institutional Contexts (Final Report to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, December 2016) 38.

2040 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final Report, 2017) vol 15, 39; Donald Palmer, Valerie Feldman and Gemma McKibbin, The Role of Organisational Culture in Child Sexual Abuse in Institutional Contexts (Final Report to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, December 2016) 53–55.

2041 Donald Palmer and Valerie Feldman, ‘Toward a More Comprehensive Analysis of the Role of Organizational Culture in Child Sexual Abuse in Institutional Contexts’ (2017) 74 Child Abuse and Neglect 23, 29.

2042 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final Report, December 2017) vol 15, 104.

2043 Refer to discussion in Chapter 12 for examples of de-escalation techniques, such as distracting or talking calmly to the individual.

2044 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 24 (2019) on Children’s Rights in the Child Justice System, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/24 (18 September 2019) 16 [95](f); Juan E Méndez, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc A/HRC/28/68 (5 March 2015) 21 [86](f).

2045 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 132.

2046 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 37 [8.3.1].

2047 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 37 [8.3].

2048 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 37 [8.3.5].

2049 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 37 [8.3.2].

2050 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 37 [8.3.8], [8.3.9].

2051 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 37 [8.3.14].

2052 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 37 [8.3.11].

2053 Office of the Custodial Inspector, Inspection Standards for Youth Custodial Centres in Tasmania (July 2018) 37 [8.3.10], [8.3.12].

2054 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Physical Force’, 10 December 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2055 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Physical Force’, 10 December 2018, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2056 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Physical Force’, 10 December 2018, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2057 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Physical Force’, 10 December 2018, 2–3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2058 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Physical Force’, 10 December 2018, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Children and Youth Services, ‘Practice Advice: Minimising the Use of Physical Force and Restraint’, 1 July 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2059 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Physical Force’, 10 December 2018, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2060 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Physical Force’, 10 December 2018, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2061 Children and Youth Services, ‘Procedure: Use of Physical Force’, 10 December 2018, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2062 The name ‘Ben’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 2 [9]–3 [10].

2063 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 3 [14], 4 [18], 5 [24–25]; Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 1, 4–7.

2064 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 2.

2065 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 7.

2066 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 7.

2067 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 7.

2068 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 4.

2069 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 4.

2070 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 6.

2071 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 6.

2072 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 5.

2073 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5 [22], Attachment [Ben]–001 (‘Ben’, Handwritten Submission to the National Royal Commission, undated) 5.

2074 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 5 [22].

2075 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [18–19].

2076 The name ‘Simon’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022; Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 1 [4].

2077 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2757 [32–37].

2078 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 2 [9]; Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2757 [33].

2079 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [11].

2080 Transcript of ‘Simon’, 18 August 2022, 2758 [38–43].

2081 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [11].

2082 Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [14].

2083 The names ‘Max’, ‘Warren’ and ‘Oscar’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication orders, 18 August 2022 and 30 August 2023. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [33]; Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16]; Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [11]. In relation to Oscar, the Commission of Inquiry received the information on the basis that the individual would remain anonymous. Consequently, the State has not been provided with identifying information in relation to this individual and has not had the opportunity to fully consider or respond to the details of the incidents alleged.

2084 The name ‘Charlotte’ is a pseudonym, Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

2085 Transcript of ‘Charlotte’, 24 August 2022, 3203 [6–13], 3205 [43–47]; Statement of ‘Charlotte’, 31 January 2022, 3.

2086 The name ‘Fred’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 4 [21–24].

2087 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 4 [23]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3342 [17–19].

2088 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [18].

2089 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [18].

2090 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [19]; Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3345 [24–31].

2091 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3345 [10–14].

2092 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 3 [18].

2093 Statement of ‘Fred’, 24 August 2022, 2 [12].

2094 Transcript of ‘Fred’, 25 August 2022, 3342 [28–29], 3343 [21–26].

2095 Statement of ‘Oscar’, 29 July 2022, 2 [6]; Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3026 [29–41]; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 4 [20–21].

2096 The name ‘Warren’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [9].

2097 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001, 2–3.

2098 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001, 3.

2099 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, Attachment [Warren]–001, 2.

2100 The name ‘Otis’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023.

2101 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 3 [15].

2102 Statement of ‘Otis’, 23 August 2022, 4 [19].

2103 Transcript of Brett Robinson, 17 June 2022, 1542 [34]–1543 [1].

2104 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 4–5 [24].

2105 Statement of Brett Robinson, 2 June 2022, 5 [24].

2106 The name ‘Erin’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [21–27].

2107 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3027 [23–27]; File note of telephone conversation from the Commission of Inquiry to ‘Erin’, 18 July 2023.

2108 The name ‘Max’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 7 [31].

2109 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 7 [31].

2110 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 9 [39].

2111 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 9 [39–40].

2112 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 9 [40].

2113 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2114 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; WorkSafe Tasmania, ‘Notified Workplace Incident: Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 8 February 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2115 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 3, 69, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2116 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2117 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2118 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2119 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2120 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 14, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2121 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 15–17, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2122 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 25, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2123 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 25–26, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2124 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 27, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2125 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 27, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2126 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 27, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2127 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 27–28, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2128 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 28, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2129 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 35–36, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2130 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 28, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2131 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 28, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2132 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 28, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2133 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 33, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2134 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2135 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2136 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2137 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 34, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2138 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2139 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2140 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2141 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2142 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2143 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2144 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2145 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2146 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2147 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 12, 14, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2148 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 12, 14, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2149 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 12, 14, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2150 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 12, 14–15, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2151 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 13, 15, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2152 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 13, 15, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2153 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 13, 15, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2154 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Report to the Minister for Human Services – Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Review of Incidents 14–15 July 2016’, 19 August 2016, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2155 Department of Communities, ‘ED5 Case Tracker’ (Spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2156 Department of Communities, ‘Magistrate’s Decision’, 14 July 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2157 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2158 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2159 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 3, 42, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce

2160 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2161 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2162 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report: Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2163 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 7, 8, 11, 22–24, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2164 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2165 Children and Youth Services, ‘Critical Incident Investigation Report – Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, undated, 30, 32, 36, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2166 WorkSafe Tasmania, ‘Notified Workplace Incident: Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 8 February 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2167 WorkSafe Tasmania, ‘Notified Workplace Incident: Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 8 February 2017, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2168 WorkSafe Tasmania, ‘Notified Workplace Incident: Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 8 February 2017, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2169 WorkSafe Tasmania, ‘Notified Workplace Incident: Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 8 February 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2170 WorkSafe Tasmania, ‘Notified Workplace Incident: Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 8 February 2017, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2171 WorkSafe Tasmania, ‘Notified Workplace Incident: Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, 8 February 2017, Annexure A, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2172 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2173 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2174 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2175 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2176 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2177 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2178 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2179 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2180 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2181 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2182 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Note that the review appears to identify this incident as occurring in December 2018, not December 2017. Given the date of the other incidents and the date of the review, we consider this is an error.

2183 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2184 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2185 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 17, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2186 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 15, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2187 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2188 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2189 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2190 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2191 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2192 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2193 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2194 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 4, 14 produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2195 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2196 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Review of Incidents at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, March 2018, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2197 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2198 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2199 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2200 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 1–3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2201 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2202 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 12, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2203 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2204 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2205 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 7–8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2206 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. This is a reference to Heather Harker, ‘Independent Review of Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Tasmania’, June 2015, 2.

2207 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce (emphasis omitted) quoting The Ashley+ Approach Custodial Youth Justice Organisational Change Program, 15.

2208 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 9, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2209 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2210 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2211 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2212 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2213 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 13, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

Case study 5: A response to staff concerns about Ashley Youth Detention Centre

2214 The name ‘Alysha’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 5 [18].

2215 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, Attachment A–1 (‘Statement of Duties: Clinical Practice Consultant and Support Office’, Department of Communities, August 2018).

2216 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 79 [402].

2217 Now the Department for Education, Children and Young People.

2218 The name ‘Lester’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

2219 Letter from lawyer at Odin Lawyers to Paul Turner, 20 September 2021, 3, 5.

2220 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 81 [414].

2221 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 85 [430].

2222 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 83 [422].

2223 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 5 [19].

2224 Peter Gutwein, ‘Independent Review Confirmed’ (Media Release, 8 September 2021) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/site_resources_2015/additional_releases/independent_review_confirmed>.

2225 Melanie Bartlett, ‘Independent Review into Processes Conducted by the Department of Communities Tasmania in Response to the Complaints Made by the Employee Known as “Alysha”’, 22 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2226 Youth Justice Act 1997 ss 3 (definition of ‘guardian’), 83(3).

2227 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 124(1).

2228 Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 1 [1.2.3].

2229 Letter from lawyer at Odin Lawyers to Paul Turner, 20 September 2021.

2230 Letter from lawyer at Odin Lawyers to Paul Turner, 20 September 2021, 1–5.

2231 Letter from lawyer at Odin Lawyers to Paul Turner, 20 September 2021, 7–9.

2232 Letter from lawyer at Odin Lawyers to Paul Turner, 20 September 2021, 5–9.

2233 Letter from lawyer at Odin Lawyers to Paul Turner, 20 September 2021; Statement of Department for Education, Children and Young People, 6 February 2023, 22.

2234 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, Annexure MP.108.002 (Report of the Bowen Investigation, Peter Bowen, 30 March 2022).

2235 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, Annexure MP.108.002 (Report of the Bowen Investigation, Peter Bowen, 30 March 2022) 2 [5–6].

2236 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, Annexure MP.108.002 (Report of the Bowen Investigation, Peter Bowen, 30 March 2022) 16.

2237 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, Annexure MP.108.002 (Report of the Bowen Investigation, Peter Bowen, 30 March 2022) 16 [58–60].

2238 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [180(a)].

2239 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2240 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2241 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2242 Department of Communities, ‘Draft Issues Briefing to Minister: Update on AYDC Matters Referred by Cassy O’Connor’s Office’, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2243 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [‘Alysha’] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 1 [1–2], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2244 Letter from Kathy Baker to ‘Alysha’, 30 June 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2245 Melanie Bartlett, ‘Independent Review into Processes Conducted by the Department of Communities Tasmania in Response to the Complaints Made by the Employee Known as “Alysha”’, 22 October 2021, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2246 Melanie Bartlett, ‘Independent Review into Processes Conducted by the Department of Communities Tasmania in Response to the Complaints Made by the Employee Known as “Alysha”’, 22 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2247 Melanie Bartlett, ‘Independent Review into Processes Conducted by the Department of Communities Tasmania in Response to the Complaints Made by the Employee Known as “Alysha”’, 22 October 2021, 16, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2248 Melanie Bartlett, ‘Independent Review into Processes Conducted by the Department of Communities Tasmania in Response to the Complaints Made by the Employee Known as “Alysha”’, 22 October 2021, 17, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2249 Melanie Bartlett, ‘Independent Review into Processes Conducted by the Department of Communities Tasmania in Response to the Complaints Made by the Employee Known as “Alysha”’, 22 October 2021, 17–18, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2250 Melanie Bartlett, ‘Independent Review into Processes Conducted by the Department of Communities Tasmania in Response to the Complaints Made by the Employee Known as “Alysha”’, 22 October 2021, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2251 Melanie Bartlett, ‘Independent Review into Processes Conducted by the Department of Communities Tasmania in Response to the Complaints Made by the Employee Known as “Alysha”’, 22 October 2021, 35–36, 60, 63, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2252 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 85 [430].

2253 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 14 [46.1].

2254 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3435 [22–23].

2255 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [176].

2256 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2257 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3435 [13–26].

2258 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 30–1 [176].

2259 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2260 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 23 [128].

2261 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 23–24 [131]; Kathy Baker, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023, 9.

2262 Email from Mandy Clarke to Kathy Baker et al, 21 September 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2263 Email from Mandy Clarke to Kathy Baker et al, 21 September 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2264 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2265 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2266 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2267 Request for statement served on Michael Pervan, 2 August 2022, 18 [46(o)]; Request for statement served on Mandy Clarke, 2 August 2022, 18 [46(o)]; Request for statement served on Kathy Baker, 2 August 2022, 18 [46(o)].

2268 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [164].

2269 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 15 [47].

2270 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3435 [13–26].

2271 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 30 [176].

2272 Statement of Department for Education, Children and Young People, 6 February 2023, 41 [6.1].

2273 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2274 Request for statement served on Michael Pervan, 2 August 2022, 16–18 [46]; Request for statement served on Mandy Clarke, 2 August 2022, 16–18 [46]; Request for statement served on Kathy Baker, 2 August 2022, 16–18 [46].

2275 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [158].

2276 Request for statement served on Mandy Clarke, 2 August 2022, 16–18 [46].

2277 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 13 [45].

2278 Mandy Clarke, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023.

2279 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [180(c)].

2280 Request for statement served on State of Tasmania, 19 October 2022, 5–6 [3].

2281 Statement of the Department for Education, Children and Young People, 6 February 2023, 32–33.

2282 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [180]; Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 15 [48].

2283 Statement of Department for Education, Children and Young People, 6 February 2023, 32–33 [18].

2284 Statement of Department for Education, Children and Young People, 6 February 2023, 32–33.

2285 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 15 [82(a)].

2286 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 42 [233].

2287 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 43 [236], 47 [274–279].

2288 Transcript of Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3442 [18–21].

2289 Kathy Baker, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023, 6–7.

2290 Letter from Kathy Baker to ‘Alysha’, 30 June 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2291 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [180(a)].

2292 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [180(b)].

2293 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31–32 [180].

2294 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [180(c)]; Kathy Baker, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023, 12.

2295 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [180(d)].

2296 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 32 [180(f)–180(g)].

2297 Letter from Kathy Baker to ‘Alysha’, 30 June 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2298 Statement of Department for Education, Children and Young People, 6 February 2023, 22 [2].

2299 Integrity Commission, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 27.

2300 Integrity Commission, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 27.

2301 Integrity Commission, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 27.

2302 Integrity Commission, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 27.

2303 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [166(i)].

2304 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 31 [180].

2305 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 17 August 2022, 1.

2306 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 15 [46.11].

2307 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 32 [181].

2308 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 32 [182].

2309 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 32 [181], 33 [187].

2310 Minister administering the State Service Act 2000, Employment Direction No. 5: Procedures for the Investigation and Determination of Whether an Employee Has Breached the Code of Conduct (13/3512, 4 February 2013) cl 7.1; Integrity Commission, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 9; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 47 [274].

2311 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 46 [273].

2312 Integrity Commission, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 9.

2313 Integrity Commission, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 10.

2314 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 14 [46.2].

2315 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint made by [Alysha] regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2316 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [158].

2317 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 29 [168].

2318 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 14 [46.5].

2319 Transcript of Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3432 [43–44].

2320 Transcript of Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3432 [44–45].

2321 Transcript of Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3432 [46–47].

2322 Transcript of Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3441 [19–21].

2323 Integrity Commission, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 9.

2324 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint made by [Alysha] regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2325 Statement of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 14 November 2022, Attachment (Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 9 January 2020).

2326 Statement of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 14 November 2022, Attachment (Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 9 January 2020).

2327 The name ‘Ira’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 14 November 2022, Attachment (Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 9 January 2020).

2328 Statement of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 14 November 2022, Attachment (Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 9 January 2020).

2329 Email from Manager, Human Resources and Workplace Relations, Department of Communities to ‘Alysha’, 9 January 2020.

2330 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Manager, Human Resources and Workplace Relations, Department of Communities and Pamela Honan, 9 January 2020.

2331 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 24 [135].

2332 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2333 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [158].

2334 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 29 [167].

2335 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 14, [46.4].

2336 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 14, [46.4].

2337 Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023.

2338 Kathy Baker, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023, 11.

2339 Email from ‘Alysha’ to Manager, Human Resources and Workplace Relations, Department of Communities and Pamela Honan, 9 January 2020.

2340 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 s 14(2).

2341 Letter from lawyer at Odin Lawyers to Paul Turner, 20 September 2021, 2.

2342 Letter from lawyer at Odin Lawyers to Paul Turner, 20 September 2021, 3.

2343 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2344 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2345 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 30 [173].

2346 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2347 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2348 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Annexure 1.14 (Minutes and actions from meeting re AYDC HR concerns, 26 October 2020) 2–3.

2349 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Annexure 13 (Email from Policy & Project Officer, Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit to Mandy Clarke, 1 April 2021).

2350 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [167].

2351 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 32 [184–185]; Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 14 [46.6], 15 [46.12].

2352 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 32 [184–185].

2353 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3435 [5].

2354 Transcript of Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3441 [16–23].

2355 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2356 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2357 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2358 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2359 Letter from Michael Pervan to ‘Lester’, 9 November 2020, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2360 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [163].

2361 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [157].

2362 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 13 [45].

2363 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 13 [45].

2364 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 28 [163].

2365 Statement of Michael Pervan, 24 August 2022, [169–170].

2366 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 33 [187].

2367 In a letter to the Commission, Ms Baker stated she disputes this observation; Kathy Baker, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023, 12.

Case study 6: A complaint by Max (a pseudonym)

2368 The name ‘Max’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

2369 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 1 [3].

2370 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [23].

2371 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [23].

2372 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 5 [24].

2373 Refer to Children, Youth and Families, ‘Procedure: AYDC Significant Incident Response’, undated, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2374 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [26].

2375 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 7 [30–31].

2376 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 8 [36].

2377 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [44–45].

2378 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [44].

2379 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [45].

2380 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [45].

2381 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [45]; Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3124 [8–12].

2382 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10 [46]; Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3124 [15–17].

2383 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 10–11 [46].

2384 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3124 [20–27].

2385 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [47].

2386 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [47].

2387 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3125 [14–16].

2388 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [47].

2389 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [48].

2390 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [48].

2391 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [48].

2392 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [49].

2393 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3125 [24–26].

2394 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [48].

2395 Custodial Youth Justice Services, ‘Procedure: Calling a Code’, 6 February 2018, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2396 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [49].

2397 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [49].

2398 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [49].

2399 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [49].

2400 Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 11 [49–50].

2401 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3125 [34], 3126 [43].

2402 Letter from Leanne McLean to the Commission of Inquiry (Attachment – ‘Timeline’), 23 September 2022.

2403 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3321 [1–5].

2404 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3322 [40–41], 3326 [36–40].

2405 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3322 [34–40], 3326 [14–25]

2406 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3326 [42–47], 3327 [1–3].

2407 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3323 [13–26].

2408 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3323 [13–26].

2409 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3323 [28–30].

2410 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3323 [42–47], 3324 [1–16].

2411 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3328 [43–47], 3329 [1–3].

2412 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3328 [45–47], 3329 [1–13].

2413 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3335 [44–46].

2414 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3329 [43–45].

2415 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3329 [44]–3330 [6].

2416 Email from Leanne McLean to Pamela Honan, 15 November 2021, 2.

2417 Email from Leanne McLean to Pamela Honan, 15 November 2021, 1.

2418 Email from Leanne McLean to Pamela Honan, 15 November 2021, 1–2.

2419 Email from Pamela Honan to Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre (including forward of Leanne McLean email to Pamela Honan), 22 November 2021.

2420 Email from Pamela Honan to Leanne McLean, 25 November 2021.

2421 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 1–3.

2422 Transcript of Leanne McLean, 24 August 2022, 3330 [34–38].

2423 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2424 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2425 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2426 Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 June 2023, 11.

2427 Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 June 2023, 11.

2428 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2429 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2430 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2431 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2432 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2433 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2434 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2435 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2436 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘List of Incidents from 1 October 2021 to 31 October 2021’, 9 November 2021; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘List of Incidents from 1 November 2021 to 30 November 2021’, 13 December 2021.

2437 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘List of Incidents from 1 October 2021 to 31 October 2021’, 9 November 2021; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘List of Incidents from 1 November 2021 to 30 November 2021’, 13 December 2021.

2438 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 4 October 2021, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Max]’, 6 October 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 2 November 2021, 2; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Centre Support Team Minutes’, 8 November 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2439 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘List of Incidents from 1 November 2021 to 30 November 2021’, 13 December 2021, compared to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘List of Incidents from 1 October 2021 to 31 October 2021’, 9 November 2021.

2440 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Multi-Disciplinary Team Minutes: Signs of Safety Assessment Map [Max]’, 1 December 2021, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Custodial Risk Summary and Management Plan [Max]’, 1 December 2021, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Custodial Risk Summary and Management Plan [Max]’, 3 December 2021, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Refer also to Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘List of Incidents from 1 November 2021 to 30 November 2021’, 13 December 2021.

2441 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2442 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2443 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2444 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2445 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 8 November 2021.

2446 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 2.

2447 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2448 Transcript of Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre [date omitted].

2449 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 8 [15(a)]; Email from Leanne McLean to Pamela Honan, 15 November 2021, 1.

2450 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 8 [15(b)].

2451 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 8 [15(b)].

2452 Email from Pamela Honan to Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 22 November 2021, 1.

2453 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 2.

2454 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 2.

2455 Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Interim Centre Support Team Minutes’, 27 October 2021, 1; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Custodial Risk Summary and Management Plan [Max]’, 27 October 2021, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘List of Incidents from 1 October 2021 to 31 October 2021’, 9 November 2021.

2456 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 2.

2457 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 2.

2458 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 2.

2459 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 3.

2460 Email from Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre to Pamela Honan, 23 November 2021, 3.

2461 Email from Pamela Honan to Leanne McLean, 25 November 2021, 1.

2462 Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 29 June 2023, 1.

2463 Email from Pamela Honan to Leanne McLean, 25 November 2021, 1.

2464 Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 29 June 2023, 1.

2465 Email from Pamela Honan to Leanne McLean, 25 November 2021, 1. Refer to Chapter 10 for a description of the behaviour management system.

2466 Request for statement served on Pamela Honan, 21 October 2022, 9 [15(b)].

2467 Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 29 June 2023, 1.

2468 The name ‘Alysha’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

Case study 7: Allegations of child sexual abuse against staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre

2469 The name ‘Walter’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

2470 The names ‘Ira’, ‘Lester’ and ‘Stan’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

2471 Notice to produce served on the Tasmanian Government, 9 March 2022, 9 [22]–10 [23]; Request for statement served on Michael Pervan, 2 August 2022, 20 [60].

2472 Notice to produce served on the Tasmanian Government, 9 March 2022, 6 [13]; Department of Justice, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-004, Item 13’, 5 April 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2473 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 21 [92]–22 [95], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Letter from Craig Limkin, Acting Secretary, Department of Premier and Cabinet to the Commission of Inquiry, 20 July 2023.

2474 Statement of Youth Worker, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 2 June 2022, 6 [25]; Statement of Youth Worker, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 2 June 2022, 5 [25]; Statement of Youth Worker, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 June 2022, 7 [38]; Statement of former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 27–28 [103]; Statement of former Youth Worker, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 8 [121]; Statement of former Project Officer, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 15 August 2022, 39 [120].

2475 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse: Criminal Justice ReportExecutive Summary and Parts I and II (Report, August 2017) 11; William O’Donohue, Caroline Cummings and Brendan Willis, ‘The Frequency of False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse: A Critical Review’ (2018) Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 27(5), 459–475; Claire Ferguson and John Malouff, ‘Assessing Police Classifications of Sexual Assault Reports: A Meta-Analysis of False Reporting Rates’ (2016) Archives of Sexual Behaviour 45, 1185–1193.

2476 Statement of former Manager, Professional Services and Policy, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 8 August 2022, 19 [62]; Statement of Youth Worker, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 2 June 2022, 4 [21]; Statement of Youth Worker, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 29 May 2022, 9 [21].

2477 Transcript of Sarah Spencer, 18 August 2022, 2820 [2–26]; Ivan Dean, Submission No. 23 to Legislative Council Sessional Committee Government Administration B, Inquiry into Tasmanian Adult Imprisonment and Youth Detention Matters (March 2023) 4.

2478 Statement of Youth Worker, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 29 May 2022, 14 [45]; Statement of Operations Manager, Ashley Youth Detention Centre, 1 August 2022, 11 [84]; Statement of Fiona Atkins, 15 August 2022, 15 [48].

2479 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4[19]; Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 2 [8], [11]. The names ‘Ben’ and ‘Warren’ are pseudonyms; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

2480 Transcript of ‘Max’, 23 August 2022, 3123 [24–43]. The name ‘Max’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 4 [19]; Call with anonymous, 24 August 2022.

2481 The name ‘Alysha’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 64 [325–326].

2482 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 66 [335–337], [340], 68 [348–349].

2483 Tasmania, Tasmanian Government Gazette, No 21 907, 28 August 2019, 498; State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 23 August 2023, 4.

2484 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 7 June 2022, 2 [3].

2485 Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘About us’ (Web Page) <https://www.ombudsman.tas.gov.au/about-us>; Office of the Custodial Inspector, ‘About us’ (Web Page) <https://www.custodialinspector.tas.gov.au/about_us>.

2486 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’, 29 October 2021 (Excel spreadsheet), produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-004, Item 13’, 5 April 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2487 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 9–10 [34], 23 [97], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2488 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 5, 12–13.

2489 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2490 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’, 29 October 2021 (Excel spreadsheet), produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-004, Item 13’, 5 April 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 9–10 [34], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2491 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2492 Youth Justice Act 1997 ss 3 (definition of ‘guardian’ para (c)), 83(3).

2493 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 s 6.

2494 Refer generally to Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997, in particular Part 7, and Youth Justice Act 1997, in particular Part 6, Division 3.

2495 Youth Justice Act 1997 s 124(1).

2496 Refer to Howard v Jarvis (1958) 98 CLR 177, 183; Campbell v Northern Territory of Australia [2018] FCA 85, [64] cited in Neil Morrissey, ‘The Duty of Care Owed to Prisoners by Prison Authorities’ (2018) 147 Precedent 39, 40. Refer also to Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final Report, December 2017) vol 15, 10, 62.

2497 Civil Liability Act 2002 pt 10C div 2, as inserted by the Justice Legislation Amendment (Organisational Liability for Child Abuse) Act 2019 s 6.

2498 Civil Liability Act 2002 pt 10C div 3, as inserted by the Justice Legislation Amendment (Organisational Liability for Child Abuse) Act 2019 s 6.

2499 Work Health and Safety Act 2012 s 19.

2500 Criminal Code Act 1924 s 105A, as inserted by the Criminal Code and Related Legislation Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2019 s 7.

2501 Criminal Code Act 1924 s 105A(3).

2502 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 53A, as inserted by the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Amendment Act 2015 s 33, later repealed and substituted by the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Amendment Act 2019 s 38.

2503 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 11A(1)(b).

2504 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 ss 28, 33, 46(2), 46(5).

2505 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 3.

2506 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 3.

2507 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 2; Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 49(2).

2508 National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Cth) ss 6, 92, 97, 111.

2509 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Regulations 2014 reg 5A.

2510 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 3 (definition of ‘reporting body’).

2511 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 2. Refer also to Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Regulations 2014 reg 4H.

2512 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 53A, as inserted by the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Amendment Act 2015 s 33, later repealed and substituted by the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Amendment Act 2019 s 38.

2513 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 53A(2).

2514 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 53A, as enacted.

2515 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3213 [6–13].

2516 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3213 [32]–3214 [1].

2517 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 53A, as inserted by the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Amendment Act 2015 s 33, later repealed and substituted by the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Amendment Act 2019 s 38.

2518 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 13 [78–84]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 84 (Emails between Jacqueline Allen and Risk Assessment Officer, Registration to Work with Vulnerable People, 11 August 2020).

2519 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3216 [24–25].

2520 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 ss 28(1A)(d), 53B(1) and Registration to Work with Vulnerable People (Risk Assessment for Child-related Activities) Order 2014 ord 5, which refers to the information the Registrar can take into account when determining an application for registration or conducting an additional risk assessment for a person who is already registered under the Act, some of which would only be available to the Registrar if an agency had notified them of this information (prior to any duty to report, which only applies when a person is already registered): ords 2(m), 5(1)(l).

2521 Personal Information Protection Act 2004 sch 1, item 2(1)(d).

2522 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3218 [34–39].

2523 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 9. Refer also to Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 s 14.

2524 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3214 [37]–3215 [11].

2525 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3215 [11–16].

2526 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 9.

2527 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 5.

2528 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 4.

2529 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 4.

2530 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 4.

2531 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 4.

2532 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 4.

2533 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 30(2)(b).

2534 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 4.

2535 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 6–7 (citations omitted).

2536 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3222 [6–8].

2537 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3222 [46]–3223 [7].

2538 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 5 [7].

2539 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 5 [7].

2540 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3222 [14–25].

2541 Tasmania Police, ‘Tasmanian Government’s Current Service System’, 23 August 2021, 6–7, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce; Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1997 s 14; Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 ss 3, 53A; Criminal Code Act 1924 s 105A.

2542 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 3 [3].

2543 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 3 [3], [5].

2544 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 3 [3–5].

2545 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 3 [6].

2546 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3237 [25–28].

2547 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 3 [3].

2548 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 3 [4].

2549 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 3 [3].

2550 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 3 [4].

2551 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3234 [30]–3235 [13].

2552 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3234 [35]–3235 [18], 3237 [9–28].

2553 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 5 [10].

2554 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 5 [11]; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-021, 2.

2555 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, Attachment 3 (‘National Redress Scheme Operational Manual for Participating Institutions’, August 2018) 42.

2556 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 5 [10]; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-021 (Letter from Jonathan Higgins to Commanders, Tasmania Police, 18 January 2021) 2.

2557 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 16.

2558 The Code of Conduct is in the State Service Act 2000 s 9 (‘State Service Act’). Relevant employment directions are: Tasmanian Government, Employment Direction No. 4—Procedure for the suspension of State Service employees with or without pay (4 February 2013); Tasmanian Government, Employment Direction No. 5—Procedures for the investigation and determination of whether an employee has breached the Code of Conduct (4 February 2013). Employment Direction No. 5 was updated in April 2023. Tasmanian Government, Employment Direction No. 6 – Procedures for the investigation and determination of whether an employee is able to efficiently and effectively perform their duties (4 February 2013). Also relevant are the State Service Principles, which are in section 7 of the State Service Act 2000 (‘State Service Principles’). The State Service Principles are a statement about the way employment in the State Service is to be managed, and the standards expected of State Service employees.

2559 Integrity Commission Tasmania, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 9–10. We note that the Integrity Commission’s guide was first published in 2017 and was updated in 2021. There are some slight textual differences between these versions, but they are otherwise substantially the same and the differences are not material for the purposes of this case study.

2560 Integrity Commission Tasmania, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 9.

2561 Jacqueline Allen, Procedural Fairness Response, 24 July 2023, 2.

2562 Integrity Commission Tasmania, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021), 15.

2563 Integrity Commission Tasmania, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021), 15.

2564 Integrity Commission Tasmania, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021), 15–16.

2565 Integrity Commission Tasmania, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021), 16.

2566 Statement of Michael Pervan, 14 June 2022, 43 [226]; Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3370 [40]–3371 [11].

2567 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3371 [8–11].

2568 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3372 [16–20].

2569 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 43 [247].

2570 Jacqueline Allen, Procedural Fairness Response, 24 July 2023, 3 [6].

2571 Jacqueline Allen, Procedural Fairness Response, 24 July 2023, 3 [6].

2572 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 36 [200]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 33 [193]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3420 [14]–3421 [15].

2573 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 15 [79]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 16 November 2022, 5 [8]; Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 5 [8(a)]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 11 [39]; Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3370 [33–38].

2574 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 47 [283].

2575 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 32–33 [182].

2576 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 11 [39]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 21 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the National Redress Scheme’, Draft Procedure, Children and Youth Services, undated), 2 [2.2]–3 [2.6].

2577 Department of Communities, ‘Briefing for the Minister: Employment Matters at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC)’, 4 November 2021, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2578 Request for statement served on Michael Pervan, 2 August 2022, 7 [7], 10 [26], 14–15 [39]; Request for statement served on Mandy Clarke, 2 August 2022, 7 [7], 10 [26], 14 [39]; Request for statement served on Kathy Baker, 2 August 2022, 7 [7], 10 [26], 14–15 [39]; Request for statement served on Jacqueline Allen, 28 July 2022, 10 [26], 13–14 [47].

2579 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3505 [38–47].

2580 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3507 [1–10].

2581 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure 26.1 (‘Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care: Notification Process’, Department of Communities, 14 December 2020) 2.

2582 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure 26.1 (‘Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care: Notification Process’, Department of Communities, 14 December 2020) 1.

2583 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure 26.1 (‘Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care: Notification Process’, Department of Communities, 14 December 2020) 5.

2584 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 1; Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 31 July 2023, 5 [14(c)].

2585 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care: Final Report—Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 10, 14.

2586 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3502 [7–17].

2587 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3502 [18–33].

2588 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter from Solicitor-General to Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, 1 May 2007).

2589 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter from Solicitor-General to Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, 1 May 2007) 1.

2590 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter from Solicitor-General to Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, 1 May 2007) 1.

2591 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter from Solicitor-General to Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, 1 May 2007) 1.

2592 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter from Solicitor-General to Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, 1 May 2007) 2.

2593 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter from Solicitor-General to Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, 1 May 2007) 2.

2594 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter from Solicitor-General to Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, 1 May 2007) 2.

2595 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 10 [32]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 15–16 [99], 17–18 [116]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3410 [27–35].

2596 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 10 [32].

2597 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 10 [32]. In relation to senior leadership generally, refer to Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 5 [17]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 7 [53].

2598 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3502 [42], 3503 [8–9].

2599 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3506 [34–40].

2600 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 11 [34], 35 [130]–36 [133], 38 [142], 39 [149–151], 40 [155], 44 [170], 45 [173], 81 [340].

2601 Statement of Ginna Webster, 29 April 2022, 1 [6–8]; Statement of Ginna Webster, 13 January 2023, 15 [28(e)(i)].

2602 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 2 [6]; Statement of former Director, Strategic Youth Services, Department of Communities, 28 November 2022, 35 [103].

2603 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 7 [51]; Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3503 [11–21].

2604 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3504 [2–18]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 7 [51–52]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3410 [28–35].

2605 Transcript of Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3410 [37]–3411 [33]; Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3505 [38]–3506 [46].

2606 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3505 [43]–3506 [30].

2607 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 10 [29], 11 [34], 35 [130]–36 [133], 39 [149–151], 40 [155], 43 [168], 44 [170], [172], 45 [173], [178], 46 [180], 47 [184], 81 [340]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 20 [77].

2608 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 10 [29].

2609 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 35 [132].

2610 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Abuse in State Care Support Service’ (Web Page) <https://www.decyp.tas.gov.au/children/adoptions-and-permanency-services/abuse-in-state-care-support-service/>.

2611 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 19 [118].

2612 Department of Communities, ‘NTP-TAS-02 – Item 15 Cover sheet’, 20 September 2021, 1–2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’, 29 October 2021 (Excel spreadsheet), produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2613 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Response – Item 19’, 11 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2614 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’, 29 October 2021 (Excel spreadsheet), produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2615 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2616 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2617 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2618 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2619 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2620 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2621 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2622 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2623 Department of Communities, ‘Magistrate’s Decision’, 14 July 2017, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2624 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2625 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2626 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2627 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 2.

2628 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2629 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2630 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2631 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2632 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2633 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2634 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2635 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2636 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2637 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2638 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2639 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2640 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2641 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2642 The name ‘Walter’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order 18 August 2022.

2643 Department of Communities, ‘Employment Histories – AYDC’, 29 March 2022, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2644 Department of Communities, ‘Employment Histories – AYDC’, 29 March 2022, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2645 The name ‘Erin’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022.

2646 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 2–3.

2647 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 2–3.

2648 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 5.

2649 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 5.

2650 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 5; Tasmanian State Service Act 1984 s 54(1)(e) (repealed).

2651 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 5.

2652 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 4.

2653 Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Item 13 – Abuse in State Care Scheme’, 5 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2654 Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2655 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 31 [112]; Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3507 [42]–3508 [13].

2656 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 2.

2657 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 3–4.

2658 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 2; Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Draft Issues Briefing for the Minister: Allegations of Sexual Assault by a Resident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (Ashley) Against a Staff Member There’, [date omitted], 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2659 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 5; Ashley Youth Detention Centre, ‘Memo from former Manager, Custodial Youth Justice to [Walter]: Allegations Made by Resident [redacted]’, [date omitted], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2660 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2661 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 2.

2662 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 3.

2663 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 2.

2664 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 2.

2665 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 2.

2666 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 3.

2667 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 4–5.

2668 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 3.

2669 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2670 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 4.

2671 Child Safety Service, ‘Notification Report’, [date omitted], 4–5, 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2672 Child Safety Service, ‘Notification Report’, [date omitted], 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2673 Notice to produce served on the Tasmanian Government, 9 March 2022, 11–12 [19]; Request for statement served on Jacqueline Allen, 28 July 2022, 13–14 [47]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022.

2674 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 22.

2675 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment H (Letter from Peter Graham to ‘Walter’, 27 July 2021) 6.

2676 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 2 [13], 4 [20], 7[36]; File note of telephone conversation from the Commission of Inquiry to ‘Erin’, 18 July 2023.

2677 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [3–6].

2678 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [6–10]; Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2679 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [10–16]; Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2680 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3021 [18–24].

2681 Transcript of ‘Erin’, 22 August 2022, 3029; Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [dated omitted], 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2682 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 2.

2683 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2684 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, Attachment [Erin]–001 (‘Letter from Investigation Officer, Ombudsman Tasmania, to ‘Erin’, [date omitted]).

2685 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, Attachment [Erin]–001 (‘Letter from Investigation Officer, Ombudsman Tasmania, to ‘Erin’, [date omitted]).

2686 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2687 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2688 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2689 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2690 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2691 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2692 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2693 Memo from Manager Custodial Youth Justice to ‘Walter’, ‘Complaint to Ombudsman from [Erin]’, [date omitted], 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Refer also to Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 2.

2694 Submission 159 Ombudsman Tasmania, 2.

2695 Submission 159 Ombudsman Tasmania, 2.

2696 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 3 [17].

2697 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 3 [18].

2698 Statement of ‘Erin’, 18 July 2022, 3 [18].

2699 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 1.

2700 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 1.

2701 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 2.

2702 Transcript of Richard Connock, 24 August 2022, 3314 [22–25], 3315 [1–3].

2703 Submission 159 Ombudsman Tasmania, 1.

2704 Submission 159 Ombudsman Tasmania, 1–2.

2705 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 31 May 2023, 2.

2706 Department of Communities, ‘File 58: Documents relating to complaints made by young people detained in Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, [date omitted] 2009, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘File 99: Documents relating to complaints made by a young person detained in Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, [date omitted] 2010, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘File 164: Documents relating to complaints made by young people detained in Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, [date omitted] 2013, 1, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2707 Department of Communities, ‘File 99: Documents relating to complaints made by a young person detained in Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, [date omitted] 2010, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘File 58: Documents relating to complaints made by young people detained in Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, [date omitted] 2009, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2708 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2709 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2710 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 8, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2711 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 1, 2, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; James Cumming Investigation Services, ’Employment Direction No. 5 Investigation’, [date omitted], 60–61, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2712 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2713 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2714 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2715 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2716 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 3, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2717 Department of Communities, ‘Allegations and incidents – Stand downs’ (Excel spreadsheet), 20 September 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2718 Email from Assistant Consultant, Safety and Injury Management to Fiona Atkins, 27 April 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 22–23; Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 2.

2719 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2720 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 6–7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2721 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 6–7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2722 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 6–7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2723 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Investigations in accordance with Employment Direction No. 5 – [Walter]’, [date omitted], 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2724 James Cumming Investigation Services, ‘Employment Direction No. 5 Investigation Report regarding [Walter]’, [date omitted], 52–53, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2725 James Cumming Investigation Services, ’Employment Direction No. 5 Investigation Report regarding [Walter]’, [date omitted], 53, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2726 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Employment Direction No. 5 Investigation Report – [Walter]’, [date omitted], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2727 Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Minute to Acting Deputy Secretary Children: Employment Direction No. 5 Investigation Report – [Walter]’, [redacted], 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2728 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 32 [117].

2729 Deed of Release between ‘Walter’ and the State of Tasmania, [date omitted], 2–3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2730 Deed of Release between ‘Walter’ and the State of Tasmania, [date omitted], 2–3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2731 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3510 [32]–3511 [18].

2732 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 31 [113].

2733 Evidence Act 2001 s 97A.

2734 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3510 [32–38].

2735 National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Cth) s 14.

2736 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, 51 [325].

2737 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, 50 [321(b)–(c)].

2738 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 3.

2739 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 2.

2740 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 2.

2741 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 2.

2742 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, 3 [17], 5 [27].

2743 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 3.

2744 Refer, for example, to Department of Communities, ‘National Redress Scheme (Tasmania) – Request for Additional Information from Records Custodians: Response regarding [redacted]’, 6 May 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘National Redress Scheme (Tasmania) – Request for Additional Information from Records Custodians: Response regarding [redacted]’, 26 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘National Redress Scheme (Tasmania) – Request for Additional Information from Records Custodians: Response regarding [redacted]’, 5 October 2020, 1.

2745 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 2.

2746 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 9-10; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 113 (‘Child abuse national redress – Ad hoc meeting minutes’, Strategy and Engagement Division, 7 October 2019) 1.

2747 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 2.

2748 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 18–19 [116].

2749 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 18 [114]; Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, 51 [326].

2750 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 18 [114].

2751 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, 51 [327].

2752 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2753 The numbers are slightly different to those in Case study 1 as we are referring here to allegations against staff only.

2754 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 11 [36].

2755 Notice to produce served on the State of Tasmania, 9 March 2022, 10 [18]; Request for statement served on Darren Hine, 29 July 2022, 5 [1]; Request for statement served on Peter Graham, 1 August 2022, 4 [1]–6 [5]; Request for statement served on Michael Pervan, 2 August 2022, 13 [35]; Request for statement served on Kathy Baker, 2 August 2022, 13 [35]; Request for statement served on Mandy Clarke, 2 August 2022, 13 [35]. We also made requests to Centre management and other departmental witnesses on this point and made further requests for this information following our hearings.

2756 Department of Communities, ‘Employment Histories – AYDC’, 29 March 2022, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2757 The name ‘Parker’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023.

2758 Department of Communities, ‘Notification regarding [Parker]’, 9 April 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2759 The name ‘Baxter’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 30 August 2023. Department of Communities, ‘Notification regarding [Baxter]’, 18 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2760 Department of Communities, ‘Notification regarding [Baxter]’, 18 September 2019, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 116 (‘Allegations of Sexual Abuse – [Ira]’, Minute to the Secretary, 3 December 2019) 4–5, Attachment 1.

2761 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 6.1 (Child Abuse Review Team file: [Parker], March 2010) 24, 29; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 116 (‘Allegations of Sexual Abuse – [Ira]’, Minute to the Secretary, 3 December 2019) 4, Attachment 1.

2762 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 6.1 (Child Abuse Review Team file: [Parker], March 2010) 25; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 116 (‘Allegations of Sexual Abuse – [Ira]’, Minute to the Secretary, 3 December 2019) 4.

2763 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 4 [9(a)]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 34 [198]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 6 [45]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2764 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022 (revised 23 August 2022), 4–5 [21].

2765 Department of Communities, ‘Details relating to [Ira’s] restricted duties’, 27 May 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2766 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 113 (‘Child abuse national redress – Ad hoc meeting minutes’, 7 October 2019) 1.

2767 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 113 (‘Child abuse national redress – Ad hoc meeting minutes’, 7 October 2019) 1.

2768 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 113 (‘Child abuse national redress – Ad hoc meeting minutes’, 7 October 2019) 1–2.

2769 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 113 (‘Child abuse national redress – Ad hoc meeting minutes’, 7 October 2019) 2.

2770 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 116 (‘Allegations of Sexual Abuse – [Ira]’, Minute to the Secretary, 3 December 2019) 2.

2771 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 116 (‘Allegations of Sexual Abuse – [Ira]’, Minute to the Secretary, 3 December 2019).

2772 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 116 (‘Allegations of Sexual Abuse – [Ira]’, Minute to the Secretary, 3 December 2019) 5–6.

2773 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 116 (‘Allegations of Sexual Abuse – [Ira]’, Minute to the Secretary, 3 December 2019) 1, 6.

2774 Email from Assistant Director, Safety, Wellbeing and Industrial Relations to Director, Office of the Secretary, 18 February 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2775 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)].

2776 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 48 [188]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2777 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Allegations Raised Against Employee [Ira] through the Redress Scheme’, 18 September 2020, 2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2778 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Allegations Raised Against Employee [Ira] through the Redress Scheme’, 18 September 2020, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2779 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.3 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 25 September 2020) 3; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2780 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.3 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 25 September 2020) 3; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 2.

2781 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 3 [20–21].

2782 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 90.19 (Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 21 October 2020).

2783 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Allegations Raised Against Employee [Ira] through the Redress Scheme’, 2 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2784 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Allegations Raised Against Employee [Ira] through the Redress Scheme’, 2 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2785 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 24 [135].

2786 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Allegations Raised Against Employee [Ira] through the Redress Scheme’, 18 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2787 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Transcript of The Nurse podcast, 2 November 2020, 56.

2788 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2789 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2790 Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, Procedural Fairness Response, 26 July 2023, 3; Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 31 July 2023, 3 [9(b)].

2791 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 57 (AYDC Working Group, Minutes, 12 February 2021) 1–2; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 59 (Strengthening Safeguards Executive Working Group, Minutes, 19 March 2021) 2.

2792 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2793 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2794 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)]; Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 34–35.

2795 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 35.

2796 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 5.

2797 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 37.

2798 Email from Assistant Director, Safety, Wellbeing and Industrial Relations to Director, Office of the Secretary, 18 February 2020, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Letter from Secretary Michael Pervan to Deputy Commissioner, Tasmania Police, 18 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2799 Request for statement served on Tasmania Police, 29 July 2022, 5 [1]; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2800 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 90.19 (Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 21 October 2020).

2801 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-002 (‘Reference material – additional information – [Stan]’) 3–17.

2802 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 33–37; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2803 Request for statement served on Tasmania Police, 29 July 2022, 5 [1]; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 33–37; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2804 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2805 Department of Communities, ‘Employment Histories – AYDC’, 29 March 2022, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2806 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 44.

2807 Tasmania Police, ‘Child Abuse Review Team File Information: [redacted]’, 9 November 2020, 1, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce; Tasmania Police, ‘Child Abuse Review Team File Information: [redacted]’, 9 November 2020, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce; Tasmania Police, ‘Child Abuse Review Team File Information: [redacted]’, 9 November 2020, 1, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce; Tasmania Police, ‘Child Abuse Review Team File Information: [redacted]’, 9 November 2020, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2808 Tasmania Police Child Abuse Review Team, ‘Child Abuse Review Team File Information: [redacted]’, 9 November 2020, 1, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce; Tasmania Police Child Abuse Review Team, ‘Child Abuse Review Team File Information: [redacted]’, 9 November 2020, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2809 Tasmania Police, ‘Disclosure Report – Intel Submission ([Lester])’, [date omitted], produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2810 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2811 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 7 November 2022, 22 [58]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 38 [145]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 28 [157].

2812 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘AYDC (01 Jan 2000 – 20 July 2021) Sexual Abuse Claims’ (Spreadsheet), 11 October 2021, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2813 Statement of former Director of Strategy, Program Development and Evaluation, Department of Communities, 26 August 2022, 19 [81–84]; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2814 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 39 [148]; Statement of former Director of Strategy, Program Development and Evaluation, Department of Communities, 26 August 2022, 20 [89]. Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2815 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 64 [326]; Statement of Stuart Watson, 11 November 2022, Attachment 3 (Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan, 9 January 2020); Email from ‘Alysha’ to Manager, Human Resources and Workplace Relations, Department of Communities and Pamela Honan, 9 January 2020.

2816 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 66 [335–336]; Transcript of ‘Alysha’, 22 August 2022, 3071 [43–47]; Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan et al, 9 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2817 Department of Communities, ‘Preliminary Assessment of Complaint Made by [Alysha] Regarding Pamela Honan’, 28 March 2022, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2818 Tasmania Police, ‘Disclosure Report – Intel Submission ([Lester])’, 10 September 2020, 1, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2819 Tasmania Police, ‘Disclosure Report – Intel Submission ([Lester])’, 10 September 2020, 1, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2820 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 23–24 [131]; Kathy Baker, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023, 9.

2821 Email from Mandy Clarke to Kathy Baker et al, 21 September 2020, 1.

2822 Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 September 2022, 1 [4]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Employment Histories – AYDC’, 29 March 2022, 10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2823 Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 September 2022, 1 [3–4]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 October 2022, 1 [2]; Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3498 [10–32]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 4 [9(a)].

2824 Statement of ’Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 67 [346]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 36 [59.7]; Pamela Honan, Procedural Fairness Response, 25 July 2023.

2825 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3186 [33–44].

2826 Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2976 [45–47].

2827 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 26 [150].

2828 Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, Procedural Fairness Response, 26 July 2023, 8.

2829 Kathy Baker, Procedural Fairness Response, 13 July 2023, 9.

2830 Letter from Lawyer to Leanne McLean, 26 August 2020, 1.

2831 Email from Mandy Clarke to Kathy Baker et al, 21 September 2020, 1.

2832 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2020, 3408 [30–46].

2833 Email from Director, Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit to Mandy Clarke, 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2834 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 26 [150].

2835 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 24 [135].

2836 Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 6 November 2020, 1, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 83 [339(o)]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 42 [160].

2837 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 83 [339(o)]; Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 9 November 2020, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2838 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2839 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2840 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2841 Letter from Michael Pervan to ‘Lester’, 9 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2842 Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 September 2022, 1 [3–4]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 October 2022, 1 [2]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 4 [9(a)].

2843 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 59 (Strengthening Safeguards Executive Working Group, Minutes, Department of Communities, 19 March 2021) 2.

2844 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2845 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-011 (‘Reference material – additional information – [Lester]’) 46.

2846 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 4 [27]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 33 [125].

2847 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 33 [125].

2848 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 83 [339(o)]; Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 9 November 2020, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2849 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3250 [27–34].

2850 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 44.

2851 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 5.

2852 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 42, 45.

2853 The name ‘Stan’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022; Department of Communities, ‘Employment Histories – AYDC’, 29 March 2022, 7, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2854 Department of Communities, ‘Abuse of Children in State Care Assessment Process: Assessment Report’, [date omitted], 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2855 The name ‘Ben’ is a pseudonym; Order of the Commission of Inquiry, restricted publication order, 18 August 2022. Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, Attachment [Ben]–001, 4.

2856 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH–001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2857 Email from Jacqueline Allen to Mandy Clarke et al, 23 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2858 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 8; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 2.

2859 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 90.19 (Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 21 October 2020).

2860 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Allegations Raised Against Employee [Ira] through the Redress Scheme’, 2 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2861 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 10.

2862 Letter from ‘Ben’s’ lawyer to Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services and Office of the Solicitor-General, [date omitted] 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2863 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 63 [339(c)].

2864 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2865 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 48 [188].

2866 Department of Communities, ‘Notification regarding [redacted]’, 15 September 2020, 1.

2867 Department of Communities, ‘Notification regarding [redacted]’, 15 September 2020, 2–3.

2868 Department of Communities, ‘Abuse in State Care Support Service Application Report’, [date omitted] 2017, 1–3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2869 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 63 [339(c)]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 88 (Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 7 October 2020); Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2870 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 90.20 (Email from Tasmania Police Detective Inspector to Jacqueline Allen, 3 November 2020); Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2871 Letter from Michael Pervan to ‘Stan’, 9 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2872 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2873 Letter from Michael Pervan to ‘Stan’, 9 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2874 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 4 [9(a)]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2875 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 80 (‘Concerns regarding [Stan] and [Lester]’, File note, 26 October 2020).

2876 Department of Communities, ‘Instrument of Appointment – Investigation pursuant to Employment Direction No. 5’, 12 February 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2877 Letter from Michael Pervan to ‘Stan’, 12 February 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2878 Email from Jacqueline Allen to Conduct and Performance Consultant, Department of Communities, 18 October 2021, 1, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 61–64 [339(c)].

2879 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2880 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (List of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 63 [339(c)].

2881 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3235 [23–41], 3236 [37]–3237 [2].

2882 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3237 [4–7].

2883 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

2884 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 88 (Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 7 October 2020); Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 2.

2885 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 9.

2886 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 5.

2887 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment A (Letter from Peter Graham to ‘Stan’, 15 April 2021); Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 9.

2888 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 9–12; Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (Letter from Peter Graham to ‘Stan’, 25 February 2022) 1–2.

2889 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (‘Notice of Proposed Cancellation of Registration – Reasons for Decision’, 25 February 2022) 17.

2890 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (‘Notice of Proposed Cancellation of Registration – Reasons for Decision’, 25 February 2022) 17–18.

2891 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 12; Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment D (‘Continuation of Positive Registration – Reasons for Decision’, 7 July 2022), 1.

2892 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (‘Notice of Proposed Cancellation of Registration Reasons for Decision’, 25 February 2022), 17–18; Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment D (Reasons for continuation of positive registration under the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 in relation to ‘Stan’, 7 July 2022) 3.

2893 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment D (Reasons for continuation of positive registration under the Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 in relation to ‘Stan’, 7 July 2022) 5.

2894 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2895 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)].

2896 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 34.

2897 Statement of ‘Alysha’, 16 August 2022, 66 [335–336]; Email from ‘Alysha’ to Pamela Honan et al, 9 January 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 83 [339(o)].

2898 Letter from ‘Ben’s’ lawyer to Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services and Office of the Solicitor-General, 24 June 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 22 [120]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 33 [192].

2899 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3421 [10–15]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 40 [214].

2900 Statement of ‘Ben’, 29 March 2022, 10 [46].

2901 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 9 [30], 34 [194]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3406 [8–16], 3421 [4–15]; Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3187 [40–47]; Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3366 [23–27].

2902 Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3187 [47]–3188 [4]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 18 August 2022, 54 [84.2].

2903 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 33 [193].

2904 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 9 [30], 34 [194]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3406 [8–16], 3421 [4–16].

2905 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 33 [193]–34 [194].

2906 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3421 [10–15].

2907 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3406 [8–16].

2908 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2909 Letter from ‘Ben’s’ lawyer to Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services and Office of the Solicitor-General, [date omitted] 2020, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2910 Statement of Stuart Watson, 16 August 2022 (revised 23 August 2022), 3–4 [21].

2911 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3590 [10–12].

2912 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3590 [35–36].

2913 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3588 [45]–3689 [36].

2914 Transcript of Patrick Ryan, 7 September 2022, 3590 [17–21].

2915 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 45 [173]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.3 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 25 September 2020) 1–2; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2916 Letter from ‘Ben’s’ lawyer to Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services and Office of the Solicitor-General, [date omitted] 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 63 [339(c)].

2917 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3244 [13–21].

2918 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.5 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (original), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020) 1–4; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2919 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 9 [29].

2920 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 5–6 [6].

2921 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 12 [42].

2922 Integrity Commission Tasmania, Guide to Managing Misconduct in the Tasmanian Public Sector (March 2021) 10.

2923 Statement of Michael Pervan, 14 June 2022, 68 [372].

2924 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Some of these claims related to employees and others to contractors working at the Centre.

2925 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. The numbers are slightly different to those in Case Study 1 as we are referring here to allegations against staff only.

2926 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2927 ‘COVID-19 Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) Global Research and Innovation Forum’, World Health Organization (Web Page, 12 February 2020) <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-public-health-emergency-of-international-concern-(pheic)-global-research-and-innovation-forum>.

2928 Peter Gutwein, ‘Ministerial Statement COVID-19 Response Measures’ (Media Release, 17 March 2020) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/releases/ministerial_statement_covid-19_response_measures>.

2929 Statement of Kathy Baker, 16 November 2022, 3 [6]; Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 3 [6(a)].

2930 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 4 [7(g), (h)]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3442 [21–32].

2931 Statement of Kathy Baker, 16 November 2022, 3–4 [6]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 3 [7(ii)].

2932 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020); Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.4 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (amended), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020); Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.5 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (original), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020).

2933 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020) 1.

2934 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 3 [7(i)].

2935 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 13 [39.11]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3442 [18–32].

2936 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020).

2937 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3442 [18–32].

2938 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 6 [10(b)(iii)]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 16 November 2022, 5 [7].

2939 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 5 [10(a)–(b)].

2940 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 6 [10(a)].

2941 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 6 [10(a)].

2942 Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 7 [26].

2943 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 9–10 [66].

2944 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020) 2, 4; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 1.

2945 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1 (Email from Client Liaison Officer, Department of Communities to Pamela Honan, 27 September 2022); Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 80 (‘Concerns regarding [Stan] and [Lester]’, File note, 26 October 2020).

2946 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 77 (Minutes from redress meeting, File note, 18 September 2020); Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020) 2.

2947 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 77 (Minutes from ‘Redress’ meeting, File note, 18 September 2020) 2; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.3 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 25 September 2020) 2–3; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.5 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (original), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020) 3–4.

2948 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 3; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020) 4; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.3 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 25 September 2020) 3; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.4 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (amended), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020) 3.

2949 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.3 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 25 September 2020) 3–4; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.5 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (original), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020) 3–4.

2950 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.3 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 25 September 2020) 2; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020) 3; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.5 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (original), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020) 1; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.4 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (amended), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020) 1.

2951 Email from Department of Communities staff member to Mandy Clarke and Pamela Honan, 18 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2952 Email from Department of Communities staff member to Jacqueline Allen, 24 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2953 Department of Health and Human Services, Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care Final Report – Round 4 (Report, November 2014) 10; Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3501 [35–44].

2954 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 21 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the National Redress Scheme’, Draft Procedure, Children and Youth Services, undated) 2–3 [2.2–2.5]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 40 [211(f)].

2955 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3408 [15–22].

2956 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 10–11 [36]; Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, Annexure MC.004 (Meeting with Lawyer, Angela Sdrinis Legal, Draft Minutes, 31 August 2020) 1–2; Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3408 [30–35].

2957 Refer, for example, to Department of Communities, ‘National Redress Scheme (Tasmania) – Request for Information from Records Custodians – Response regarding [redacted]’, 6 May 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘National Redress Scheme (Tasmania) – Request for Information from Records Custodians – Response regarding [redacted]’, 26 March 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2958 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 9 [33]–10 [34].

2959 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 9 [32]–10 [34].

2960 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 2 [7–8]; Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3378 [5–13]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 21 [110]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3407 [47]–3408 [8].

2961 Jacqueline Allen, Procedural Fairness Response, 24 July 2023, 6–7 [19].

2962 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3378 [10–13].

2963 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3378 [24–37].

2964 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 9 [27].

2965 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 9 [27]; Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 2 [5(a)]; Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3408 [46]–3409 [7].

2966 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 29 [106]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 21 [115].

2967 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2968 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 21 [115]; Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 2 [5(a)].

2969 Email from Director, Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit to Mandy Clarke, 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 17 [10].

2970 Email from Director, Child Abuse Royal Commission Response Unit to Mandy Clarke, 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2971 Email from Mandy Clarke to Pamela Honan et al, 21 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2972 Department of Justice, ‘Claims of Abuse in AYDC’ (Spreadsheet), 19 September 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2973 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 1; Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 9–10 [34], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2974 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 2 [10].

2975 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 10 [36], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2976 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘AYDC (01 Jan 2000 – 20 July 2021) Sexual Abuse Claims’ (Spreadsheet), 11 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2977 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 9–10 [34], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

2978 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 13 [78].

2979 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 13 [78].

2980 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 16 November 2022, 6 [11(a)–(c)]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 16 November 2022, 6 [11]; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, 8 [16]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 13 [47].

2981 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 35.

2982 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 84 (Email from Jacqueline Allen to Risk Assessment Officer, Registration to Work with Vulnerable People, 11 August 2020) 2–3.

2983 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 84 (Email from Risk Assessment Officer, Registration to Work with Vulnerable People to Jacqueline Allen, 11 August 2020).

2984 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 13 [84].

2985 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 7 November 2022, 2 [2].

2986 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 7 November 2022, 2 [2].

2987 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020) 2.

2988 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 13 [82], [84].

2989 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 14 [87].

2990 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 13 [85].

2991 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 6 [13]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 14 [87].

2992 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 22 [71].

2993 Statement of Michael Pervan, 14 June 2022, 56 [306]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 17 [109].

2994 Statement of Michael Pervan, 14 June 2022, 56 [306]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, 17 [109].

2995 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-002 (‘Reference material – additional information – [Stan]’) 55–62.

2996 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020) 1.

2997 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 3; Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 21 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the National Redress Scheme’, Draft Procedure, Children and Youth Services, undated); Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

2998 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 3.

2999 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3000 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 21 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the National Redress Scheme’, Draft Procedure, Children and Youth Services, undated); Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3001 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3002 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3003 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3004 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3005 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3006 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 11 [39]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3007 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 11 [39(a)].

3008 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 11 [39(a)].

3009 Statement of Michael Pervan, 7 June 2022, Annexure 22 (‘Responding to Requests for Information relating to Claims under the NRS’, Process Flowchart, Department of Communities).

3010 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 12 [39.10].

3011 Transcript of The Nurse podcast, 2 November 2020, 56.

3012 Transcript of The Nurse podcast, 2 November 2020, 56.

3013 David Killick, ‘Analysis: Culture of cover-up a cancer on Tasmania’s democracy’, Mercury (online, first published 20 November 2020) <https://www.themercury.com.au/news/tasmania/analysis-culture-of-coverup-a-cancer-on-tasmanias-democracy/news-story/d12f9021cb14a67add8a875010180fe7>.

3014 Peter Gutwein, ‘Premier’s Statement – Commission of Inquiry’ (Media Release, 23 November 2020) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/site_resources_2015/additional_releases/progress_on_the_new_burnie_ambulance_station/premiers_statement_-_commission_of_inquiry>. Refer also to Statement of Kathrine Morgan-Wicks, 22 June 2022,15 [82]; Statement of Kathrine Morgan-Wicks, 22 June 2022, Annexure 48 (Email from Tasmanian Government Media Office to Department of Health employee, 23 November 2020).

3015 Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly Estimates Committee A, 25 November 2020, 15–16 (Alison Standen) <https://search.parliament.tas.gov.au/search/isysquery/9cbf8c00-9f7a-46fa-bbee-2927d153e3ad/1/doc/>.

3016 Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 September 2022, Annexure MP.SUPP.001 (‘Correction to Response to Question on Notice’, Minute to the Secretary, 9 December 2020) 1.

3017 Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 September 2022, Annexure MP.SUPP.001 (‘Correction to Response to Question on Notice’, Minute to the Secretary, 9 December 2020).

3018 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 34 [128]; Email from Michael Pervan to Jacqueline Allen et al, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3019 Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 31 July 2023, 3 [9(a)].

3020 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3021 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3022 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Allegations Raised Against Employee [Ira] through the Redress Scheme’, 18 September 2020, 3–4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3023 Refer, for example, to Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3024 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3025 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3026 Refer, for example, to Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Lester] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce. Refer also to Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Stan] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Allegations Raised Against Employee [Ira] through the Redress Scheme’, 18 September 2020, 4, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3027 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3028 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3029 Email from Michael Pervan to Director of People and Culture et al, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3030 Email from Michael Pervan to Director of People and Culture et al, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3031 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure 37.001 (Email from Michael Pervan to legal adviser, Mandy Clarke and Kathy Baker, 14 December 2020).

3032 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure 37.001 (Email from Michael Pervan to legal adviser, Mandy Clarke and Kathy Baker, 14 December 2020); Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure 26.1 (‘Review of Claims of Abuse of Children in State Care: Notification Process’, Department of Communities, 14 December 2020) 5; Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 35 [130].

3033 Statement of Michael Pervan, 6 September 2022, Annexure 37.001 (Email from Michael Pervan to legal adviser Mandy Clarke and Kathy Baker, 14 December 2020).

3034 Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 31 July 2023, 3 [9(d)].

3035 Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 31 July 2023, 3 [9(e)].

3036 Michael Pervan, Procedural Fairness Response, 31 July 2023, 3 [9(e)].

3037 Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 20–21 [78]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 7 [52].

3038 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 35 [130].

3039 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 7 [52].

3040 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 7 [53].

3041 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 7 [53].

3042 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 23 August 2023, 7–8.

3043 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 23 August 2023, 7–8.

3044 Email from Michael Pervan to former Solicitor-General, 24 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3045 Request for statement served on Michael Pervan, 2 August 2022, 13 [37(a)].

3046 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 35 [130].

3047 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 30 [172].

3048 Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 4–5 [17].

3049 Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 4 [16].

3050 Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 5 [17].

3051 Statement of Ginna Webster, 13 January 2023, 15–16 [28(e)].

3052 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 8 [55]; Email from Michael Pervan to former Solicitor-General, 24 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3053 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 5 [25], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3054 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 5 [26], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3055 Emails between Ginna Webster, legal adviser and Michael Pervan, 10–14 December 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3056 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter of Advice from Assistant Solicitor-General to Michael Pervan, 15 December 2020) 5 [21], [23].

3057 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter of Advice from Assistant Solicitor-General to Michael Pervan, 15 December 2020) 3 [10].

3058 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter of Advice from Assistant Solicitor-General to Michael Pervan, 15 December 2020) 3–4 [14]; Refer to National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 s 97.

3059 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter of Advice from Assistant Solicitor-General to Michael Pervan, 15 December 2020) 3 [12].

3060 Personal Information Protection Act 2004, Schedule 1, s 2(1)(d), (g) and (i).

3061 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 11 [35–38]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 47 [183].

3062 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 45 [258]; Transcript of Stuart Watson, 23 August 2022, 3160 [14–23].

3063 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 13 [43–44], 35 [132]; Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3373 [1–4].

3064 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3373 [7–10], [17–31].

3065 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3424 [15–31], [18–24]; Transcript of Pamela Honan, 19 August 2022, 2971 [41–40], 2977 [35–37].

3066 Notice to produce served on Tasmania Police, 29 July 2022, 5–6; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, 2–4; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

3067 Letter from Michael Pervan to Deputy Commissioner, Tasmania Police, 18 February 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

3068 Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 9 November 2020, produced by Tasmania Police in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3069 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3250 [6–25].

3070 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3250 [21–25].

3071 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3250 [27–34].

3072 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

3073 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)]; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

3074 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

3075 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022); Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3235 [23–41], 3236 [37]–3237 [2].

3076 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3237 [4–7].

3077 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 23 August 2022, 3–4 [9].

3078 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 23 August 2022, 3–4 [9]; Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3248 [30]–3249 [8].

3079 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3248 [43]–3249 [8].

3080 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 23 August 2022, 4–5 [10].

3081 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 23 August 2022, 7–8 [16].

3082 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 23 August 2022, 8 [16]; Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3251 [17–43].

3083 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3237 [14]–3238 [4].

3084 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3238 [33–46].

3085 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3241 [5–31].

3086 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3240 [40]–3241 [3].

3087 Consultation with Launceston Police, 19 August 2021.

3088 Consultation with Launceston Police, 19 August 2021.

3089 Statement of ‘Warren’, 19 May 2022, 3 [16]; Statement of ‘Max’, 19 May 2022, 6 [27]; Statement of ‘Simon’, 7 July 2022, 3 [14].

3090 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 14 [91(a)].

3091 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3258 [10–13].

3092 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3258 [14–22].

3093 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3259 [17–19].

3094 Transcript of Jonathan Higgins, 24 August 2022, 3259 [2–19].

3095 Consultation with Launceston Police, 19 August 2021.

3096 Consultation with Launceston Police, 19 August 2021.

3097 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [Ira] (the Employee) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct and Suspension with Pay’, 8 November 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3098 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 8.

3099 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 8.

3100 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3228 [39–44].

3101 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 8.

3102 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 8.

3103 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 5.

3104 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3227 [34–42].

3105 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 6.

3106 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 6; Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3221 [11–17].

3107 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 6; Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3225 [41]–3226 [2].

3108 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 26.

3109 Letter from Crown Counsel to legal adviser, Department of Communities, 12 March 2021, 4 [15–18], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3110 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, Annexure MP.5.001 (Letter of Advice from Assistant Solicitor-General to Michael Pervan, 15 December 2020) 3–4 [14], [16–17].

3111 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 6.

3112 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 7; Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3226 [32–46].

3113 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3227 [1–2].

3114 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 6–7; Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3222 [46]–3223 [7].

3115 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 7.

3116 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 7.

3117 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 36–37 [200(h)], 38 [203(g)], 49 [294], 55 [326(g)], 84 [340(b)], [340(d)].

3118 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 7.

3119 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 7.

3120 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3521 [25–36].

3121 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3226 [4–14].

3122 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 7.

3123 Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, 7–8; Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3228 [5–11].

3124 Transcript of Peter Graham, 24 August 2022, 3228 [13–18].

3125 Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, Procedural Fairness Response, 26 July 2023, 9; Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3368 [39–43].

3126 Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, Procedural Fairness Response, 26 July 2023, 9.

3127 Transcript of Jacqueline Allen, 25 August 2022, 3366 [23–34]; Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3412 [40–47].

3128 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3413 [2–10].

3129 Kathy Baker and Mandy Clarke, Procedural Fairness Response, 26 July 2023, 9–10.

3130 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 9–10; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 113 (‘Child abuse national redress – Ad hoc meeting minutes’, 7 October 2019) 1.

3131 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 10.

3132 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 113 (‘Child abuse national redress – Ad hoc meeting minutes’, 7 October 2019) 1–2.

3133 Department of Communities, ‘National Redress Scheme (Tasmania) – Request for Information from Records Custodians – Response regarding [redacted]’, 6 May 2019, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3134 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 10.

3135 Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 20–21 [78].

3136 Statement of Michael Pervan, 20 December 2022, 20–21 [78].

3137 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 5 [25–26], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Emails between Ginna Webster, legal adviser and Michael Pervan, 10–14 December 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 10.

3138 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, 51 [326].

3139 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 3–4. Refer generally to State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, Attachment 3 (‘National Redress Scheme Operational Manual for Participating Institutions’, August 2018).

3140 Request for statement served on Ginna Webster, 29 March 2022, 13 [81].

3141 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, 54 [339–340].

3142 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 3.

3143 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 4.

3144 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 23 August 2023, 1.

3145 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 64 [339(d)]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 90.19 (Email from Jacqueline Allen to Jonathan Higgins, 21 October 2020); Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

3146 Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

3147 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 13 [17].

3148 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 10–13 [16].

3149 State of Tasmania, Procedural Fairness Response, 27 July 2023, 7.

3150 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, Annexure 118.9 (Letter from Crown Counsel to Deputy Secretary, Corrections, 20 September 2018) 1–3, 8–10.

3151 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 53A.

3152 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, Annexure 118.4 (Letter from Deputy Secretary, Corrections to Office of the Solicitor-General, 15 August 2018) 2.

3153 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, Annexure 118.4 (Letter from Deputy Secretary, Corrections to Office of the Solicitor-General, 15 August 2018) 4.

3154 Statement of Ginna Webster, 10 June 2022, Annexure 118.4 (Letter from Deputy Secretary, Corrections to Office of the Solicitor-General, 15 August 2018) 4.

3155 National Redress Scheme for Institutional Child Sexual Abuse Act 2018 (Cth) s 97; Personal Information Protection Act 2004, sch 1, item 2(1)(d).

3156 Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Act 2013 s 53A.

3157 Elise Archer, ‘Commission of Inquiry Formally Established’ (Media Release, 16 March 2021) <https://www.premier.tas.gov.au/site_resources_2015/additional_releases/commission_of_inquiry_formally_established>.

3158 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3405 [11]–3406 [46].

3159 Request for statement served on the Department for Education, Children and Young People, 25 November 2022, 10 [34].

3160 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023 produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 21 [92].

3161 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023 produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 21 [92].

3162 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023 produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 21 [92].

3163 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 22 [94].

3164 Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce, 22 [95].

3165 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final Report, December 2017) Preface and Executive Summary, 41.

3166 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 7 [18].

3167 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3407 [3–12]; Department for Education, Children and Young People, ‘Response to NTP-TAS-008’, 20 January 2023, 22 [94], produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3168 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 10 [32]; Department of Communities, ‘Project Initiation Document: Records Digitisation and Remediation Project’, 7 July 2020, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3169 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3407 [6–12].

3170 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3406 [20–25].

3171 Transcript of Kathy Baker, 25 August 2022, 3407 [19–27].

3172 Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 7 [18].

3173 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, 12 [39.8].

3174 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, Annexure MC.002 (‘Common Law Claim, State-based Redress (historical), National Redress Application or other information received by People and Culture’, Flowchart, Department of Communities, 1 December 2020).

3175 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, Annexure MC.002 (‘Common Law Claim, State-based Redress (historical), National Redress Application or other information received by People and Culture’, Flowchart, Department of Communities, 2021).

3176 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, Annexure MC.002 (‘Common Law Claim, State-based Redress (historical), National Redress Application or other information received by People and Culture’, Flowchart, Department of Communities, 2021).

3177 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, Annexure MC.002 (‘Common Law Claim, State-based Redress (historical), National Redress Application or other information received by People and Culture’, Flowchart, Department of Communities, 2021).

3178 Statement of Mandy Clarke, 19 August 2022, Annexure MC.002 (‘Common Law Claim, State-based Redress (historical), National Redress Application or other information received by People and Culture’, Flowchart, Department of Communities, 2021).

3179 Jacqueline Allen, Procedural Fairness Response, 24 July 2023, 20 [55].

3180 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (Q 26–34) (‘Flow chart – State servant suspensions due to allegations of child sex abuse – Notification process’).

3181 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (Q 26–34) (‘Flow chart – State servant suspensions due to allegations of child sex abuse – Notification process’).

3182 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (Q 26–34) (‘Flow chart – State servant suspensions due to allegations of child sex abuse – Notification process’).

3183 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (Q 26–34) (‘Flow chart – State servant suspensions due to allegations of child sex abuse – Notification process’).

3184 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (Q 26–34) (‘Flow chart – State servant suspensions due to allegations of child sex abuse – Notification process’).

3185 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, Attachment B (Q 26–34) (‘Flow chart – State servant suspensions due to allegations of child sex abuse – Notification process’).

3186 Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3424 [15–24].

3187 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3188 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3189 Department of Communities, ‘AYDC Child Sexual Abuse Allegations’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 October 2021, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3190 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 77 (‘Description of Allegations or Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or in relation to its Officials Received by the Department from 20 July 2021’, Spreadsheet, undated).

3191 Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, 86 [342]; Statement of Michael Pervan, 27 July 2022, Annexure 77 (‘Description of Allegations or Incidents of Child Sexual Abuse at Ashley Youth Detention Centre or in relation to its Officials Received by the Department from 20 July 2021’, Spreadsheet, undated) 1. In Chapter 17 Redress, civil litigation and support we note that, as at 8 April 2022, 689 National Redress Scheme claims had been made in relation to Tasmanian Government institutions.

3192 Department of Communities, ‘Briefing for the Minister: Employment matters at Ashley Youth Detention Centre (AYDC)’, 4 November 2021, 3, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3193 ‘AYDC Class Action’, Angela Sdrinis Legal (Web Page) <https://www.angelasdrinislegal.com.au/aydc-class-action.html>; Amber Wilson, ‘Ashley abuse action: Dozens more join lawsuit’, The Mercury (Hobart, 25 February 2023) 8 <gandmmonitoring.com.au/reports/story.php?storyProfileID=732722>.

3194 Submission 086 Angela Sdrinis Legal, 48.

3195 Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.2 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 18 September 2020) 4; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.3 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 25 September 2020) 3; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.1 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes, Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 9 October 2020) 3; Statement of Pamela Honan, 16 November 2022, Attachment 1.4 (‘Meeting re AYDC HR concerns’, Minutes (amended), Strengthening Safeguards Working Group, 26 October 2020) 3.

3196 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet) 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 82 [339(n)].

3197 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 14–15 [50]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3198 Statement of Michael Pervan, 14 June 2022, 62 [335].

3199 Transcript of Michael Pervan, 26 August 2022, 3500 [5–12]; Transcript of Mandy Clarke, 25 August 2022, 3423 [41]–3424 [6]; Statement of Kathy Baker, 18 August 2022, 8 [23].

3200 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3201 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 29 July 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 83 [339(o)].

3202 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 11 [37].

3203 Statement of Michael Pervan, 23 August 2022, 11 [37].

3204 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [redacted] (the Employee) (Employee No. [redacted]) Referral for consideration into alleged breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5 and suspension with pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 4 November 2021, 5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3205 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [redacted] (the Employee) (Employee No. [redacted]) Referral for consideration into alleged breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5 and suspension with pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 4 November 2021, 1−2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3206 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Additional Allegations raised against employee [redacted] through the National Redress Scheme’, 22 July 2021, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [redacted] (the Employee) (Employee No. [redacted]) Referral for Consideration of Investigation into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5) and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 4 March 2022, 4–5, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3207 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: Additional Allegations Raised Against Employee [redacted] through the National Redress Scheme’, 22 July 2021, 6, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3208 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [redacted] (the Employee) (Employee No. [redacted]) Referral for Consideration into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5 and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 4 November 2021, 4, 9–10, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3209 Department of Communities, ‘Minute to the Secretary: [redacted] (the Employee) (Employee No. [redacted]) Referral for Consideration into Alleged Breaches of the State Service Act 2000 Code of Conduct (Employment Direction No. 5 and Suspension with Pay (Employment Direction No. 4)’, 4 November 2021, 1−2, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 78 [339(k)].

3210 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 20 August 2022, 78 [339(k)]; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Spreadsheet), 11 April 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3211 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 15–16 [99], 17–18 [116].

3212 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 17 [107].

3213 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 17 [109–113].

3214 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 17 [111–113].

3215 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3216 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Jonathan Higgins, 8 August 2022, Annexure JCH-001 (Updated list of victim-survivors, allegations and actions, Spreadsheet, 24 August 2022).

3217 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3218 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3219 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3220 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Statement of Peter Graham, 15 August 2022, Attachment 1 (Registration to Work with Vulnerable People Records Concerning Ashley Youth Detention Centre Staff, 15 August 2022) 14.

3221 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3222 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3223 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3224 Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 6 February 2023, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce; Department of Communities, ‘ED tracker’ (Excel spreadsheet), 17 August 2022, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3225 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 15 August 2022, 77 [339(j)].

3226 Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, 17 [114]; Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 110 (Email from Mandy Clarke to Jacqueline Allen et al, 8 October 2021); Statement of Jacqueline Allen, 21 December 2022, Attachment 110.1 (‘The Impact of Being Wrongly Accused of Abuse in Occupations of Trust: Victims’ Voices’, Carolyn Hoyle et al, 2016).

3227 Refer to Chapter 10; Ombudsman Tasmania, ‘Preliminary Inquiries into the Assessment of a Use of Force Incident at Ashley Youth Detention Centre’, December 2019, 11, produced by the Tasmanian Government in response to a Commission notice to produce.

3228 Richard Connock, Procedural Fairness Response, 19 July 2023, 3.


Acknowledgment of country

We acknowledge and pay respect to the Tasmanian Aboriginal people as the traditional and original owners, and continuing custodians of this land and acknowledge Elders, past and present.


© 2021 Commission of Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse