
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

**COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE TASMANIAN GOVERNMENT'S
RESPONSES TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS**

**At Kannenner Room, Mövenpick Hotel
28 Elizabeth Street, Hobart**

BEFORE:

**The Honourable M. Neave AO (President and Commissioner)
Professor L. Bromfield (Commissioner)
The Honourable R. Benjamin AM (Commissioner)**

On 18 August 2022 at 10.09am

(Day 25)

1 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Good morning, everybody. I'd like to
2 take the opportunity to acknowledge and pay our respects to
3 the Tasmanian Aboriginal people as the traditional and
4 original owners and continuing custodians of this land, and
5 to acknowledge elders past and present. We celebrate the
6 stories, culture and traditions of Aboriginal and Torres
7 Strait Islander elders of all communities who live and work
8 on this land.

9
10 Before we start, we also want to acknowledge all
11 victim-survivors of child sexual abuse. We recognise the
12 profound and lasting harm caused by the sexual violation of
13 a child and the hurt and sense of betrayal that is
14 experienced by children and their families when child
15 sexual abuse is not adequately or appropriately prevented,
16 recognised and responded to with action and empathy.

17
18 We acknowledge the strength and determination of those
19 parents and others in seeking to make the world a safer
20 place for all children.

21
22 Before we come to Counsel Assisting's opening address
23 I'd like to speak to the orders that we have to make in
24 advance of this hearing. During previous hearings I
25 explained that it will sometimes be necessary for the
26 Commission to make an order which restricts the publication
27 of certain information.

28
29 The Commission is committed to being open and
30 transparent, respecting the preferences of
31 victim-survivors, and considering the impact evidenced from
32 these hearings may have on other investigations, legal
33 proceedings and the wider community.

34
35 This week and next the hearings are focused on a
36 particular institutional setting, namely Youth Justice, and
37 the Ashley Youth Detention Centre. During this week the
38 evidence will explore the conduct of a range of people. In
39 order to protect the identity of certain people the
40 Commission has decided to make a restricted publication
41 order.

42
43 The Commission makes this order because it is
44 satisfied that the public interest in the reporting on the
45 identities of certain people who may be discussed during
46 this hearing is outweighed by the legal and privacy
47 considerations.

1
2 I will now briefly explain how the order will work.
3 The order will apply for the duration of the hearing this
4 week and next week. The order contemplates the use of
5 pseudonyms in relation to a number of people who will give
6 evidence. Any information in relation to the identity of
7 those people must be kept confidential.
8

9 This means that anyone who watches or reads the
10 information given by these witnesses must not share any
11 information which may identify the people who will be
12 referred to by the following names: Simon, Warren, Jane,
13 Eve, Alysha, Max, Fred, Erin or Charlotte.
14

15 This information is not limited to their real names
16 and may include other information which may identify them,
17 such as where they live or work.
18

19 There are also a large number of other individuals who
20 may be referred to during the evidence during the hearings
21 this week and next week. Some of them were children who
22 were detained at Ashley Youth Detention Centre, while
23 others are people who have worked there.
24

25 The order contemplates the use of pseudonyms in
26 relation to these people as well. This means that anyone
27 who watches or reads the information given during these
28 hearings also must not share any information which may
29 identify the individuals who are listed in the
30 schedule attached to the order. Again, this information is
31 not limited to their real names and may include other
32 information which may identify them, such as where they
33 live or work.
34

35 I make the order which will now be published. I
36 encourage any journalist wishing to report on this hearing
37 to discuss the scope of the order with the Commission's
38 media liaison officer. A copy of the order will be placed
39 outside the hearing room and is available to anyone who
40 needs a copy.
41

42 Thank you. Ms Ellyard.
43

44 MS ELLYARD: Thank you, Commissioners, and good morning.
45 In the hearings this week and next I appear with my learned
46 leader, Ms Bennett SC, and with my learned friends,
47 Ms Norton, Ms Darcey and Ms Rhodes to assist you by calling

1 evidence about the ways in which allegations of child
2 sexual abuse at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre have been
3 responded to by the Department of Communities.
4

5 I would like to begin by paying my respects to the
6 traditional and original owners of this land, the Muwinina
7 people. I pay my respect to those who have passed before
8 us and acknowledge today's Aboriginal people of Tasmania
9 who are the custodians of this land.
10

11 The Ashley Youth Detention Centre is Tasmania's only
12 place of Youth Detention. Late last year the government
13 announced that it would close in three years. As this
14 hearing opens, there continue to be young people detained
15 there.
16

17 The Commission has heard through its work in the
18 lead-up to this hearing about both past and recent
19 practices and responses that are of concern; all of these
20 have implications for whether the community can presently
21 be satisfied that children who are presently detained in
22 Ashley are safe from the risk of sexual abuse.
23

24 It's important to note the role that Ashley plays in
25 the Youth Justice System in Tasmania. In Tasmania, when
26 children and young people are over the age of 10, although
27 that's soon to be raised to 14, and are charged with a
28 crime they may be placed on an order to be supervised in
29 the community or in detention facilities.
30

31 As in other Australian jurisdictions, Tasmania has a
32 preference that children and young people should be placed
33 on orders in the community wherever possible with detention
34 seen as an option of last resort.
35

36 When placed on a custodial sentence or if refused bail
37 and placed on remand, children and young people are
38 currently placed at the Ashley Youth Detention Centre. The
39 facility can accommodate up to 51 children and young people
40 across five units but the number of residents housed at any
41 one time is generally low but in the past years it's
42 generally been between 10 and 15 people.
43

44 Recent statistics indicate that in 2020 and 2021 on an
45 average day there were a total of 118 Tasmanian children
46 and young people aged 10 or over who were under juvenile
47 justice supervisions, and 8 per cent of those were in

1 detention at Ashley. Of those who were detained,
2 71 per cent of them weren't sentenced, they were either
3 awaiting the outcome of a court matter or they were not yet
4 sentenced having pleaded guilty.

5
6 The median length of a completed period of detention
7 in Tasmania is 18 days. Similar to other jurisdictions,
8 there are three times as many males as females engaged in
9 Youth Justice, and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
10 people make up a third of people under supervision orders
11 and are over-represented as well in the number of children
12 in detention.

13
14 Thinking about the cohort of children in Ashley, the
15 Commission has heard in earlier evidence that children who
16 find themselves in the Youth Justice System or in Youth
17 Detention are overwhelmingly children who have experienced
18 a background of trauma and disadvantage. Prior
19 maltreatment not only affects children and young people's
20 emotional and psychological wellbeing but it also increases
21 their risk of sexual victimisation and assault once they
22 are in detention.

23
24 It's trite to note that children who are placed in
25 detention are in the care of the state. As we've noted,
26 many children in Ashley are on remand and have not yet been
27 found guilty of a crime, but even where they have been
28 found guilty and are sentenced the state has an obligation
29 to keep them safe while they're in detention and to treat
30 them in a way which promotes their rehabilitation.

31
32 It's clear that some of these children present with
33 very complex behaviours and needs, some pose a risk to
34 themselves or to others, they're very challenging to
35 manage. The Commission's received evidence that some of
36 them pose risks to other children and some of them have
37 been violent towards staff. There can be no doubt that
38 meeting the needs of the cohort of children in Youth
39 Detention is a very complicated job and one with which many
40 jurisdictions around Australia may struggle.

41
42 This group of children requires a trauma-informed and
43 rehabilitation-focused response. The evidence over the
44 next seven days will suggest that many in Ashley have not
45 been receiving it, despite many recommendations for reform
46 over the last two decades and multiple reports provided to
47 government which have drawn attention to gaps and concerns.

1
2 In its earlier hearing weeks the Commission has been
3 concerned to investigate institutions, like schools and
4 hospitals, into which sexual predators have been able to
5 enter. The focus has been on how the institution was able
6 to identify the risk of abuse and respond to abuse where it
7 occurred. In those earlier case studies there was an
8 analysis of how and where systems broke down and enabled
9 predators to enter and abuse to occur. There was no
10 suggestion in those earlier hearings that the whole
11 institution was itself of its nature a threat to the safety
12 of children.

13
14 The coming days of hearings are different. In
15 considering child sexual abuse at the Ashley Youth
16 Detention Centre we're considering much more than the way
17 in which an institution responds to isolated incidences of
18 offence. We're considering much more than gaps in policy
19 or deficiencies in practices that have permitted a few
20 abusers to enter an otherwise safe institution.

21
22 A review of Ashley's history over the past two decades
23 invites the possibility of a finding that Ashley the
24 institution is itself abusive, it is inherently unsafe for
25 children and it has defeated every attempt thus far that
26 has been made to make it safer.

27
28 Rather than it being about monsters who have been able
29 to enter an institution which was otherwise serving the
30 interests of children, here you may find that it's Ashley
31 that's the monster.

32
33 While the primary focus is Ashley as an institution,
34 at this stage we cannot rule out the possibility that the
35 evidence might also support findings of misconduct in
36 relation to individuals, and under your Act, Commissioners,
37 it's relevant to note that misconduct is defined as:

38
39 *Conduct by a person that could reasonably*
40 *be considered likely to result in criminal*
41 *charge, civil liability, disciplinary*
42 *proceedings or other legal proceedings.*

43
44 We cannot advise you at this stage that a finding of
45 misconduct will be open to you, we'll carry out a rigorous
46 and fair examination of the evidence that is available to
47 you.

1
2 A partial explanation for why Ashley, it seems, has
3 been able to perpetuate itself as a toxic and damaging
4 institution can be found in its origins. Before Ashley was
5 a Youth Detention Centre it was a boys' home. A large
6 number of claims have been made by former residents of the
7 Ashley Boys' Home to redress schemes alleging physical and
8 sexual abuse when they lived at the home. Those claims and
9 that time period are beyond the scope of this Commission's
10 work, but we acknowledge those who have come forward to
11 tell their stories from those earlier days and who still
12 live with the impact of the abuse that they suffered.
13

14 It's clear from the evidence that we have received and
15 from the large number of those claims which have been made
16 under various schemes to the state that practices in the
17 former Ashley Boys' Home were punitive and violent and that
18 some children were sexually and physically abused.
19

20 The Ashley Youth Detention Centre operates on the same
21 land as the former Ashley Boys Home. A number of staff
22 from the boys' home transferred to work at the detention
23 centre once it started and have remained working there for
24 many years since.
25

26 The evidence and material available to the Commission,
27 including a number of reports and reviews conducted over
28 the last two decades, invites the conclusion that some of
29 the practices and culture of the boys' home were
30 incorporated from the earliest days into the culture and
31 practices of the detention centre; not only because the
32 detention centre took over the buildings, but also because
33 of the engagement of staff previously engaged at the boys'
34 home, some of whom, as I have noted, still work at Ashley
35 or did until very recently.
36

37 When Ashley became a Youth Detention Centre in 1999
38 that change coincided with the introduction of the Youth
39 Justice Act and a changing of responsibility for older
40 young offenders. Prior to the Act youths aged 16 and 17
41 were held at Risdon Prison. After the Act came into effect
42 they were placed at Ashley. Their more challenging
43 behaviours were not able to be dealt with by staff from the
44 boys' home who had remained on staff but weren't prison
45 guards and didn't know how to run a prison, and so adult
46 prison staff were brought in to help. From the earliest
47 period then it seems that this approach solidified a

1 culture of violence, brutality and no consideration for
2 rehabilitation or therapeutic responses to children.

3
4 Reports written about Ashley as early as 2002 noted
5 that Ashley was not staffed in a way which permitted it to
6 respond to the complex needs of the children who were
7 detained there. Although as a Youth Detention Centre it
8 was intended to operate with the rehabilitative focus of
9 the Youth Justice Act, it was increasingly staffed with a
10 combination of former boys' home employees, and prison
11 guards and then later security guards. These workers
12 weren't trained in youth work and it appears from the
13 earliest time the culture and practices of Ashley have
14 fallen short of what the Youth Justice Act intended and
15 what the rights of the detainees would have required.

16
17 Children at Ashley have always been children from a
18 disadvantaged cohort with multiple risk factors such as
19 unstable home environments, being victims of physical or
20 sexual abuse, lack of education, cognitive issues,
21 disabilities and homelessness. However, it appears that
22 over time, whilst the rate of young people in detention has
23 decreased through the use of diversion practices,
24 recidivism rates for those who enter prison remain high.
25 Some detainees come into Ashley with serious offending and
26 behavioural issues because diversion hasn't worked and
27 rehabilitation hasn't worked, and that means over time the
28 cohort of children in detention is becoming smaller but
29 they are displaying more and more complex needs.

30
31 I have mentioned that there have been a number of past
32 reports into Ashley over the last two decades. The
33 evidence to be called over the next seven days will focus
34 on a number of examples that have been drawn from a
35 combination of document reviews and from statements made to
36 the Commission of practices which have placed children at
37 risk of harm and which are evidence of Ashley being an
38 institution in which children are not safe, children are
39 not respected, and children are not treated in the way the
40 community would expect.

41
42 Some details of what young people have experienced at
43 Ashley have become public through media reporting or in
44 foreshadowed legal proceedings, but we expect that the
45 Tasmanian community will be horrified by some of the
46 evidence that is to be called over the coming days. That
47 evidence will be that children have been harmed in

1 significant and preventable ways. There will be evidence
2 that successive governments have been unable to achieve
3 meaningful change to how children are treated while in
4 detention.

5
6 It'll be shocking for the community, but it has to be
7 said that very little of the evidence that we're going to
8 call will be new. It's instructive to read reports written
9 about Ashley Youth Detention Centre from 2002 onwards and
10 to see how the concerns and issues that are raised in those
11 reports are reflected in what we hear today about Ashley.

12
13 Many of those concerns read as if they could have been
14 written in 2022, not in 2002, and they're concerns that
15 have been raised consistently in reports to government over
16 the past two decades.

17
18 So that means that, as shocking as the evidence might
19 be to the community, none of the evidence should come as a
20 surprise to the government. None of the evidence should
21 surprise anybody who has worked at Ashley or who has been
22 alert to the contents of reports and reviews that have been
23 prepared over the last two decades.

24
25 The themes which emerge again and again through those
26 reports include a culture of brutality towards and the
27 dehumanising of children; the increasingly complex needs of
28 children in detention; staffing practices; nepotism in
29 recruitment and promotion of staff; the overuse of
30 strip-searches; a lack of programs out-of-school hours and
31 on weekends which mean children are left bored with greater
32 risk of behavioural issues and violence; detainees being
33 violent towards each other; the lack of an effective
34 complaint mechanism for detainees; the location of Ashley
35 which makes it hard to recruit staff and have professionals
36 and family attend and makes it difficult to re-integrate
37 children into the community; the lack of through-care and
38 step-down accommodation and community services; the lack of
39 programs that are designed to address the causes of
40 offending; the lack of security, including blind spots in
41 CCTV; the lack of proper searches for visitors;
42 non-compliance by staff with policies and procedures; high
43 numbers of children on remand; the improper use of
44 isolation; bad record-keeping; lack of systems data in the
45 Youth Justice System as a whole to identify patterns and so
46 improve the system; lack of cooperation and information
47 sharing between operational staff, Health Services and

1 Education, and a terrible culture with attitudes to
2 children more like those in a prison with poor
3 relationships between staff and management.
4

5 It's striking and concerning how closely these themes
6 drawn from the reports reflect the evidence that you have
7 gathered and that we will be presenting about the current
8 state of affairs at Ashley.
9

10 The reports reveal that since 2015 the number of young
11 people in detention has continued to drop but the
12 recidivism rate remains high. Ashley is not rehabilitating
13 children, it's not turning children away from criminal
14 offending.
15

16 In 2016 a report by Noetic recommended two smaller
17 centres close to population centres in replacement of
18 Ashley to assist with the delivery of a therapeutic
19 approach and better through-care and integration into the
20 community. The report wasn't taken up at the time by the
21 government.
22

23 In 2017, the government did commit to a therapeutic
24 approach with the introduction of an approach called the
25 Ashley+ Approach and the Ashley Model of Care, but the
26 evidence will be that those frameworks were not well
27 understood and not taken up so that by April 2020 a report
28 recorded very low levels of understanding of those
29 frameworks amongst staff.
30

31 During this period of discussions about therapeutic
32 change it seems that there was very little done to actually
33 improve conditions for detainees and there was a noted
34 resistance to change observed amongst staff.
35

36 It appears that over time the deficiencies,
37 vulnerabilities and risks at Ashley which have been
38 referred to in report after report have come to be accepted
39 as an inevitable part of the Youth Justice System.
40

41 Although over the past two decades there have been
42 reforms in Youth Justice which have reduced the number of
43 children entering Ashley and which have made a number of
44 other positive changes for the benefit of children in the
45 Youth Justice System, Ashley has remained a place of
46 punitive, dangerous and damaging practices. Successive
47 proposals for reform have not taken root. The accounts of

1 abuse the Commission has received from detainees who were
2 in Ashley in 2000 are distressingly similar to accounts
3 from detainees who were there a year ago.
4

5 Against that backdrop may I summarise the themes which
6 are going to be pursued in the evidence to be called.
7

8 The first theme is the theme of culture.
9 Commissioners will recall that in our first week of
10 hearings in May evidence was called from a number of
11 witnesses who spoke about the importance of culture in
12 institutions and the ways in which institutional culture
13 could make the risks of abuse inside those institutions
14 more or less likely. There was evidence that policies and
15 procedures are important and training matters, but culture
16 eats policy for breakfast. It's the culture of an
17 institution far more than any carefully written policy
18 which will determine whether the institution is a safe one
19 for children. That culture can be so pervasive that it
20 corrupts otherwise good people. It can be so pervasive
21 that it resists well meaning attempts at reform.
22

23 The Commission has received materials and received
24 statements which indicate that Ashley has had for
25 many years a culture which has included the inappropriate
26 use of isolation and segregation, the use of unnecessarily
27 invasive personal searches and a hierarchical and toxic
28 culture in which incidents are not properly reported and
29 children are threatened and dissuaded from making
30 complaints.
31

32 There will be evidence that those practices do not
33 reflect the therapeutic and rehabilitative goals of the
34 Youth Justice Act. Isolation and placement decisions are
35 made to punish or to intimidate children. Behaviour
36 management systems appear to be unnecessarily punitive and
37 open to misuse if workers have a personal grudge against,
38 or a personal preference for, particular detainees.
39

40 Former detainees and staff members will give evidence
41 over the coming days of Ashley staff being verbally
42 abusive, being physically violent and in some cases being
43 threatening or abusive to fellow staff members.
44

45 The evidence will suggest that, not only is Ashley not
46 child-focused and not child safe, Ashley has had a culture
47 over many years which can almost be described as

1 anti-child, a culture in which children are not valued,
2 their needs are not regarded as important and harm done to
3 them is not taken seriously.
4

5 The second thing we'll be pursuing is the way in which
6 the department and management have responded, it appears
7 poorly, to allegations of abuse when they have been made.
8 It appears from the materials we've received that at a
9 government level there's been no action taken on
10 information received through abuse in state care and
11 redress schemes about the conduct of employees which meant
12 that staff were permitted to remain at Ashley working with
13 children despite allegations of serious physical and sexual
14 abuse being made against them, in some cases being made by
15 multiple complainants.
16

17 There will be evidence of a nepotistic culture in
18 which staff were more likely to back each other up if a
19 complaint is made rather than to act on a young person's
20 complaint. The evidence we call will examine whether
21 children are able to complain about their treatment and how
22 they are treated if they do complain; whether appropriate
23 notifications to police were made where allegations of
24 abuse were raised; whether the police conducted appropriate
25 investigations; why in some cases young people did not wish
26 to participate in investigations or give evidence in court,
27 and whether there was timely notification to the Registrar
28 for Working With Vulnerable People or Child Safety Services
29 where allegations of sexual abuse arose.
30

31 Linked to this theme is the question of disciplinary
32 action when an Ashley staff member is alleged to have
33 engaged in child sexual abuse. The Commission has heard
34 evidence in earlier weeks of the hearing about the way in
35 which the Employment Direction 5 process works and the
36 extent to which it is a suitable or not suitable tool for
37 ensuring that persons who pose a risk to children are
38 prevented from working with them. That issue is a live one
39 in the case of Ashley because many workers over the years
40 have been subject to ED5 processes which mostly didn't
41 result in any outcomes against them, but in the recent past
42 many workers have been stood down because of historical
43 claims which have been made and accepted through the
44 Redress Scheme.
45

46 A third theme and an important one in the evidence
47 over the coming days is the question of harmful sexual

1 behaviours and the way in which Ashley management and
2 departmental management have responded to harmful sexual
3 behaviours displayed by detainees. There are a number of
4 former detainees who have come forward to the Commission,
5 some of whom will give evidence, who have described being
6 the victim or threats of sexual violence or harmful sexual
7 behaviours from other detainees. Their evidence suggests
8 that harmful sexual behaviour was and may remain common in
9 Ashley and that management failed to respond to either
10 protect those being harmed or to provide support and
11 treatment to those engaging in the behaviours.
12

13 Staff who previously worked at Ashley have told the
14 Commission that they've observed practices of sexual hazing
15 of younger residents by older ones which was, if not
16 condoned, then not sufficiently acted on by management and
17 staff. Several former detainees have shared their stories
18 confidentially of being sexually assaulted by other
19 detainees and of a lack of care and support from staff when
20 the assaults became known.
21

22 The Commission will examine this question including
23 through how staff at Ashley responded to a particular
24 incident of harmful sexual behaviour engaged in by two
25 older detainees and how management responded when that
26 incident was investigated by the Serious Events Review
27 Team. The Commission will hear evidence about attempts by
28 professional and clinical staff to address harmful sexual
29 behaviours of the older detainees and the attitude of
30 Ashley management to those attempts.
31

32 And that brings us to the question of staffing. A
33 significant theme which emerges both from the observations
34 of those with past or current professional connections to
35 Ashley and from the many statements that have been obtained
36 from Ashley staff, is the state of the supervision,
37 training and support that is or is not given to Ashley
38 workers and the qualifications that they were required to
39 have, if any, before taking up their roles.
40

41 What emerges from past reports and from the evidence
42 that the Commission has gathered is that, with some
43 exceptions of course, staff at Ashley have always been
44 underqualified and undertrained for the complex and
45 difficult work that they are required to do.
46

47 When Ashley turned from a boys' home to a detention

1 centre the staff weren't trained to manage the children,
2 including older children with serious and challenging
3 behaviours, in a therapeutic and rehabilitative way.
4

5 Throughout the entire period of this Commission's
6 terms of reference reports and reviews record staff
7 complaining that they are not properly trained, that they
8 don't have time for training, that they're not told about
9 new policies, that they have a bad relationship with
10 management and feel unsupported.
11

12 One person provided information to the Commission on a
13 confidential basis through the analogy of a hospital.
14 Imagine hospital orderlies being the ones operating on
15 patients: there's a complete mismatch on one view between
16 the skills required for the work and the skills of those
17 who are being called upon to do the work.
18

19 Ashley's located near Deloraine, a small town remote
20 from Tasmania's larger cities. Historically it would seem
21 that much of the workforce has been drawn from that small
22 local community of Deloraine and its surrounds, and from a
23 cohort without specialist training or experience in youth
24 work.
25

26 The Commission heard from Elena Campbell during its
27 Launceston hearings about the complex nature of work in
28 Youth Justice, and of the high degree of training including
29 trauma-informed practice that those who work with young
30 people in detention should receive. The statements of
31 current and former Ashley staff suggest that many of them
32 have not had that training, many of them are aware of the
33 limits on their own skills. It appears from the evidence
34 that the levels of WorkCover claims and sick leave at
35 Ashley are high and that there's an over-reliance on casual
36 staff or security staff.
37

38 Historically, until recent stand-downs, there was a
39 lack of turnover in staff so that old attitudes to children
40 carried over in some cases from the boys' home days remain
41 and are taught to new staff, perpetuating old practices.
42

43 The Commission is also aware of a perception that
44 local sporting connections and associations are the means
45 by which many staff at Ashley have obtained their
46 positions. Ashley's location has over the years been
47 identified as the reason why it's been hard to attract and

1 retain suitably qualified staff, but at the same time its
2 status as a significant employer in a small town has seen
3 Ashley become a focus of political advocacy or debate.
4

5 The Commission will hear evidence of a concern in
6 parts of the community that Ashley has been left open
7 because its closure would be politically unpopular rather
8 than because it's fit for purpose and meeting the needs of
9 the children who are detained there.
10

11 This brings me to the question of oversight. Who is
12 monitoring how children are being treated at Ashley and who
13 has power to take action in response to complaints or
14 concerns? Can children make complaints at all in a
15 meaningful way? Are their complaints taken seriously and
16 acted on? The evidence to be called, including from very
17 recent detainees, suggests that there continue to be real
18 barriers to children being able to assert themselves and
19 raise concerns about their treatment, and if they can't
20 raise concerns about even minor things it's not to be
21 expected that they'll feel able to complain if they're the
22 victim of sexual abuse.
23

24 We'll hear from both the current Commissioner for
25 Children and Young People and a former holder of that role
26 and from the Custodial Inspector. In that regard it's
27 important to note comments that were offered by detainees
28 who participated in the Commission's research on children's
29 perceptions of safety which included relevantly children
30 with experience of Youth Justice.
31

32 One 17-year-old child said:
33

34 *Usually we use a complaint form that goes*
35 *up to some high up people or we're allowed*
36 *to call the Commissioner, but sometimes*
37 *they don't let us call the Commissioner for*
38 *Young People.*
39

40 Another child said:
41

42 *That's another thing that Ashley hates as*
43 *well, they put all these posters up and*
44 *that but deep down they hate it if you say,*
45 *"I want to call the Commissioner". They're*
46 *just going, "Oh, you're going to do that*
47 *are you?" Because most times people do it*

1 to complain about a certain staff member,
2 and then that staff member doesn't do shit
3 for you. They say, "Well, if you're going
4 to call the Commissioner then I'm not going
5 to do shit for you". They say, "I'll give
6 you what I have to, I'll give you your food
7 and that but only because I have to by law
8 but I'm not going to sit there and like
9 you. If you do that you're just a
10 scumbag". The amount of times I've had
11 that said to me, and then they say, "No,
12 I'm only joking".

13
14 At our opening hearing in October 2021 we noted that
15 at that time a concerning number of staff members at Ashley
16 had been stood down as a result of allegations made against
17 them by former detainees through the National Redress
18 Scheme and some had been stood down since the Commission's
19 work started. Others had left the State Service but were
20 still subject of allegations made to the Commission that
21 they failed to act responsibly and appropriately in
22 response to child abuse, or that they were themselves
23 people who had engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviour
24 towards children.

25
26 Since October last year we understand there have been
27 more stand downs and senior state servants will be called
28 to give evidence about the nature of the investigations
29 that are undergoing into those stand downs.

30
31 It's important at this point to note that it is not
32 the role of this Commission to investigate the truth of
33 individual complaints or to make findings that any
34 particular person has been a perpetrator of sexual abuse;
35 that's not the role that this Commission has been charged
36 to perform. Our focus is on how allegations once made have
37 been responded to and how Ashley as an institution protects
38 or does not protect children from the risk of child sexual
39 abuse.

40
41 We said in October 2021 that the number and
42 consistency of the allegations which former detainees have
43 made demanded a careful examination of Ashley's guiding
44 principles and practices and how they've responded to
45 abusive and harmful behaviours. With the benefit of the
46 evidence gathered since October 2021 it can be clearly said
47 that those principles and practices have failed to protect

1 children from the risk of sexual abuse in Ashley and in
2 some cases have facilitated that abuse or been indifferent
3 to it.
4

5 There can be no doubt that many children in Ashley
6 were sexually abused by workers and that many others were
7 victims of harmful sexual behaviour from other detainees.
8 The evidence implicates a group of workers, not all, in the
9 sexual abuse and a broader group in associated physical
10 abuse and emotional mistreatment. To say that of course is
11 not to say that every worker at Ashley was an abuser or an
12 enabler of abuse. There have been and no doubt continue to
13 be those who have worked with a high degree of integrity
14 and who have done their best to carry out their duties at
15 Ashley in a proper way.
16

17 The Commission has received many statements from
18 current and former Ashley staff members who tell a story of
19 trying their best to work hard in challenging
20 circumstances. There will be evidence that morale at
21 Ashley is low and has been made lower by recent stand downs
22 and negative media articles. We are very conscious that
23 there are workers at Ashley today as we open these hearings
24 who may feel that they are being tainted by evidence that
25 will be called about the alleged conduct of others.
26

27 We are aware that many who are the subject of
28 historical allegations of abuse deny those allegations.
29

30 The case examples we examine will be anonymised to
31 protect the interests of those concerned, including both
32 the detainees who are the alleged victims and the alleged
33 perpetrators. It must be said that there are a number of
34 current or recently retired staff members who would
35 otherwise have been called to give evidence about Ashley
36 but who are not being called because they are the subject
37 of allegations of sexual abuse. However, those staff
38 members have been afforded the opportunity to make written
39 witness statements which the Commission will consider.
40

41 In addition to the evidence to be called this week and
42 the next and statements which have been obtained from
43 additional witnesses who are not being called, the
44 Commission has also received information from a range of
45 persons, including former Ashley detainees, former Ashley
46 staff members, and other persons who have had a
47 professional connection with Ashley. Those people didn't

1 wish to make statements or, if they did, they did so on the
2 basis that their material would be kept confidential. In
3 varying ways they expressed a fear that they would be
4 subject to retribution, either professionally or
5 personally, if they were known to have assisted the
6 Commission.

7
8 In some cases they feared damaging their ongoing
9 professional connections with Ashley and, through that,
10 losing their ability to support children and young people
11 who are detained there. In other cases their concern was
12 that speaking out would place them at risk of harm. Of
13 course, the Commission has respected their wish to remain
14 confidential, but it is a concern that so many have felt
15 unable to speak to the Commission publically. What can be
16 said about that information received in confidence, though,
17 is that it is entirely consistent with the evidence that is
18 going to be called and only serves to corroborate that
19 evidence about practices and culture at Ashley.

20
21 I want to say something now about the scope of these
22 hearings. The Commission's terms of reference direct the
23 Commission's attention to allegations of child sexual abuse
24 at Ashley and related matters. The evidence to be called
25 this week will consider the broader context of Ashley Youth
26 Detention Centre, its policies and practices generally.

27
28 You will hear evidence about how children are treated,
29 how those employed to care for them are trained and
30 supervised to paint a whole picture of what it's like to be
31 a detainee at Ashley.

32
33 Some witnesses and some interested persons have
34 queried whether this is properly within the scope of your
35 terms of reference and queried whether matters such as
36 behaviour management systems, staff training and policies
37 or therapeutic practice are inside or outside your terms of
38 reference. It's been suggested that it's not within the
39 Commission's remit to consider broader questions of culture
40 and practices in institutions and that you should focus
41 merely on the way in which allegations of child sexual
42 abuse have been responded to.

43
44 I invite the Commission to set those queries and
45 concerns to one side. As the Commission has heard in
46 earlier weeks, there is a clear link between the culture
47 and practices of an institution and the risk that a child

1 will be harmed in that institution. An institution which
2 does not respect children, which treats them as less
3 important or less worthy of care and attention is one in
4 which children will not feel safe to complain and one where
5 perpetrators may feel safe to offend, and it appears that
6 Ashley may have been such an institution.

7
8 It also needs to be said that children and young
9 people who experience one form of maltreatment are at
10 greater risk of other and different forms of abuse in the
11 future. Similarly, children who have experienced previous
12 maltreatment sometimes come to accept that such treatment
13 is normal; they don't know that they can complain, and if
14 they have had their expectations to what they're entitled
15 to lowered, their confidence in the world will reduce and
16 they won't make complaints when they could.

17
18 Turning to a couple of specific issues that are
19 important to keep in mind as we continue the evidence this
20 week. I've already mentioned the over-representation of
21 Aboriginal young people in Youth Justice generally and in
22 Ashley. It's a matter which often is mentioned and mustn't
23 be ignored.

24
25 The Commission will recall that during the Out-of-Home
26 Care week Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre CEO, Heather
27 Sculthorpe, spoke about the need for different and better
28 Youth Justice options for Aboriginal children, including
29 community-led options. The Commission has also held a
30 number of community forums in a number of locations around
31 Tasmania which have provided an opportunity to hear from
32 Aboriginal elders and community members about their
33 concerns for the safety and wellbeing of Aboriginal
34 children. The comments that they've offered have included
35 comments about Ashley.

36
37 One elder said:

38
39 *A very high percentage of our young people*
40 *have been to Ashley. Those young people*
41 *then started getting into trouble as*
42 *adults. Once they came out they should*
43 *have been proud of who they are and have*
44 *aspirations of what they want to do but*
45 *they were so mistreated in there it's*
46 *another layer of abuse: layer upon layer.*
47

1 Another said:

2
3 *Our children go in as a mess and come out*
4 *ten times worse. If someone goes in angry*
5 *and you can't control them, they'll come*
6 *out more angry.*

7
8 Another said:

9
10 *You might have five white kids and one*
11 *black in there and he'll be on the outer*
12 *already. People enter an environment where*
13 *they know they'll be brutalised.*

14
15 And another:

16
17 *Every time I drive past Ashley I feel sick.*
18 *It hurts me to know our children are locked*
19 *up. Nearly every staff member in Ashley*
20 *has been put off for sexual misconduct. I*
21 *talk to one staff member frequently who is*
22 *very frank about what happened there. We*
23 *all know that inside that institution and*
24 *others this is what happens. We have got*
25 *to stop our children being abused.*

26
27 And another said:

28
29 *When our children are in Ashley they've got*
30 *nowhere to go, nothing to do, no follow-up,*
31 *it's a real big problem, they re-offend and*
32 *go back in there again.*

33
34 Participants in the community forum spoke about their
35 concerns for children losing their culture and their
36 community and that for some children the effect of
37 intergenerational trauma and disadvantage meant that, to
38 quote one elder:

39
40 *It's all they know. Their parents probably*
41 *had so much trauma that they didn't know*
42 *what else to do. That's why those children*
43 *are that way. Some kids would get*
44 *themselves in trouble so that they could go*
45 *back there because they didn't have*
46 *anywhere else to go. They just home to*
47 *drugs and abuse. For some of them it's a*

1 *roof over their heads, it's meals three*
2 *times a day.*

3
4 In addition to hearing those voices of the Aboriginal
5 community it's important, as in earlier weeks of the
6 hearing, to hear the voices of children and to hear their
7 stories and experiences. The Commission has the benefit of
8 a number of statements obtained by your investigator, as
9 well as the sessions conducted by Professors Moore and
10 McArthur with young people, including young people in the
11 Youth Justice System. I've quoted from them already with
12 respect to the Commissioner for Children and Young People.
13 Let me refer to a number of other things that they have
14 said which they would wish you to hear.

15
16 They spoke about physical violence. One young person
17 said:

18
19 *I have had a few restraints because I was*
20 *young. Back then I was having fun. Got*
21 *restrained a heap of times, got taken to my*
22 *room. I got bashed multiple times by the*
23 *staff and just thrown around. Obviously*
24 *they had to restrain me but they're trained*
25 *to restrain people in a certain way, not*
26 *sit there and lay knees into you and that*
27 *and hit you in the back of the head. And*
28 *there have been times where they stripped*
29 *me of all of my clothes and left me in my*
30 *room.*

31
32 Another described the treatment of a friend:

33
34 *They dragged my mate back to his room and*
35 *bashed him. I think he got kicked in the*
36 *guts by one worker. He got bashed by a*
37 *worker in his bedroom, he got choked by an*
38 *older worker. They make it look like*
39 *they're not doing something, but they are.*

40
41 The Commission has heard stories from a number of
42 detainees about the practice of strip searching, a practice
43 which has also been described in claims made to the
44 National Redress Scheme. One participant in the
45 Commission's research said:

46
47 *They're supposed to put me in a cell with a*

1 camera and not strip me of me clothes but
2 they done that anyway. And that was really
3 awkward, having three blokes, they're
4 looking at you. Why? You're young, naked,
5 standing there, and then making jokes
6 saying, "Oh, you've got a little one
7 there", and I'm sitting there bawling my
8 eyes out because I've just been fucked up
9 and I've just got my clothes stripped off,
10 a full invasion of your privacy.

11
12 In this context the Commission will remember the
13 evidence given by Mr Robinson about his experiences in
14 Ashley when he gave evidence before you earlier. He
15 described how he was strip searched when he first arrived
16 at Ashley. He said to you:

17
18 *I got down to basically my boxer shorts. I*
19 *had already been searched at the police*
20 *station and I didn't have to take my boxer*
21 *shorts off so I didn't think that I would*
22 *have. So basically I got down to me boxers*
23 *and then I went to pick me clothes up and*
24 *he said, "No, you need to take your shorts*
25 *off".*

26
27 *I basically pretended that I didn't hear*
28 *him. I went to continue to try and get me*
29 *clothes and he slammed me to the ground,*
30 *pretty much ripped my shorts off me and*
31 *then he said to me, he said, "You're not*
32 *listening", then he ran his finger*
33 *basically through between my butt cheeks*
34 *and inserted a finger in and said, "Welcome*
35 *to Ashley boy, you do as you're told".*

36
37 Many of the incidences of physical and sexual abuse
38 which former detainees have described to the Commission
39 involve other detainees. Concerningly, there appear to
40 have been instances where adults witnessed violent and
41 abusive behaviour but they didn't intervene or they allowed
42 the violence to escalate. One participant in Professor
43 Moore's research said:

44
45 *I told them multiple times over the years*
46 *about being physically assaulted, not just*
47 *when I was younger, but I have been bashed*

1 by lots of people. They're like, "You've
2 been a cunt to us so why should we protect
3 you?" That's what really pissed me off
4 with the whole centre, they're supposed to
5 be there worrying about our safety but
6 they're sitting there and they let us get
7 bashed and stuff and they sit there and
8 watch you get bashed. They laugh about it.
9 They say, "Oh, I reckon you won that fight"
10 or "He won that fight", what the fuck's
11 that shit? That's wrong.

12
13 The Commission will hear evidence about how placement
14 decisions, that is the placement of children in particular
15 units, are made at Ashley and how in some cases those
16 decisions exposed children to the risks of violence
17 including harmful sexual behaviours.

18
19 One 16-year-old child said to Professor Moore:

20
21 *I reckon they should separate young boys*
22 *from the older boys because it's hectic in*
23 *there. They get out thinking they're big*
24 *fucking Terry tough nuts because they hang*
25 *around with the big boys, they think*
26 *they're massive when they get out and they*
27 *just end up doing more crime because*
28 *they're been hanging around those boys when*
29 *they get out.*

30
31 Another child said:

32
33 *Why put the 13-year-old up with all the*
34 *people that are like 17 and 18-years-old.*
35 *But now they've got one 13-year-old in*
36 *there, he's trying to get up with all of us*
37 *and then he says something wrong and then*
38 *he ends up getting himself bashed.*

39
40 You will also hear evidence about the use of
41 isolation. Mr Robinson described being in isolation to you
42 when he gave his evidence. He said:

43
44 *The longest that I was isolated in my room*
45 *was for about six weeks, it happened quite*
46 *regularly. It was no certain unit, it was*
47 *called ISP, which stood for individual*

1 support program. Every Wednesday they ran
2 a meeting to discuss your overall weekly
3 behaviour and they'd come around and if
4 they decided that your behaviour wasn't up
5 to standard they'd put you on ISP for a
6 week which meant that I'd just be in my
7 room and seven days later they'd come
8 around and if I'd been behaving they'd let
9 me out. But if you'd go to officers that
10 didn't like you, they'd just basically
11 write a book and stuff and say that you'd
12 abused them and write to a friend and that
13 was enough to keep you in ISP for another
14 week.

15
16 There will be evidence that many young people at
17 Ashley experienced verbal abuse and disrespect and they
18 were made to feel worthless, as Mr Robinson said to you in
19 his evidence in June:

20
21 *To be honest, it was horrible. Basically*
22 *you were made to feel like an adult and you*
23 *were just treated like shit, you were*
24 *belittled. I lost track of the number of*
25 *times that I was told that I was a drug*
26 *baby, that I wasn't wanted and that this*
27 *was all I was ever going to be and stuff*
28 *like that. It was continuous. It was just*
29 *how they spoke to you. Don't get me wrong,*
30 *there were a couple of nice ones that*
31 *worked there and they wouldn't treat you*
32 *like that and when they were working they*
33 *would basically keep officers in line, so*
34 *there was only one or two of them.*

35
36 In the light of all that may I turn to consider the
37 evidence that's going to be called before you. Today the
38 Commission will hear the evidence of two former detainees,
39 one who will give evidence remotely and one whose statement
40 will be read.

41
42 Then we will hear the evidence of former Commissioner
43 for Children and Young People, Mark Morrissey, some
44 evidence from two current Ashley employees, the evidence of
45 Professor Rob White, and then the evidence of experts
46 Mr McGinness and Ms Mitchell on best practice for the new
47 facilities which are intended to replace Ashley.

1
2 Tomorrow evidence will be called from two parents of
3 former detainees who saw the terrible impact that the
4 conditions at Ashley had on their children. Then we'll
5 hear evidence from the Aboriginal Legal Service and
6 Tasmania Legal Aid, from the principal of the Ashley
7 School, and from the Health Department, before calling a
8 senior Department of Communities official whose role was
9 the head of custodial youth services.

10
11 On Monday, evidence will be given by a number of
12 current and former Ashley and departmental employees about
13 their observations and experiences of practices at Ashley,
14 including responses to harmful sexual behaviour.

15
16 On Tuesday and Wednesday evidence will be called from
17 a number of senior practitioners and managers at Ashley and
18 from senior police and we'll also hear from other former
19 detainees about their experiences of abuse.

20
21 On Thursday and Friday, the Secretary of the
22 Department of Communities and other senior executives will
23 answer questions about the themes, case studies and issues
24 which are being examined and evidence will also be called
25 to assist you in considering how to make recommendations
26 for culture and practice change.

27
28 Commissioners, we're conscious that the evidence over
29 the coming days will be confronting and distressing. We're
30 pursuing that evidence though to enable you to make the
31 findings and recommendations that will best protect
32 children in Youth Detention from the risk of sexual abuse
33 in future.

34
35 Thank you, Commissioners, may I invite you to take the
36 morning break before the first witness, who will appear
37 remotely.

38
39 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you, yes, we'll take the morning
40 adjournment.

41
42 **SHORT ADJOURNMENT**

43
44 MS ELLYARD: Thank you, Commissioners, the next witness
45 wishes to give evidence to you under a pseudonym but to not
46 be live-streamed, so may I ask that the Commissioners
47 direct that the live stream be turned off?

1
2 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Yes, could the live stream be turned
3 off, please? And, we've already made orders relevant to
4 the pseudonyms.

5
6 MS ELLYARD: Yes, thank you. I'll ask the witness and
7 those assisting him to turn their camera on because the
8 live stream's been turned off. This is the witness who's
9 being known by the pseudonym, Simon. Simon, can you see
10 and hear me?

11
12 SIMON: Yes.

13
14 MS ELLYARD: The next voice you'll hear will be the
15 Commissioners' clerk who will take you through the
16 Commissioners' affirmation Process.

17
18 <SIMON, affirmed and examined: [11.27am]

19
20 <EXAMINATION BY MS ELLYARD:

21
22 MS ELLYARD: Q. Simon, you've made a statement which
23 you've signed that has described for the Commission some of
24 your experiences during the times that you were a detainee
25 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre?

26 A. Yes.

27
28 Q. And you are going to answer some questions now about
29 the things that you've described in your statement?

30 A. Yep.

31
32 Q. Now, you've said in your statement that you first went
33 to Ashley when you were around 10 years old. Can you tell
34 us about why it was that you went to Ashley then, when you
35 were so young?

36 A. Well, I got a call from my little cousin, oh, a little
37 friend, that I was doing the wrong thing.

38
39 Q. And --

40 A. Stealing, I was breaking into people's cars, yeah.

41
42 Q. And usually someone that young would get bail perhaps
43 and they wouldn't go to Ashley; do you know why it was that
44 you were sent to Ashley?

45 A. I don't know, but it was a pretty - a bit of a ride
46 going there, you know what I mean. I went there because, I
47 don't know, they opposed bail on both of us.

1
2 Q. So, the police opposed bail so that you were both sent
3 to Ashley on remand?

4 A. Yes.

5
6 Q. And, as I understand it, that first time you only
7 spent two days there but they were very difficult days; can
8 you tell us what made them difficult?

9 A. Well, shut in the room, they were shoving me and my
10 little mate in the room together, chucked us a teddy and
11 told us to sleep with each other, it was pretty wrong, you
12 know what I mean. That was the first couple of days, they
13 were just treating us like shit.

14
15 Q. And when you were a little bit older around 11 or 12
16 you went to Ashley a second time?

17 A. Yeah.

18
19 Q. And you stayed there for about two months that time;
20 is that right?

21 A. Yeah, about two, two and a half months, yep.

22
23 Q. Were you treated differently that second time from the
24 way you had been treated the first time?

25 A. A little bit differently. Not really, yeah, I got
26 treated, yeah - yeah, I did.

27
28 Q. What was different? Can you describe what was
29 different about the way you were treated that second time?
30 Was it better or worse?

31 A. Worse, I think.

32
33 Q. Yeah? It's a difficult question and I don't want you
34 to say things you don't want to say, but can you give us
35 some examples of the way they behaved that made it bad?

36 A. Just disgusting, um, I don't know if it was my second
37 or third time where I had that visit where they were strip
38 searching me, I don't know, I can't recall, but yeah, that
39 was no, I don't know if that was another time or not, but
40 it was just disgusting the way they treat kids, you know
41 what I mean, there was no need for it, they can't stick up
42 for themselves.

43
44 Q. So, do you mean that they would treat you badly in the
45 way they would speak to you?

46 A. Yeah, they speak to me like "You're a [REDACTED] little
47 scum", and just stuff like that, you know what I mean. It

1 does affect kids, you don't do that, you know what I mean,
2 you don't do that.

3
4 Q. You've described strip searching, you've said in your
5 statement that you were strip-searched each time you came
6 into Ashley and each time you went back and forward to
7 court and sometimes for random searches?

8 A. Yeah.

9
10 Q. I know there was a particular search that you've told
11 us about, but the usual search, what did that involve?

12 A. You used to have to bend over and squat and spread
13 your arse kids, like a kid, they shouldn't have to spread
14 their arse cheeks and all that sort of stuff, that's
15 another disgusting, you know.

16
17 Q. And would you be allowed to keep your clothes on
18 during the searches?

19 A. No, you have to take all our clothes off naked and
20 spread your arse cheeks and squat, you know what I mean.

21
22 Q. And would they give you any kind of shirt or anything
23 like that to cover yourself up while you were being
24 searched?

25 A. No, you had to be fully naked in front of them.

26
27 Q. You've described one occasion where you were going
28 back through the admissions section and the guards wanted
29 to search you for drugs, it was after a time that you had
30 had a visit and you were still quite young, can you tell us
31 what happened on that occasion?

32 A. Um, I didn't have no drugs, they obviously thought I
33 did, I said no, I'll do a normal search, they wanted me to
34 spread my arse cheeks and all that and then they'd hold me
35 down, it was pretty disgusting, I still remember it from
36 this day, there's just no need for it, you know what I
37 mean, like, hold me down and spread my arse cheeks apart.
38 I didn't even have nothing, they didn't even get nothing
39 out of me, you know what I mean. I still sit there and
40 think about it from this day, you know what I mean, it's
41 disgusting, you know, don't do that.

42
43 Q. I don't want you to say their names but there were
44 three different guards who held you down on that occasion,
45 is that right?

46 A. Yes, and I shouldn't be sitting here saying it now,
47 I'm older man now. If I ever see them on the streets - you

1 just don't - just brought memories back in my head that
2 shouldn't be there, you know what I mean?

3
4 Q. You've also described, and again I don't want you to
5 use his name, the way another older guard used to behave
6 when you guys were showering. Can you tell us about that?

7 A. He's a dirty old man. Because there used to be this
8 viewing panel about that big (indicating), and they used to
9 undo this and have a little look if you, like, they can't
10 find you and you're suicidal, you know what I mean. There
11 used to be a really old guard, I know his name but you know
12 I won't say it, but he used to sit there and he used to
13 watch you shower, you know what I mean: what the hell?

14
15 Q. And did other kids ever talk about that with you,
16 about him doing that?

17 A. Yeah, yeah, he got - I'll sit there and say it, he got
18 called a dirty old dog for doing that, that was his
19 nickname, you know what I mean, dirty old dog, you know
20 what I mean, he used to sit there and watch kids. And the
21 girls side was right beside my unit, so I don't know what
22 he did to the - how he looked to the girls, I don't know.

23
24 Q. Did you ever complain to other people, perhaps the
25 manager or the supervisors, about the fact that this guard
26 was watching you in the shower?

27 A. That's a different story. If you used to complain
28 about it, that's why I haven't said nothing, so I used to
29 complain about it, no-one believes you, you just get locked
30 down for lying, you know what I mean, and it's not a lie,
31 it's just wrong.

32
33 Q. Simon, you've also described in your statement being
34 hit by the guards?

35 A. Yeah, I used to cop some hidings off them, I've copped
36 some big hidings off them, like.

37
38 Q. What kind of things happened that they said you'd done
39 that would lead them to hit you?

40 A. Just not going to bed on time, or just slipping up
41 doing something simple like a kid does, you know how kids
42 slip up and do things wrong, just doing something simple
43 wrong and bang, just be gone, smashed up.

44
45 Q. And you said in your statement that you would get
46 belted up and you would have bruises and grazes, did that
47 happen quite often?

1 A. Yeah, that happened a bit. All the people that was in
2 there around my time they'll all tell you the same story
3 I'm telling you. It all matches up, you know what I mean.
4

5 Q. That was going to be my next question, did you see
6 other children get treated the way you were treated?

7 A. Yeah, I've seen some children treated some pretty bad
8 ways in that place. I had a good mate there, his name was
9 Craig, he's dead now, he died in that place, he got treated
10 pretty bad too, you know what I mean.
11

12 Q. And again, maybe you've already answered this, but why
13 didn't you ever complain or try to tell anybody about the
14 fact that the guards were belting you?

15 A. I'll sit down and say it right now: at the time I'm
16 just a criminal, that's the law, they're going to believe
17 the law before a dirty old criminal. That's how I seen it
18 in my eyes, sorry to say it.
19

20 Q. You've also described in your statement being placed
21 in isolation at Ashley, what did that involve, being put in
22 isolation?

23 A. I'll tell you this right now, I still remember the
24 room, I think it's cell 9 isolation, they chucked me a
25 horse blanket and I slept there for days. I'm telling you
26 it was the coldest thing in my life I've ever been through,
27 it was so cold, and I was cold.
28

29 Q. So you were put in cell 9 with a horse blanket and
30 just left by yourself?

31 A. Yeah.
32

33 Q. And what would happen about getting food?

34 A. Bring you food once a day or so, yeah.
35

36 Q. What was the longest time you were ever left in
37 isolation like that that you can remember?

38 A. I don't know, I think it was a week or two weeks.
39

40 Q. In your statement you said that you thought that once
41 it was two and a half weeks; does that sound right?

42 A. Yeah, probably that's about right, yeah.
43

44 Q. And it was cold?

45 A. It was freezing, I'm telling you, it was freezing, it
46 felt like it was snowing. I was freezing.
47

1 Q. What had you done, the times that you were put in
2 isolation, what did the guards say was the reason for you
3 being put in isolation?

4 A. Just, you get DOs up there, that's what they get
5 injury reports for, like, DOs; just not listening to them,
6 not listening to staff, simple things like that.

7
8 Q. So, it would be a punishment?

9 A. Yeah. Yeah, that's what it is, it's meant to be a
10 punishment.

11
12 Q. In your statement, Simon, you say that you went to
13 Ashley at least seven or eight times and it would always be
14 that you'd go in on remand and then get sentenced while you
15 were in there; is that right?

16 A. Yep.

17
18 Q. Then you said that when you were 17 you were remanded
19 and you asked to go to Risdon instead of Ashley?

20 A. Yeah, it was about 17, I'm pretty sure it was, it was
21 in Launceston, it was.

22
23 Q. It might seem strange that a child would ask to go to
24 an adult prison rather than go to a child's prison. Why
25 did you request to be sent to Risdon?

26 A. Because the way I've been treated there all my life,
27 you know what I mean, it was disgusting, and I got all my
28 uncles and all that down here treated a bit better, you
29 know what I mean, just treated bad.

30
31 Q. And when you got to Risdon, can you remember, was it
32 different to the way you were treated at Ashley?

33 A. I can sit here and tell you right now the guards at
34 Risdon Prison are a lot better than the Ashley Youth
35 Detention Centre ones, they treated people like shit. You
36 shouldn't be doing that, you know what I mean, they're
37 children at the end of the day. There should be more
38 better help for children and that. And another thing, that
39 jail - Ashley shouldn't be put into a jail. What about
40 people with memories, they're going to lay their head down
41 and think they've been abused, you know what I mean?

42
43 Q. I think what you're saying there, Simon, is you're
44 referring to the fact that the government has suggested
45 that once Ashley closes as a Youth Detention Centre they
46 might build an adult jail there instead?

47 A. Yeah.

1
2 Q. And you're saying that a lot of the people who might
3 be sent there would have bad memories of being at Ashley?

4 A. Of course they would. Just saying if I went back
5 there right now I'm telling you right now I would have real
6 bad memories. I wouldn't be myself. Just be doing
7 different. I know I can't say nothing about it, but there
8 shouldn't be a jail there, you know what I mean, people who
9 have been sexually abused have gotta go back there.
10 Imagine their heads laying down at the end of the day.
11 It's not good, it's not good. If I sit down and lay on my
12 bed right now I still think how they did that, even though
13 it wasn't actually them, but it was, they still touched me,
14 you know what I mean, they shouldn't be doing that.

15
16 Q. One of the things you say in your statement is that
17 you feel that what happened to you at Ashley has really
18 affected you?

19 A. (Indistinct words) Yeah it did, I've been locked up
20 all my life, you know, it probably made me being locked up
21 all my life, you know what I mean, I don't know about it;
22 it's just - I dunno. And, what about the next poor kid
23 that gets treated like that? It's not just about me now,
24 what about the next poor kid, you know I mean? I've been
25 there, I've done it, I know what happens.

26
27 Q. What do you think Ashley should have been like? How
28 should the guards have behaved with you?

29 A. They should behave with me good, but they should be
30 behaving - and if I, like, not belt me up and that, just
31 proper discipline and that, not belt me up and that. They
32 should work with kids, you know what I mean, help them.

33
34 Q. And so, help you to change your behaviour instead of
35 just punishing you?

36 A. That's right. That's right, that's what they should
37 have had, they should have for kids, shouldn't be coming
38 back there, you know, they're being punished, not punished
39 in that way.

40
41 Q. We know that there's still kids at Ashley right now.
42 What do you think about that, that there's still kids there
43 now at Ashley?

44 A. I reckon they need better help or something to help
45 them, something - I don't know what youse could do, just
46 something, I don't know, to help them.

1 Q. You've already mentioned your friend Craig, Simon, who
2 died and the Commission know about Craig and they've read a
3 lot of documents that tell us about Craig's experiences and
4 what happened to him before he died, but I know that it's
5 something that's important to you; can you tell us what's
6 important, what is it about that that's made you want to
7 speak to us?

8 A. I was in jail at the time, here's another story, when
9 he got hit and he had blood clots and that, I've been told
10 this off heaps of people so I believe it's the same story,
11 this is another thing that went on. When he got hit - he
12 had a car accident he got hit, when he went to Ashley he
13 got hit. And he complained about his head for weeks and
14 weeks, for about a week, complained about his head's sore
15 and he spewed everywhere and all they did was go and chuck
16 him a towel and say "clean up the spew" and that was the
17 last time anybody seen him alive. Imagine that, you being
18 alive, right, and someone - and you're spewing everywhere
19 and someone come and chuck you a towel at you and go "clean
20 your mess up, you little shit" and walking out and then you
21 drop dead. That's not nice. It's bringing a tear to my
22 eye now, it's not nice.

23
24 Q. I think what you're saying, Simon, is that you didn't
25 observe that, you've been told about it, but it sounds like
26 you're sure it's true because you saw the way guards at
27 Ashley behaved?

28 A. They treated me like that, you know what I mean, they
29 treated me like it, so I believe it, and all different
30 people are telling the same story about that too and I
31 believe it. I've been treated like that - worser.
32 I believe it; me too.

33
34 Q. Part of the role of the Commission, Simon, is to make
35 recommendations to the government about the kind of Youth
36 Detention facilities that should be built to replace
37 Ashley. What are the kinds of things that you feel should
38 be part of - if there's going to have to be a jail for kids
39 in the future and perhaps there does need to be for a few
40 kids, what should it be like and how should it help the
41 children who are sent there?

42 A. Courses, um, in saying that, I don't know where you're
43 gonna put them: courses, programs, just heaps of things to
44 help us rehabilitate ourselves, you know what I mean, just
45 try to help them. I know some kids don't listen, but at
46 least try; I don't know.

1 Q. Do you think if there had been programs and
2 rehabilitation help for you it might have made a difference
3 to your experience when you were in Ashley?

4 A. That would help me, yeah, bloody oath it would have, I
5 probably wouldn't be sitting in jail when I was from this
6 day, you know what I mean, I'd be normal. I can't blame
7 anyone else, I'm the silly one that done it meself, but at
8 the end of the day I probably would be normal, yeah.

9
10 Q. Thank you, Simon, those are the questions that I
11 wanted to ask you but I'm just going to ask you to wait
12 because the Commissioners who have been listening carefully
13 to your evidence may have something they want to say to you
14 or ask you?

15 A. Yeah.

16
17 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: Q. Yes, Simon, Robert Benjamin
18 here. When you were talking about courses and programs,
19 I've been to a couple of other detention centres in other
20 states and territories and they sometimes have football
21 teams, senior football teams and athletes, would that be
22 the kind of thing you'd be looking at?

23 A. That would be lovely, even something like that, you
24 know what I mean, something fun for the kids, that would be
25 lovely.

26
27 Q. The other thing I saw some of them do, they have
28 simulators there where they teach kids how to drive and
29 allow them to get their hours up for their driver's
30 licences, is that the sort of thing that may be of some
31 value, do you think?

32 A. Oh, just depends really, probably see a silly little
33 kid go out and think they can drive a car.

34
35 Q. I'm not suggesting that we give kids cars, but 17 and
36 18-year-olds, because I think you've got to get a couple of
37 hundred hours, don't you, to get a driver's licence?

38 A. Yep. No, that probably would be good for kids too, an
39 incentive in front of them, you know what I mean, so not
40 doing the wrong thing, I reckon that would probably be,
41 you're probably right on that too, mate.

42
43 Q. Thank you, Simon.

44 A. Thank you.

45
46 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. Simon, I wanted to ask you, was
47 there a school there when you were there?

1 A. Yes, there was a school, yes, yes.

2
3 Q. How was that school, was the school helpful to you?

4 A. No, not really. All they give you is 20 minutes of
5 program a day, that's all they give you, 20 minutes. By
6 the time you get your work out, you're out. That's all
7 they give you, 20 minute programs.

8
9 Q. So you mean, you wouldn't go to the school from 9.30
10 till the afternoon?

11 A. No, no, you'd probably only do about 20 minutes a day.

12
13 PRESIDENT NEAVE: I see, thank you.

14
15 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: I didn't have any questions for
16 you, Simon, but I did just want to make a comment about
17 something you said. You said that, you know, it wasn't up
18 to you or it wasn't something you really had a right to say
19 what should happen to Ashley, but I just wanted to say that
20 the things you've got to say are really important and they
21 do help us to think about what should happen at Ashley.
22 You are an expert because you were there and so thank you
23 for sharing your story?

24 A. That's okay, have a lovely day.

25
26 MS ELLYARD: Thank you very much.

27
28 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you very, very much.

29 A. Thank you, have a lovely day. Thank youse all.

30
31 MS ELLYARD: Thank you, Commissioners, we can turn off the
32 link to Simon and restart the live stream. My learned
33 friend, Ms Rhodes, is going to read the evidence of another
34 witness.

35
36 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you, Ms Rhodes.

37
38 MS RHODES: Thank you, Commissioners. I'm reading the
39 evidence of a former detainee at Ashley Youth Detention
40 Centre who is going by the name "Warren". Warren has
41 kindly given permission for me to read out his statement
42 and also a statement that he prepared for the National
43 Redress Scheme. I'll be reading both to make a story, so I
44 will be going between the two, I hope you can follow, but I
45 do thank Warren for allowing me to read his story:

46
47 *Before Ashley Youth Detention Centre I was*

1 living with my mother until I was made a
2 ward of the state. At age 3 I was
3 diagnosed with ADHD and was prescribed
4 Ritalin to help with my symptoms.

5
6 During my childhood my mother struggled to
7 cope with parenting me and frequently
8 physically abused me from a very young age.
9 I often had bruises on my face which spread
10 all the way down to my ribs.

11
12 On one occasion she smashed my face into
13 the kitchen bench. I believe she did this
14 so that when I went to school the staff
15 could see that I had bruises and hoped I
16 would be taken away from her.

17
18 Following this incident I was taken into
19 state care and removed from her care
20 completely. I was then placed into
21 numerous foster homes which I often ran
22 away from. I received some care from an
23 organisation but I kept stealing from them
24 in the hope that I would be sent home. I
25 ran away from this organisation many times
26 as well.

27
28 I was first admitted to Ashley when I was
29 13 years old. I was arrested and charged
30 with stealing some clothes from What's New
31 and assault. I was on bail for prior
32 offences which included conditions like a
33 curfew. I was sent to Ashley on remand and
34 stayed there for four months.

35
36 I didn't think the conditions at Ashley
37 were too bad. Some of the workers were
38 alright and I got along with them really
39 well. They would treat me like I was a
40 human being and not just a criminal. They
41 would help me out, pull me aside if I was
42 doing badly, and try to keep me out of
43 trouble.

44
45 Other guards would bring their bad mood to
46 work. If they didn't like you, they would
47 be physical with you. If you gave them a

1 little bit of lip they would restrain you
2 and nearly snap your arm behind your back.
3

4 While I was at Ashley I mostly tried to
5 keep to myself. I stayed in my cell a lot
6 so I didn't have to interact with other
7 people. There was a fair bit of violence
8 among the kids. It was mostly for stupid
9 shit. If the other kids saw you talking to
10 the workers they could start something. I
11 tried to keep out of this stuff.
12

13 There was some goods parts of being at
14 Ashley. When I got there I didn't know how
15 to read and write. The teachers at the
16 school at Ashley taught me how to read and
17 write. I also did things like a barista
18 course and woodwork. They gave us the
19 opportunity to play sport. They taught me
20 life skills that I hadn't learnt prior to
21 coming to Ashley.
22

23 In total I went to Ashley around 21 times.
24 Usually I was there for a couple of months
25 a time. The longest time I was there was
26 for a year which was from just before I
27 turned 18 until I was nearly 19. About
28 half the time I was in Ashley I was on
29 remand. The rest was under sentence, this
30 includes when I spent the year there.
31

32 I was a victim of sexual assault when I was
33 placed in Ashley Youth Detention Centre.
34 I am a father and would never want any of
35 this to happen to them if they were to take
36 the same road in life that I did. I hope
37 they don't.
38

39 It is so sad that this stuff happens in an
40 institution that is run by the Tasmanian
41 Government. They are trusted with looking
42 after young people and children who have
43 not coped well in the community. I have a
44 hard time trusting people because of what I
45 experienced at Ashley.
46

47 The strip-searches conducted on me at

1 Ashley were degrading and abusive. During
2 the strip searches I was forced to get
3 completely naked in front of the guards.
4 The majority of the time there were two
5 guards present. One would sometimes stand
6 outside the door while the other one was in
7 the room with me.

8
9 During the strip-searches the guards forced
10 me to bend over with my backside towards
11 them to check for contraband. They never
12 found anything. The proper procedure at
13 the time was to either have your top or
14 bottom half closed at all times. During
15 these searches I was forced by the guards
16 to masturbate myself, which I was watched
17 by the guards. The guards would sometimes
18 also force me to touch their penises with
19 my hands and force me to perform oral sex
20 on them.

21
22 Due to my ADHD diagnosis I was prescribed
23 Ritalin. It was necessary for me to take
24 this medication under supervision of the
25 guards. The guards were required to give
26 me medication in my cell. This is where
27 the abuse occurred.

28
29 When it was time for me to have my
30 medication the guards, named Reuben, Clyde
31 and Lionel, would restrain me by grabbing
32 my arms and pinning them behind my back to
33 the point where it felt like my arms were
34 about to break or my shoulder would pop out
35 of the joint. Lionel would ram my head
36 into the walls on purpose and because I was
37 restrained I couldn't do anything to
38 protect myself.

39
40 I also already had a head injury due to
41 another accident where I fractured my
42 skull. The guards were aware of this
43 injury. During the time that the guards
44 were in my cell they would then make me
45 touch my penis and masturbate myself. The
46 guards would also force me to touch their
47 penises and masturbate them. They would

1 make me masturbate them until they
2 ejaculated. They made me put their penises
3 into my mouth as well. The abuse
4 alternated between oral sex and
5 masturbation, depending on what they could
6 get away with on that day.

7
8 All three guards perpetrated sexual abuse
9 against me. The three named guards were
10 constantly working on the same shift,
11 rotation, at Ashley, meaning all three were
12 working at the same time on the same days.

13
14 In addition to the forced oral sex and
15 masturbation, Clyde would also penetrate my
16 anus with his penis whilst another
17 restrained me so I could not move. I was
18 anally raped over 20 times over the course
19 of my stay at Ashley. I was supposed to
20 take Ritalin twice a day, once in the
21 morning and again in the afternoon. The
22 abuse often occurred in the morning.
23 Reuben and Clyde would often enter my cell
24 together, Lionel would come alone. None of
25 them would give me my medication until I
26 did the sexual acts on them. The abuse
27 happened a total of 50 occasions.

28
29 The first time I was sexually abused was
30 during my second admission when I was about
31 14 years old. This was the first time I
32 had been placed in this particular unit.
33 It occurred while I was being searched.
34 The first time I was abused in my room was
35 when I came back to Ashley the third time.
36 I think I would have been 15 by then.

37
38 The abuse continued right up until I left
39 Ashley when I was 18 years old. I never
40 told anyone what was happening to me. The
41 workers that were abusing me would threaten
42 me if I did say anything. They would tell
43 the other boys in Ashley that I was turning
44 them in so that I would get bashed. They
45 would also make threats against my family
46 saying they would go and smash my mum's
47 house up and burn it. They would tell me

1 that no-one would believe me anyway because
2 I'm just a little criminal. I didn't want
3 to say anything because I was afraid of
4 what they could do.

5
6 I never made a complaint about anything
7 that happened while I was in Ashley. The
8 process of making a complaint was to write
9 it down and give it to the workers. If
10 someone ever complained about something it
11 would always get back to the workers and
12 they would tell each other about it. They
13 would make your life hell and you suffered
14 more. Because of this, no-one really made
15 any complaints. I didn't know if there was
16 anyone outside Ashley we could make a
17 complaint to.

18
19 Now I know I can make a complaint to the
20 Ombudsman but I didn't know that when I was
21 at Ashley. The first person I ever spoke
22 to about what happened to me at Ashley was
23 my girlfriend and we spent time in Ashley
24 together and I knew her all my life. I
25 told her when we first got together when I
26 was about 28 years old. Since then I have
27 also spoken to my mum and told her what had
28 happened.

29
30 After I told my girlfriend about what
31 happened to me she suggested that I go for
32 redress. I contacted a lawyer and told
33 them what happened at Ashley. I am
34 currently going through this redress
35 process with my lawyer. I found this
36 process very good. My lawyer has also
37 arranged counselling which has really
38 helped me.

39
40 I have a hard time trusting people. This
41 makes it really hard for me to keep
42 relationships and friendships. I tend to
43 keep to myself and distance myself from
44 people.

45
46 Since leaving Ashley I have made very few
47 achievements in my life. The first time I

1 went to Risdon Prison I was aged 22. I had
2 accumulated 150 charges at the time and I
3 have been in and out of prison ever since.
4 My longest time out of prison is one year
5 and my longest sentence is 18 months.

6
7 I started using ice around the age of 23.
8 I have now been clean for one year. I
9 attributed my problems with drug addiction
10 to my experience at Ashley. Ever since
11 being in Ashley I have suffered with my
12 mental health and battled substance abuse.
13 I have felt suicidal since leaving Ashley
14 and have tried to commit suicide.

15
16 I have children of my own, all very young.
17 As a result of my abuse I am extremely
18 cautious and protect my children. I will
19 not allow them to be smacked and I will not
20 trust anyone to care for them.

21
22 Ashley or any other Youth Detention Centre
23 that replaces it needs more security
24 cameras. When I was at Ashley there were
25 places with no security cameras. This was
26 where things always happened.

27
28 The workers need to treat kids in detention
29 better. They need to be better trained to
30 deal with kids and not take their problems
31 out on them. The workers in the adult
32 prisons are better than the ones that are
33 at Ashley. I hadn't had the sort of
34 problems with workers in adult prisons that
35 I did with those in Ashley.

36
37 There needs to be a way for kids in Ashley
38 to make complaints safely. This needs to
39 be someone who is from outside Ashley that
40 comes into the centre for the kids to speak
41 to.

42
43 That is the statement of Warren.

44
45 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you very much, Ms Rhodes.

46
47 MS RHODES: I believe we need to take a short recess.

1
2 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Yes, just briefly.
3

4 **SHORT ADJOURNMENT**
5

6 MS ELLYARD: Thank you, Commissioners, the next witness is
7 Mr Mark Morrissey who appears via video and I'll ask that
8 he take the affirmation.
9

10 **<MARK BARRIE MORRISSEY, affirmed and examined: [12.04pm]**
11

12 **<EXAMINATION BY MS ELLYARD:**
13

14 MS ELLYARD: Q. Mr Morrissey, could you tell the
15 Commission, please, your full name?

16 A. Yes, my full name is Mark Barrie Morrissey.
17

18 Q. And you reside presently in Western Australia?

19 A. Correct, yes.
20

21 Q. You've made a statement to assist the work of the
22 Commission. Do you have a copy of the statement with you?

23 A. I do, I've got it here on the screen.
24

25 Q. And it's signed by you and dated 9 August 2022. Are
26 the contents of that statement true and correct?

27 A. They are to the best of my memory, yes.
28

29 Q. And you've attached a number of attachments which you
30 would wish the Commission to look at as well as part of
31 their consideration of your evidence?

32 A. Yes, I have.
33

34 Q. You're giving evidence because for a period of time
35 you held the role of Commissioner for Children and Young
36 People in Tasmania. Can I ask you, prior to taking up that
37 role in 2014, what was your professional history as it
38 related to child safety and related matters?

39 A. Yes, I have spent much of my career working in the
40 children and young people space. I worked as the Director
41 of Policy For Child Protection in Western Australia, and
42 for around a decade I headed up child and adolescent
43 community health and also for a period child and adolescent
44 mental health, but most of my career has been in the area
45 of children and young people. Also, I have worked in Youth
46 Justice as well.
47

1 Q. When you took up the position of Commissioner for
2 Children and Young People, what was your intention in
3 taking up that role? What was it that you hoped you would
4 be able to achieve for the benefit of children?

5 A. Yeah, I was very interested in being able to make a
6 contribution in some of the areas that I've seen needed -
7 needed work; reforming child protection, how we treat and
8 manage young people in the Youth Justice System, and more
9 broadly children and children's rights.

10
11 Q. This particular session of the Commission, as you are
12 aware, is focusing on experiences of children in the Ashley
13 Youth Detention Centre.

14 A. Yes.

15
16 Q. At paragraph 26 and following of your statement you
17 make some remarks about the cohort of children who enter
18 Ashley and their particular needs; could you tell us about
19 that, please?

20 A. In essence, I believe that most if not all of the
21 children and young people who enter Ashley have significant
22 developmental disorders. I think, in regard to the
23 available evidence, that's not an uncontested viewpoint.
24 They've suffered lots of trauma, often from birth and right
25 through to their admission, and I feel putting young people
26 in a detention centre with significant developmental delay
27 and damage is not the appropriate response.

28
29 Q. And instead you make the comment at paragraph 29 and
30 following that a therapeutic environment is what's required
31 for this cohort of children. What do you mean by
32 "therapeutic environment" and what would it look like?

33 A. Yeah look, that's a big question and I would
34 ultimately defer to the experts in this space, but my
35 understanding is, it has to be an adequately and thoroughly
36 therapeutic environment. How it was structured was not, in
37 my view, representative of really any reflection of what a
38 therapeutic environment should be.

39
40 If I could probably start with the - I'd call them the
41 guards there: I think their skills needed to be quite
42 different than they were equipped. I believe there needed
43 to be a much different environment, physical environment
44 for them to be in.

45
46 In my witness statement I refer to the treatment we
47 give children and young people in the general healthcare

1 system, which I won't detail now, but essentially we accord
2 children who are injured in other ways a much more
3 professional response with specialists and
4 paraprofessionals working with them. In no way was this
5 really being delivered to the young people at Ashley.
6 There were sessional professionals attending, but not to
7 the adequacy and breadth required.

8
9 Q. One of the other things that you say at paragraphs 36
10 and following of your statement is, you comment on the ways
11 in which Ashley perhaps didn't just not help children but
12 perhaps harmed them by acting as a conduit towards them
13 becoming more serious criminals. Can you tell us how you
14 came to form that view?

15 A. I'll answer that question with one example. I was
16 speaking to a child, he was 12 or 13 years of age. His
17 first admission - and as you develop, I guess, a
18 relationship to these children by visiting them they start
19 to disclose, and he was very happy to share how he was
20 becoming much more upskilled in crime and the ability to
21 steal a car and to commit crime, and he was also forming
22 networks that he would have connected into once he was
23 released from Ashley.

24
25 So, aside from the lack of a therapeutic context,
26 these children often build networks that tragically would
27 be their trajectory for life.

28
29 Q. You comment at paragraph 45 and following that the
30 absence of a therapeutic and trauma-informed model of care
31 at Ashley resulted in what you've called a generational
32 revolving door, which as I understand it meant that
33 children were likely to be incarcerated and ultimately to
34 have children or other family members who are incarcerated
35 in turn?

36 A. Yeah, look, this is not just a Tasmanian issue, but
37 families often - these children, and usually boys, lack
38 role models and the only role models they have are often
39 the bigger boys of Ashley who they try to emulate and often
40 older people in the community who are involved in crime, so
41 their career is established from the networks they make at
42 Ashley right through to the community where they often end
43 up in an adult jail. So, they often would have children
44 who have no more opportunity than they did, yeah, and not
45 always but I'm talking about a general trend.

46
47 Q. One of the things you describe in the statement is a

1 view you formed from your visits to Ashley that there
2 needed to be a mechanism by which children could complain
3 or raise concerns about the ways in which they were being
4 treated, and you deal with this at paragraphs 78 and
5 following of your statement and you offer some reflections
6 of what, in response to your concerns, the institution did
7 to create what you saw as an ineffective complaints
8 process.

9
10 Can you tell us, firstly, what's the significance of
11 children being able to complain and what are your
12 reflections on what the capacity was at Ashley during your
13 time to make complaints in a meaningful way?

14 A. Children having a voice is fundamentally one of the
15 most important child safe mechanisms. The children at
16 Ashley, and I think the last evidence made that very clear,
17 often and pretty well universally don't have the voice they
18 need. There's many factors that mitigate against them
19 being able to speak up, and I guess, if young people can't
20 speak up they can't report abuse, they can't get their
21 needs met, and they become highly vulnerable to ongoing
22 abuse.

23
24 Obviously, when I was the Commissioner we had quite a
25 small team, so endeavoured to focus on the issues that may
26 have made the biggest difference, and I formed a view that
27 it was giving children a voice and that included the
28 children at Ashley. I think as the Commission is hearing,
29 that was a very difficult task to actually reach out and
30 actually gain the children's voice; there were so many
31 factors preventing that occurring.

32
33 Q. You mention at paragraph 87 of your statement a
34 complaints box that was instituted by Ashley management
35 ostensibly so that children would have a means of making
36 complaints; what was your view about whether that was
37 meeting the need of a complaints mechanism?

38 A. I would suggest that a complaints box is never going
39 to work in any context; particularly, it's never going to
40 work in a Youth Detention Centre where the young person,
41 firstly, had to write something down - a number were
42 illiterate - in public view, and then going through often
43 complaining about the very people that they had concerns
44 about, those complaints would go to them.

45
46 I did persevere/advocate that it was a futile
47 endeavour. It's always a fine balance between alienating

1 the people in management who are trying to do their best
2 and encourage them to keep thinking, but also just seeing
3 the futility of some of the - I suppose that it probably
4 wasn't intentional, I think it was probably well meaning by
5 management but absolutely misguided.
6

7 Q. And it wasn't a solution which took account of the
8 barriers that children would face in making the difficult
9 decision to make a complaint and to come forward?

10 A. Not at all, for several reasons it was never going to
11 work.
12

13 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. Can I have a follow-up question on
14 that? I think we've heard in a number of contexts that
15 there is, quite apart from the absurdity of having a
16 complaints box where you've got to write a complaint and
17 put your complaint in, in the view of everybody in the
18 dining room, which was the situation you describe; that
19 there may well be a culture among the children of not
20 complaining, not just because of fear of what will happen
21 to them if they do, but because they're seen as being dogs
22 or something along those lines.
23

24 Have you had any experience of how you would overcome
25 that particular culture, that issue of, "I can't complain
26 because other kids will penalise me" perhaps as well as
27 prison officers?

28 A. I believe that the culture in a Youth Detention Centre
29 is adversarial to children speaking up.
30

31 Q. Yes.

32 A. So, one potential solution is to actually have a
33 therapeutic safe environment where children are given the
34 skills and permission to have a voice, in many cases for
35 the first time in their life and, in the absence of a
36 therapeutic model, I don't think children are ever going to
37 talk up and speak up.
38

39 One thing I observed: often the culture that existed
40 in an adult prison would reach back into the young people
41 at Ashley. So, some of these children came from the
42 generational situation where other family members had been
43 in jail and they learnt the culture and the rules of a
44 prison and that was seen to be something that was desirable
45 and they actually tried to live by those rules, which meant
46 not being a dog or speaking up, yep.
47

1 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you.

2
3 MS ELLYARD: That brings us to the question of the culture
4 that you observed to be in place at Ashley, Mr Morrissey,
5 and you deal with this at a couple of points in your
6 statement, but one of them is at paragraph 50 and
7 following, and there's been some things said today already
8 about evidence of culture.

9
10 I'm sorry, I'm just pausing there, I'm told that there
11 are audio issues and I need to ask Mr Morrissey to stand by
12 and the Commissioners to stand down for five minutes so
13 that the audio issues can be corrected.

14
15 So, excuse us, Mr Morrissey, but might I invite the
16 Commissioners to leave the bench shortly.

17
18 **SHORT ADJOURNMENT**

19
20 MS ELLYARD: Q. Thank you, Commissioners. Mr Morrissey,
21 are you with us?

22 A. I am here, yes.

23
24 Q. Thank you very much for your patience. Before we had
25 to stand down, I was moving to the topic of culture which
26 you deal with at a couple of points in your statement, but
27 including at paragraph 50. And, before asking you a
28 question, I wanted to refer you to the fact that the
29 Commission's received a statement from John Corvin, who was
30 the manager of Ashley in its very early days, around 2002
31 to 2004. And one of the things he observed during his time
32 at Ashley was that the staff group were, to his view,
33 uninvolved and unaware of what they should do, struggled to
34 understand the concept of restorative justice and good
35 staff were disempowered by those who wanted at that time to
36 turn Ashley into a prison.

37
38 That's some evidence the Commission has about the
39 picture at Ashley in about 2002 to 2003. Can I ask you,
40 what were your observations of the culture at Ashley during
41 the period of time you were carrying out your role as
42 Commissioner for Children and Young People?

43 A. The comments that you have just mentioned then from
44 2002, I think in my witness statement I talk about culture
45 remaining status quo or being frozen, so I think the
46 culture has largely remained as is and unchanged for
47 decades, yep.

1
2 Q. And that culture, as I understand paragraph 50 and
3 following of your statement, relevantly included,
4 effectively, prioritising government and staff interests
5 over the interests of children - perhaps not overtly but in
6 practice?

7 A. That's a view I formed when I was there, and I don't
8 think I've changed that view. I used the term "adultism",
9 and it really was focused on the needs of the adults and
10 not the best interests of the children, in my view.
11

12 Q. You make some observations at paragraph 53 of your
13 statement of seeing some staff coming in and then leaving
14 within a short space of time because they couldn't or
15 wouldn't adapt themselves to that culture. Can you tell us
16 about that?

17 A. Yeah. In my years there I often met new staff. I
18 don't know the exact data on staff turnover but there often
19 were new staff were coming in, and they'd often come in
20 with energy and great ideas, but I think they were often
21 overwhelmed with the existing and long-standing culture,
22 and I think they often had a choice of adopting the
23 prevailing longstanding culture or moving on. It was a
24 very - culture, as we know, is very critical, but the
25 culture at Ashley was a very powerful culture that was very
26 difficult for just a few people to overcome and change,
27 yep.
28

29 Q. At paragraph 72 of your statement you refer to a view
30 that you formed, as I understand it, based on the work you
31 did at Ashley and the advocacy in which you engaged, that
32 there was a community that had accepted the status quo and
33 that incarceration as the solution wasn't questioned and
34 that Ashley just shouldn't be discussed. Can I ask you to
35 unpack those observations?

36 A. Yes. To the best of my recollection it was, in my
37 experience, discussions on Ashley changing significantly
38 were a closed issue. It was, as anyone observing at the
39 time, an issue that I chose to limit in the public forum,
40 although I did make quite a few comments around the need
41 for an adequate model of care there, but it was something
42 that never got a particularly warm reception whenever I
43 brought it up. It was often seen, "Well, it is what it is
44 and we actually don't really want to change." That was my
45 reading of the responses I were getting. Although there
46 were some public statements that we were going to implement
47 a new model of care, I never saw that transpire.

1
2 Q. Indeed, at paragraph 120 of your statement you refer
3 to receiving contact from a politician in response to the
4 advocacy, whether public or behind the scenes, that you
5 were engaging in; can you tell us about that?

6 A. Yes, I received a phone call, sort of unexpected, just
7 asking me to understand that any, I guess, challenges I had
8 to the existing system would affect employment, that it was
9 a very important employer for the Deloraine district, and
10 essentially asking me to back off. I wasn't surprised, but
11 at another level I was surprised that a politician was
12 willing to actually say that to me, yep.

13
14 Q. You've mentioned in your statement and in your oral
15 evidence a decision that you made to limit some of your
16 public-facing advocacy. The Commission's considered in
17 other weeks of the hearing the delicate balance that people
18 in roles such as yours sometimes need to find between
19 advocating in accordance with their duties on the one hand
20 and preserving relationships with management and senior
21 bureaucrats on the other. Was that a balance that you
22 found it necessary to consciously strike during your time
23 in the role?

24 A. It was. I think it's important not to, I guess, use
25 an expression, "burn your currency too quickly", so I
26 endeavoured - I realised early on it was a very sensitive
27 issue, it was a very long-standing issue, and I was
28 endeavouring to use persuasion and evidence and good
29 argument around the need to change, yeah. Essentially, I
30 don't think I would have gained very much traction on going
31 any more public than I did, although I did go public on
32 other areas such as out-of-home care and child protection
33 and others, yeah.

34
35 Q. And so, thinking particularly about Ashley, was it
36 your view that success in achieving any kind of change was
37 more likely to be found through private or
38 behind-the-scenes persuasion?

39 A. That was my strategy at the time, but like all
40 strategies we reflect and we wonder maybe a different
41 strategy may have been more effective. It's not science, a
42 hard science in regard to how to tackle these things; you
43 have to go with your best guess and your EQ on that
44 situation.

45
46 Q. And, of course, part of the calibration will depend on
47 the powers that you have to hand under your governing

1 legislation and the funding that you have to hand to pursue
2 and carry out the powers and functions that you have been
3 given.
4

5 In your statement, you have offered some reflections
6 on the extent of the powers that were available to you, but
7 the levers perhaps that were open to be pulled by
8 government, if they had wished, to limit you in the
9 exercise of your powers.
10

11 Can I ask you firstly, what's your view on whether the
12 powers granted to you under the legislation were sufficient
13 for you to be able to carry out the role of acting as an
14 advocate for children in Ashley and monitoring, in an
15 appropriate way, the conditions of their treatment?

16 A. As the Commissioner, you have - probably one of the
17 few areas that you have a responsibility for advocating for
18 individual children, so I was able to do that. The ability
19 to ensure follow up action occurred was not within the
20 role. I won't comment whether it should be or it shouldn't
21 be, but there should be an expectation that, if concerns
22 are brought to the attention of the department and
23 government, that real change will occur. You would hope
24 that there would be that shared passion and care and
25 kindness from everyone involved in regard to very
26 vulnerable children.
27

28 Q. You say that you would hope that would be the case.
29 Was it, in your experience, the case that there was a
30 shared commitment between you and relevant government
31 officials to the wellbeing of children in Ashley?

32 A. I will probably respond there wasn't the shared
33 understanding of the need to have a stronger, different,
34 more thoroughly rehabilitative restorative approach, yep.
35

36 Q. May I ask you about the question of Child Safe
37 Organisations. You refer in your statement to the fact
38 that this was something that you felt strongly about, but
39 that perhaps you had a mixed response from various
40 government departments to the advocacy and efforts that you
41 engaged in to comment Child Safe Organisational principles
42 in Tasmania.

43 A. I held a view, which I still hold, that one of the
44 most powerful ways to keep children safe in any
45 institutional context is through the full adoption of the
46 Child Safe Organisation framework. Whilst there was
47 acknowledgment that that was a good thing, I really in my

1 time there couldn't observe - was unable to observe very
2 much progress in regard to adopting and implementing those
3 recommendations which did come out of the Royal Commission.
4

5 Q. I think you say in your statement that the Department
6 of Education was perhaps more open than others.

7 A. Yeah, I had warm reception from the leadership at the
8 time about Child Safe Organisations. I can't comment on
9 why they didn't progress as rapidly as - I actually
10 understood or believed that these - I guess, the
11 principles, the framework of a Child Safe Organisation made
12 such a compelling case that there would be momentum to
13 begin adopting them right across all organisations, but
14 that wasn't the case.
15

16 Q. As I understand it in your role, whilst you could
17 recommend and advise and direct attention to relevant
18 resources, it wasn't in your power to compel the taking up
19 of those practices by government?

20 A. No, the role is that of an advocate and to provide
21 advice; it's up to departments and governments as to
22 whether they take that advice or not.
23

24 MS ELLYARD: I'm sorry, Commissioner Benjamin. Did you
25 have a question?
26

27 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: No.
28

29 MS ELLYARD: Q. Turning back to the question of the role
30 that you performed as Commissioner for Children and Young
31 People, you offered some reflections at paragraph 166 and
32 following of your statement, Mr Morrissey. And some of
33 these things we've touched on already, but can I draw your
34 attention to paragraphs 177 and 178 and ask you to offer
35 any reflections you would wish to offer to the Commission
36 on how to approach the question of making recommendations
37 for change and dealing with what might be quite entrenched
38 attitudes within departments that are resistant to new
39 ideas and change?

40 A. In my observations it has been a common, I guess,
41 occurrence right across Australia since Commissioners for
42 Children were put in place; I think they are valued, but
43 they are often required to, you know, criticise, and
44 usually in a very positive constructive way offering a way
45 forward, but sometimes this will challenge governments and
46 departments in regard to their understanding of the message
47 in regard to their capacity to do something.

1
2 But also, we talk about Ashley having a culture:
3 departments and governments also have cultures, so to
4 actually work out a way forward for the Commissioners
5 nationally to be more, I guess, influential and act with
6 stronger advocacy, I think that issue does need exploring
7 in regard to the reception of messages, yep.
8

9 Q. And when you say "that issue needs exploring", might
10 that include, for example, increased or different powers in
11 the Office of the Commissioner for Children and Young
12 People that might strengthen their capacity to speak firm
13 truths, where appropriate, to government?

14 A. Yeah, in my witness statement I talk about a number of
15 areas that - I talk about consideration of the need to
16 review the current CCYP legislation, but also to look at
17 issues that may be quite subtle in regard to performing the
18 role that can also, I guess, be a factor that also
19 constrains the role as well. Sometimes the influences can
20 be subtle but powerful in regard to being effective.
21

22 It's very easy, I think, for an advocate in any
23 context to be subject to influence from endeavours to
24 establish relationships and an effective communication.
25 Also too, I guess there's an implicit message to try to be
26 part of the bigger team, which is important, but you've
27 also got to keep outside of that team if you're going to
28 advocate strongly for children and young people. So it's a
29 very - at times, quite a tricky relationship.
30

31 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. So, is this a bit equivalent to the
32 notion of regulatory capture? I know the Commissioner is
33 not a regulator, but it's the same sort of idea, is it?

34 A. I agree fully: it is around regulatory capture. I've
35 had some recent experience of that, and yes, it is quite a
36 good, I guess, parallel example, yeah.
37

38 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you.
39

40 MS ELLYARD: Q. I started my questioning, Mr Morrissey,
41 asking you what you had hoped to achieve or had envisaged
42 for yourself in taking up the role in 2014 as Commissioner
43 for Children and Young People. As I understand your
44 evidence, you ultimately remained in it for three years and
45 didn't continue after that. Can I ask what you felt you
46 achieved - did you feel that progress had been made in your
47 three years and, if not, why not and perhaps why didn't you

1 stay in the role longer?

2 A. I believed that we made good progress in regard to
3 children in out-of-home care. I'm not familiar with the, I
4 guess, the granularity of what's occurring now, but I
5 understand the government has committed significant
6 resources in endeavouring to, I guess, improve the
7 standards and I guess monitoring of kids in out-of-home
8 care.

9
10 We commenced some significant reform in Child
11 Protection, but at the end of my witness statement I talk
12 about the need to adopt a public health approach. We're
13 often dealing with after the fact, after the damage has
14 occurred, and for this to ever change and to stop, I guess,
15 the harm and suffering that occurs as a result of not early
16 intervention, we need to actually be more actively involved
17 in preserving families, supporting children younger;
18 keeping them out of Ashley, keeping them out of out-of-home
19 care, out of the Child Protection System and, until we
20 switch to that, I believe we'll still be confronting these
21 same issues we've been facing for decades.

22
23 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. Can I just ask: having regard to
24 that difficulty of doing that, would you have preferred to
25 continue with this struggle, that is, to continue to
26 contribute to the Tasmanian situation or did you decide
27 that it was all too difficult really?

28 A. I was finding it very difficult to increasingly have
29 my message accepted and listened to and I made a decision,
30 a very clear decision, that it would have been in the best
31 interests of the role to let someone else give it a go. I
32 think there are times when you realise that your currency
33 is not being accepted where it should be and I think I made
34 a decision to retire and to do it as quietly as I possibly
35 could; I didn't make any comments at the time because I
36 wanted the focus to stay on the needs of children and young
37 people.

38
39 Q. Am I right in thinking that your two predecessors also
40 seemed to make a similar decision or didn't continue in the
41 role of Commissioner for Children and Young People?

42 A. I guess that's an example of what I was alluding to
43 earlier: these roles are very tricky and often, you know,
44 the longer people are in them the tougher they are to
45 continue in.

46
47 Q. Yes.

1 A. And so, I would never want to be in a situation where
2 I was in the role and not gaining - not continuing momentum
3 and leading reform. So, I think by their nature within the
4 current context and the impediments they may be a shorter
5 term than ideally they should be, yep.

6
7 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you.

8
9 MS ELLYARD: Commissioner Bromfield, did you have a
10 question?

11
12 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Q. I did, actually, it was in
13 relation to your comments about early intervention. I was
14 reflecting on the complexity of the children and young
15 people who are detained at Ashley, and I'm aware that when
16 we talk about early intervention that sometimes there can
17 be a perception that that is low intensity intervention and
18 I just wanted to reflect on, when you talk about early
19 intervention, do you think that's a low intensity
20 intervention for these kids?

21 A. It's absolutely high intensity for the children and
22 their families; it needs to, I think, be a whole family
23 approach. Just trying to work with one child is probably
24 going to be futile. The small numbers of children going
25 into Ashley actually, I think, facilitate the ability to
26 have a high intensity approach to the families, in my view.
27 I would defer to experts who know much more about this than
28 me: that's just the view I've formed.

29
30 MS ELLYARD: Q. The last question that I have,
31 Mr Morrissey, is that from the evidence in your statement
32 it's clear that you didn't yourself receive and you didn't
33 become aware of complaints on behalf of any child in Ashley
34 that they were being sexually abused. The materials
35 available to the Commission tends to suggest that during
36 the period of time that you held your role there were
37 allegedly children being abused who have since come to the
38 Commission's attention or otherwise made their stories
39 known, and so, my final question to you is, what are your
40 reflections on what more could be done to create an
41 opportunity for children if they're being abused, as it
42 appears during your tenure they were, to find their way to
43 you or to find their way to someone else to make a
44 complaint?

45 A. I think a lot more consideration needs to be given to
46 a child safe reporting mechanism at Ashley. Right away the
47 children first understand they do have a voice, they do

1 have a right to speak up, and there's some strategies
2 developed where they can speak up without it coming to the
3 attention of their peers, particularly the staff there, but
4 I think firstly they have to understand that they will be
5 believed as well. You know, it's a common theme throughout
6 all of this whole area of abuse that children often haven't
7 been believed.

8
9 I think as adults and professionals we understand that
10 it's critical they are believed, but I'm not sure children
11 are getting that message. And that, once again, I'll go
12 back to, it needs to be a therapeutic model where they're
13 working with a team intensively that helps them understand
14 that it's safe to report and something will be done. Look,
15 it's a big answer, I'm not going to try to cover it all
16 now, but that's just my off-the-cuff --

17
18 Q. Certainly, and clearly part of that will mean a system
19 which involves those working at Ashley being open to the
20 possibility that complaints might be made and being open to
21 and accepting of the proper scrutiny of authorities
22 including people like you. And it's in that context - I
23 note in your witness statement you refer to an incident
24 that occurred when you attended Ashley for a visit and you
25 were locked in. Can I ask you to tell us about that and
26 what your reflections were at the time as to why that might
27 have occurred and what the attitude of Ashley management
28 was to the work you were doing and the role that you had?

29 A. Yeah, I think 2014/15, it was reasonably early days in
30 my regular visits. I have managed to negotiate that a
31 guard wasn't with the child or the young person when I was
32 talking to them. We arranged for a room in another part of
33 the facility, went into that and, for whatever reason, they
34 locked the door. Now, I will never know the reason for
35 that, so I'm sort of benignly ignorant whether it was
36 intentional or an accident. It was quite a while before
37 someone returned.

38
39 It raised some issues of supervision, and I guess
40 literally oversight of where people were. I found it quite
41 intriguing that I could be in there alone for so long, and
42 it raised issues of, what about the young people here? Are
43 they ever in this same situation? Also a reflection: it
44 could have represented a lack of interest in someone
45 talking to the young people alone; you know, there's
46 several areas that you could actually reflect on which
47 could raise concerns. That's the story in short, unless

1 you have any more questions.

2
3 MS ELLYARD: Thank you, Mr Morrissey. Thank you,
4 Commissioners, those are my questions unless you had any
5 further.

6
7 PRESIDENT NEAVE: I have one follow-up question and I
8 think my fellow Commissioners have.

9
10 Q. In some organisations, often not dealing with
11 children, often dealing with young adults, there's
12 provision for some form of anonymous reporting; I don't
13 know whether that has any relevance or usefulness. It can
14 be a source of data if you get more than one report about a
15 particular person, for example, and I'm familiar with it in
16 university contexts where they've had some university
17 colleges and other bodies have had this provision for
18 anonymous reporting so that patterns can be discerned.
19 Would that have any relevance to this situation?

20 A. If it could be effectively administered, and anonymous
21 reporting, I think it would be an excellent idea to see
22 implemented. You know, you'd have to sort through - I
23 won't go into what you have to do - but I think that is,
24 like, an excellent suggestion, yeah.

25
26 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Okay, thank you. I think you had some
27 questions?

28
29 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Q. Yes. Mr Morrissey, in
30 paragraphs 59 to 62 of your statement you make the
31 observation that in your view the Ashley Youth Detention
32 Centre was in breach of several articles of both the United
33 Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and perhaps
34 even more troubling, the Optional Protocol to the
35 Convention Against Torture. They're extraordinary things
36 to read in a statement about a Youth Detention Centre in
37 Australia and I wondered if you wanted to make any further
38 statement or provide examples about what led you to that
39 conclusion?

40 A. Yeah, could you just give me the number?

41
42 Q. Yes, 59 to 62.

43 A. Okay. Sorry. Okay, so one example, and a child right
44 is the right to healthcare. Based on the assumption that
45 these children have developmental damage, they have brain
46 trauma, I believe they have a right to adequate care and
47 not be put in the situation where they're further damaged.

1 That's an example of one of the breach of rights.

2
3 The children's right to participate in decisions that
4 affect them, and this is something we've been talking about
5 in the last hour: the ability to make a complaint, to be
6 consulted over their daily lives, I think that's another
7 breach of child rights. Does that answer your question?

8
9 Q. Yes, and I believe in paragraph 62 that you gave
10 examples of where you felt the treatment of children at
11 Ashley was in breach of the Optional Protocol to the
12 Convention Against Torture.

13 A. Yep. So, I understand within the OPCAT context, which
14 I don't think has been finalised in Australia yet, it's
15 still a work-in-progress, the use of isolation to some
16 people's minds would actually be a form of torture, and
17 young people were often - and we've heard evidence, I
18 think, when I've been listening, of young people being
19 locked in their cells for a week or two or longer alone,
20 often on weekends due to staffing, short staffing, whatever
21 reasons they were locked in their rooms as well. For a
22 young person to be locked in a room, in my view, that does
23 constitute a form of torture, yep.

24
25 Q. Thank you. I have one more question. We've seen
26 repeatedly in our statements from former detainees that one
27 of the things that have prevented them from speaking up was
28 the view that they were criminals and no-one believed them.

29
30 Given your experience in speaking with the children at
31 Ashley in the role of Children's Commissioner and your
32 experience in the field I just wanted to invite you to
33 offer any views on the credibility of particularly children
34 who have been in detention when they speak up.

35 A. Often the young people aren't seen as the person they
36 are, they're seen as the criminal. We look at the symptoms
37 of their - I guess, their psychopathology, their damage,
38 and we don't look past that to actually see the young
39 person who's sitting in front of us who we're talking to.

40
41 I had many a long conversation with the young people
42 at Ashley. The first few meetings were often chaotic and
43 symptomatic, they were quite florid in their behaviour and
44 bragging about doing dreadful things, but when you actually
45 got to know them and started to form some trust you
46 realised that those young people had many of the same needs
47 and desires and hopes and wishes that our own young

1 children have; that that is often ignored in a place like
2 Ashley. You know, they want to feel safe, they want to
3 feel loved, they want to feel cared for, they want all the
4 things that they aren't provided with.

5
6 So we so often - and I make a comment in my witness
7 statement, the stories of these young people need to be
8 shared with society more broadly, that whilst they
9 committed crimes and at times done dreadful things, it
10 doesn't define them who they are and, given a different
11 opportunity, there is an ability to rehabilitate back to
12 mainstream society and live successful lives.

13
14 MS ELLYARD: Q. Mr Morrissey, there's going to be some
15 suggestion in evidence that the Commission receives that
16 children in Ashley make false allegations and that the
17 accusations that have been made, whether in the past or
18 more recently, are false. Of course, you can't speak to
19 individual cases, but do you have any reflections based on
20 your observations and understandings of the extent to which
21 the Commission should take the view that there's a pattern
22 or a habit of false accusations on the part of young people
23 in Ashley?

24 A. Yeah, I can respond with, I guess, some experience and
25 a best guess. Of course at times there may be false
26 accusations made, but also I think one thing we do know
27 about young people is, they also tell the truth and we need
28 to in the first instance believe them until we can find
29 evidence to the contrary: that's my personal view based on
30 my experience over many years. So, I think it's really up
31 to the experts to drill down the truth or not of what
32 they're saying, yep.

33
34 MS ELLYARD: Thank you, Mr Morrissey. Thank you,
35 Commissioners.

36
37 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you very, very much indeed,
38 Mr Morrissey, that was very helpful, and we'll now break
39 for lunch.

40
41 **LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT**

42
43 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Ms Bennett.

44
45 MS BENNETT: Commissioners, the next witness is Professor
46 Robert White, who I'd now ask to be sworn or affirmed.
47

1 <ROBERT DOUGLAS WHITE, affirmed:

[2.13 pm]

2
3 <EXAMINATION BY MS BENNETT:

4
5 MS BENNETT: Q. Professor, could you please tell the
6 Commissioners your full name and professional address?

7 A. I am Robert Douglas White, I am Emeritus Distinguished
8 Professor of Criminology at the University of Tasmania.

9
10 Q. And you've made a statement to assist this Commission;
11 is that right?

12 A. Yes, I have.

13
14 Q. Have you read that statement recently?

15 A. Yes, I have.

16
17 Q. And are its contents true and correct?

18 A. Yes, they are.

19
20 Q. Thank you, Professor. Could you tell the
21 Commissioners about how you came to be involved with Ashley
22 Youth Detention Centre?

23 A. I became involved in two different capacities: as a
24 Professor of Criminology, obviously I was teaching Juvenile
25 Justice and so I was familiar with the institutions of
26 Juvenile Justice in Tasmania.

27
28 The specific way in which I became familiar with
29 Ashley was, I was a member of a special investigation team
30 at the end of 2010 and 2011, and it was to investigate the
31 death of a young boy at Ashley, and that's when I became
32 very familiar with aspects of Ashley Youth Detention
33 Centre.

34
35 Q. And as part of that very familiar association, you
36 visited Ashley Youth Detention Centre?

37 A. We visited and we interviewed, I think, 29 staff - as
38 a team we interviewed 29 staff and we had multiple visits
39 of Ashley, yes.

40
41 Q. So, when was this?

42 A. This was mainly in 2011.

43
44 Q. And, who asked you to do this?

45 A. This was an investigation initiated from within the
46 Department of Health and Human Services.

1 Q. So, it was with the full cooperation of the department
2 and the staff?

3 A. Yes, it was established by the department.
4

5 Q. Can you offer some reflections based on your
6 observations of the physical space at Ashley; what's it
7 like?

8 A. The physical infrastructure of Ashley is, to put it
9 crudely, is awful. It's incredible to think that we would
10 house children and young people in that kind of a place.
11 It's physically unattractive, it's basically a prison and
12 we need to get beyond the euphemisms of calling it a
13 detention centre, it really is a prison. It looks like a
14 prison, it smells like a prison, it feels like a prison,
15 it's physically unattractive and very oppressive. The
16 colour scheme is such that basically there is no visual
17 stimulation, and it's basically one large lock up; very
18 cold and imposing kind of place.
19

20 Q. What do you mean by cold and imposing? Can you tell
21 the Commissioners about what causes you to use those
22 descriptors?

23 A. It's basically, it's basically a prison, that's all I
24 can say, but it's not a modern contemporary prison, so in
25 fact it doesn't incorporate any prison design or
26 architectural design of a modern contemporary prison.
27

28 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Q. I believe in your statement
29 you actually say that another person on your committee who
30 was an officer in adult prisons was appalled by the state
31 of Ashley.
32

33 MS BENNETT: I think the Commissioner is referring to
34 paragraph 13 of your statement, you say there you worked
35 with an officer who said he had visited prisons all over
36 the world, especially in the United Kingdom. Can you tell
37 the Commissioners about that observation?

38 A. He had been an adult prison corrections officer for
39 over 30 years, he had visited the United States, Canada,
40 all through Europe and other places, including the UK, and
41 basically the moment he walked in the door he turned to me
42 as an aside and said, "This is the worst institution that I
43 have seen", and it's worst of any of the adult institutions
44 that he had visited on his various study tours and so on.
45 So, basically physically it was particularly uninviting,
46 and when you think it's meant to be the home for children,
47 it becomes even worse, but it's also a place where people

1 work, so as a workplace as well as a place to live, it was
2 oppressive.

3
4 Q. These are observations that you made in 2011 and 2012,
5 have you had any cause to go back since?

6 A. No, not since. So, these are retrospective and
7 they're very much directly related to that incident, and I
8 was a member of both the special investigations team.
9 After we submitted our report they put together a review
10 steering committee to look at the implementation of the
11 recommendations, and that group that I was part of, we kept
12 going out to Ashley for another 18 months and our job was
13 actually to try and review and assist the implementation of
14 the recommendations, particularly around standard operating
15 procedures.

16
17 Q. While we're speaking about physical infrastructure,
18 you mentioned the colour scheme and it being a dull
19 environment; is that fair?

20 A. Yes. So, there might have been some colour, but the
21 colour itself was drab, it's sort of hard to describe. So,
22 it's not necessarily that it was all grey, but even if
23 there was a reddish colour, it would be a drab reddish
24 colour. So, the colour scheme was just visually
25 unexciting.

26
27 Q. Was there anything that reflected a cultural safety
28 for First Nations or Indigenous children?

29 A. In 2010, 2011, 2012, I don't recall anything like
30 that.

31
32 Q. You say in your statement, around paragraph 12, that
33 the atmosphere was one of cold indifference on the part of
34 those living and working there. Can you tell us why you
35 say that?

36 A. I need to qualify that a little bit. I'll say that,
37 from the point of view of the support staff, the
38 therapeutic staff, the education workers and so on, I got
39 the sense that there was a - a mission and there was some
40 enthusiasm about the work that was being done. That sense
41 of coldness and indifference was really amongst what I
42 would consider the custodial staff. Again, a misnomer,
43 they were called youth workers but I think again that's a
44 euphemism that describes basically people who lock people
45 up, and I found that there was the sense that, "Well, this
46 is a job".
47

1 Q. You speak in your statement about social
2 infrastructure, what do you mean by that concept?

3 A. Well, that's what I mean in terms of the workforce,
4 and obviously any institution's going to have multiple
5 components to that workforce. Most of my negative comments
6 and remarks have to do with the so-called youth workers.
7 We interviewed 29 different people, most of whom were
8 amongst the youth workers, but also included medical staff,
9 the nurse, for example. But the sense I got - and later as
10 part of the review team the sense we got, there's quite a
11 bit of resistance to having outsiders talking to them or
12 questioning how they did their job, and certainly a
13 resistance to some of the implementation of new standard
14 operating procedures and so on.

15
16 Q. I think you say in your statement that there was an
17 orientation towards control and a lock-up mentality; how
18 did that manifest itself?

19 A. Well, basically that's how the so-called youth workers
20 saw their role: it was basically to provide security and,
21 in their terms security meant basically to make sure that
22 the kids are locked up and that there's secure movement
23 through the institution. So, there's nothing particularly
24 innovative or progressive about the role of the youth
25 worker: again, it's a misnomer to call them youth workers
26 because the usual sense of the word youth worker means it's
27 a professional youth and community worker who works to
28 support children and to address their immediate needs.
29 This is by no means what we mean by youth worker in the
30 case of Ashley.

31
32 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. Could I just follow up on that? We
33 know now that some of them have, I think it's a certificate
34 qualification, I think it might be Certificate IV. Were
35 the people that you talked to then qualified in that way?
36 Is that an improvement, and do you have any views about
37 that particular qualification?

38 A. Well, it depends on what the qualification is and what
39 it's for.

40
41 Q. Yes.

42 A. So, usually a Certificate IV is a basic qualification
43 and often, but not always, it's a tick and flick exercise.

44
45 Q. Yes, okay.

46 A. So, it's substantively not particularly onerous and
47 doesn't really do much more than provide minimal training,

1 but it's not training as a youth worker, it's training as a
2 custodial, and there's a big difference. There was
3 additional training and in-service training relating to,
4 say, first aid, but then the question is, how do you
5 professionalise that workforce to incorporate a whole range
6 of their skills and knowledge into a supportive
7 rehabilitative process, and certainly that wasn't part of
8 it.

9
10 Q. And is that possible when you're taking people whose
11 level of qualification is not very high at the time and not
12 oriented to being a youth worker, you could take this group
13 of people and bring them up to the level, or leaving aside
14 the cultural issues which I think you were talking about,
15 is that possible?

16 A. Well, I think it is, but you have to have the proper
17 training and education scheme in place, and it has to be
18 both in-service and pre-service, so that you have to couple
19 it, and it has to be ongoing, because issues and our
20 concepts are changing, so you need continuous education of
21 any workforce, but particularly when you're talking about
22 Human Services, and that's how I'd construct this activity,
23 it's Human Services, but it's actually in practice comes
24 simply as lock-up and corrective services, but not a Human
25 Service as such.

26
27 MS BENNETT: Q. Do you have any observations you can
28 offer the Commissioners about how accountability was
29 perceived within the staff at Ashley at the time that you
30 were involved?

31 A. Okay, again, mainly concentrating on the custodial
32 staff, that is the youth workers, the impression we got was
33 basically a lot of people coming up with rationales and
34 reasons for why the particular event happened, but nothing
35 that directly squared with taking responsibility and
36 accountability amongst themselves, either individually or
37 as an institution.

38
39 So, the general response tended to be along the lines
40 of, "Well, this is the first time this has happened with
41 us, it's never happened before", rather than saying what
42 are the specific conditions, and without going into details
43 of this particular death, the specific conditions were
44 horrendous and for those who have looked at this case
45 there's absolutely no excuse why this event should have
46 happened, but beyond that, there's also that notion that,
47 "Well, we've been doing this kind of stuff for a long time

1 and that's just how we roll".

2

3 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. And "we haven't had any deaths
4 before"?

5 A. Yeah.

6

7 Q. "This is unfortunate"?

8 A. Yeah, "This is an accident". The underlying premise
9 is that, "Oh well, this is an accident, this is an
10 unforeseen accident", rather than, "This is something we
11 could have stopped if we'd engaged in risk adverse kind of
12 professional activity".

13

14 MS BENNETT: Q. And that kind of professionalism that
15 you're talking about, as I understand your statement, you
16 think that was lacking as a mindset and as a cultural
17 approach; is that a fair observation?

18 A. Absolutely, and in fact it's not just my opinion, it's
19 the opinion of the special investigation team. There are
20 six of us on the team and basically the report itself,
21 that's one of the key things that we point out is the lack
22 of professionalism. And even in cases where people
23 appeared to be well meaning, there is a demonstration of
24 that lack of professionalism.

25

26 Q. Can you give the Commissioners an example of what you
27 mean by that?

28 A. What I mean by that is somebody talking about this
29 young boy who died and saying, "Well, as a mother I know
30 that, when I deal with my kids, this is how I deal with
31 them", so talking as a mother rather than as a professional
32 about how they would deal with these issues and that
33 manifests in certain types of practice. And the practice
34 in this case was that the custodial officers were outside
35 the cell asking the boy if he was okay and he was saying,
36 "Yeah, I'm okay", and they're accepting that at face value,
37 and this is a boy who had been vomiting and vomited all
38 over himself and a few hours later was dead.

39

40 Q. You made a number of observations --

41

42 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Sorry, Ms Bennett, can I just?

43

44 MS BENNETT: Please.

45

46 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Q. I appreciate the example in
47 terms of a lack of professionalism, but you also speak in

1 your statement about more than a lack of professionalism,
2 you talk about a lack of empathy.

3 A. Again, I wouldn't want to generalise across all of the
4 youth workers because I think that's unfair, but there were
5 some where, if you look at the transcript you're not gonna
6 pick that up, right; but if you're talking face-to-face
7 with somebody, then you pick up the vibe and the vibe in
8 this case was that they just didn't care. The lack of
9 empathy struck me, and this was by somebody who was a
10 senior youth worker at the time, and I was just astonished
11 and appalled actually. And, of course, as we were doing
12 the interviews you can't challenge that or you can't give
13 anything away, but afterwards we as an investigation team
14 discussed that at length and that's reflected in some of
15 our comments in the report that we submitted to the
16 department.

17
18 Q. Given it was in the context of a formal interview, did
19 it strike you - I'm trying to phrase this question - I
20 suppose it strikes me that that is the kind of context
21 where you'd be motivated to put your best foot forward.
22 So, is it more striking then to demonstrate a lack of
23 empathy in the context of a formal investigation?

24 A. I was astonished, and really, the sense I got was,
25 that the person wasn't even being defensive, so there was
26 none of that defensiveness that was coming across in their
27 body language or their voice or anything, they were just
28 trying to state it matter-of-factly, that "this is how we
29 do stuff around here", it was presented back to us that
30 this was, "Stuff happens, it's an accident". They didn't
31 use the word "accident" but that's how they were sort of -
32 the feel of what they were saying was along those lines.
33 And the abrogation of both specific responsibility for the
34 case happening and also the transfer of responsibility to
35 the young person implicitly and saying, "Well, basically
36 they died because they were saying they were okay". So,
37 yeah, amazing stuff actually.

38
39 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. So, is this to do with the fact
40 that these children were regarded as "other", they weren't
41 really real children, they were - is that what it's about?
42 Is that why there's a custodial mentality?

43 A. No, again, different youth workers present in slightly
44 different ways.

45
46 Q. Yes.

47 A. So, a couple of them said, "We've known this kid, the

1 kid's spent a lot of his life in Ashley and they actually
2 quite like the kid, they said that explicitly, they felt
3 comfortable, they felt sad that he'd died and so on, so
4 there was feelings of empathy amongst these people but it
5 was in a sense misplaced because it was personalised rather
6 than professional.

7
8 Q. Yes.

9 A. But on the part of this particular person, the senior
10 youth worker it was like, "Well, it happened, we've been
11 here for 10 years, this is how we do things around here".
12 Then some of the chickens came home to roost a bit later
13 when we were doing the review and implementation of
14 recommendations, and you could just see the resistance to
15 the idea, "Well, this is extra work for us" --

16
17 MS BENNETT: Q. I wanted to ask you about that, if I
18 could pause you there, if I could ask you to silence your
19 phone for me.

20 A. Sure.

21
22 Q. How did you perceive that resistance to manifest
23 itself? What did it look like? Well, perhaps we should go
24 back, sorry, let's do this chronologically. You did your
25 review, you spoke with these people, you made your
26 observations and you did a report; is that right?

27 A. Yes.

28
29 Q. I think you've summarised the key findings and key
30 observations from that report, paragraph 21 of your
31 statement, and importantly there's a lack of risk-based
32 decision-making, the youth workers were not professional
33 and there was a lack of formal approach to the delivery of
34 care, a failure to provide humanitarian conditions, and
35 training provided to staff was inadequate, they were
36 trained to lock kids up and perhaps they were given a bit
37 of first aid training but little or inadequate training was
38 provided in the area of critical incidents. That's a
39 summary of your --

40 A. (Witness nods.)

41
42 Q. You provided that report to the department?

43 A. To the department, yep.

44
45 Q. What happened next? After you provided that report
46 you were provided - what happened next?

47 A. There was four of us then asked to be part of a review

1 committee to monitor and review the implementation of
2 recommendations; most of that work involved advising on the
3 introduction of new standard operating procedures and to go
4 for visits, periodic visits to Ashley and talk to the
5 manager, to talk to some of the workers and get a sense of,
6 are new things being put into place, and for 18 months we
7 did that.

8
9 Q. And that's the standard operating procedures that you
10 were just saying to the Commissioners you felt there was
11 resistance to the implementation?

12 A. Yes, we got the sense, by some of the youth workers,
13 that it was a burden, that it was an additional workload,
14 that basically, if you're doing lock-up work, why are you
15 getting us to do all this other stuff? So, there was that
16 sense in conversations and also, again, body language,
17 stuff that sometimes is not tangible but you're picking it
18 up.

19
20 Q. So, you monitored that implementation of the new
21 standard operating procedures for 18 months; is that right?

22 A. My estimate was around 18 months that we were
23 involved, and then it stopped.

24
25 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. And, how did it stop? Sorry, I may
26 have anticipated you, do you want to follow up with that,
27 Ms Bennett?

28
29 MS BENNETT: Q. Just before we get to why did it stop, I
30 just wanted to ask you further about the resistance. Did
31 you observe that resistance to change at all levels?

32 A. Well, in fact, we discussed it with the manager
33 because he was concerned about that issue as well.

34
35 Q. What was the nature of his concern?

36 A. Well, the resistance and just that, if you're trying
37 to undertake cultural change, then sometimes there are
38 sections of the troops who are resisting that change, and
39 that was clear to senior manager as well as to us when we
40 were discussing it with people.

41
42 Q. And, among the youth workers who were resisting
43 change, were they junior, were they senior, what was the
44 general profile? Was there a general profile?

45 A. No, it would be a mix, and it's not every - not every
46 person would be resisting but there was certainly
47 resistance.

1
2 Q. I think Commissioner Neave then asked you, what
3 happened towards the end of your review, you continued
4 these reviews, you reported back, I take it?

5 A. We reported back to another section within the
6 Department of Health and Human Services, and we'd been
7 doing this I think it was around eight - it might have been
8 12 months but I think it was around 18 months, and then the
9 communication stopped and there was no explanation, we
10 just --

11
12 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. So, you were communicating but not
13 getting anything back from the department or?

14 A. We were having regular meetings as a monitoring group
15 and they were set up through the department and then we
16 would go to Ashley and do some stuff there, but we could do
17 some stuff remotely because of standard operating
18 procedures and that kind of thing. Then to me it appeared
19 suddenly and all of a sudden there was no more contact and
20 when we were asking about it they said, "Well, the group's
21 no longer in existence", and it's partly because the person
22 who we were reporting to, she was moved somewhere else
23 within the department, somebody else moved in to oversee
24 the monitoring and review group, but that meant the end of
25 the group because we never met again.

26
27 MS BENNETT: Q. So, it was a reform steering committee,
28 was that your committee as far as you know, comprised of
29 oversight the implementation of recommendations from the
30 CAT and SRI reports?

31 A. Yes.

32
33 Q. And that was chaired by the Deputy Secretary for
34 Children, was that your recollection?

35 A. Our group was chaired by the Director of Nursing, I
36 think, [REDACTED].

37
38 Q. And, who did you report to?

39 A. We reported to [REDACTED] --

40
41 Q. [REDACTED]?

42 A. [REDACTED], I think, yes. Again, I'm trying to
43 remember all the --

44
45 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. And she was then moved, have I got
46 that right?

47 A. That's my recollection, yes.

1
2 MS BENNETT: Q. Had your recommendations been
3 implemented at the time you finished carrying out your
4 monitoring function?

5 A. They were being implemented, so it was a process.
6

7 Q. What I'm asking is: did you stop doing it because the
8 job was done and done properly?

9 A. No. No. And, in fact, one of the clear things that -
10 and we were quite keen to keep the monitoring going - one
11 of the clear things was that it had to be a continuous
12 process well into the future, because that was the way to
13 have culture change and to make sure that - you can have a
14 whole bank of new standard operating procedures, but if you
15 don't do your monitoring and auditing, then they can just
16 be ignored like the previous ones were.
17

18 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. Can I ask you who was head of the
19 department at that time, do you remember? We can find out,
20 but I'd be interested to know?

21 A. I know the name but I'm --
22

23 Q. It's gone.

24 A. It's gone, yeah.
25

26 PRESIDENT NEAVE: That's all right, we can follow up on
27 that, thank you.
28

29 MS BENNETT: Q. You say in your statement that there
30 were no alternatives to Ashley as a detention facility.
31 Tell us about the significance of that in the context of
32 remand. Was remand treated as a different category, in
33 your observation?

34 A. Well, in Tasmania we've had a longstanding issue with
35 putting juveniles on remand and then putting them into
36 detention, in part because of the lack of alternatives for
37 young people, depending on which part of the state they're
38 living in. So, if you're not living at home and you're in
39 a vulnerable situation, you would often be put into remand
40 which means that you're put into detention. And over time,
41 I mean, as a criminologist we know that often it was well
42 meaning police and magistrates doing this because they were
43 concerned about the kids because the kids had nowhere else
44 to go, but we've had series of reports from the Criminology
45 Research Council from the Children's Commissioner's various
46 reports and so on that I have looked at the use of remand
47 and unfortunately it's mainly due to the lack of adequate

1 housing or alternative places to put kids.

2
3 Q. So there's a relationship there between out-of-home
4 care and intersects with the Juvenile Justice System; is
5 that fair?

6 A. That's another issue.

7
8 Q. What is it about that issue?

9 A. So, you can have - there's a lot of crossover, we know
10 nationally a lot of crossover between children in
11 out-of-care child protection type systems who end up being
12 put into the juvenile system for a variety of reasons,
13 partly because of background and activities, but also, it's
14 part of the movement from one silo to another, so there's a
15 lot of crossover.

16
17 Q. Then there seems to be another relationship you
18 identify in your statement at around paragraph 52 about the
19 relationship between Ashley and Risdon; can you tell the
20 Commissioners about what the flow-through is like between
21 those two?

22 A. Yeah, I've reflected on this and I think the key
23 question is, is there anybody who's been at Ashley who
24 hasn't ended up at Risdon Prison? So, invert the question,
25 because when I've looked at this in the past it was very
26 hard to find any of the young people who have been at
27 Ashley who haven't ended up in the adult prison system, so
28 it's really an indictment of the pipeline.

29
30 Q. Speaking as a criminologist, is that in any way
31 normal, that a youth facility would have, it seems, such
32 rates of recidivism?

33 A. Um, no, not really. The fact is that coercive
34 institutions like prisons, whether it's a youth prison or
35 an adult prison, have a tendency to fail precisely in this
36 way. So, if you put somebody into, say, a youth prison
37 there is a whole bunch of things that accompany that,
38 detachment from home, from school, a whole bunch of things,
39 but also the stigma that's attached to spending time
40 inside, all that then generates a track record which makes
41 it more difficult for young people to succeed into the
42 future and a similar process with the adult prisons as
43 well.

44
45 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. Just to follow up on that, would
46 you say that statistically it's worse in Tasmania than in
47 some of the other states? I understand the relationship

1 between being in Youth Detention and ending up in an adult
2 prison; is that more likely to happen here, less likely,
3 about the same, do you have any feeling for that?

4 A. I'd probably - okay. It's very difficult to do direct
5 comparisons of Tasmania with other states and territories.
6

7 Q. Of course, yep.

8 A. Because we have, relatively speaking, a small
9 population of both young people in detention and the adult
10 prison compared to many other jurisdictions.
11

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. We are unique in the sense, though, that because of
14 our size that, when you've only got one Youth Detention
15 Centre and one adult prison in essence, or a prison system,
16 then that pipeline becomes more clear. So, it's a very
17 clear relationship and it's virtually 100 per cent.
18

19 MS BENNETT: Q. Tell the Commissioners, you speak in
20 your statement about green criminology, I'd like to ask you
21 to explain what you mean by that and what its role might be
22 in preventing that re-offending?

23 A. Green criminology refers to taking into account issues
24 relating to the environment. And, in the specific case of
25 rehabilitation, for example, green criminologists and
26 mainstream criminologists would be interested in looking at
27 how young people can do meaningful, creative, energising
28 activities associated with the environment: it could be
29 partly about learning about the environment. So, there are
30 Indigenous programs worldwide which are not simply about
31 connecting the country but also doing environmental related
32 activities.
33

34 There are various programs that involved - a
35 particularly good one is the skill mill based in the UK
36 where they have young people engaged in a series of
37 reclamation projects and cleaning up the waterways in the
38 UK. People are learning about plants and botany and all
39 that kind of stuff, so they're developing a whole bunch of
40 different kinds of knowledge. It's physical, a lot of it,
41 so the physicality of this kind of activity.
42

43 The analogy as well, not just the environment as such,
44 but would be, when we've had various kinds of natural
45 disasters, whether it's cyclones in Queensland or bushfires
46 here in Tassie, when prisoners have gone out and done
47 volunteer work they've been regarded really differently by

1 the local community because they're doing something and
2 they're doing something that's physical and they feel good
3 about doing that, they're outside breathing fresh air and
4 basically providing something back to the community, so
5 there's a whole bunch of benefits associated with
6 environmental projects specifically and just giving back
7 more generally.

8
9 Q. And in the context of Indigenous children and young
10 people, that involves consultation with local First Nations
11 communities, I assume?

12 A. Yes.

13
14 Q. And is that something you saw any evidence of in your
15 time working in the Ashley context?

16 A. No, we didn't deal with that specifically, but there
17 has been a longstanding program of Indigenous young people
18 who spent time at Ashley going to an island and going
19 through cultural education and stuff with Indigenous
20 elders.

21
22 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. That's the Clarke Island program?

23 A. Yep.

24
25 Q. I'm sorry, I can't remember the Aboriginal name for
26 it. Is that still going, that program, do you know?

27 A. I'm not sure.

28
29 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Okay, thank you.

30
31 MS BENNETT: Q. My learned friend for the state tells me
32 it was defunded a little while ago. I want to ask you a
33 final question which is, what would you say to the
34 Commissioners about how to change Ashley? What needs to
35 shift, in your view, coming from your perspective and with
36 your experiences? What needs to shift?

37 A. I know I've only got limited time. Okay, the negative
38 is, I would raze Ashley to the ground. I would destroy the
39 physical infrastructure tomorrow, I wouldn't wait, and we
40 don't have three years of transition: I would get rid of it
41 immediately and transfer the children to other places,
42 houses, secure houses or whatever, but I would certainly
43 knock it down.

44
45 On the positive side, I think that what we need is a
46 rethink of the philosophy and the mission of Juvenile
47 Justice, and we know worldwide that the best Juvenile

1 Justice practice is driven by about six key propositions:
2 one is justice re-investment, so don't put your money in
3 physical infrastructure, bricks and mortar of a prison, put
4 your money into community and housing and projects at the
5 community level.
6

7 Restorative justice is about repairing the harm and
8 bringing people meaningfully into the process of
9 accountability, so restorative justice, but making
10 restorative justice not simply at the front-end but make it
11 the centre of your Juvenile Justice system, so the most
12 problematic and troubled and vulnerable and marginalised
13 children are often those who don't get a chance to go
14 through a juvenile conferencing system because that's only
15 dealing with trivial offending and first-time offenders.
16 What we need is to put restorative justice at the centre.
17

18 A third thing is a trauma-informed approach because
19 many of the children that we're describing in places like
20 Ashley come from extremely vulnerable backgrounds and we
21 need to talk about issues such as drug and alcohol use and
22 mental illness and cognitive impairment and brain injury,
23 and trauma-informed care is really important as part of
24 this approach.
25

26 Another component is mentoring. Mentoring for me is
27 huge for young people, and the mentor doesn't have to
28 necessarily be a member of their family but somebody who
29 they respect: it could be a sportsperson, it could be a
30 musician, it could be other people who want to go back in
31 and work with young people, but it's all about respect.
32 So, that's another component.
33

34 Two other things in passing I would say as well: the
35 age of criminal responsibility, let's align ourselves to
36 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
37 and make it 18. Does that mean we're not going to deal
38 with children who commit crimes under 18? No, of course it
39 doesn't, but it means that we approach it very differently.
40 So we take it out of the punishment regime and put it into
41 a rehabilitation and restorative regime.
42

43 The sixth thing I would do is talk seriously about
44 therapeutic jurisprudence, which basically is a fancy way
45 of saying, many of the children that we're talking about
46 need support. We have a Drug Court in Tasmania, we can
47 learn from the example of the Drug Court, and deal with

1 underlying issues rather than the superficial issues of the
2 offending itself. So, take a deep dive into, why do people
3 act out in the way they act out.
4

5 What we need in essence is a holistic multi-pronged
6 approach that puts relationships at the centre, and we have
7 to always remind ourselves that we're dealing with children
8 and we're dealing with the most vulnerable marginalised
9 children in our society. That's the short answer to all
10 this.
11

12 And, I'll complete the answer with one final comment:
13 that more than simply restorative justice as conflict
14 resolution, we need to have a restorative ethos ingrained
15 in our institutions. We can do it, we have examples here
16 in Tasmania of some primary schools that have got a
17 beautiful restorative ethos where basically it's premised
18 on three ideas: respect yourself, respect others and
19 respect our place. If you get everybody on-line doing
20 that, so the teachers, the groundskeepers, the accountants,
21 the youth workers, if we can instil that, then you have a
22 restorative ethos and it works way much better.
23

24 MS BENNETT: Please the Commissioners, those are the
25 questions I had for Professor White.
26

27 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: No questions, but thank you very
28 much for your evidence.
29

30 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Q. I just wanted to ask, there are
31 always difficulties in transposing models from elsewhere
32 into a particular context, but if we were to be looking at
33 other models, where would we look, within Australia, let's
34 say?

35 A. I think that we can establish the Tasmanian model. We
36 are a small jurisdiction, we are in a sense a
37 self-contained island; we're not talking about a huge
38 number of children, and I think that we can learn from many
39 jurisdictions on the mainland and worldwide, but those
40 propositions that I've just put forward, if you distil the
41 essence of that, what we need is community-based, what we
42 need is small institutions.
43

44 So, if we're going to have an institution where we
45 need some kind of secure accommodation, make it a house;
46 and rather than isolating and segregating our children who
47 are in trouble and who are troublesome, we need to surround

1
2 MS BENNETT: Ms Ray, you've made a statement in response
3 to a notice to this Commission; is that right?
4
5 MS RAY: Yes.
6
7 MS BENNETT: You've made a statement to this Commission;
8 is that right?
9
10 MS RAY: That's right, I was asked to do it.
11
12 MS BENNETT: That's right. And you've read that recently?
13
14 MS RAY: Yeah, I had a quick look through it the other
15 day.
16
17 MS BENNETT: And it's true and correct?
18
19 MS RAY: Yes, it is.
20
21 MS BENNETT: Ms Spencer, you've made a statement to assist
22 the Commission, haven't you?
23
24 MS SPENCER: Yes.
25
26 MS BENNETT: Have you read that recently?
27
28 MS SPENCER: Yes.
29
30 MS BENNETT: Can you tell the Commissioners if it's true
31 and correct?
32
33 MS SPENCER: Yes, it is.
34
35 MS BENNETT: Thank you, Ms Spencer. I just want to
36 identify for the Commissioners both of your respective
37 backgrounds and how long you've worked at Ashley. So,
38 starting with you, Ms Ray, can you tell the Commissioners
39 how long you've worked at Ashley?
40
41 MS RAY: I've been there approximately 20 years, went
42 there as a youth worker, did various other positions at the
43 centre, and currently was a youth worker when I went on
44 long service leave. So ...
45
46 MS BENNETT: So, that's since about 2002; is that right?
47

1 MS RAY: Yes.

2

3 MS BENNETT: Ms Spencer, can you tell the Commissioners
4 about how long you've worked at Ashley?

5

6 MS SPENCER: Since 2011, in April.

7

8 MS BENNETT: What roles have you held at Ashley?

9

10 MS SPENCER: I worked as a youth worker, I did a
11 few months in case management, on contract, and I filled in
12 in programs, but generally my job was a youth worker.

13

14 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: 2011.

15

16 MS SPENCER: 2011.

17

18 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you.

19

20 MS BENNETT: Ms Spencer, starting with you then, what was
21 involved in the role of youth worker at Ashley?

22

23 MS SPENCER: Taking young people through the daily
24 routine, looking out for their wellbeing, performing
25 pro-social behaviour for them and encouraging them to, ah,
26 basically, um, potentially, regardless of their outside
27 lives, try and perform better for themselves basically;
28 escorting them from place to place safely, looking out for
29 the other people within the centre, the staff and other
30 visitors within the centre, looking out for the safety and
31 security within the centre. So, our job was basically
32 dynamic security.

33

34 MS BENNETT: Ms Ray, can you tell the Commissioners about
35 what you understand to be the role of a youth worker?

36

37 MS RAY: Taking children as individuals or young people
38 and working with those individual traits to give them
39 self-esteem for the future and being able to make informed
40 decisions, so taking them through those processes. Every
41 time there might be a hiccup, how do I go about making an
42 informed decision. And also, rehabilitating them to what
43 it says in the Youth Justice Act as community acceptable
44 behaviours. That's basically what it is, so it's role
45 modelling, you know, what the community is expecting from
46 our young people.

47

1 MS SPENCER: That's better than what I said.

2

3 MS BENNETT: Starting with you, Ms Ray, tell us about the
4 sort of training and induction you got when you started
5 working at Ashley?

6

7 MS RAY: Well, I was supposed to have two weeks but I only
8 got four days because there was a riot. So, after day 4 I
9 got put into a unit with 15 boys and three staff. So,
10 there was me and two other senior staff, and 20 minutes
11 later it all kicked off. So, it was, yeah, quite a first
12 day. However, I got through that first day and I'm still
13 here 20 years later.

14

15 MS BENNETT: Did you ever get back to the induction
16 program?

17

18 MS RAY: No. No, the riots would have - over in Bronte,
19 because the whole building was trashed, there was no time
20 for that and there was staff injured, staff away due to
21 stress, so they needed all bodies on hand.

22

23 MS BENNETT: And what about training after that? So,
24 induction got curtailed?

25

26 MS RAY: Yes.

27

28 MS BENNETT: Was there some follow-up training?

29

30 MS RAY: Yes, I read all the books and everything just to
31 make sure I was on par with what - where we were going and
32 what we were doing. I was already a trained youth worker
33 in New Zealand.

34

35 MS BENNETT: So, did you have some qualifications from
36 New Zealand?

37

38 MS RAY: Yes, I did.

39

40 MS BENNETT: What were they?

41

42 MS RAY: I was a youth worker with the YMCA and also was
43 part-time Phys Ed teacher at the Gisborne Girls High school
44 for six months while they were waiting for their exchange
45 teacher to come out, and I also was part of the Youth at
46 Risk Program with the police, so I had quite a lot of
47 experience before I went there.

1
2 MS BENNETT: And so, then you arrived, you had four days
3 of your two weeks, then you read your documents.
4

5 MS RAY: Yep.
6

7 MS BENNETT: Was that pretty much on-the-job training
8 after that?
9

10 MS RAY: Well, it was because I had to get up to par very
11 quick. So, I read the SOPs religiously, that's the
12 operating procedures to make sure I had them down pat, and
13 from then on I always kept up with them to make sure I knew
14 when there were changes made.
15

16 MS BENNETT: Did you rely on the people who worked there a
17 bit longer than you to tell you how things were done?
18

19 MS RAY: Well, you can rely on people to a point only and
20 that's the point where you'll say, "Oh, I think I'll get
21 somebody else's opinion on this". So, I didn't know
22 anybody when I went there, so I wasn't under anybody's
23 influence, and I went there with the good intention of
24 trying to make the lot of a young person better.
25

26 MS BENNETT: Ms Spencer, turning to you, can you tell the
27 Commissioners about your experience starting at Ashley,
28 about the training and induction process as it was for you?
29

30 MS SPENCER: So I had, I believe it was three weeks
31 training; part of that was buddy shifts. So, from memory,
32 actual training in a room was about 11 days and the rest
33 were buddy shifts. I had come from a previous detention
34 centre where I had six weeks training up there and I had my
35 Youth Justice certificate before I came down, my
36 Certificate IV.
37

38 MS BENNETT: I think you did some further training after
39 you started at Ashley; is that right?
40

41 MS SPENCER: Yep.
42

43 MS BENNETT: Tell the Commissioners about that.
44

45 MS SPENCER: I did a diploma in Community Services,
46 specifically in drug and alcohol and mental health.
47

1 MS BENNETT: Was there further ongoing training provided
2 at Ashley about the Ashley environment?

3
4 MS SPENCER: There was, we had a training day set one day
5 per every three months, and then we had essential training,
6 so first aid, things like that that were required every
7 12 months. There were definitely gaps.

8
9 MS BENNETT: What sort of gaps do you feel like there
10 were?

11
12 MS SPENCER: We didn't have restraint training
13 consistently. We should have had it at least every 12
14 months and I think I had it three times in eleven and a
15 half years.

16
17 MS BENNETT: Why was that a matter of concern for you?

18
19 MS SPENCER: Because I was injured at work in a restraint.

20
21 MS BENNETT: Can you tell the Commissioners about, not
22 that specific incident, but what was it you feel you didn't
23 know about restraints?

24
25 MS SPENCER: I think it had more to do with the physical
26 aspect of it. So, my previous detention centre in
27 Townsville, we had extensive training. We had, like, a
28 week of theory and a week of physical. The training that I
29 received down here was very minimal and it wasn't
30 resistive. So, when you have to restrain a resident who is
31 resisting, it's very different than saying, "Please put
32 your hand here, please put your hand there and I'll
33 comply", so there was very much a lack of understanding or
34 experience around how to take - to intervene where two
35 young people are assaulting each other or to defend
36 yourself if someone was assaulting you: we just didn't get
37 that, ever.

38
39 MS BENNETT: What about you, Ms Ray, was that your
40 experience as well?

41
42 MS RAY: We did it on and off, but the problem was, was
43 that towards the latter part of our time there they were
44 iffing and erring about what model to use, and I did take
45 over the training role there for a little while, because
46 during COVID and just before COVID we got behind in our
47 training, so for the three months that I was on that

1 position I made sure that everybody went through all their
2 mandatory training, but I could not get an answer on the
3 restraint training, what model they wanted to do. Up until
4 then we'd used the universal one that's used in the
5 hospitals and throughout government areas, which is the
6 non-violent crisis intervention.

7
8 What Sarah's referring to, unless you're actually
9 practising it all the time you forget how to apply equal
10 pressure, and that's the thing in it: it's about equal
11 pressure. And, if you're not training all the time, you do
12 forget stuff; it's not, you know, one, two, three, four,
13 okay, we've got him under control, now we can talk to him,
14 see where we're going, see if he's going to calm down, see
15 if he does have to go to his room or see whether or not we
16 can resolve this, yes.

17
18 There's a lot in it because there's various stages of
19 escalation and de-escalation and, unless you're actually
20 going over the training all the time, a physical response
21 that is required from you all of a sudden means that you
22 have to be in a position where you can remember what all
23 the steps are fluently, straight away, and so, everybody
24 comes in to play.

25
26 MS BENNETT: It's a pretty busy centre and there have been
27 staffing issues over time; is it fair to say that it's
28 difficult for everyone to get to their scheduled training?

29
30 MS RAY: Yes.

31
32 MS BENNETT: Would you say, Ms Ray, that that causes some
33 risks?

34
35 MS RAY: Of course it does.

36
37 MS BENNETT: Tell the Commissioners about what risks you
38 perceive arising from that.

39
40 MS RAY: Well, the risks that I perceive is that staff are
41 very unsafe. Young people are very, what we call
42 streetwise. They know on a given day, hello, here's a
43 couple of new ones and there's only one old one here today,
44 we might play up today. They're very, very good at reading
45 situations. Now, if you want the best out of a young
46 person you need to nearly have one-on-one staff ratio to
47 residents, right, that's the only way that you can actually

1 have a therapeutic centre.

2
3 Now, there was always constraints over budget, over
4 staffing, they never did enough recruitment, we couldn't
5 keep enough people, so for a whole period of four years
6 there was quite a cohort of staff who were working three
7 and four 12-hour shifts a week. Now, under those
8 circumstances, in a 24/7 alert level situation, that's a
9 lot for the human brain to take on for a long period of
10 time.

11
12 At that stage the government didn't even want to
13 recognise vicarious trauma, PTSD, those sorts of things.
14 They've finally come round to it, but by golly it's been a
15 long slog

16
17 MS BENNETT: Ms Spencer, I think I heard you say "no
18 breaks", can you tell us --

19
20 MS SPENCER: Yes. Sorry, no breaks. We didn't get
21 allocated breaks. The only time there was any room for a
22 break was when we didn't need one.

23
24 MS BENNETT: And how often did you not need a break?

25
26 MS SPENCER: Very rarely. We couldn't even get to a
27 toilet, and that's not a joke.

28
29 MS BENNETT: What do you do?

30
31 MS SPENCER: Take spare underwear to work.

32
33 MS RAY: Always.

34
35 MS SPENCER: That's embarrassing but that's true. That's
36 how bad it was. Under-staffed and the government just kept
37 deciding - we've always been a political football, always.
38 Ashley has always been a political football: close it down,
39 shut it down, it costs too much to run, cut the staffing
40 numbers, you don't need that many people to run the
41 scenario, and then took our measures of authority away from
42 us so we couldn't actually manage these challenging
43 behaviours with the young people that were working.

44
45 MS BENNETT: So, what are the measures of authority that
46 were taken away?

1 MS SPENCER: So, when young people used to be play
2 fighting when I first started, because that obviously turns
3 pear-shaped quite quickly, we'd be like, "Right,
4 10 minutes in your room, cool down. Cool off, come back
5 out". If it happened again, okay, 20 minutes, yep, no
6 worries. If it happened again they might be in for an hour
7 or for the night depending on what time of the day it was,
8 and it worked, it worked. We had a lot of - everyone keeps
9 referring to them as children, they're young men in a gym
10 working out and very hard to manage, and without the proper
11 workforce to manage them physically, we had other measures
12 which we are now not allowed to do due to the isolation -
13 and I do not get the fact that it - there's definitely been
14 issues with that not being managed correctly, but when it
15 was managed correctly it worked.

16
17 MS BENNETT: And so, when kids are sent off to their room
18 effectively, so they're --

19
20 MS SPENCER: Yep, so at home if I had to send my child to
21 their room as a, "Go to your room for a few minutes, cool
22 off". Come back out, start again, reflect on what's just
23 gone on, you know, de-escalate, let's go again, let's start
24 again.

25
26 MS BENNETT: And so, they go to their room and they stay
27 in their room for the 10 minutes.

28
29 MS SPENCER: Yep.

30
31 MS BENNETT: And they're told they are allowed - are they
32 locked in?

33
34 MS SPENCER: This is going back 10 years.

35
36 MS BENNETT: 2011, 12. So, they're looked in their room
37 for the 10 minutes.

38
39 MS SPENCER: Yep.

40
41 MS BENNETT: And then they come out and they might still
42 not be compliant and they might be sent in for 20 minutes?

43
44 MS SPENCER: Yeah, not necessarily straight away though,
45 if it amps up again. Because we were dealing with a lot
46 higher numbers then and the boys were a lot generally -
47 well, was particularly usually boys, older, stronger,

1 physically fit, not unfit like they are nowadays, and yeah,
2 we had to have measures to - and then when I started that's
3 what everybody did and it worked: it worked.

4
5 MS BENNETT: Was that part of your training or did you
6 pick that up on the job?

7
8 MS SPENCER: Um, I think it was both, to be honest. It
9 would have been mentioned in training. I don't know -
10 yeah, but it was definitely an on-the-job thing, yeah.

11
12 MS RAY: It was one of the measures that we used to have,
13 yeah.

14
15 MS SPENCER: It worked back then, yep.

16
17 MS BENNETT: Was there any limit on how long the kids
18 might be sent back to their room for?

19
20 MS SPENCER: I don't think it was ever very long, like, it
21 worked; like, the 10 minutes normally worked or the
22 20 minutes worked, like, it wasn't something that ended up
23 usually where they - unless a fight broke out. So, if that
24 third time the play fighting turned into an incident, then
25 they were isolated and that was more of an official thing
26 than a leading up to that, but that was rare because it
27 normally worked.

28
29 MS BENNETT: Is that the sort of thing that got documented
30 back then?

31
32 MS SPENCER: I don't know about the 10 and the 20 minutes
33 scenario, but obviously if they were officially isolated
34 due to an actual incident because it ended up being a fight
35 and we had to document everything, then it would have been.

36
37 MS BENNETT: So, there's this sort of - I don't want to
38 put words in your mouth, just check if I understand - so
39 there's this informal isolation.

40
41 MS SPENCER: There was back then.

42
43 MS BENNETT: And then there's the sort of more formal that
44 would be a response to an incident and more formal would
45 probably get written up?

46
47 MS SPENCER: Yeah, definitely, 100 per cent.

1
2 MS BENNETT: And less formal might not?
3
4 MS SPENCER: Well, the play fighting could potentially be
5 documented - it would have been documented in the diary
6 potentially, the daily diary, like, the shift handover, so
7 that the other shift were aware that there was tension
8 between particular residents and to keep an eye on them
9 and, like, be mindful of that.
10
11 MS BENNETT: Ms Ray, you've been nodding along there;
12 anything you need to add to that?
13
14 MS RAY: You talk about formal and informal. Regardless
15 of whether a young person is in their room, there's always
16 observations made.
17
18 MS SPENCER: Yep.
19
20 MS RAY: So it depends on the risk factors. So, if we
21 have somebody who's on a SASH and they're on 10 minutes or
22 on constants and we have to pop them in their rooms, then
23 we will be watching them according to the risk factor that
24 is down, they're not just put in there and forgotten about.
25
26 MS SPENCER: Yep.
27
28 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Just for the purpose of the
29 transcript, can you tell us what SASH is, for people that
30 read it later?
31
32 MS RAY: It's a suicide risk assessment that takes place
33 with young people. So, if you had somebody who was of risk
34 of that, obviously you'd want to be watching them fairly
35 constantly to make sure that they were okay and they didn't
36 become disorientated and dysfunctional in their room and
37 hurt themselves.
38
39 MS BENNETT: I'll go back. Ms Spencer, you told us that
40 this was back in 2011/12. When did that practice of
41 formal/informal isolation stop?
42
43 MS SPENCER: I believe we had a young person in their
44 room. One of our processes used to be, due to a serious
45 incident, that there would be a lockdown procedure that
46 went with that and they would need to come out to - they
47 could come out and do a conference and go through whatever

1 the issue was and then they'd move from what we used to
2 call "the Blue Program" and that involved a lot of
3 isolation.

4
5 And I recall a young person being in their room for
6 quite some time because they refused to go to conference.
7 Loved reading books, were quite happy to stay in their
8 room, he just said, "I don't wanna come out, I don't want
9 to go to conference". We also saw a lot of self-isolation
10 as well where kids refused to come out: had nothing to do
11 with us, they chose to, and that became an issue. It was
12 notified, from what I understand, to the Commissioner, I
13 can't remember what year it was; I want to say 2012 or 2013
14 maybe. Yeah, and then from what I understand that's when
15 our Blue Program was diminished, and because they didn't
16 want him in his room, so they were doing everything to get
17 him to come out but he didn't want to because he knew he
18 had to go through the conference and conferencing process.
19 He'd assaulted a staff member quite badly.

20
21 And then I think he loved reading books, he was really
22 happy in there, and we're like, this isn't healthy, you
23 can't stay in your room, mate, you need to come out, and
24 yeah, from that was my last memory of a long isolation
25 period and I believe that from then that's when all of the
26 practices and procedures changed around isolation. I just
27 don't remember the dates.

28
29 PRESIDENT NEAVE: How long did you say that was? I missed
30 when you said?

31
32 MS SPENCER: I believe he was in his room for four weeks,
33 about that, roughly, that's from memory, yeah.

34
35 MS BENNETT: Was there a Blue Program that was
36 reintroduced more recently?

37
38 MS SPENCER: I don't know that I'm officially aware of
39 that. I don't think so. As in, how recent?

40
41 MS BENNETT: 2019 or so.

42
43 MS SPENCER: Where are we now? So --

44
45 MS RAY: No, that's not a Blue Program.

46
47 MS SPENCER: I don't think so. I think there was some

1 isolation around a riot, but I don't believe that it was an
2 official Blue Program. People around the centre may have
3 used that word just because that's what they related it to
4 because of their previous history, but I don't think it was
5 officially called that, I think it was just in regards to
6 managing these particular young people that had a pretty
7 serious riot.

8
9 MS BENNETT: I see, and where perhaps there weren't other
10 strategies available?

11
12 MS SPENCER: No, I don't - I wasn't involved in that.

13
14 MS BENNETT: Ms Ray, do you have any (indistinct).

15
16 MS RAY: There's a risk factor associated with these young
17 people that kept them in the unit, not necessarily their
18 room all the time because they were rotated through their
19 rooms into the unit, and they had a program for them each
20 day: it might be, they would have education, modules that
21 they had to use. They would have phone calls, they would
22 have physical education, all sorts of things. It was a
23 program revolving around the members.

24
25 MS SPENCER: Keeping them separated.

26
27 MS RAY: Keeping them separated from one another, because
28 once they got together they became unmanageable, and so
29 this is what they did until they could get to the bottom of
30 what was going on and get these young people conferenced
31 properly and get some agreements from them to come out and,
32 you know, carry on as normal and not do those types of
33 behaviours and they went back to school. It came out to
34 orange the following week and was back at school.

35
36 MS BENNETT: So, these are colours you're talking about
37 there?

38
39 MS RAY: Yes.

40
41 MS BENNETT: And these colours denote a risk rating?

42
43 MS SPENCER: They would have been red.

44
45 MS BENNETT: And orange is quite high a risk?

46
47 MS RAY: Red, orange, yellow, green. Green's the top.

1 Green's a young person who's travelling very, very well
2 managing programs, schooling, their responsibilities inside
3 the unit, and generally doing well in case management and
4 case assessment.

5
6 MS BENNETT: And the restriction of a child with a blue
7 rating - sorry, the movement of a child with a blue rating
8 isn't restricted at all, but the movement of children with
9 an orange rating might be restricted to a degree?

10
11 MS RAY: It could be because it may be also that Johnny
12 has decided that when he sees Harry out in the courtyard
13 he's going to belt him, so the restriction might be that
14 those members can't cross. So, we would have to do a
15 program where these two young people weren't crossing until
16 we got to the - you know, resolved the issue that was going
17 on with them.

18
19 Our main thing is the safety of everybody inside that
20 centre, the safety and security, and so we take that part
21 of it very, very seriously. We don't want young people
22 assaulting one another, we don't want to be assaulted
23 either. So, you know, there is a lot more risk assessment
24 done - probably not seen by a lot of people, but it is
25 done.

26
27 MS BENNETT: And that risk assessment, in your statement,
28 Ms Ray, I might be confusing the two statements, I think in
29 your statement you say that you're not given additional
30 time to reduce all of these matters to writing. Is that -
31 let me put it in a positive question, are you given enough,
32 are you given some space?

33
34 MS RAY: No. Because we're short on staff and an incident
35 may have happened at 12 o'clock during the day, and because
36 you've got young people coming in and out from school into
37 the unit, you don't get time to sit down and write your
38 actual incident reports. You might get your book done,
39 your communication book, and you've got to stay after
40 3 o'clock and do it, find somewhere quiet where you can sit
41 down and actually type it up. Sometimes you get paid, most
42 times not.

43
44 MS BENNETT: Ms Spencer, is that your experience as well?

45
46 MS SPENCER: Yes.
47

1 MS BENNETT: Tell the Commissioners about what
2 difficulties that presents for you.

3
4 MS SPENCER: So, on my last shift that I did I could have
5 written multiple detention offences, and I didn't get a
6 chance to. I could have written an SRLS for myself but the
7 moment my shift finished I just wanted to go straight home
8 because we're not safe.

9
10 MS BENNETT: Tell the Commissioners what you mean by that,
11 what's not safe?

12
13 MS SPENCER: Well, when you're working with staff who
14 can't restrain aggressive young people, who at the moment
15 due to the fact that we're in restricted practices, so
16 rolling lockdowns because we don't have the staff when they
17 do come out, obviously they're heightened, and we get that,
18 but we can't - the few people that were managing them
19 couldn't manage them, and so, the whole shift was just
20 horrific, and it was only four females on the floor. One
21 left with one person in one unit who shouldn't be left with
22 that - no-one should be left alone with him at all, let
23 alone a female, and then the three other females, including
24 myself, on work cover restrictions who also can't restrain,
25 with two units of boys just absolutely out of control.

26
27 MS BENNETT: Tell the Commissioners about the rolling
28 lockdowns.

29
30 MS SPENCER: So, at the moment due to the lack of staff
31 we've had to keep the young people in their room for longer
32 periods than normal and let them out at different times
33 rather than all together. And, the Children's Commissioner
34 requested dates and times of when they were out and so then
35 we were under pressure to make sure that that was happening
36 - I'm assuming that's what happened that particular day,
37 because we let them out with less staff than the day
38 before, which didn't make sense to me. And, yeah, it was
39 just extremely unsafe for everyone: for them and for us.

40
41 MS BENNETT: I'm going to conclude this examination, but I
42 just wanted to give you the chance, I wanted to ask you one
43 last question and then to offer any reflections that you
44 might have to the Commissioners.

45
46 Ms Ray, can you tell the Commissioners what's been the
47 trajectory in your 20 years there? Has it gotten better or

1 worse?

2
3 MS RAY: When I first went there we used to do lots of
4 things: we used to go fishing, we used to go caving. We
5 were always, at least once or twice a week, out with a
6 group of people, young people.

7
8 We had a few boys run away, got in the papers, as it
9 does, and then they decided that we had to do more risk
10 assessments and that we couldn't do these off-site
11 activities, which is therapeutic practice, as we used to.
12 So, it meant that there had to be longer periods of a young
13 person being on green before they could go outside the
14 fence, whereas before, you know, kids were taken on camps,
15 yeah, they used to do some pretty awesome stuff.

16
17 So, community expectations were, you know, goodness
18 me, these kids are running around, you know, taking
19 government cars and getting away from the area where they
20 were supposed to be, we need to do something about it. So,
21 pressure was applied for us to apply a different risk
22 criteria, and that's what happened. We used to go to the
23 movies, or I remember filling my car up with kids and going
24 off to the movies.

25
26 MS SPENCER: Baseball, sport.

27
28 MS RAY: Take kids to soccer, I might take --

29
30 MS BENNETT: Where did that pressure come from?

31
32 MS RAY: From the department. We're just the minions, we
33 can only do - we can only work by the operating procedures
34 and policies in front of us. Until such times as those
35 policies change or the interpretation changes, we have to
36 maintain what we're doing. So, if the interpretation comes
37 through that it's changed, that we're not reading it
38 properly, we change and we work a different way.

39
40 So, you've got horses for courses here, certain things
41 have happened at certain times during the evolving process
42 of the centre and its policies and its processes, and how
43 that's been overseen by the department and the
44 Attorney-General's department as to how the SOPs are
45 perceived.

46
47 MS BENNETT: Ms Spencer, would you like to offer any

1 observations of your own?

2
3 MS SPENCER: Oh, yeah, I would. I'll try and keep it
4 short. Staff are assaulted on site regularly,
5 consistently, not supported to charge young people with
6 assault because it looks bad on paper, and that is
7 happening all the time, constantly. Brand new worker
8 couple of days ago, punched in the face. Any assault
9 charge? Like, that's his first day. We're trying to get
10 more staff: we're not supported.

11
12 We don't get debriefings after critical incidents, we
13 don't get breaks as I've already said. We do not get
14 clinical supervision. I feel like there's been a lot of -
15 well, I know - we have had a lot of work colleagues, like,
16 targeted instead of actually the institution and how this
17 has actually come to be. There's a lot of allegations and
18 I'm not diminishing the fact that there would no doubt be
19 some of those would be legitimate, but there are massive
20 amounts that are not.

21
22 So, we've lost a huge wealth of experience off the
23 floor. We've got inexperienced staff who are not trained
24 properly, who are only going to make more mistakes, and
25 then it's going to be their fault again, and it shouldn't
26 be.

27
28 The government gave these young people, ex-residents
29 whether they went to Risdon, payouts when they said, "Oh,
30 so and so interfered with me or did this". No
31 investigation, just gave them 10 grand there, 20 grand
32 there, 30 grand there. We knew about it because they told
33 us all the time. They would leave the centre saying, "I'm
34 going to say this when I leave, so and so got this much
35 money for saying this". Constantly we've lost valuable
36 workers through a lot of unproven allegations with no
37 investigations whatsoever. Why would anyone want to work
38 at Ashley Youth Detention Centre?

39
40 MS RAY: The instrument of delegation.

41
42 MS SPENCER: It just doesn't make - it's horrific, because
43 they just kept handing them money with no investigation,
44 and now we've got this flood of allegations, and there
45 would be a percentage, I'm not diminishing that, but all of
46 these false allegations take away from the legitimate ones.
47

1 MS BENNETT: Commissioners, those are the questions that I
2 had, unless there are other matters?

3
4 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: What would you like to tell us
5 about what you think we should do? We have the obligation
6 to make the recommendation.

7
8 MS SPENCER: I think the government and the department
9 need to be held accountable, and I believe that the
10 pressure from them onto the centre managers, whoever it was
11 at the time, to make sure this box looks ticked and that
12 box looks ticked, and we'll pretend we didn't have a
13 thousand staff assaults and all that rubbish because they
14 felt pressured due to the fact that, oh, we're going to
15 close it down and we're going to do this and we're going to
16 do that and they all had to perform in a certain way and
17 look a certain way, and I feel like what is at the top
18 flows down and they need to be held accountable, and
19 instead of being held accountable at the top they're
20 pointing fingers at the plebs.

21
22 MS RAY: Yep, the minions.

23
24 MS SPENCER: It's not okay. People's lives have been
25 affected, like there are whole families and lives have been
26 affected by some of these accusations that are completely
27 and utterly false and it's not okay. No support, nothing.
28 It's disgusting, in my opinion. We all got into this
29 business, into this job because we cared about vulnerable
30 young people, and to end our careers after all of this lack
31 of support and all of the lack of - everything is just
32 disgusting.

33
34 People gave up times with their own families, they did
35 extra hours, they came in on their days off, they didn't
36 get breaks, they didn't get the training and everything,
37 and now they're sitting at home under these investigations,
38 like, with all this scrutiny absolutely devastated, and
39 some of them are so outlandish, it's not even physically
40 possible, some of them, it's just so - what? And there's
41 no-one supporting these people, and there's no proper
42 investigation. Like, just --

43
44 MS RAY: I just think that --

45
46 MS SPENCER: Was that enough?

1 MS RAY: -- to go into the work being a caregiver and to
2 end up coming out with children coming home from school and
3 saying to their mothers and fathers who work there, "Oh,
4 the kids at school says you're a paedophile, mum".

5
6 MS SPENCER: Yep, a house of paedophiles, that's what we
7 are.

8
9 MS RAY: How is that after 20 years? How is that after
10 20 years? Because there's been no muting of the
11 government, the politicians or the media leading up to
12 this, and we're the ones, the workers on the floor - not
13 management, not those people up the top - that appear to be
14 coping it in the media and I don't think it's right.

15
16 MS SPENCER: I reported misconduct. There is no way I
17 would not report it. I've done it more than once and I
18 work closely with a lot of these colleagues: there is
19 absolutely no way that I would have turned a blind eye,
20 ever, and it's just appalling, in my opinion.

21
22 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Thank you.

23
24 PRESIDENT NEAVE: I had a question that's hopefully a
25 little bit more positive.

26
27 MS SPENCER: Sorry. Enough with the negativity.

28
29 PRESIDENT NEAVE: My question 's this: the government has
30 announced, and you may disagree with this decision, but has
31 announced that Ashley will go and that there will be two
32 centres, probably one in Launceston and one in Hobart,
33 although I don't think that that's necessarily been
34 decided. What would you do to make those places work
35 better, from the point of view of both the workers and the
36 children?

37
38 MS SPENCER: Well, they need to be staffed correctly.

39
40 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Yes, and what does that mean?

41
42 MS SPENCER: Like Sue has already said, in our opinion
43 when it comes to therapeutic care, they need one-on-one,
44 and no staff member should ever be left with a young person
45 on their own, ever; and then that will, like, you know,
46 avoid any allegation either way, something happening, but
47 also someone being accused of something that didn't happen.

1
2 I believe that, depending on the risk factors, there
3 should be a lot more off property experiences for these
4 young people, which is what the centre has actually been
5 trying to do recently, you know, to their credit, so that
6 they can have different life experiences and realise that
7 there is other stuff outside of their criminal behaviour.
8

9 Diversionary programs, I think, would be ideal.
10 Unfortunately, when that ends it's just whether or not
11 they're on their feet enough not to return to their same
12 environment that they came back from, because we were just
13 discussing that we have a young person who went away and
14 was doing really well, but now he's back in Tassie and he
15 ended up straight back in Risdon, but he was doing awesome,
16 which is sad for us because we like to hear the good
17 stories, we don't hear many. So, yeah, that would be a few
18 things definitely.
19

20 MS RAY: There's got to be support.
21

22 MS SPENCER: Definitely, support and staff, staff need
23 support too. Because, if we're not looked after, we can't
24 look after them.
25

26 MS RAY: No.
27

28 MS SPENCER: Like, as you know, if our cup's not full,
29 what have we got left? We have not had the support, we
30 have not had the care that we have required or the
31 professional training or the professional supervision or
32 anything that we needed, and so, when staff - you know,
33 when we fail at work we're under scrutiny. Where's the
34 accountability for the centre? Where's the accountability
35 for who's above them that says what they should and
36 shouldn't be doing?
37

38 MS RAY: Where's the accountability when they leave Ashley
39 and sit in a shelter, get evicted from the shelter because
40 a younger child has come in and they're back on the streets
41 again?
42

43 MS SPENCER: Or they get bailed to a tent. We had one
44 child bailed to a tent in winter. That's not us.
45

46 MS RAY: And we get them back again and then we have to
47 start all over again. We've gotta ...

1
2 MS SPENCER: Yeah.
3
4 MS RAY: So it's about starting at the very beginning, not
5 at the end. The very beginning of the process starts as a
6 small child: parenting. If the parents aren't doing the
7 right thing, they should be sent to parenting school for a
8 start, and we have a lot of those parents who don't parent
9 very well, because they've come from --
10
11 MS SPENCER: The same scenario.
12
13 MS RAY: -- the same scenario, so it's all learnt
14 behaviour. But there's nothing. If it doesn't get picked
15 up at school they just get suspended, so they're on the
16 streets straight away. It's got to go right back to the
17 very start.
18
19 MS SPENCER: More youth work support for education for
20 disengaged kids.
21
22 MS RAY: Yep.
23
24 MS SPENCER: Of which I think there are a few programs,
25 but that could probably be amped up a lot more in the
26 community.
27
28 MS RAY: Because that sort of comes and goes depending on
29 what's being pushed at the time.
30
31 MS SPENCER: Yep, definitely.
32
33 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you. Have you got any questions?
34
35 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: No, I'm just trying to reflect on
36 what you've said, which is important. But you're saying,
37 from what I've heard, there's a lack of proper training?
38
39 MS SPENCER: Yep, definitely.
40
41 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: There's a lack of time, because I
42 was trying to work out when I was listening to your
43 evidence carefully, that you finished, I think you said at
44 3 o'clock and you had to go into your own time to write up
45 about what happened at that time.
46
47 MS SPENCER: Yep. Oh, yeah, if I stayed anymore, yep.

1
2 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: Presumably, the young person that
3 you're writing up about is then under the supervision of
4 somebody else who have the same problems in terms of time.

5
6 MS SPENCER: Yep.

7
8 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: So you don't then have time to
9 reflect before you go on as to where the issues may be. Is
10 that a fair assessment of your evidence?

11
12 MS SPENCER: Absolutely, time constraints, lack of staff,
13 and the massive amount of pressure.

14
15 MS RAY: You don't get the time to sit down with the young
16 person and say, "Look here, mate, look at all this. Does
17 this look good or does this look bad?" Try and teach them,
18 a few lessons in amongst it, and get them to reflect on
19 their behaviours, and maybe the next time they might think,
20 even if it's only for 2 seconds it's better than the last
21 time because it wasn't at all, and it's about building that
22 process all the way through so that they can make a
23 decision based on what's happening around them in a
24 positive way; the best, you know, decision possible.

25
26 MS SPENCER: When we do have the numbers and we do have a
27 lower - like, we have lower numbers of the residents and we
28 have more staff, you get that opportunity to say, once
29 everything's sort of de-escalated and calmed down, "Okay
30 mate, how did this happen? How did this start? Okay, this
31 is what you did, this is what happened, what will you do
32 differently next time?" You get to have that conversation.
33 We don't get to do that anymore, there's no time: it's
34 hectic, it's crazy, it's out of control really.

35
36 MS RAY: I guess too we're in a no win situation with
37 COVID. Who wants to come and work at Ashley Youth
38 Detention Centre? However, what do we do in the meantime
39 to make the place safe? I've got people falling over
40 everywhere that I know. I'm not at work at the moment, I'm
41 trying to take some of my leave, look after my husband, and
42 I'm just astounded about the people that are there and have
43 gone about their mental health and the fact that they
44 haven't really been looked after the way they should have
45 been and that, to me, is so poor.

46
47 The WorkCover says that you can go to work and come

1 home safely: well, that's not what's happening because
2 staff at Ashley Youth Detention Centre are having their
3 mental health damaged every day without the right
4 procedures in place to help maintain a healthy lifestyle
5 because it's all work and no play.
6

7 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Can I ask: what, if any, supports
8 or check-ins you've had about giving evidence for today?
9 It's a tough process.

10
11 MS RAY: Nothing.

12
13 MS SPENCER: Nothing.

14
15 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: And time off to prepare your
16 statements?

17
18 MS SPENCER: I did mine at work while I was supervising
19 kids, and I wasn't even supposed to be a number on the
20 floor because I was on return to work, and I had workers
21 walking around me when I got an opportunity to get on the
22 computer, and it's supposed to be a private and
23 confidential document, so that's how that went.
24

25 MS RAY: And I did mine at home in between looking after
26 my husband because we were waiting for a pacemaker to be
27 put in and, because of COVID it kept getting cancelled, and
28 yeah. So, there was extra stress there too.
29

30 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: I'm sorry that you both feel so
31 let down in your role.

32
33 MS SPENCER: Thanks.

34
35 MS RAY: Thank you for that because you'd be the only
36 person who said that.

37
38 MS SPENCER: I reckon.

39
40 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you very much for speaking to us
41 and I'm sorry you received no support in preparation of
42 your statements.

43
44 MS SPENCER: Oh, we had support from the union. I have to
45 say that, definitely. Lucas was great, yep.

46
47 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you very much.

1
2 MS SPENCER: Thank you.

3
4 MS BENNETT: Commissioners, I note the time and I wonder
5 if we might have a slightly shorter break in order to
6 hopefully finish the evidence today.

7
8 MS SPENCER: I talked too much.

9
10 MS BENNETT: No, no, I don't mean any criticism at all.

11
12 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Yes, of course we can, thank you.

13
14 **SHORT ADJOURNMENT**

15
16 MS BENNETT: Commissioners, the next two witnesses appear
17 in panel: they are Ms Janise Mitchell and Mr Anthony
18 McGinness. Could I ask that they be sworn or affirmed?

19
20 <ANTHONY DANE MCGINNESS, affirmed: [3.55 pm]

21
22 <JANISE LEIGH MITCHELL, affirmed:

23
24 <EXAMINATION BY MS BENNETT:

25
26 MS BENNETT: Q. Mr McGinness, could you tell the
27 Commissioners your full name and professional address?

28
29 MR MCGINNESS: Anthony Dane McGinness. I work for Future
30 Friendly in Canberra.

31
32 MS BENNETT: And you've made a statement to assist the
33 Commission?

34
35 MR MCGINNESS: I have.

36
37 MS BENNETT: Are the contents of that statement true and
38 correct?

39
40 MR MCGINNESS: They are.

41
42 MS BENNETT: Ms Mitchell, can you tell the Commissioners
43 your full name and professional address?

44
45 MS MITCHELL: Janise Leigh Mitchell, I work for the
46 Australian Childhood Foundation based in their Melbourne
47 offices.

1
2 MS BENNETT: You've made a statement to assist the
3 Commission; is that statement true?
4

5 MS MITCHELL: It is.
6

7 MS BENNETT: Ms Mitchell, could you tell the Commissioners
8 your professional background and area of expertise, please.
9

10 MS MITCHELL: I can. I am a social worker by trade, I've
11 been in the child and family welfare service for more than
12 30 years. I did a masters in therapeutic out-of-home care
13 in 2008. I'm currently the Director of the Centre for
14 Excellence in Therapeutic Care and I'm an Adjunct Associate
15 Professor at Southern Cross University.
16

17 MS BENNETT: Thank you, and Mr McGinness, could you tell
18 the Commissioners your professional background?
19

20 MR MCGINNESS: Sure. So, for the last five years or so I
21 founded a product design and service studio, but it's
22 really before that I worked for the Noetic Group as a
23 management consultant where for about 10 years I provided
24 consulting services and a lot of that time was providing
25 sort of strategic advice in Youth Justice, including the
26 Custodial Youth Justice Options Paper here in Tasmania, the
27 foundational review of the New South Wales Juvenile Justice
28 System and a range of other program evaluations and
29 strategic advice projects.
30

31 MS BENNETT: So I'll start with a broad question around
32 Youth Justice and the approach over the time you have each
33 been working in the space and I want to ask you about the
34 trends that you've observed at a macro level and I'm going
35 to zoom in after that.
36

37 Generally, starting with you, Ms Mitchell, can you
38 tell the Commissioners what are the broad areas of change
39 in terms of the trends that you have seen over the last
40 decade or so in Youth Justice.
41

42 MS MITCHELL: I think there's been a growing trend
43 internationally, probably over the last 15 to 20 years
44 around the growing recognition with the body of knowledge
45 around interpersonal neurobiology and developmental trauma
46 to recognise that an adult corrections approach to young
47 people who require custodial settings is just not fit for

1 purpose, and that most of the young people who require
2 detention because of their criminal behaviour are nine
3 times out of 10 no different to the young people that are
4 walking through Child Protection's doors, through Mental
5 Health doors, through Disability doorways, and it's just
6 through bad luck that they end up in a Corrections door and
7 are dealt with with a Corrections response.

8
9 And I would say that, you know, this population is a
10 highly disadvantaged, highly traumatised group, you know,
11 they would tick most of the boxes on the ASIS study, they
12 have many undiagnosed vulnerabilities and additional needs
13 as a result of their adverse early childhood experiences,
14 and they need a response that recognises all of their
15 needs, not just focuses on what they have done.

16
17 And so, I think internationally there's been a growing
18 recognition of that. I think nationally jurisdictions are
19 getting their heads around that in different ways at
20 different speeds. I think Tasmania's had an appetite for
21 it, and certainly in discussions that I've been involved in
22 for a decade; I don't know that it's necessarily found the
23 right mechanism to deliver on that idea to date.

24
25 MS BENNETT: Mr McGinness, does that track with your
26 experience in this area?

27
28 MR MCGINNESS: Yeah, I'd agree that there is a growing
29 recognition of some of those underlying principles: the
30 need for therapeutic approaches, trauma-informed
31 approaches. Justice re-investment as a concept was
32 relatively new back when we conducted the review of the New
33 South Wales Juvenile Justice System. Unfortunately I think
34 reform and adoption of those principles has been sort of
35 slow; too many reviews and reflection on these sorts of
36 issues, without probably enough progress on the
37 implementation of those sorts of recommendations and
38 reforms that are necessary to truly embed those principles.

39
40 MS BENNETT: Is that an observation that you make in
41 respect of Tasmania or?

42
43 MR MCGINNESS: Nationally, I'd say.

44
45 MS BENNETT: Nationally. Let's focus into Ashley a little
46 bit. Ms Mitchell, you were part of an advisory group that
47 was established in 2012. Can you tell the Commissioners

1 what the role of that advisory committee was?

2
3 MS MITCHELL: So, that advisory group was a
4 whole-of-government response, I think led by the Deputy
5 Secretary of the department, and it arose out of the report
6 that was referred to in the earlier testimony by --

7
8 MS BENNETT: Professor White.

9
10 MS MITCHELL: Professor White, and the purpose of that at
11 that point was to look at what was some minor capital works
12 programs that could be undertaken relatively quickly to
13 improve the physical environment at Ashley, taking on board
14 the recommendations of that review. And, as part of that
15 group I came to quickly see that changing some of the
16 aesthetics at Ashley was not really going to change the
17 experience for the kids, and so suggested to the department
18 at that point that they would be well served by developing
19 a fit for purpose practice model and operating framework
20 that drew on best practice evidence thinking at the time
21 around trauma-informed Youth Justice and made the most of
22 the capital investments and modifications that they were
23 trying to undertake at that time.

24
25 MS BENNETT: You tell us in your statement, at about
26 paragraph 12(a), that you formed the view around that time
27 that it was important to shift Ashley away from an adult
28 justice oriented detention approach. Was that the approach
29 you understood was in place at Ashley at the time?

30
31 MS MITCHELL: Very much so. I think that most of the work
32 with children with complex needs tends to devolve from
33 adult ways of thinking: harmful sexual behaviours is
34 another field of endeavour that has devolved from an adult
35 perpetrator criminal framework and that paradigm is slowly
36 shifting.

37
38 I think that, at the time it was very much about
39 containment, it was very much using traditional methods of
40 points and rewards systems. We heard in the previous
41 testimony from the staff the different gradings that kids
42 were given that gave them more or less liberties and
43 freedoms, so it was very much operating as a traditional,
44 very adult-centric (indistinct).

45
46 MS BENNETT: And what's the problem with that?

1 MS MITCHELL: It fails to recognise that first and
2 foremost these are children. I think the concept of
3 justice for children in the Youth Justice System is a
4 really complicated one and I struggle at times with the
5 idea of restorative justice and the centrality of that as
6 an organising principle for children who, by no fault of
7 their own, have been dealt a hand in life up to that
8 point that has seen them experience significant
9 disadvantage, trauma.

10
11 I know some of the kids at Ashley personally through
12 other roles that I've held and I know they've got serious
13 histories of having been physically assaulted in the
14 community; they are the victims of many, many crimes,
15 sexually, physically, neglect, parental abuse, and so, I
16 think the system has let these kids down.

17
18 But they end up in a setting where, suddenly at the
19 age of 13, 14, 15, when their cognitive brain development
20 isn't at a point where they have the capacity yet to - for
21 the executive function that the sorts of cognitive
22 processes around responsibility taking and making sense of,
23 no-one has said sorry to me, no-one has had to take
24 accountability for anything that has been done to me,
25 adults or anyone else, and at the ripe old age of 13 or 14
26 I'm being put in this position where I have to say sorry
27 for something that I've done, and I think it's really hard
28 for a child to make sense of how that is justice and how
29 that is fair.

30
31 And I think we've got to understand that these are
32 first and foremost kids and that adults have let them down,
33 systems have let them down, and they are where they are
34 because they've done the best they can to survive the hand
35 that they've been dealt by life to date, and that in many
36 instances has caused them to run foul of the laws, but I
37 think kids in the main are doing the best they can with
38 what they've got to work with and they're just in the
39 business, a lot of them, of surviving and we need to
40 understand that and look at the meaning of what this
41 behaviour is telling us. It is criminal behaviour, it's
42 not okay, it needs to be addressed, but I don't know that a
43 traditional approach to Youth Justice derived from adult
44 justice changes the trajectories for these kids.

45
46 MS BENNETT: And this is the tenure of your
47 recommendations and interactions back in 2012; is that

1 right?

2

3 MS MITCHELL: That's right.

4

5 MS BENNETT: And then, following from that advisory group,
6 there was a proposal in 2013 for the development of a
7 practice framework; is that right?

8

9 MS MITCHELL: There was. So, out of the reflections that
10 I made as part of that panel that I was on, there was an
11 appetite within government to progress the idea of a
12 practice framework. We were asked to put a proposal
13 forward; that proposal was accepted. We were issued a
14 contract to undertake the work, but in the early stages of
15 that contract the project was terminated, I believe because
16 there had been a decision to undertake a wholesale review
17 of Ashley, and they just didn't see that running that
18 project whilst that review was happening was (indistinct).

19

20 MS BENNETT: So your project was to be - what was your
21 project to be, the one in 2013 that you were getting the
22 contract for, what was that to be?

23

24 MS MITCHELL: So, it was to develop in the first instance
25 a practice framework, and then translate that into an
26 operating framework. Alongside that we were looking at the
27 workforce capability needs, and by that I'm not talking
28 about training, that's just one part of it, but we heard in
29 the previous testimony, unless you've got enough staff to
30 deliver the intent of a therapeutic model of care, it's not
31 possible unless you've got the capacity for staff not to be
32 on the floor all of the time but to have professional
33 supervision, to have opportunities for reflective practice,
34 to come together as a team, to do effective handovers, all
35 of these have staffing implications and rostering
36 implications.

37

38 So, part of what we were going to look at as well was
39 workforce capability needs both in terms of how rosters and
40 staffing levels worked, as well as a capability matrix from
41 the leadership down to the floor.

42

43 MS BENNETT: What happened to the contract, what happened
44 to that work in 2013? It got terminated, I think you said?

45

46 MS MITCHELL: Yeah, it got terminated.

47

1 MS BENNETT: And nothing further heard about it?

2
3 MS MITCHELL: Nothing further heard about it, no.

4
5 MS BENNETT: All right, Mr McGinness, I think the story
6 then picks up again with you in 2016. Can you tell us
7 about what work you and your organisation undertook then.

8
9 MR MCGINNESS: So, on the back of some of the work we had
10 done previously with New South Wales and also the ACT
11 Government, we were asked to do a custodial Youth Justice
12 Options Paper for Ashley; it was an opportunity to look at
13 what options are available. I think there was a
14 recognition of some of the operational and probably more
15 systemic challenges that existed, but also growing
16 financial pressure. As numbers of young people in the
17 centre went down, the proportional cost to run that centre
18 per young person was under scrutiny, and so, I think there
19 were questions being asked around, is this the best model
20 both to meet the needs of young people, but also, you know,
21 the most cost-effective option available to the state.

22
23 So, we led a review effectively speaking to a range of
24 different government stakeholders, non-government service
25 providers, staff at Ashley, children in Ashley; we worked
26 to sort of co-design and develop those options with
27 stakeholders, analyse them and ultimately landed on the
28 recommendation that they move from Ashley to smaller
29 home-like facilities in the north and south of the state.

30
31 MS BENNETT: In doing that work, you worked with some of
32 the kids at Ashley; is that right?

33
34 MR MCGINNESS: Yeah, we spent a day there at Ashley and
35 spoke to, I think, five - five young people.

36
37 MS BENNETT: What were you hearing from the young people
38 at Ashley at the time?

39
40 MR MCGINNESS: They really enjoyed the education program
41 that was there. For them, it was, you know, often their
42 first opportunity to really meaningfully engage with
43 education that was suited to them, that was contextualised
44 to them and their needs, but there wasn't enough of it.
45 They were often bored and a lot of the incidents that might
46 occur, sort of aggressive or otherwise, they felt, were
47 often a product of boredom, not enough programming and, you

1 know, for them more broadly it was an opportunity for them
2 to engage with education, to sort of get their life on
3 track and, yeah, that was some of the themes that came out
4 of it.

5
6 MS BENNETT: What were your recommendations arising out of
7 the work that you did in 2016?

8
9 MR MCGINNESS: So we looked at a number of options, and
10 the paper sort of outlines those in terms of what's
11 involved in them, the benefits, the costs, the social
12 impact and the like. We looked at, like, a do nothing
13 option: what would happen if we stayed on the current
14 trajectory? What would happen if we just made some minor
15 improvements? What would happen if we refurbished Ashley?
16 What would happen if we built a new purpose-built facility?
17 And what if we went to the two smaller facilities? And
18 ultimately through that analysis for a variety of reasons,
19 including some of the existing issues that are pretty well
20 documented and discussed today with Ashley, but also really
21 fundamentally the location: we recommended that they move
22 to two smaller facilities.

23
24 MS BENNETT: And what was the issue about the location?

25
26 MR MCGINNESS: It's - there's multiple issues. I think
27 fundamentally you've got this dynamic where a young person
28 starts to push up and interact with the Justice System, and
29 there's a pretty swift or, you know, steep graduated
30 response from some of the diversionary practices that they
31 might have and all of a sudden they find themselves in some
32 instances dislocated and removed from one corner of the
33 state to the other; they're disconnected and dislocated
34 from family, from community. Often the cost and the impost
35 that would come in terms of maintaining that contact is
36 prohibitive.

37
38 It means that, while they're in detention, it's really
39 hard to provide experiences and support that mean that,
40 when they are eventually released - remembering all these
41 young people will eventually be released - that none of
42 that sort of good through-care support can happen in terms
43 of reconnecting them with education, with service
44 providers, whether it's Health and the like. It has
45 challenges in terms of the workforce, in terms of
46 attracting/retaining talent. So, yeah, from before, during
47 and after there's all sorts of issues that really make it a

1 less desirable option.

2

3 MS BENNETT: And what happened after that Options Paper
4 was finalised? What was the next thing that happened from
5 your perspective?

6

7 MR MCGINNESS: From our perspective nothing, you know, our
8 involvement ceases when we hand over the report and watch
9 with bated breath as we await a government response. My
10 understanding was that they rejected that recommendation
11 and decided to make some improvements to Ashley, until very
12 recently when it appears as though someone, you know, might
13 have picked it back up or through other means is moving
14 towards a similar direction to the one we recommended.

15

16 MS BENNETT: Moving then to 2017 and back to you,
17 Ms Mitchell, you were in 2017 asked to join an internal
18 process to develop an Ashley practice framework; is that
19 right?

20

21 MS MITCHELL: Yeah. We were approached in May 2017; the
22 department had indicated that it was their intention to
23 apply some internal resources to the development of a
24 practice framework for Ashley, that they were wanting to
25 establish an expert advisory group around that process, so
26 I was asked to participate on that.

27

28 MS BENNETT: How did that link to the work you'd done in
29 2013? Was it the same thing or was it new?

30

31 MS MITCHELL: It read as if it was going to be similar,
32 its intent was similar, but it was an internally-driven
33 process, but it wasn't as expansive as what we had
34 proposed, it was really just looking at the practice
35 framework and then a learning and development framework
36 that would sit alongside it. So, it wasn't looking at
37 organisational reform, staffing, structural change.

38

39 MS BENNETT: So it was a narrower set of issues than you
40 had?

41

42 MS MITCHELL: It was looking very much just at practice.

43

44 MS BENNETT: Just for those who are following along at
45 home, what's a practice framework?

46

47 MS MITCHELL: So, a practice framework is the set of

1 principles, the agreed knowledge or theoretical frameworks
2 and the ways - the agreed ways of undertaking all aspects
3 of the work, and so, very often now we talk about a common
4 elements approach in the evidence community as opposed to
5 some of the, kind of, the models that are available for
6 licence.

7
8 So, a common elements approach would look at a range
9 of models that are out there and would look at, what are
10 all the common features of models that are seen to be
11 effective? So, it could be from the principles that
12 underpin the theoretical orientation to, how are you going
13 to undertake an assessment and why. How planning and
14 intervention occurs, what your theory of change is, how
15 you're going to involve young people and families and
16 staff.

17
18 The role of organisational congruence; you're looking
19 at an entire picture around, how does the organisation live
20 and breathe and approach to understanding and responding to
21 the needs of the children and young people that are cared
22 for or detained within Ashley, and how, regardless of who
23 it is on shift, can we make sure that children receive a
24 level of care and a way of responding that is consistent so
25 it's not left to the idiosyncrasies of the individual staff
26 member on shift.

27
28 MS BENNETT: I'm sorry, Commissioner.

29
30 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Yes, I just wanted to understand that
31 clearly. So, it's a philosophy, it's the way everyone at
32 Ashley commits to doing what they're doing, and then
33 presumably for the people who are on the ground doing the
34 work, it sort of gives them guidance about how that
35 philosophy is put into practice; is that right?

36
37 MS MITCHELL: Well, it's more than a philosophy. So, a
38 practice framework will generally say, we need to set this
39 organisational culture as a starting point.

40
41 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Yes.

42
43 MS MITCHELL: That needs to be mirrored, there needs to be
44 organisational congruence, so from the executive through to
45 the cleaner everyone is working from the same
46 understanding; they share a language, they share concepts,
47 they share ways of thinking about how the work needs to

1 happen; they share an orientation or a theoretical basis
2 around, that behaviour is happening because I'm going to
3 look at it using these ways of looking at it rather than
4 that way of looking at it, and we're going to make sense of
5 it and respond to it this way; we're going to undertake
6 assessment of kids' needs using this lens to look at them;
7 we're going to use planning processes using this approach.

8
9 So, it provides the theoretical and the conceptual map
10 for how we're going to make sense of the needs of children
11 and young people that are here, how we create safety, how
12 we create change, and then what the roles and the
13 capabilities of the staff are in that process.

14
15 So, you heard earlier that relationships are central.
16 So, a relationship-based approach would be part of a
17 practice framework. It says to the youth workers or the
18 custodial staff, your job is not to stand back and watch;
19 your job is to be engaged with and use your relationship as
20 a vehicle for change, your job is not to stand back and do
21 nothing until you have to intervene to de-escalate
22 something, so it sets the tone and the orientation for how
23 change happens, for how learning happens and how we set
24 goals and measure success.

25
26 You then develop an operating framework which are the
27 policies, the systems, the processes that will enable the
28 practice framework to be put into operation.

29
30 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Yeah, that's the step that I was trying
31 to understand.

32
33 MS MITCHELL: So that's the operating framework, that
34 brings the practice framework to light.

35
36 PRESIDENT NEAVE: So leaving aside questions about
37 recruitment and all of those things which are obviously
38 really important. I'm working on the floor, I'm a youth
39 worker: what it will eventually, quite apart from what
40 we're trying to achieve, having an agreement on what we're
41 trying to achieve, does it when combined with an operating
42 framework tell us what we should be doing in certain
43 situations?

44
45 MS MITCHELL: Yes.

46
47 PRESIDENT NEAVE: So the guidance that it might give to

1 somebody where they walk into the place and they know that
2 things are brewing, and they're nervous and they're
3 frightened perhaps, as we heard, how they might think about
4 that and how they might respond to that. I mean, I'm not
5 suggesting it's a one-off exercise.
6

7 MS MITCHELL: That's exactly right. How do you make sense
8 of what you're seeing; is what I'm seeing all there is to
9 know, or do I need to understand what's gone before or
10 what's driving this behaviour because, if I want to change
11 the behaviour I need to understand the drivers for it. A
12 trauma-informed lens would say, children have a range of
13 unmet needs, behaviour is an expression of them, so we've
14 got to understand the needs that the child has, the young
15 person has, if we want to extinguish the behaviour. A
16 behaviour modification approach won't work for kids with
17 high levels of trauma.
18

19 So, it gives that orientation and then the operating
20 framework provides them with the tools, the systems, the
21 processes, including training, including professional
22 supervision, including opportunities for reflective
23 practice, good handover, because we become more cognisant
24 of the need for really high levels of consistency
25 predictability for these kids to help them feel safe and,
26 if they're feeling safe, then you're less likely to get
27 escalations in their behaviour.
28

29 MS BENNETT: I just want to understand about, you've
30 talked about including training, including reflective
31 practice, including understanding de-escalation. Now, you
32 heard the evidence of the youth workers that immediately
33 preceded yours; are you able to offer some comments about
34 what barriers there might be or how consistent are what
35 we're hearing from those youth workers on the ground with
36 the implementation of that kind of a model?
37

38 MS MITCHELL: I've sat with those youth workers and others
39 in the process of doing the work that I did in 2020.
40 There's a range of barriers. There's no authorising
41 environment sitting within the leadership and management
42 for them to try to do things differently. There's no unity
43 of vision at the operational level, within the operations
44 staff - which is what the youth worker group are called,
45 operations. There are the "old guard" as some would call
46 them, and then there's the new guard. There's people who
47 are more up for giving something different a go, and then

1 there's the died in the wall, "This is the way we've always
2 done it, this is the way I'm going to keep doing it, this
3 is what's going to make a difference", so you've got no --
4

5 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Sorry, just out of fairness to
6 the Ashley youth workers, when you talk about old guard and
7 new guard, I presume that's not solely based on years of
8 service?
9

10 MS MITCHELL: No, it's not at all, and that's their
11 language, that's their language that they have used.
12

13 So, there's division within that workforce around who
14 wants to change their practice. Management aren't
15 supporting any change of practice. When things escalate
16 and the system's put under stress it reverts back to the
17 old ways of doing things. So, staff who had tried to do
18 something differently feel unsupported and targeted at
19 times by their colleagues for having - maybe be seen to
20 have contributed to things having escalated.
21

22 So, the testimony that was given around staff not
23 feeling safe is a very real one; it's a very real one
24 because they in the main in my experience and in the
25 conversations I had with them in 2020 know they need to do
26 something differently, they want to do something
27 differently, they want to be resourced to be able to do it
28 differently because their reason for being there is what
29 you heard them say: "we want to make a difference in the
30 lives of these kids, we don't want to be jailers". But
31 they end up feeling unsafe with the kids and they feel
32 unsafe with their operational management, and they're very
33 much kind of in what they've told me, feel like the meat in
34 the sandwich much of the time.
35

36 MS BENNETT: So those are the matters that flow into, I
37 think what you describe in your statement as the Ashley
38 Model from 2017.
39

40 MS MITCHELL: Yeah, so the outcome of the process that was
41 engaged in in 2017 was what was called "the Ashley Model".
42 The advisory group process kind of fell away during that,
43 so we weren't involved to see that project through to its
44 end point, so I really have no sense of what the outcome of
45 that was.
46

47 PRESIDENT NEAVE: So this was another advisory group;

1 because, we've heard about quite a number of advisory
2 groups, but this was an advisory group set up specifically
3 in relation to your work; is that right?
4

5 MS MITCHELL: It was an advisory group set up in 2017 to
6 support the internal efforts of the department to develop a
7 practice framework.
8

9 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Right, thank you.
10

11 MS MITCHELL: Which became known as the Ashley Model.
12

13 MS BENNETT: And that, as I understand it, fell away at
14 some point?
15

16 MS MITCHELL: That advisory group process fell away and
17 then I heard nothing more until 2019.
18

19 MS BENNETT: What did you hear in 2019?
20

21 MS MITCHELL: I was contacted in December of 2019 by the
22 department, suggesting that there was a need to review the
23 work that was done in 2017; that the Ashley Model and a
24 further iteration of it that was referred to as "the
25 Ashley+ Model". There were questions that the department
26 had themselves around its fitness for purpose and how
27 comprehensive or robust it was, and we were asked, would we
28 be interested in almost doing what we were going to do in
29 2013 but starting with, review the Ashley and Ashley+
30 Models to see if they could be built on or whether they
31 needed to be scratched and we needed to start again.
32

33 So, that was at that point I said, there's been a lot
34 of work happen in the intervening years that I didn't
35 really have a strong handle on, so before we could kind of
36 do a scope of work and try and work out what this project
37 would involve we would do a rapid discovery process, which
38 is what the Through the Fence and Into Their Lives Report
39 was.
40

41 MS BENNETT: And that report, you contacted and spoke to
42 people at Ashley for the purposes of that report?
43

44 MS MITCHELL: I spent two days at Ashley, yep.
45

46 MS BENNETT: Can you tell the Commission about your
47 observations arising from that research?

1
2 MS MITCHELL: At the time of these conversations there was
3 a significant change of leadership; so, there was a lot of
4 instability in leadership and a new manager was on his way
5 in, or had started within the preceding week, so there had
6 been some significant change. The department had a view at
7 that point that they hoped that that would drive some
8 cultural change. There was a recognition at that point
9 that the culture at Ashley was not what they would want it
10 to be and held promise in this new manager coming in to be
11 able to drive some of that change.
12

13 The workforce at that point was very much as described
14 today by the staff that gave testimony: they felt
15 overworked, undersupported, under-resourced. They had very
16 little awareness of the Ashley Model or the Ashley+ Model.
17 So, one of the questions I had as part of the review was,
18 "What do you know about it", and, "What do you think about
19 it?", and very few had any awareness of it at all. Those
20 that did knew something about it but didn't see how it
21 related to their work. Others knew it a little bit better,
22 liked the ideas, but didn't feel supported to use them for
23 the reasons I referred to earlier. So, the issues raised
24 by the staff were very much contemporary with what was
25 talked about today.
26

27 I interviewed the clinical team and I interviewed the
28 Ashley School staff. I interviewed Education Department
29 staff from outside of Ashley and some of the non-government
30 providers, Child Protection and a range of others, and it
31 really felt like the fence was the wall between everyone
32 and everything. There was very little working together
33 happening between Ashley and Communities, Justice, between
34 the Ashley School and Education more broadly around
35 educational pathways for kids coming out of Ashley; there
36 was very little transition, through-care planning back into
37 Community Youth Care, Justice, or beyond for kids, so the
38 wall was a metaphor for a lot of the barriers.
39

40 Equally, there were a lot of silos between the Health
41 and the clinical team, the Ashley School team, and the
42 operating team, the youth workers: they all worked in silos
43 and really didn't understand what each other was doing or
44 have a shared language or shared way of thinking about the
45 kids, talking about the kids, planning for the kids, there
46 were no processes that really supported that well.
47

1 MS BENNETT: Mr McGinness, it sounds a lot like what you
2 were discussing earlier, or the antithesis perhaps of what
3 you were discussing earlier as a model as the current
4 trend. Can you tell the Commissioners about how that
5 measures with what the current trends are in this area?
6

7 MR MCGINNESS: Yeah, I suppose it comes back to my opening
8 remark about the pace of reform or lack thereof. I mean,
9 we just heard an example where, in 2013 a need was
10 identified and then a decision was taken to defer that,
11 because another view was going to happen, and then another
12 review, you know, it's a bit saddening and a bit maddening
13 to hear these sort of issues over and over again.
14

15 And, you know, a lot of the issues that we heard from
16 evidence earlier from the youth workers is very consistent
17 with what we heard in our consultation. And, yeah, I
18 suppose it's, on this side of the fence, a tad frustrating
19 to see the lack of action and momentum on putting some of
20 the recommendations in practice.
21

22 MS BENNETT: You were involved in New South Wales in
23 implementing some reforms around Youth Justice in the that
24 jurisdiction in the ACT.
25

26 MR MCGINNESS: Yep.
27

28 MS BENNETT: Why not just pick up that model and put it in
29 Tasmania?
30

31 MR MCGINNESS: Yeah, there's a lot of parallels to be
32 drawn between the ACT and Tasmania in particular given very
33 similar numbers in terms of number of young people in
34 detention at any point in time, but it's a very different
35 context. So, I think geography is a huge factor here in
36 Tasmania compared to the ACT, where one centre is perfectly
37 appropriate in the ACT where I live, and you can drive from
38 one edge to the other in 30 minutes; so, we can't just pick
39 up and take what works in one place and move it into
40 another, but we can learn from that experience.
41

42 ACT, certainly there are some examples of good
43 practice there in terms of their investment in bail support
44 programs, in sort of through-care, in terms of some of the
45 challenges they face with a really high fixed cost involved
46 in maintaining that big centre but having to have that
47 ability to surge.

1
2 So, I'd absolutely hope and expect that jurisdictions
3 would be willing and wanting to learn from one another, but
4 certainly not just pick up and sort of (indistinct) --
5

6 MS BENNETT: What do you see as being the key, kind of,
7 the core components in what's been successful perhaps in
8 the ACT that you think might be applicable in the Tasmanian
9 context?
10

11 MR MCGINNESS: I think a lot of the principles that have
12 been discussed. I think, if they put a very strong
13 emphasis on therapeutic practice, thinking about how that
14 can move from sort of a blueprint for reform in that case
15 through to practice.
16

17 There has been quite a significant investment in
18 through-care in particular, which I'd strongly advocate.
19

20 MS BENNETT: What's through-care?
21

22 MR MCGINNESS: So really, from the moment a young person
23 comes into custody, we should be thinking about and
24 planning for their eventual release. So, that's also why,
25 in the context of Tasmania, it was one of the key reasons
26 why I think having two centres more closely situated to
27 Launceston and Hobart is so important, is because you can
28 then be forming those bonds and relationships with service
29 providers, with education providers, with organisations,
30 with individuals, with family, that are going to allow them
31 to sustain the improvements that they often make when
32 they're in detention. So, making sure that we're putting
33 those plans and actions in place from the outset and
34 actively sort of supporting them in their transition back
35 into the community.
36

37 It's not about walking out at the end of their
38 custodial sentence and sort of waving them goodbye and
39 wishing them good luck but making sure that they're
40 continued to be supported, because often there are
41 incredible gains when there is that opportunity to
42 inconvenient in terms of education, in terms of health and
43 in terms of alcohol and drug abuse that might have happened
44 in the past, so it's about making sure we don't lose that
45 momentum.
46

47 MS BENNETT: I think I left off, Ms Mitchell, in the

1 narrative in about 2019, I want to return to it now. You
2 did a review in which you found - I think you summarise in
3 about paragraphs 20 and 43 of your statement some of the
4 outcomes from that review, and you found there wasn't a
5 high knowledge of the Ashley+ Model, there was poor
6 understanding, significant turnover, staff feeling
7 excluded. What happened next?

8
9 MS MITCHELL: So, as I said earlier, there was the request
10 for us to undertake the larger piece of work that had been
11 the intent in 2013, and so, the discoveries phase was
12 supposed to enable us to scope that full project.

13
14 We agreed that we would then undertake a literature
15 review and a file audit, because I think that the
16 opportunity in Tasmania is that, if we really understood
17 this population, the population of Tasmania is not that
18 big, the population of kids that cycle through Ashley is
19 not that big, and I think that anecdotally we can all think
20 of kids and young people that have been through Ashley that
21 have touched multiple tertiary systems, multiple secondary
22 systems, and we could really - if we interrogated the
23 histories of these kids and looked at where, if we had
24 intervened earlier, and intensively, that we may have
25 changed the trajectories of these kids.

26
27 These kids aren't unknown to the system and systems
28 around them, they are --

29
30 PRESIDENT NEAVE: We're only talking about a tiny number
31 really, aren't we, too?

32
33 MS MITCHELL: We're only talking about a tiny number and
34 it wouldn't be that difficult to do a really comprehensive
35 file audit and pathway analysis of these kids to look at
36 where, had we done something different earlier, might we
37 have changed the trajectories and what could we be doing
38 differently now in terms of the through-care planning.
39 Because there is such a volume of these kids that are just
40 cycling through on very short periods of remand, there are
41 very few there on lengthy sentences, and so, there is a
42 failure in the system that we just cycle kids through.

43
44 And, I know anecdotally as well that a lot of kids
45 will offend again to get back to Ashley, because it's the
46 closest thing to a bed and food that they have. And so, we
47 know that there are challenges for these kids when they're

1 released from Ashley, there are challenges for these kids
2 before they get to Ashley in having their basic needs met,
3 their relational needs met, their need for care and support
4 met, and I think if we really had a good look at some of
5 these kids, most of them I would hazard a guess will have
6 been known to Child Protection at some point in their life,
7 if not currently. Many of them will have undiagnosed
8 disability, FASDs never looked at.

9
10 There will be a range of quite significant
11 developmental needs that these kids will have that won't be
12 picked up before they hit Ashley, so I think doing
13 something like that will be incredibly instructive not only
14 to think about what the future of the youth justice reform
15 needs to be, but the role of Ashley in meeting the needs of
16 the population that actually need to spend some time in a
17 contained environment.

18
19 PRESIDENT NEAVE: One of those elements could conceivably
20 be supporting parents who are dealing with disabled
21 children?

22
23 MS MITCHELL: Absolutely.

24
25 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Or children with undiagnosed disability
26 so that their behaviour, which is hard to manage for the
27 parents, doesn't end up with some other intervention; is
28 that right? Do I understand you correctly?

29
30 MS MITCHELL: That's right. You know, it would be my view
31 that if we did that work, we would find that these families
32 have a range of vulnerabilities themselves: the parents
33 have a range of vulnerabilities that really mitigate their
34 ability to meet the needs of their children and the
35 trajectory starts.

36
37 MS BENNETT: So that was a scoping review that led to this
38 report, Through the Fence, that was a scoping document.

39
40 MS MITCHELL: So that was the discovery phase. But there
41 we did - I put a proposal in to do the file audit, to
42 really understand who this population of kids was and to do
43 a really comprehensive literature review with a view to
44 coming up with a common elements framework around which a
45 practice model could then be built.

46
47 MS BENNETT: And, has that happened?

1
2 MS MITCHELL: We put that proposal in and we heard nothing
3 beyond that. So, that was in May 2020.
4

5 MS BENNETT: Can I just pause there. I just want to make
6 sure I understand. So, in 2013 there was a review and some
7 recommendations and you heard nothing, or didn't proceed?
8 And then --
9

10 MS MITCHELL: It started and stopped.
11

12 MS BENNETT: Started and stopped, thank you. Then,
13 Mr McGinness, you came in in 2016 and you made a series of
14 recommendations.
15

16 MR MCGINNESS: Yep.
17

18 MS BENNETT: And those recommendations you made were not
19 taken up at that time; is that right?
20

21 MR MCGINNESS: Correct.
22

23 MS BENNETT: Then it reverted to you in 2017 with a review
24 that I think you said --
25

26 MS MITCHELL: No, so there was a --
27

28 MS BENNETT: Advisory committee, sorry.
29

30 MS MITCHELL: To do - the department, to drive the
31 development of the practice framework.
32

33 MS BENNETT: And that's the advisory committee that sort
34 of --
35

36 MS MITCHELL: Tried to support.
37

38 MS BENNETT: Yes, and it ended up going away?
39

40 MS MITCHELL: Yeah, it kind of fell away from the process.
41

42 MS BENNETT: It kind of fell away? And then in 2019 you
43 did a further discovery, and recommended further work to
44 develop a practice framework, and that didn't go anywhere?
45

46 MS MITCHELL: Well --
47

1 MS BENNETT: At the time?

2
3 MS MITCHELL: At the time.

4
5 MS BENNETT: And what's happened now?

6
7 MS MITCHELL: So, in July of this year I was contacted
8 again by the department, who told me that there had been a
9 literature review done internally by the department. So,
10 some of the works that I recommended needed to happen had
11 happened and had been undertaken internally.

12
13 So, my understanding is that two staff were tasked
14 with the project of coming up with a practice framework and
15 a learning and development framework, which are now what I
16 think the Commission has. They were developed and released
17 in December 2020. So, that was the outcome of not
18 progressing with what we suggested, and they undertook some
19 internal processes.

20
21 The contact that's been made with me now is not
22 dissimilar to that that was made back in December 2019 as
23 to a desire to review the work that was done in 2020 around
24 the practice framework and the learning and development
25 framework, and to look at its fitness for purpose moving
26 forward into the re-imagined Ashley or Youth Detention
27 programs in the separate facilities and what that might
28 look like and is there a need to do further work on that.

29
30 So, we're in discussions with the department about
31 that; nothing's been agreed to at this point.

32
33 MS BENNETT: Mr McGinness, can I ask you this: how do you
34 know when a model is successful, a model of Youth Justice
35 is successful?

36
37 MR MCGINNESS: It's not simple. I mean, ultimately if we
38 had no Youth Justice Centres that would be a good measure
39 of success, but I'm not sure that's possible. I think it's
40 probably important, and I talk in my witness statement, of
41 probably having different horizons of what success looks
42 like, having some short-term measures in place around what
43 "good" looks like in a centre itself. Do we have
44 through-care plans for 100 per cent of our residents?
45 There might be more of that output-level sort of
46 measurement around how we're functioning at the moment.

1 Moving towards in the medium-term, hopefully starting
2 to see what happens when young people leave Ashley. You
3 know, recidivism is but one measure and not a perfect
4 measure, but it's certainly something you'd want to look
5 at, and obviously in the long-term you'd want to be making
6 sure that the investments we're making are paying off in
7 terms of these young people are on a better trajectory:
8 they're reengaging with education, they're going into
9 employment pathways, and ultimately not continuing that
10 intergenerational transmission of offending that they're
11 caught up in. So I think it's important to understand the
12 complexity of measurement, but probably have that sort of
13 time-horizon view.

14
15 MS BENNETT: Are you able to tell the Commissioners of, in
16 your experience in other jurisdictions, the proportion of
17 people in the Youth Justice System who go on to be part of
18 the adult Justice System?

19
20 MR MCGINNESS: Yeah, I don't have the figures on hand, but
21 it's a huge, you know, huge percentage. I think, from
22 memory, the moment you come into contact with the Youth
23 Justice system, you're something like 26 times more likely
24 to end up in the adult Criminal Justice System. So the
25 more that we can be doing, the more that we can be
26 investing at that front-end to divert people away from
27 formal Youth Justice interventions, the better, because
28 it's a very strong pool and pipeline to adult Corrections
29 and then ultimately, as I as well, that intergenerational
30 impact that cycles through.

31
32 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Can I just have a follow-up question on
33 that, and it may be outside your expertise or the expertise
34 of either of you, but I was thinking about the children who
35 are, while they're in Ashley, engaged in harmful sexual
36 behaviours. Do we know how many of those children go on to
37 offend as adults?

38
39 MR MCGINNESS: No, not something I've got visibility on.

40
41 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: No. Ms Mitchell might have, I
42 think.

43
44 MS MITCHELL: The data is overwhelmingly that children who
45 engage in harmful sexual behaviours as children and young
46 people do not progress to adult offending. The behaviour
47 in and of itself is not unlike any other challenging

1 behaviour that children have.

2
3 PRESIDENT NEAVE: I suspected that was the case. Thank
4 you.

5
6 MS BENNETT: Ms Mitchell, do you have any theories as to
7 why there's been such a history of review and without
8 implementation?

9
10 MS MITCHELL: I've got --

11
12 MS BENNETT: You may not.

13
14 MS MITCHELL: I've got a view. You know, I look at the
15 context of Youth Justice nationally and internationally,
16 and I think young people who do wrong things in community
17 are very quickly labelled as a problem to be fixed, and
18 very often what we have is young people displaying a range
19 of behaviours that represent a whole lot of things that
20 we're not paying attention to, that is wrong within their
21 families or in the community more broadly. And so, we're
22 very quick to blame the kids, and I think that that
23 attitude sits in the community.

24
25 People don't like kids graffiti-ing, they don't like
26 kids busting their letterboxes, they don't like kids
27 nicking stuff. It gets in the way of our civil freedoms.
28 And I think because of that these kids - the issue of Youth
29 Justice is a very political one, and I think the
30 politicisation of Youth Justice and the interface between
31 these kids and Joe Citizen in the community is a really
32 complicated one for government and it gets in the way of
33 good reform.

34
35 MS BENNETT: Let's address that complexity head on. What
36 about children who are dangerous? We heard one of the
37 witnesses earlier say, "We say 'kids', but they're pumping
38 iron. They're men really," They're scary, basically.
39 What should the response be?

40
41 MS MITCHELL: There is no doubt that there are some kids
42 who are dangerous and they are scary and they need
43 containment; that doesn't mean they need detention.
44 Containment can be provided in a range of ways. I've
45 visited Youth Justice facilities in Europe where there is
46 very little more than a cyclone fence; kids could get well
47 away and are in there for serious crimes, and they don't

1 because it's the relationships and the programmes that hold
2 them; it's the relationship and the programs within which
3 they feel safe, so they don't escalate into dangerousness.
4

5 If you look at a lot of what developmental trauma
6 theory would tell you, escalated behaviour is the response
7 to a lack of safety, an internal sense of feeling safe.
8 You are primed to survive. You don't think before you run
9 away from a car that's just about to hit you, you just run.
10 And so, we've got to orient ourselves to what is
11 dangerousness about, what is safety about, and we've got to
12 find a pathway to promote safety and see that that will
13 mitigate dangerousness in most instances.
14

15 You absolutely have to have really sound risk
16 assessments and protocols in place to deal with high levels
17 of dangerousness that aren't mitigated through other means,
18 but for most children and young people it is possible to
19 mitigate dangerousness through addressing safety and
20 providing a relational and physical environment and
21 activities, and having a clear sense of what they need so
22 that they don't have to engage in these survival-based
23 behaviours that are all about not feeling safe.
24

25 MS BENNETT: Does incarceration ever lead to better
26 outcomes for children? Using the term "incarceration"
27 quite deliberately there.
28

29 MS MITCHELL: I don't think so. I think it's an
30 indictment on a system that we haven't been able to do
31 better earlier, and it's the last resort. These kids don't
32 wake up engaging in the level of offending that requires
33 them to be incarcerated overnight. We've missed so many
34 opportunities to intervene earlier with these kids, so I
35 don't think they need to be locked up. It's a question of
36 who is responsible? You know, if you say children need to
37 be locked up because of what they've done, what that's
38 saying is that all the responsibility sits with that child.
39 I don't see it that way.
40

41 MS BENNETT: Mr McGinness, how does that fit in with your
42 understanding of this framework?
43

44 MR MCGINNESS: Yeah, look, I'd say in response to your
45 question, it can, but it's not the best way. I think it's
46 really important that, whatever we do, we do take a good
47 assessment of risk and as we've heard there are examples

1 where we do need to contain, but if we have a
2 disproportionate response to that risk, it can have the
3 opposite effect; so that can increase the risk, it can lead
4 to negative outcomes.

5
6 And so, if we apply a blanket approach, we can have a
7 very negative impact overall. So I think if we can look at
8 alternative ways to get the same or better outcomes, and we
9 can, then that's what we should be pursuing, and that is
10 through community-based responses, through better
11 integration of services and the like.

12
13 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: Can I just check in, just a plain
14 language check-in here really. Can I confirm that what
15 you're both saying here is that essentially a punishment
16 model is going to make things - escalate children's
17 behaviours and potentially make both their outcomes worse,
18 but their behaviour more dangerous? Is that what all those
19 words meant?

20
21 MS MITCHELL: A punitive approach is not going to meet the
22 needs of children.

23
24 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: It doesn't meet their needs.
25 Does it potentially make their outcomes or their behaviour
26 worse?

27
28 MS MITCHELL: I think it has the potential to make their
29 behaviour and their outcomes worse, absolutely. I think it
30 also doesn't meet the interests or the needs of the
31 community, because what they're offered while they're in
32 detention is no guarantee that the community's any safer in
33 the long run either. So, it's not meeting the young
34 person's needs and I'm not sure it's meeting the
35 community's needs, because we don't have a way of
36 conceptualising the purpose of incarceration as part of a
37 change process; we just see it as a "time out".

38
39 MR MCGINNESS: And I think there is a reasonable community
40 expectation that young people are held accountable for
41 their actions, but our response to that can be different.
42 It can be through a more therapeutic approach where, you
43 know, we do protect the wellbeing of those individuals and
44 the community, but we also deal with the underlying causes
45 of the offending. And if we sort of lean too heavily in
46 the other direction, it can have very negative impacts or
47 that individual and ultimately the community.

1
2 MS BENNETT: What's the role of leadership in changing a
3 culture of a system that's been entrenched for a long time?
4 Can I start with you, Mr McGinness?

5
6 MR MCGINNESS: Yeah, it's huge. I think, you know, you
7 asked about the challenges of implementation and why do we
8 keep reviewing, and I think we can often underestimate just
9 how hard change is and what is truly required for the sorts
10 of reforms that we're talking about. It does require more
11 than a list of recommendations and a Gantt chart and, you
12 know, a few fund recommendations.

13
14 We do need to recognise, and again I think that this
15 again is one of the reasons that the model that we
16 recommended is so important; it represented, like, a
17 step-change opportunity, an opportunity to reset, to open
18 two new centres that would come with fresh practice
19 frameworks, with new leadership, with fresh faces. And
20 yeah, I mean, leadership is critical.

21
22 MS BENNETT: Ms Mitchell?

23
24 MS MITCHELL: You can't do it without leadership.
25 Leadership sets the environment within which the work
26 happens. So, if you don't have leadership that is on board
27 with what you're trying to achieve operationally, then you
28 are doomed to fail. Particularly in the space of Youth
29 Justice, because of the very political nature of it, it is
30 always something that has a very high profile either
31 through the media or because there's been issues.

32
33 Victoria at the moment, Western Australia, you know,
34 every jurisdiction - Don Dale - they're all struggling with
35 it; no-one's got the answer. So, leadership is absolutely
36 key, and I couldn't agree more with the lack of
37 understanding around, how do you move from a
38 business-as-usual approach to a new business, embedded
39 business-as-usual approach? And implementation science is
40 really clear: this is a complex, multisystem undertaking
41 that needs strong whole-of-government leadership across
42 portfolios, because these kids have needs that are going to
43 intercept with Health, with Justice, with Child Protection,
44 with Housing, with Disability.

45
46 So we need a whole-of-government approach, and we need
47 to understand that for the change to be embedded, it is

1 system reform, and for Ashley to change from the way it
2 thinks and works at the moment to the new opportunities to
3 present themselves, it's at least a five-year
4 implementation program of work before it becomes the new
5 business as usual, where it's not going to be dependent on
6 who the leader is or who the staff group are.
7 Implementation science is really clear about that.

8
9 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: How do we stop - you've had,
10 between 2012 and 2022, some attempts to bring about change,
11 haven't we? There's been a pretty significant churn but
12 not a lot of butter's being made.

13
14 MS MITCHELL: Yep.

15
16 COMMISSIONER BENJAMIN: And you've got almost an
17 institutional sclerosis. How do we avoid our
18 recommendations falling into that pit and be another churn?
19 Have you any - I mean, you talk about leadership, you talk
20 about whole-of-government. How do we defeat that, if it
21 can be defeated?

22
23 MR MCGINNESS: I think one of the things that we need to -
24 I agree that it's a five-year-plus reform journey, but we
25 also can't make it some big bang where we analyse for three
26 years and develop policies and processes: we need to find a
27 way to act and bring a bit of action bias to some of these
28 reforms, to not defer hard decisions, to commit to that
29 action, to iterating and improving on what works.

30
31 I think in this very specific context as well two new
32 facilities represents a fantastic opportunity for reform.
33 That's the sort of step change that can make Tasmania a
34 leader in this space, so use that opportunity that is there
35 in terms of two new facilities to really sort of turbo
36 charge that process, because I think it was - you know, it
37 was always going to be pretty impossible or very, very
38 difficult to make those improvements in the context of the
39 existing facility

40
41 MS MITCHELL: I think when I was saying "implementation",
42 I was talking more about, once we know what we want to
43 happen, the implementation window is a five- to seven-year
44 window. It's not planning to do it, but actual doing of
45 it, the implementation of it is a long-term proposition.
46 So you're challenged around election cycles and all sorts
47 of things around the policy and the sustained investment

1 around that.

2
3 I think that one of the things that really often gets
4 in the way of - I think that one of the things that really
5 needs to happen is we've got to engage the community in the
6 conversation about who these kids are and what they need
7 and how they got there, because at the moment they are the
8 problem, and the only frame the community have to
9 understand what should be done is the frame we've got,
10 because they only define the kids as young offenders.

11
12 I think we've got to change the conversation in the
13 community, because there is no doubt that politicians come
14 under a lot of pressure from the community if Youth Justice
15 and youth crime is seen to be escalating and the
16 government's not doing enough about it, so we've got to -
17 education of the community has to be part of one of the
18 recommendations, because if we can't engage the community,
19 it's going to be very difficult to have a government that's
20 prepared to invest and sustain the change that's going to
21 be required.

22
23 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Would it be at all possible to try and
24 strive for a bipartisan approach on this issue?

25
26 MS MITCHELL: I would love to think we could.

27
28 MR MCGINNESS: It starts with that. It really does.

29
30 PRESIDENT NEAVE: We did it with road safety. Remember
31 the debates about road safety 20 years ago, and that's a
32 complex issue - maybe not as complex as this one. Maybe
33 you can.

34
35 MR MCGINNESS: Unless we have a bipartisan approach to
36 this and can show that leadership that is required to shape
37 community sentiment and to sort of stick to and have the
38 bravery to make tough decisions and to sustain investment
39 in this space, you know, we'll only be here talking about
40 this until the next election cycle and a "get tough on
41 crime" campaign, you know, comes through.

42
43 MS MITCHELL: And we know that, you know, in the
44 out-of-home care space with residential facilities, no-one
45 wants them in their street or over their back fence. These
46 kids aren't quiet in the neighbourhood, because a lot of
47 activity goes on around them. So I can imagine the kind of

1 conversations that would happen in trying to get community
2 youth justice housing sites.

3
4 There's a lot of work done with the community to get
5 the local community to accept these kids into their
6 communities. So that's often, I think, the missing piece.

7
8 MS BENNETT: Commissioners, I'm conscious of the time.
9 I'm grateful for the commissioners for allowing us to go
10 over time today. I have nothing further for these
11 witnesses.

12
13 COMMISSIONER BROMFIELD: I don't have any further
14 questions. I'd like to thank you for your time. I did
15 just have a reflection. In listening to your timeline ,it
16 struck me that in the time that all of these reviews have
17 happened, we've seen a population of children who will have
18 entered and graduated from Ashley Youth Detention Centre
19 and missed the opportunity for change. Thank you.

20
21 PRESIDENT NEAVE: Thank you very much for your work and
22 for your evidence today, and we'll adjourn, thank you.

23
24 **AT 5.00PM THE COMMISSION WAS ADJOURNED TO**
25 **FRIDAY, 19 AUGUST 2022 AT 10.00AM**
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